



3 1761 08823862 1

27772

GRINNELL COLLEGE
LIBRARY.

WITHDRAWN



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Toronto


AUG 28 1901

THE INTERNATIONAL MONTHLY


A Magazine of Contemporary Thought.

VOLUME II.

JULY-DECEMBER, 1900.



Published at Burlington, Vt., by
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, NEW YORK,
MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED, LONDON.



AP
2
I75
v. 2

Copyright by
FREDERICK A. RICHARDSON,
1900.

INDEX.

NOTE: The first word of titles of essays and of works noticed are italicised.

- Adams, Charles K., 314.
 George P., 65.
 Henry, 312; his works, 313, 320.
 John, 437.
- Agriculture.
 cattle breeding, 123.
 dairy produce, 123.
 defects of modern, 125.
 Department of, 114; work of, 115, 116.
 farm area, in United States, 110, 111, 123.
 fertilizers, 123.
 growth, 108-117.
 intellectual factor in, 122, 125.
 national aid, 114.
 state aid, 119.
 seeds, 114; importation of, 115.
- Agricultural associations, 120.
 colleges, 117, 118.
 experiment stations, 119.
 libraries, 121.
- Agriculture*, Modern Trend of, in U.S., G. W. Hill, 107.
- Allen, Grant, 470.
- Allen, James Lane, 31,
Seven Waves of Literature.
- Alexander I., of Russia, 227.
- Alphonso XII., 598, 605.
 visit to Germany, 607.
- Alien and sedition acts, 445.
- Algerian Sahel*, 523-28.
- Algonkian rocks, *See* Geology.
- Almodovar, Duke de, 607.
- America*, Poets of, 139.
- American Federation of Labor, 264, 266, 269, 273.
- American Historical Assoc., 316.
- American literature, 32.
 development of, 32.
 lack of, 33.
- American Literature*, Philosophy of, 32.
- American Literary Criticism and the Doctrine of Evolution*, W. M. Payne, 26, 127.
- American School of Historians*, A. B. Hart, 294.
- American Statesmen series, 316.
- Ameil, 163.
- Amur river, 343.
 settlement on, 344.
 outlet discovered, 344.
- Ancestorism, 334, 460.
 effects of, 335.
- Ancient Law*, 545.
- Andamanner, 366.
- Animals.
 fear, 370.
 mentality of, 320.
 psychology of, 163-165.
- Animism, 382, 384, 457, 461, 468.
- Anthropomorphism, 461.
- Ants, 163.
- Art, 515.
 Chinese, 532, 534.
 historical representations in, 517.
 plastic, 520, 533.
 relation to poetry, 530.
 truth in, 520.
- Archæology, 687.
 American work in, 688, 701.
- Assyria, 696, 703.
- Crete, 705.
- Delphi, 701.
- Egypt, 696, 704.
- English, 701.
- France, 689, 693, 700, 704.
- Germany, 689, 693.
- Greece, 695.
 growth of, 690.
 Institute, 688.
- Italy, 691, 696.
- Mykenae, 699, 701, 705.
- organs, 697.
- Pergamon, 699, 706.
- prehistoric, 368, 371.
- Tiryns, 699, 701, 705.
- Troy, 699.
- Archæological Progress and the Schools at Rome and Athens*, A. L. Frothingham, Jr., 686.
- Aristotle, 546, *Politics*.
- Armijo, Marquis de la Vega, 606, 607.
- Arnold, Matthew, 28, 30, 44, 131.

- Association by contrast, 1.
 immediate, 15, 16.
 one idea, 17, 18.
 Athletics, 660.
 Athens, 699.
 American School, 688.
 French School, 693.
 German School, 697.
 Attention, 159.
 Australian native, 364, 365, 380.
 Azeglio, Massimo de, 389.
- Bachofen**, 546.
 Das Mutterrecht.
 Bacillus pestis, *See* Bubonic Plague.
 Bacteria, 279.
 in butter, 287-290.
 cheese, 290-293.
 chemical products, 282.
 cocoa, 285.
 foods, 280.
 flavor, 281.
 "gamey" 286.
 milk, 283-284.
 reproductive power of, 280.
 Bacteria in our Food Products, Use of,
 H. W. Conn, 278.
 Bagehot, 550.
 Baldwin, J. Mark, 162, 165, 550.
 Bancroft, George, 295, 306, 318.
 Barth, Paul, 554.
 Barth, Theodor, 196, *Modern Political Germany*.
 Bantie tribes, 472.
 Beacon Biographies, 316.
 Beers, H. A., 145.
 Bees, homing instinct of, 164.
 Bethe, 163.
 Beverly, 301.
 Biological Research, Some Aspects
 of, 74.
 Bismarck, Otto von, 197, 199, 202.
 struggle with Liberals, 200.
 overthrown, 202.
 Boas, F., 546.
 Boileau, 38.
 Booth, Charles, 181,
 Life and Labor in London.
 Bossuet, 44.
 Bradford, 298, 312.
 Brandes, Georg, 28, 30.
 British Museum, 175, 192.
 Broderick, 578.
 Browning, Robert, 434,
 Lost Leader.
- Brunetiere, 28, 30, 41, 42, 45.
 Bubonic Plague, The, Cyrus Edson, 94.
 plague, 94.
 cause of, 94.
 history of, 101, 102.
 mortality of, 100.
 symptoms, 97, 98.
 treatment, 100.
 types, 96.
 Buckle, 539, 546.
 propositions, 547.
 Buckley, Edmund, 323.
 Conflict in China.
 Bulgaria, 234.
 Bunsen, 404, 691.
 Burckhardt, J., 613, 623, 624.
 Burroughs, John, 46.
 Butter, *See* Bacteria.
 Byron, 44.
- California**, 554.
 climate of, 558.
 history of, 564, 577.
 isolation of, 576.
 journey to, 556.
 life in, 573.
 northers, 561.
 poetry of, 567-570.
 psychology, 571-576, 581.
 topography of, 554, 562.
 type, 579, 581.
 Calvin, 69, 71.
 Campos, Marshall, 602.
 Captains Courageous, R. Kipling, 189.
 Capitalism, *See* Trade Unions.
 Caprivi, Count, 202.
 policy of, 203, 208.
 Carducci, 28.
 Carlyle, 42, 44.
 Caroline Isles, 606.
 Castiglione, *Courtier*, 70.
 Castillo, Canovas del, 600.
 foreign policy of, 607.
 tariff, 607.
 Catherine II., 226-39.
 Eight hour law, 269.
 See Trade Unions.
 Cell, 74.
 discovered, 75.
 inter-relations of, 89.
 one-celled organisms, 85-88.
 origin of, 79.
 relation to environment, 85.
 theory of, 74.
 vehicle of inheritance, 76, 80.

- Cellini, *Autobiography*, 70.
Cellini Benvenuto, 615.
 Centrosome, 84.
 Ceuta, 609.
 Champlain, 297.
 Chang, Li Hung, sketch of, 584.
 assistants, 588.
 negociates with Japan, 591.
 on missions, 595.
 present attitude, 594.
 Charioteer, statute of the, 700.
 Chateaubriand, 486.
 Chaucer, 44.
 Cheese, *See* Bacteria.
 Chromosomes, 81, 84.
 Child and the Race, Mental Development of, J. M. Baldwin, 162.
 China, The Conflict in, E. Buckley, 323.
 China, agreement of 1898, 350.
 grant's religious tolerance to Russia, 344.
 treaties of Algon and Tientsin, 1858, 346.
 development of Russian influence, 346.
 war with Japan, 347.
 loan on Russia, 349.
 Kamtschatka annexed by Russia, 344.
 Chinese, characteristics of, 323.
 architecture, 328.
 ethics, 329-331.
 government, 332.
 industry, 327.
 mental, 326.
 opium effects on, 325.
 physical, 324-25.
 Civilization, definition of, 323.
 Civilization During the Middle Ages, 65.
 Cleveland, Grover, 454.
 Cocoa, *See* Bacteria.
 Columbus, letters of, 296.
 Comte, 436.
 Condorcet, 539.
 Conn, H. W., 278.
 Bacteria in Our Food Products, Use of.
 Constellation, 15-18.
 Coolbrith, Miss, 568.
 Congress of Berlin, 231, 489.
 Paris, 488.
 Verona, 484-487.
 Vienna, 479.
 failure of, 484.
 Congress of Vienna.
 results, 483.
 social effects, 480.
 Constance, Council of, 69.
 Corea, *See* Japan.
 Cortesi, Salvatore, 388, *The New Italy*.
 Council of Constance, 69.
 Courtier, 70.
 Creation, 4.
 diversions of, 4-7.
 influence of toxicants on, 12.
 Crimean War, 345.
 Criticism, literary, 26.
 American, 146, 150.
 cf. with Europe, 28.
 definition, 29, 138.
 evolutionary, 40-44, 128, 149, 151.
 lack of, 144.
 Methods and *Materials* of, 146.
 objective, 36, 151.
 periods of transition, 43, 149.
 subjective, 28, 151.
 Critics,
 American, 28-30, 32, 143.
 classical, 38.
 province of, 31.
 romantic, 38.
 scientific, 39, 146, 151.
 types of, 37.
 Cuba, war, 492, 598.
 Curtis, George W., 28.
 Cyprus Exploration Fund, 702.
 Dairy produce, *See* Agriculture.
 Dante, 70, 625.
 Darwin, 83, 536, 623.
 Davis, W. M., 407.
 Debrit, Marc, 477, "*Europe is No More.*"
 De Greef, 544, *Introduction de le Sociologie*.
 Delacroix, 527.
 Debruck, Rudolph, 198.
 Declaration of Independence, 439, 440.
 Delphi, 701.
 Democracy, Industrial, 260.
 Democratic Party, Significance of, in American Politics, A. D. Morse, 406.
 Democratic party, 419, 532.
 administration, 455.
 after the Civil War, 453.
 during the Civil War, 452.
 in conflict with sectionalism, 450.

- Democratic party.
 Jacksonian period, 449-450.
 Jeffersonian period, 446-448.
 origin of, 437.
 party revolution, 446.
 Deming, Edward, 181.
Development of English Thought, 58.
 Dock strike, 180.
 Douglass, Stephen A., 452.
 Drawing, introduction in schools, 664.
 Dred Scott decision, 451.
 Durkheim, Emile, 550, 552.
- Eastern Question, 193.
 Economy, social, 180.
 Edson, Cyrus, *Bubonic Plague*, 94.
 Education, *See* School.
 Education societies, 556.
 Eggleston, Edward, 320.
 Eggs, development of, 90-92.
 fertilization, 86.
 Egypt Exploration Fund, 702.
 Ellsworth, M., 114.
 Elster, Ernst, 637.
 Emerson, 30, 42, 123.
 Empress Dowager, 592.
 position in China, 592.
 England in China, 361, 352.
 Equal franchise, 425.
 Esquimaux, 471.
 Etruria, 696.
 "Europe is No More," Marc Debrit,
 477.
 Evolution, 27.
 in human thought, 34.
 Exhibition, *See* Exposition.
 Expansion, 498, 503, 568.
Expansion of Russia, Alfred Ram-
 sand, 211, 341.
 Exposition, 1835, 180.
 educational value of, 178, 186.
 history of, 179.
 Paris, 173, 176.
- Farmers' institutes, *See* Agriculture.
 Farms, 110, 111, 123.
 Farrand, L., 546.
 Father Jaques, 297.
Faust, 634.
 Feeling, 160.
 Feng-shih, Lu, 388.
Ferdinand and Isabella, 309.
 Fermentation, *See* Bacteria.
 Fermented milk, 283.
 Fertilizer, 123, *See also* Agriculture.
 Feudalism, 60, 68, 71.
 Fischer, K., 622.
 Fiske, John, 321.
 Fisher, Geo. P., 50, *Outlines of Uni-
 versal History*.
Food Products, Use of Bacteria in, 278.
 Force Bill, 426.
 Foster, J. W., 584, *Great Chinese
 Viceroy and Diplomat*.
 France in China, 348, 352.
France, The Story of, 55.
 Franchise, 425.
 Francke, Kuno, 612,
 *Evolutionary Trend of German Lit-
 erary Criticism*.
 Frazer, *Totemism*, 546.
French Revolution, The, 51.
 Freytag, G., 623, 627.
 Frothingham, Jr., A. L., 686,
 *Archæological Progress and the
 Schools at Rome and Athens*.
 Fuller, Margaret, *See* Ossoli, Margaret
 Fuller.
 Furness, 228, *Variorum*.
- Gallatin, 444.
 Geddes, P., 169,
 *Man and the Environment: A
 Study from the Paris Exposition*.
 Genius, distribution of, 22.
 Geography, introduction in schools,
 664.
Geology, Recent Progress in, A. C.
 Lawson, 403.
 Geology.
 algonkian rocks, 414.
 economic, 414.
 genesis of rocks, 403, 406.
 glacial phenomena, 408.
 drifts, 409, 410.
 peneplains, 407, 408.
 pre-Cambrian, 412, 413.
 recent methods in, 404.
 tectonic, 411.
 Gerhard, 691, 692.
- German Literary Criticism, Evolu-
 tionary Trend of*, Kuno Francke,
 612.
 Germany, 197.
 agrarians, 199, 202, 205, 209.
 commercial treaties, 203.
 in China, 348, 350, 352.
 industrial development, 203, 204.
 liberals, 197, 200.

- Germany.
 socialist law, 200, 202.
 social democracy, 206, 207.
 squirarchy, 199, 202, 205.
 unity, 197.
Germany, Modern Political, Th. Barth, 196.
 Gérôme, 520.
 Gervinus, 623.
 Giddings, F. H., 536, *Modern Sociology*.
 Glacial phenomena, 408-410.
 See also Geology.
 Gods, The, 458, 461, 464.
 Goethe, 29, 615.
 Faust, 634.
 Gordon, 303.
 Government, 454.
 necessity of, 418.
 in United States, 420.
 in England, 421.
 parties, 423, 424.
 bearing on slavery, 431, 451.
 party revolution, 446.
Government, The Need of Party, G. F. Hoar, 418.
 Gray, 44.
Great Chinese Viceroy and Diplomat, J. W. Foster, 584.
 Greece, 228, 485.
 Greek poetry and art, 616.
Greek Poetry, On the Schools of, 618.
 Grimm, 623.
 Jacob, 623, 633.
 Herman, 623, 631.
 Wilhelm, 623.
 Guilds, 70.
 Gumplowicz, Ludwig, 544, *Der Rassenkampf*.
 Gwinn, William, 578.
- Hall, G. Stanley, 162.
 Hamilton, 441.
 character, 442.
 financial schemes, 442-44.
Hamlet, 641.
 Hanus, P. H., 647, *School and the Home*, The,
 Haptics, 157.
 space perception, 158.
 Hart, A. B., 294,
 American School of Historians.
 Harte, Bret, 566.
 Hauptmann, 639, *The Weavers*.
- Haynn, R., 622.
 Hebert, 140.
 Hegel, 616, 620.
 Heine, 44.
 Helmholtz, 156.
 Herbst, 86.
 Herculaneum, 696.
 Herder, J. G., 613, work.
 diary, 614.
 Hermes of Praxiteles, 699.
 Hering, 156.
 Hertwig, Oscar, 89, 85.
 Hettner, Hermann, 623, 624.
 Higginson, T. W., 28.
 Hildreth, Richard, 307, 312.
 historical work, 308.
 Hill, George W., 107,
 Trend of Modern Agriculture in the United States.
Histories, Popular, Their Defects and Possibilities, J. H. Robinson, 47.
 History, American.
 early historians, 295-300.
 richness of, 297.
 Plimoth Plantation, 298.
 histories of Virginia, 301, 302.
 first general historian, 302.
 pre-Revolutionary, 303.
 ante-bellum school, 306-310.
 monographs, 315.
 in colleges, 313, 315, 317.
 historical papers, 316-317.
 present writers, 320, 62.
 required in schools, 664.
 History.
 definition of, 47-55.
 general treatment of, in school books, 48.
 defects in, 50, 60.
 purpose of, 53, 56, 58.
 political, 53, 54.
 medæval, 65.
 treatment of, 68, 72.
 principles of, 72.
 United States, 60.
 European history, introduction to, 61.
 defects of treatment, 62-64.
 modern outline of, 71.
History, Ideas on the Philosophy of, 614.
History, Outlines of Universal.
 Hoar, George F., 418, *Need of Party Government*.
 Hoffding, *Psychologie*, 2.

- Hog-cholera bacillus, 115.
 Home, responsibility of, 547, 651.
 co-operation with school, 616, 666.
 Houghton, Arthur E., *International*
 Position of Spain at the Close of
 the XIXth Century, 597.
 Howells, 31, 151.
 Huan, Chang Yen, 593.
 Hudson, H., 128.
 Hugo, 44.
 Hundred Days, 482.
 Hunt, Holman, 518.
 annuity of, 519.
 Hutchinson, Thomas, 302.
 Hypermnosis, 11.

 Idea, The, 621-622.
 Ideal, The, 20.
 Imagination, 19.
 emotional character of, 19-23.
 intellectual character of, 20-23.
 unity of, 19.
Imagination, The Nature of the
 Creative, Th. Ribot, 1.
 Imperialism, 429.
 See also Expansion.
 Independents, 427.
 Indian, American, 364, 366, 471.
 Indian, 673.
 cf. with negro, 672.
 economic value, 673.
 Algonquin, 676.
Industrial Democracy, 260.
 Inspiration, 8, 13-21.
 definition of, 14.
 history of, 8.
 qualities, 9-10.
 Instinct, 2, 7.
 creative, 3.
 Institutions, 64, 66, 72.
 Invention, 8.
 Iron, Lake Superior, 415.
 Italy, 485, 698.
 commerce, 395.
 Istituto di Correspondenza Archaeol-
 ogica, 692.
 emigration, 392.
 politics, 390-402.
 progress of, 389, 391, 393.
 religions, 392.
 tax rates, 390.
Italy, The New, Salvatore Cottasi,
 388.
 Ivan the Great, 210, 219, 239.

 Jackson, 449.
 policy, 449.
 James, W., 166,
 Talks to Teachers on Psychology.
 Japan.
 Corea, 347, 351.
 relation with Russia, 346.
 Shimonosaki treaty, 348.
 treaties of, 347.
 war with China, 347.
 Jefferson, Thomas, 442.
 character, 442-444, 446.
 founder of democratic party, 442.
 policy, 447.
 Jenghis Khan, 214.
 Jennings, 163.
 Jevons, F. B., 474.

 Kalevala, 149, 184.
 Kamtchatka, 344.
 Keasbey, L. M., 548.
 Kidd, Benjamin, 551,
 Social Evolution.
 Kitasato, 94, 99.
 Kleist, 640.
Kohlhaas, Michael, 640.
 Kongtze, 329.

 Labor, American Federation of, 264,
 266, 269, 273.
 Lachmann, Karl, 633.
 Lacroix, 406, *Les Granite des Pyrénées*
 et ses Phenomenes de Con-
 tact.
 La Farge, John, 510, *Ruskin*, Art
 and Truth.
 Lamarch, 438.
 Lamartine, 44.
 Landor, 44.
 Language, in religion, 386.
 Lanier, Sidney, 141.
 his work, 143.
 Lao-tze, 329.
 Lapworth, 411, *The Secret of the*
 Highland.
Law, Ancient, 545.
 Lawson, A. C., 403, *Recent Progress*
 in Geology.
 Layard, 696.
 Lea, Henry C., 318,
 History of the Inquisition, 319.
 Le Bon, Gustave, 550, 552.
 Psychology of Socialism, 165.

- Leo XIII., 180.
 Le Play, Frederick, 179-182, 183.
 Lestrade, Combes de, 544.
 Elements of Sociologie.
 Li Hung Chang, *See* Chang.
 Lilienfeld, 548.
 La Pathologie Sociale.
 Lincoln, Abraham, 452, 453.
 Lessing, 28.
 Letourneau, C., 546.
 Literature.
 comparative, 635, 636.
 development of, 624.
 evolutionary, 614.
 psychological, 637.
 Schiller's conception of, 617.
 tragic, 638-646.
 turning point in, 623.
 writers in Germany, 623, 629.
 Literature, *American*, C. F. Richardson, 144.
 Analytics, 36, L. A. Sherman.
 Comparative, 36, H. M. Posuett.
 Danish, 144, Hansen.
 Dramatic, Lectures on, 618.
 Norwegian, 143, Jaeger.
 Spanish, 143, Ticknor.
 study of, 152.
 London, Life and Labor in, Charles Booth, 181.
 Louvre, 175, 176, 182.
 Lowell, 130, 151, 30.
 as critic, 131, 132.
 Luther, 67, 69, 77.
 Luynes, Duc de, 691.

 McLaughlin, E. T., 148.
 McLannan, John F., 545, *Primitive Marriage*.
 McMaster, 318, 320.
Macbeth, 645.
 Machiavelli, 70, *Prince*.
 Machinery.
 effects in modern life, 256.
 introduction, 261-2.
 See also Trade Unions.
 Mackenzie, 551, 554.
 Madison, 444.
 Malay negro, 674.
 Manchuria, 345.
 Manila, battle of, 502.
 Manning, Cardinal, 180.
 Mahan, Capt., 319.
 Matthews, B., 31.

 Maine, Sir Henry S., 545, *Ancient Law*.
 Makers of America, 316.
 Man and the Environment: A Study from the Paris Exposition, P. Geddes, 169.
 Marconi telegraphy, 167.
 Marillier, L., 363, 457, *Primitive Objects of Worship*.
 Marriage, Primitive, John F. McLennan, 545.
 Marx, Karl, 548, *Das Kapital*.
 Massachusetts, 425.
 Mather, Cotton, 301.
 Mediæval Church, 54, 57, 59, 66-68.
 importance of, 67.
 Melanesians, 471.
 Mental development, 369.
 Middle Ages, *See* Mediæval History.
 Militarism, 505-6.
 Milk, fermented, 283.
 Mind, organic structure, 155.
 Mental Development of the Child and of the Race, 162.
 Missions in China, 595.
 Missouri compromise, 451.
 Modern Sociology, F. H. Giddings, 536.
 Monodeism, 23.
 Mongolian races, *See* Chinese.
 Montesquieu, 539, 546, 624.
 Morgan, Lewis H., 545.
 Morse, A. D., 436.
 Significance of the Democratic Party in American Politics.
 Moscow, 215.
 Motley, 309, 310, 318.
 Muller, K. O., 692.
 Muller, G. E., 156.
 Munsterberg, Hugo, *Psychology and Life*, 167.
 Mykenae, 699.
 Myths, 18, 466.

 Nageli, *Theorie der Abstammungslehre*, 83.
 Napoleon, 478, 481.
 National Grange, 121.
 National Labor Union, 273.
 Nature and Elements in Poetry, Stedman, 140.
 Neibuhr, 691.
 Negro, American, and his Economic Value, B. T. Washington, 672.

- Negro, American, 673.
 Malay, 674.
 as workman, 675.
 financial factor, 676-77.
 in Virginia, 679.
 statistics, 781-785.
 New York, greater, 497.
 Nibelungenlied, 633, 634, 642, 643.
 Nicholas II., 236.
 Siberian policy, 342.
 Nietzsche, F., 637.
 Norton, C. E., 31.
 Novikov, 551.
 Nucleus-protoplasm, 67-89-72.
 Extra-nuclear, 84, 85.

 Optical illusions, 157.
 Opium, effects on Chinese, 325.
 Oregon, 557.
 climate of, 558.
 Ossoli, Margaret Fuller, 134.

Pacific Coast: a Psychological Study of Influence, Josiah Royce, 555.
 Palestine Exploration Fund, 707.
 Pantheism, 385.
 Paris Exposition, 173, 176.
 arrangement of, 182.
 a world museum, 177.
 educational value of, 178, 186.
 exposition of 1855, 80.
 Finn exhibit, 182-183.
 Swiss exhibit, 184.
Paris Exposition, a Study from, P. Geddes, 169.
 Parkman, F., 310.
 Party Government, *See* Government.
 Pascal, 44.
 Payne, W. M., 26, 127, *American Literary Criticism and the Doctrine of Evolution*.
 Patrick, W. N., 587.
 Pearson, K., 546, 554.
 Perthes, B. de, 178.
 Perry, T. S., 145.
 Peter the Great, 222, 225, 238.
 sends embassy to Peking, 344.
Petrarch, Letters, 70.
 Philippines, 501.
 Manila, battle of, 502.
 Phillips, Wendell, 430.
 Philology, 632.
 Phylogenic development, 366.
 Physics and Politics, Bagehot, 550.
 Pitkin, Timothy, 304.
 Plant diseases, 115.
 Plastids, 84.
 Plato, *Republic*, 545.
 Plymouth Plantation, Bradford, 289.
 Poe, 42, 129.
Poetry, Nature and Elements of, Stedman, 140.
 Naive and Sentimental, 616.
Poets of America, Stedman, 139.
 Poland, 223.
 Polydeism, 22.
 Pompeii, 696, 698.
 Porto Rico, 501, 598.
 Posada, A., 546.
 Powell, J. W., Major, 546.
Predominant Issue, W. G. Sumner, 496.
 Primitive man.
 dreams, 375, 462.
 objects of worship, 363.
 illusions, 377.
 mental structure of, 379.
 hallucinations, 376.
 initatory rites, 379.
 animals and, 386, 457.
Primitive Objects of Worship, L. Marillier, 352, 457.
 Prescott, 308, 318.
 Ferdinand and Isabella, 309.
 Protestant revolt, 63, 69.
 Protoplasm, 74, 80, 82, 91.
 definition of, 77.
 structure of, 78.
 Puerto Rico, *See* Porto Rico.
 Psychology.
 acoustics, 156.
 analytical, 159-169.
 animal, 163.
 attention, 159.
 child, 368-370.
 experimental, 155-160.
 feeling, 160.
 genetic, 162.
 new, 154.
 of sensation, 156, 157.
 physiological, 155.
 social, 165.
 of Socialism, 165,
 and Life, 167.
 Talks to teachers on, 166.
 Leitfaden der physiologischen Zie-
 hen, 17.
 Recent Advance in, E. B. Titchener, 154.

Psychophysic *See* Psychology.
Pupil study, 655.

Qualities.

form, 159.
sense, 160.

Racine, 44.

Rambaud, Alfred, 211, 341,
Expansion of Russia.

Ramsay, 304.

Ranke, 53.

Ratzel, 336.

Raven, The, 42.

Reading required in schools, 665.

Reed, 128.

Reformation, 58, 61, 70, 72.
Catholic, 63.

Religion, 467, 468.

ancestor worship, 460.
animism, 382, 384, 457, 461, 468.
euhemerist theories, 383.
gods, 458, 461, 464.
mystery, 380.
pantheism, 385.
primitive, 372, 379, 467.
similarity of, 366, 368.
spirits, 461-4
soul, 462.
terror factor in, 372, 380, 382.
totem alliance, 475.
totemism, 460.

Renaissance, 58, 61, 69, 72.

Republican party, 431.

result of, 428.

strength of, 422, 424.

Revolution, 439.

Rhizopods, 89.

Rhodes, James F., 321, 322.

Ribot, Th., 162,

Nature of the Creative Imagination.

Riehl, W. H., 613, 623, 626-630.

Ripley, George, 128.

Robertson, John M., 547. *Buckle*
and his Critics.

Robinson, J. H., 47,

Popular Histories, Their Defects and
Possibilities.

Roman literature, 614.

Rome, 698.

Academie de France, 693, 697.

American School, 688.

German Institute, 694, 697.

Rontgen rays, 166.

Roskoff, 466.

Rossette, 44.

Royce, 165.

Royce, Josiah, 555, *Pacific Coast.*

Roumania, 233.

treaty of Berlin, 490.

Roumelia, 490.

Rousseau, 44, 538, 546, 616, 624.

Ruskin, Art and Truth, John La Farge,
510.

Ruskin, John, 510, 534.

scholarship, 511, 514.

Russia, agreement of 1898, 350.

Amur river seized, 344.

Corea, 347.

expansion in Asia, 237, 342-344.

North, 222.

South, 224.

Kamtchatka annexed, 344.

loan with China, 349.

Manchuria annexed, 345.

origin of, 212.

policy of, 352-360.

ports in China, 350, 351.

relations with China, 344-46.

struggle with Sweden, 225.

subjugation by the Tartars, 214-218.

treaty with Japan, 346.

of San Stefano, 229.

of St. Petersburg, 349.

of Tokyo, 348.

Russia, Expansion of, Alfred Ram-
baud, 211, 341.

Saghalin, 344.

discovery of, 344.

Sainte-Beuve, 28, 38.

San Stefano, treaty of, 489.

San Martino, Ponza, 389.

Schaffle, 544.

Scherer, W., 633, *History of German*
Literature.

Schiller, 131, 615.

Naïve and Sentimental Poetry, 615.

Schlegels, 615, 618.

Frederick, 618.

August W., 619-21.

Schleiden, 75.

Schleimann, 699.

Schouler, James, 320.

School, 656.

responsibility of, 647.

private, 649.

public, 649.

- School.
 co-operation, 650, 656, 666.
 medical inspection of, 652.
 physical training in, 652.
 pupil study, 655.
 athletics, 660.
 tone, 661.
 elective system, 663, 666.
- School and the Home*, The, P. H. Hanus, 647.
- Schwann, 75, 88.
- Scudder, H. E., 145.
- Seeds, *See* Agriculture.
- Sensation, *See* Psychology.
- Serbia (Servia), 233.
- Seven Waves of Literature*, J. L. Allen, 31.
- Shakespeare, 44.
- Shelley, P. B., 435.
- Shimonosaki treaty, *See* Japan.
- Shinn, Milicent, 567.
- Siberia, 341.
 deportation to, 342.
 divisions of, 342.
 towns, 342.
- Sicily, 392.
- Sill, E. R., 583.
- Silvela, Francisco, 599, 608.
 prime minister, 609, 610.
- Simmel, Georg, 545.
- Slavo-Russian tribes, 212.
- Smith, F. Robertson, 546,
Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia.
- Social democrats, 275-76.
 platform, 276.
- Social Statics*, 537.
- Sociology.
 causation, 546.
Elements of, 544.
 in Germany, 548.
Introduction de, 544.
Modern, F. H. Giddings, 536.
 origin of word, 536.
 social genesis, 545.
 Spencer's views of, 537.
 theoretical, 553.
- Society d'Economie Sociale, 181.
- Some Aspects of Recent Biological Research*, E. B. Wilson, 74.
- Summatism, 13.
- Sooloo Islands, 597.
- Spain at the Close of the XIXth Century*, International Position of, A. E. Houghton, 597.
- Spain, relations with France, 606.
 army, 608.
 fortifications, 609, 610.
 France, relations with, 609.
 navy, 608.
 new policy, 608, 610.
 policy before the war, 697.
 policy in Morocco, 602-3.
 position, 501.
- Sparks, Jared, 306.
- Spencer, Herbert, 83, 536.
 as reformer, 537.
 naturalistic view of, 538.
 originality of, 539.
 system, 540, 549.
Principles of Sociology, 540.
 propositions, 543.
- Spermatozoon, 80, 87.
- Spirits, *See* Religion.
- Starcke, C. N., 546.
- Stedman, E. C., 28, 30, 45.
 as critic, 137-140.
Victorian Poets, 137.
Poets of America, 137.
Nature and the Elements of Poetry, 137.
- Stephens, H. M., 51.
- Strasburger, 80, 81.
- Strauss, D. F., 622.
- Strikes, 259.
 dock, 180.
- Sumner, W. G, 496,
Predominant Issue, The.
- Sweatshops, *See* Trade Unions.
- Swift, 44.
- Switzerland, architecture, 190.
 characteristics, 187-189.
- Symonds, J. A., 30, 37, 43.
- Taine, 33, 39, 138, 144, 614, 631.
- Taiping rebellion, 585.
- Tamerlane, 216.
- Tarde, Gabriel, 550, 552.
- Tartar-Mongols, 214.
- Telepathy, 462.
- Tendencies in Trade Unionism*, A. F. Weber, 252.
- Tennyson, 44, 140.
- Tetuan, Duke de, 607.
- Texas fever, 115.
- Ticknor, 128, 143.
History of Spanish Literature, 143.
- Tiele, 367.
- Timofévitch, Irmak, 341.
 conquers the Tartars, 341.

- Ting-fang, Wu, 588.
 Tiryns, 699.
 Titchener, E. B., *Recent Advance in Psychology*, 154.
 Totemism, 46, 475.
Totemism, Frazer, 546.
 Towns, development of, 70.
 Tragedy, 638.
Tragischen, Æsthetik des, 638.
 Tran-Siberian railroad, 349-350.
 Travelling libraries, 121.
 Treaty of Aigun and Tientsin, 346.
 of Tokyo, 348.
 of St. Petersburg, *See* Russia.
 Trades unions, 252, 260, 266.
 apprenticeship, 263.
 benefit funds, 264.
 eight hour law, 269-70.
 equality, factor in, 256-258.
 free land, 257.
 in England, 253, 264.
 machinery, 256, 261.
 methods of work, 263.
 political demands of, 267.
 organs of, 278.
 social value of, 265.
 child labor, 268.
 strikes, 259, 263, 269.
 sweatshops, 262.
 law of 1899, 270.
 trusts, 274.
 weakness of, 254.
 Trade unions act, 253.
 Trade unions label, 265.
 Trade Unionism, Tendency in, A.
 F. Weber, 522.
 Troy, 699.
 Turko-Greco war, 491.
 Tyrrell, 408.

 United States, *See also* under Repub-
 lican Party and Democratic Party.
 California, 499.
 Florida, 499.
 imperialism, 497, 503, 504.
 Louisiana, 499.
 political history, 496.
 Revolution, 498.

 Van Beneden, 81.
 Vaughn, 140.
 Vanilla, *See* Bacteria.

 Victorian Poets, 137, 139.
 Victory of Alcarnenes, 699.
 Vilmar, 623. BTE
Virginia, History of, Beverley, 301.
 Virchow, 76, 79, 89, 94.
 Vischer, F. T., 622, 637.
 Vogt, J. H. L., 417.
 Volcanoes, 403.
 Volkelt, J., 638.
 Voltaire, 624.
 Von Holst, Hermann, 320, 321.

 Waitz, Theodor, 546.
 Ward, Lester F., 551.
 Warner, Charles D., 28.
 Francis, Dr., 650.
 Mercy, 304.
 Washington, Booker T., 672,
 *American Negro and His Eco-
 nomic Value*.
 Waterloo, 482.
 Weavers, The, 639.
 Webb, Mr. and Mrs. Sidney, 260, *Indus-
 trial Democracy*. BTE
 Weber, A. F., *Tendency in Trade
 Unionism*, 522.
 Wells, B. W., 135.
 Werner, R. M., 637.
 Westermarck, 546.
 White, Greenough, 32.
 Whittier, J. G., 140.
 Whitman, Walt, 45, 46.
 as critic, 132-136.
 Winckelmann, 613.
 and his Age, 615.
 Winsor, Justin, 313.
 Winthrop, John, 299, 312.
 Wolf, F. A., 633.
 Woodberry, 28.
 Wood cuts 528-529.
 Wordsworth, William, 434, 436.
 Worms, Rene, 548.
Worship, Primitive Objects of, 362,
 457.
 Wu, Ting-fang, 588.

 Yeast, 282.
 See Bacteria.
 Yersin, 100.

 Zeus, Temple of, 699.
 Zulu, 364, 366.

CONTENTS

The Nature of the Creative Imagination, (<i>concluded</i>) <i>Th. Ribot, Paris.</i>	I
American Literary Criticism and the Doctrine of Evolution, <i>William Morton Payne, Chicago.</i>	26, 127
Popular Histories, their Defects and Possibilities, <i>J. H. Robinson, Harvard University.</i>	47
Some Aspects of Biological Research, Origin of Life and Heredity, <i>Edmund B. Wilson, Columbia University.</i>	74
The Bubonic Plague, <i>Cyrus Edson, M. D., New York.</i>	94
The Trend of Modern Agriculture in the United States, <i>George William Hill, Washington.</i>	107
Recent Advance in Psychology, <i>E. B. Titchener, Cornell University.</i>	154
Man and the Environment: A Study from the Paris Exposition, <i>Patrick Geddes, Edinburgh.</i>	169
Modern Political Germany, <i>Theodor Barth, Berlin.</i>	196
The Expansion of Russia: Problems of the East and Problems of the Far East, <i>Alfred Rambaud, Paris.</i>	211, 341
Tendencies in Trade Unionism, <i>Adna F. Weber, Albany.</i>	252
The Use of Bacteria in our Food Products, <i>H. W. Conn, Wesleyan University.</i>	279
The American School of Historians, <i>Albert Bushnell Hart, Harvard University.</i>	294
The Conflict in China, <i>Edmund Buckley, University of Chicago.</i>	323

The Primitive Objects of Worship,	362, 457
<i>L. Marillier, Paris.</i>	
The New Italy,	388
<i>Salvatore Cortesi, Rome.</i>	
Recent Progress in Geology,	403
<i>Andrew C. Lawson, University of California.</i>	
Party Government in the United States : The Importance of Government by the Republican Party,	418
<i>George F. Hoar, Worcester.</i>	
The Significance of the Democratic Party in American Politics,	437
<i>A. D. Morse, Amherst College.</i>	
"Europe is No More,"	477
<i>Marc Debrit, Geneva.</i>	
The Predominant Issue,	496
<i>W. G. Sumner, Yale University.</i>	
Ruskin, Art and Truth,	510
<i>John La Farge, New York.</i>	
Modern Sociology,	536
<i>Franklin H. Giddings, Columbia University.</i>	
The Pacific Coast : A Psychological Study of Influence,	555
<i>Josiah Royce, Harvard University.</i>	
The Great Chinese Viceroy and Diplomat,	584
<i>John W. Foster, Washington.</i>	
The International Position of Spain at the Close of the XIXth Century,	597
<i>A. E. Houghton, Madrid.</i>	
The Evolutionary Trend of German Literary Criticism,	612
<i>Kuno Francke, Harvard University.</i>	
The School and the Home,	647
<i>P. H. Hanus, Harvard University.</i>	
The American Negro and his Economic Value,	672
<i>Booker T. Washington, Tuskegee Institute.</i>	
Archæological Progress and the Schools at Rome and Athens,	687
<i>Arthur L. Frothingham, Jr., Princeton University.</i>	

THE NATURE OF THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION¹

TH. RIBOT, *Paris.*



ASSOCIATION by *contrast* is from its very nature vague, arbitrary, and indeterminate. This form of association is based, indeed, upon an essentially subjective and fugitive conception, that of the contrary, a conception the real nature of which it is almost impossible for us to determine scientifically; for contraries exist most frequently only through and for us. We know that this form of association is not primary and irreducible. Some reduce it to contiguity; the majority to resemblance. But the two opinions do not appear to me to be irreconcilable. In association by contrast we may distinguish two layers. The first layer, which is superficial, is made up of contiguity. We all carry in our memory associated pairs, such as great-small, rich-poor, high-low, right-left, etc., which come from repetition and habit. The second layer, which is fundamental, is made up of resemblance; the contrast exists only where a common standard is possible between the two forms. As Wundt observes, a marriage may cause one to think of a funeral, but not of a toothache. There is a contrast between colors, and there is a contrast between sounds; but there is no contrast between a sound and a color, unless there be a common ground to which

(1) Continued from the June number.

both may be referred, as in the cases of colored hearing which we have mentioned above. In association by contrast there are conscious elements which stand in opposition to each other, and beneath which there is an unconscious element, namely, resemblance,—a resemblance which is not clearly and logically perceived, but which is felt, which calls forth and approximates the conscious elements.

The question aside, whether the interpretation is exact or not, let us note that association by contrast could not be omitted in this discussion, because its mechanism, which is full of surprises, easily lends itself to new assimilations. For the rest, I do not claim that it is entirely dependent upon the emotional factor. But as Höfding observes: "The peculiar province of the affective life is to move between contraries; it is determined absolutely by the supreme antithesis between pleasure and pain; thus, the results of contrast are very much stronger than in the domain of the sensations."¹ This mode of association predominates in æsthetic and mythic creation, that is to say, in the domain of free fantasy, and disappears in the rigorously determinate forms of practical, mechanical, and scientific inventions.

III. So far, we have considered the emotional factor only under a single aspect,—the purely affective,—that aspect which is revealed to the consciousness under a form that is agreeable, disagreeable, or both combined. But sentiments, emotions, and passions enclose still profounder elements,—elements of impulsion and inhibition, that is to say, motor elements, and which the more especially claim our attention, since it is in movements that we are seeking the origin of the creative imagination. This motor element is what in popular speech, and sometimes even in treatises on psychology, is designated as "creative instinct," as the instinct of invention. This, again, is what is intended when we hear it alleged that the great creators are the

(1) Höfding, *Psychologie*, p. 219.

blind instruments of instinct, that they are impelled after the analogy of the lower animals to perform certain acts.

If I do not err, this means that the "instinct of creation" is present to some extent in all men; feeble in some, very noticeable in others, and supreme in the great inventors.

Moreover, I do not hesitate to affirm that the creative instinct, if taken in this strict sense, namely, on the same basis with animal instinct, is a pure metaphor, a pure abstraction, an entity that has been realized. There are needs, appetites, tendencies, desires, that are common to all men, and that in a given individual, at a given moment, may result in a creation; but there is no specific psychic manifestation which may be properly termed the creative instinct. What would such an instinct be? Every instinct has its own peculiar end: hunger, thirst, sex; the specific instincts of the bee, of the ant, of the beaver, of the spider, consist in a group of movements adapted to a determinate end that remains ever the same. Moreover, what would a creative instinct *in general* be, an instinct which, according to the hypothesis, would produce in turn an opera, a machine, a metaphysical theory, a financial system, the plan of a military campaign, and so on? Such a conception of instinct is utterly chimerical. Invention has not one, but many sources.

Let us consider from our present point of view the duality of the human being, the *homo duplex*.

Let us for the moment conceive of man as reduced to a state of pure intelligence, that is to say, as capable of perceiving, remembering, associating, dissociating, reasoning, and nothing more. All creation would then be impossible, because there would be nothing left that would invite it.

Let us conceive of him, on the other hand, as reduced wholly to organic manifestations. He is now nothing more than a bundle of needs, of appetites, of tendencies, of instincts, that is to say, of motor manifestations; blind forces, which for the lack of a cerebral organ can create nothing whatever.

The coöperation of these two factors is indispensable; without the one nothing commences, without the other nothing ends; and although it is in needs, as I maintain, that we must seek the primary source of *all* inventions, it is evident that the motor element alone is not sufficient. If the needs are feeble, the invention will be null. If the needs are strong, energetic, they can determine a creation, or miscarry, if the intellectual factor is inadequate. Many desire to invent, and invent nothing. A need as common as hunger or thirst will suggest to one some ingenious method of satisfying it, while another will remain still in absolute want. In fine, for a creation to be produced a need must first be awakened; and then it is necessary that this need call forth a combination of images, and finally that it transform itself into the act, that it be realized in some form that is appropriate to it.

Without resting content with these observations of a theoretical kind, let us show briefly that this, and no other, is the course of things. Every work of the creative imagination can be ranged under two great classes: practical inventions and æsthetic inventions; the latter including all that man has created in the domain of art; the former all the rest. Although this division may appear somewhat capricious and unjustifiable, it has, nevertheless, its reason for existing, as we shall presently see.

Let us consider, first, the class of non-æsthetic creations. Though widely differing in nature, all the creations of this group correspond exactly at one point: they are of practical utility; they are born of a vital need, of some one of the conditions of human existence. First, there are the practical inventions in the strict sense of the term: all that pertains to clothing, defence, habitation, etc.; each of these special needs has called forth inventions that are adapted to a special end. Inventions in the social and political order arise in response to the conditions of the collective existence; they are born of the necessity of maintaining the cohesion of the social aggregate, and of defending it against hostile groups. That labor of the imagina-

tion from which myths have issued, and religious conceptions, and the first efforts at giving a scientific explanation to things, may seem at first of a more disinterested character, may seem foreign to the utilitarian motive. But this is an error. Man, when brought face to face with those superior powers of nature, the mystery of which he cannot penetrate, feels the imperative need of reacting upon them; he endeavors to conciliate them, even to bring them into subjection by the rites and ceremonies of magic. His curiosity is not theoretical, he does not dream of knowing merely for the sake of knowing; but his aim is to know in order that he may act upon the outer world, that he may draw his profit from this world. To the numberless questions with which he is confronted by necessity, it is his imagination alone that responds, because his reason is as yet vacillating, and his scientific culture null. Here, therefore, invention is once more the result of pressing needs.

The truth is none the less evident, however, that in the course of the ages, and by reason of an ever advancing intellectual development, all these creations arrive at a second moment, at which their origin seems, as it were, to disguise itself.

The majority of our mechanical, industrial, commercial inventions are not called forth by some immediate necessity of maintaining existence, by some constraining need; the question is no longer one of how to live, but of how to live more comfortably. The same is true also of those social and political inventions which are born of the ever increasing complexity, of the ever new requirements of those vast human aggregations of which our great societies are composed. It is evident, finally, that primitive curiosity has partially lost its utilitarian character, to become, at least in certain groups of men, a taste for pure research,—a research that is wholly theoretical, speculative, disinterested. But all this does not tend in the least to invalidate our position; for it is a well known law of elementary psychology, that on primitive needs are grafted acquired needs that are no whit less exacting

in their demands; the primitive need is modified, transformed, adapted to new conditions, but this need remains none the less the mainspring of the creation.

Let us consider, next, the class of æsthetic creations. According to the generally admitted theory,—one that is too well known for me to tarry over the exposition of it,—art has its origin in a superfluous activity, which must be placed in the category of luxury, which is of no utility in the preservation of the individual, and which reveals itself first of all under the form of play. Afterwards, this play in a transformed and intricate character becomes primitive art, at one and the same time, dance, music, and poetry, all closely united into a distinct and indissoluble whole. Although this theory of the absolutely non-utilitarian character of art has its strong opponents, let us accept it for the moment.

Save for this non-utilitarian character,—still waiving the question whether the theory be true or false,—the psychological mechanism remains the same here as in the preceding cases. We shall merely add, that in the place of a vital need, it is a need having its origin in luxury that acts, and acts solely because it is equally a part of human nature.

In the meanwhile, the inutility of play from a biological point of view is far from having been demonstrated. Groos in his two excellent works on this subject has come to the support of the contrary opinion with a great deal of force. According to Groos,¹ the theory of Schiller and Spencer as to the expenditure of a superfluous activity, and the opposing theory of Lazarus, who finds the source of play in relaxation, that is to say, in a restoration of energy, are only partial explanations. Play has a positive utility. A large number of instincts exist in man which at the moment of their origin are not as yet developed; unfinished being that he is, man must complete the education of his apti-

(1) Groos, *Die Spiele der Thiere*, and *Die Spiele der Menschen*, 1899.

tudes, and he accomplishes this by play, which is the exercise of the natural dispositions of human activity. In man and the higher animals, plays are only a preparation, a prelude to the active functions of life. No instinct of play in general exists, but special instincts which are revealed under the form of play. If we admit this explanation, which is by no means lacking in weight, the work of the æsthetic imagination itself would be reduced to a biological necessity, and there would be no longer anything to justify us in assigning it to a category apart. Whatever side one may take in this discussion, this fact is permanently established, that every invention may be reduced, directly or indirectly, to some special, determinable need, and that to admit in man a special instinct, the peculiar and specific character of which would be to incite to creation, is a wholly chimerical conception.

Whence comes, then, this persistent, and in some respects seductive, idea that creation is the outcome of an instinct? From the fact that inventive genius has characteristics which manifestly cause it to approximate an instinctive activity in the exact sense of the word. First, there is that precocity, of which we might give numerous examples, and which so strongly simulates the spontaneity of instinct. Then again, that orientation in an exclusive sense: the inventor is, so to say, polarized; he is the slave of music, mechanics, mathematics, very often fit for nothing outside of his peculiar sphere. Such was the import of the sparkling sally of Madame Du Deffant at the expense of Vaucanson, who was so awkward, so insignificant when he left his mechanics: "You would say that this man was a piece of his own fabrication." Finally, the extraordinary facility with which invention often (though not always) manifests itself, causes it to bear a very strong resemblance to the work of a preëstablished mechanism.

But these and similar characteristics may be entirely lacking. They are necessary for instinct, not for invention. There have

been great creators who were neither precocious nor confined to a single narrow domain, and whose creations were painfully and slowly engendered. Between the mechanism of instinct and that of the creative imagination notably strong analogies often exist, but not identity of nature. Every tendency of our human organization, be this advantageous or just the contrary, may become the source of a creation. Every invention is born of some special need of human nature that acts in its sphere, and for its own peculiar end.

But if it be asked why it is that the creative imagination moves in some one direction rather than in any other, towards poetry or physics, towards commerce or mechanics, geometry or painting, strategy or music, etc., we have nothing to reply.

This is the result of an individual organization whose secret we do not possess. In the life of everyday, we meet people who have a manifestly strong bent towards love or good cheer or ambition or riches or piety; and all we can say is that they were made this way, that such is their nature. The two questions are at bottom identical, and psychology at its present stage of advancement is not in a condition to answer either of them.

IV. THE UNCONSCIOUS FACTOR.

I designate under this term,—mainly, though not exclusively,—what is meant in popular speech by inspiration. In spite of the mysterious and semi-mythological form of it, this term describes a positive fact, though one that is very imperfectly understood in any closer sense; as is the case with everything that touches on the roots of creation. This conception has its history; and if we may be allowed to apply a very general formula to a very special case, we may say that it has been evolved according to the law of the three states as this was conceived by the Postivists.

At its beginnings, inspiration was attributed literally to the gods; as among the Greeks, for example, to Apollo and the Muses;

and this is true also of the various polytheistic religions. After this, to supernatural spirits, angels, saints, etc. In one way or another, the inspiration is always regarded as exterior, as superior to human nature. At the beginning of all inventions (agriculture, navigation, medicine, commerce, legislation, the fine arts, etc.) the belief in a revelation is present; the human mind concludes that it is incapable of having created all these marvels. The creation, as is supposed, burst forth all at once, one does not know how by reason of his ignorance of the steps that have gone before.

Subsequently, these superior beings become empty formulas, mere survivals; there remain only the poets who invoke them, and that without believing in them, simply by force of tradition. But along with these survivals of forms there exists a mysterious ultimate ground, which is commonly explained by vague expressions and metaphors: enthusiasm, poetic frenzy, possession, the wind bloweth where it listeth, etc. One has given up the supernatural without endeavoring, however, to offer a positive explanation of the phenomena of inspiration. Finally, in the third phase one essays to fathom this unknown. The psychologist sees there a peculiar manifestation of mind, a singular condition, half conscious, half unconscious, which we must now study.

First of all, and contemplated under its negative form, inspiration presents a very clearly defined character; it does not depend upon the will of the individual. Just as for sleep or digestion, we may try certain measures for inciting, favoring, prolonging the inspiration; but we do not always succeed. Inventors, both great and small, never grow weary in complaining of those periods of sterility to which they are subjected against their will. The more sagacious of them await the peculiar moment, while others, less wise, struggle against their evil fate, and endeavor to create against nature.

Considered under its positive aspect, inspiration has two essential signs: suddenness, impersonality.

It makes a sudden irruption into the consciousness, but an irruption that presupposes a latent process that is often long in its duration. Inspiration has its analogies in other well known psychic states : some passion for example, of which the subject is ignorant, and which after a prolonged period of incubation suddenly reveals itself by an act ; or, indeed, the sudden forming of a resolution after endless deliberations that seemed never able to mature. Absence of effort and apparently of preparation. Beethoven might strike at random the keys of a piano, and his auditors seemed to hear the song of birds. "With Chopin," says George Sand, "creation was spontaneous, miraculous, he found it without seeking, without foreseeing the creation ; it came complete, sudden, sublime." We could multiply such facts in profusion. Sometimes, even, the inspiration surges up while the subject is fast asleep, and awakens him. And let us not infer that this suddenness is peculiar to artists : it is found in all forms of invention. "You feel," says Buffon, "a little electric shock that strikes you on the head, and at the same time seizes your heart ; that is the moment of genius." "I have had in my time," says Dubois-Reymond, "some happy moments, and I have observed that they came to me involuntarily, when I was not thinking of them." Claude Bernard has made repeatedly the same observation.

Impersonality is a characteristic of inspiration that goes deeper than that of suddenness : it reveals the workings of a power that is above the conscious individual, a stranger to him, though acting through him ; a state which so many inventors have spoken of in these terms : "I count as nothing in it."

The best way of defining this characteristic would be to transcribe some of these confessions of the inspired themselves, since they are very numerous, and often of a very high value experimentally. But this would carry us too far from our way. Let us note merely that this impulse from the unconscious acts differently according to individuals. Some yield to the inspiration

with a sense of suffering ; they strive against it after the fashion of the ancient Pythia at the moment of delivering an oracle. Others (especially in cases of religious inspiration) yield themselves up absolutely to the impulse, with pleasure, or submit passively to it. Others of a more analytic turn have observed the concentration of all their faculties and aptitudes upon a single point. But whatever the form the inspiration may assume, since it remains at bottom impersonal, and cannot possibly proceed from the conscious individual, we must admit (unless we ascribe to it a supernatural origin) that it derives from the unconscious activity of the mind. To reach any final opinion as to its nature, it would first be necessary to clear up the nature of the unconscious, that is to say, solve one of the enigmas of psychology.

I pass over as idle, and as not to our purpose, all the discussions that have multiplied on this subject of the unconscious. These may be reduced definitively to two principal hypotheses. For the representatives of the first theory, the unconscious is a purely physiological activity, a "cerebration." For the representatives of the second, it is a gradual lessening of the consciousness, which exists without being reunited to the self, that is, to the principal consciousness. Both positions are full of difficulties, are open to almost insurmountable objections. Let us, therefore, assume the unconscious to be a *fact*, and confine ourselves for the sake of greater clearness to a comparison of inspiration with certain other mental states which have been considered of a kind to throw light on the phenomenon.

I Hypermnesia, or exaltation of the memory, teaches us nothing, whatever may be said to the contrary, as to the nature of inspiration, and nothing as to invention in general. Hypermnesia appears in hypnotism, in mania, in cases of alternating insanity at the period of excitement, at the beginning of general paralysis, and above all in religious epidemics under the form known as "gift of tongues." We find certain instances of hypermnesia (one quoted by Régis among others in which an

illiterate news-vender composed involuntarily several snatches of verse) which show that exaltation of the memory is accompanied occasionally by a certain tendency to invention; but hypermnnesia, pure and simple, consists in an extraordinary afflux of memories that are totally lacking in the essential sign of creation, that is to say, in new combinations. It seems, indeed, that an antagonism exists between the two rather than otherwise; exaltation of the memory coming nearer to the ideal law of complete redintegration, which, as we know, is an obstacle in the way of invention. Hypermnnesia and inspiration resemble each other only in the great mass of material which they make available; but where the principle of unity is lacking, there can be no creation.

2 Creation has also been compared with the state of excitement which precedes intoxication. It is a well known fact that many inventors, whose names we need not cite, have sought inspiration in wine, in alcoholic drinks, and in toxic substances (hasheesh, opium, ether, etc). The abundance of the ideas, the rapidity of their gait, the sallies, the eccentric caprices, the new points of view, the exaltation of the vital and emotional tone, in short, that rapture of composing or of performing, of which novelists have given such good descriptions, show to the least clairvoyant that the imagination is working here much above its ordinary level, under the influence of an intoxication in its initial stage. Meanwhile, how tame even this is when compared with the action of those intellectual poisons we have mentioned above, notably hasheesh. The "artificial paradises" of De Quincey, Moreau de Tours, Théophile Gautier, Baudelaire, and others, have proclaimed to all a prodigious unbridling of the imagination, cast forth on a giddy course beyond the limits of both time and space.

These facts, however, represent an imagination that, in the last reduction, has been but factitiously excited, and that endures only for a moment; they do not enable us to penetrate into the true nature of inspiration; they instruct us, at best, as to some

of its psychological conditions. It is not even inspiration in the real sense of the word, but rather an assay, an embryo, a sketch analogous to the creations that appear in dreams, and are found at our wakening to be totally incoherent. One of the essential conditions of creation, a chief element, is lacking, namely, the regulating principle which organizes, and imposes its unity upon the whole. Under the influence of toxicants and alcoholic drinks the attention and will always fall into a state of syncope.

3 More rational is the effort to explain inspiration on the analogy of certain forms of somnambulism; and the opinion has been advanced that "it is only the least degree of a second state, that it is somnambulism in a waking state. In inspiration it is as if a stranger dictated to the author; in somnambulism it is this stranger himself who dominates word or pen, speaks, writes, in fine, creates the work."¹

Thus, inspiration would be the mitigated form of a state which is the triumph of the subconscious activity, and a case of double or alternate personality.

But since this last mentioned method of explaining the enigma of inspiration has been curiously abused, and invoked on all occasions, it is most necessary that we should state our meaning as exactly as possible.

The subject of the inspiration resembles a sleeper who is awake; he lives in a dream. Examples of this are given which appear to be authentic: Shelley, Alfieri, etc. Psychologically this means that a double introversion of the normal state has taken place in the subject of the inspiration.

The consciousness is so completely monopolized by the number and intensity of the representations that it is closed to all the influences from without, or yields to them only to make them enter into the framework of the dream; with the result that the

(1) Dr. Chabaneix, *Le subconscient sur les artistes, les savants et les écrivains*. Paris, 1897. p. 87.

inner life annihilates the outer, a process that is exactly the reverse of the normal state.

The unconscious (or subconscious) activity, moreover, presses into the foreground, plays the leading part, though still holding on to the characteristic of impersonality.

But when this is granted, if we wish to go further, we are confronted with ever increasing perplexities. The existence of an unconscious process is beyond all question; we could bring forward a multitude of facts in proof of this obscure elaboration which enters into consciousness only when all is done. But what is the nature of this process? Is it purely physiological? Is it psychological? We return to the two opposing hypotheses. *Theoretically*, we can affirm that all takes place in the unconscious as in the conscious, save that the former is in no communication with the self; that in clear consciousness the elaboration may be followed step by step, with its ebbs and its flows; that in the unconscious all proceeds in the same way, but without our being able to perceive it. It is evident that all this is purely conjectural.

To sum up: inspiration is the result of a subterraneous process which is present in all men, and to a very high degree in some. The character of this process being unknown, we can draw no conclusion as to the ultimate nature of inspiration.

On the other hand, we are fortunately able to determine in a very exact way the value of this phenomenon in invention, since there is a common tendency to over-estimate this value. We must bear in mind, indeed, that inspiration is not a cause, but an effect rather,—more exactly expressed, a moment, a crisis, an acute state. It is a *sign*.

It marks either the *end* of an unconscious elaboration which has been very short or very long, or the *commencement* of a conscious elaboration which will be very long or very short (the latter happening especially in cases of creation suggested by chance). On the one side, it is never an absolute commencement; on the other, it never produces a finished work, as is abundantly

proved by the history of inventions. What is more, it may be dispensed with entirely : many creations of a very prolonged incubation appear free from the crisis, properly so called, as, for example, Newton's theory of gravitation, and the Last Supper and Monna Lisa of Leonardo da Vinci. And, finally, many have experienced the throes of a genuine inspiration without producing anything whatever of value.

II. The preceding discussion has not exhausted the subject of the unconscious factor as the source of new combinations. The rôle of this factor may be studied under a simpler and more restricted form ; and to this end, we must return once more, and for the last time, to the association of ideas. The ultimate ground of association (contiguity excluded in part at least) must be sought in the temperament, the character, the individuality, often even in the moment, that is to say, in some transient influence, almost imperceptible because it is unconscious or sub-conscious. These momentary dispositions, which are latent in form, may evoke new assimilations by two processes : mediate associations, and a special mode of groupings to which the name of "constellation" has recently been given.

I Mediate association has been well known since the time of Hamilton, who was the first to determine its nature, and who has given us a personal example of it which has become classic. Lake Lomond suggested to him the Prussian system of education, because while on a visit to this lake, he made the acquaintance of a Prussian officer with whom he entered into a conversation on this subject.

His general formula is this : A evokes C, although there exists between them neither contiguity nor resemblance, for the reason that a middle term B, which does not enter into consciousness, serves as a transition from A to C. This mode of association, which seemed to have met with universal acceptance, has in these later times been challenged by Münsterberg, and several others.

They resorted to experimentation,—which produced results, however, that hang rather poorly together.¹

For my part, I rally to the ranks of those of my contemporaries who accept this mode of association; and they are in the majority. Scripture, who has made a special study of this subject, and who has succeeded in noting all the intermediate gradations between a consciousness that is almost clear and the unconscious, “considers the existence of mediate association as proved.” To reject as illusory a fact which is so frequently met with in daily experience, and which has been studied by so many excellent observers, we need more than a certain number of experimental researches, the conditions of which are often factitious and artificial, and some of which, moreover, turn out in favor of the affirmative side of the question.

This form of association is produced like the others, now by contiguity, and now by resemblance. The example given by Hamilton belongs to the first type. In the experiments of Scripture some of the second type are found: a red light recalls by the vague recollection of the brilliancy of the strontium a scene from the opera.

It is evident from its very nature that mediate association may give rise to new combinations. Contiguity itself, which is in general only a repetition, becomes the source of unexpected asso-

(1) In this vein Howe (*American Journal of Psychology*, vi., 2.) has published researches in the negative sense. A course of five hundred and fifty-seven experiments yielded him eight associations of a mediate appearance; but after further scrutiny he has reduced these to a single one, which appears to him doubtful. Another series of nine hundred and sixty-one experiments gives seventy-two cases for which he proposes an explanation other than that of mediate association. On the other hand, Aschaffenburg admits these in the proportion of four per cent; the time of association is longer than for mediate associations (*Psychologische Arbeiten*, i. and ii.). Consult especially Scripture, *The New Psychology*, chap. xiii., with experiments in support of his conclusions.

ciations, owing to the elimination of the middle term. There is no proof, moreover, that there are not at times several latent intermediaries: A evokes D by the mediation of B plus the mediation of C, both of which remain below consciousness. It would seem impossible to deny this in the hypothesis of the subconscious, in which we see only the two extreme links of the chain, without being able to admit between them a solvent of continuity.

2 Ziehen, in his determination of the controlling causes of the association of ideas, names one of these "constellation," a term that has been adopted by some authors. This fact may be expressed thus. The calling up of an image, or of a group of images is in some cases the resultant of a sum of predominating tendencies.

A single idea may become the point of departure for a throng of associations. The word Rome might evoke hundreds of them.

But why is one association called up rather than another, and at this moment rather than at that? There are associations founded on contiguity and resemblance that fall within our prevision, but what of the rest? Here is an idea A; it is the centre of a complexus; it may radiate in every direction B, C, D, E, F, etc., but why does it call up now B, and F later?

The reason is that each image may be compared with a force of tension which can pass at any moment into living force, and in this tendency the image may be aided or impeded by other images. There are tendencies of a stimulative, and tendencies of an inhibitive character. For example, B is in a state of tension, and C is not in such a state, or, indeed, D exercises on C an arrestive influence, and in consequence C cannot prevail against D; but an hour later the conditions are changed, and the victory remains with C. This phenomenon rests on a physiological basis; namely, the existence of several currents in a state of diffusion in the brain, and the possibility of receiving simultaneous excitations.¹ A few examples will enable us the better to

(1) Ziehen, *Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologie*, 4th ed., 1898, p. 164, 174. J. Sully, *Human Mind*. I, 343.

understand this phenomenon of reënforcement by reason of which one association prevails. Wahle relates that the Gothic town hall which was near his house had never in spite of certain architectural resemblances suggested the palace of the Doges in Venice, until a certain day, on which the idea surged up most distinctly. He remembered then that two hours before his attention had been attracted by a lady who was wearing a handsome breastpin in the shape of a gondola. J. Sully has very justly observed that it is much less difficult to recall the words of a foreign language when we return from the country than it is after we have resided for a long time in our own: the tendency to the recall is reënforced by the recent experiences of the words heard, spoken, read, and by the entire sum of latent dispositions that operate to the same end.

The most beautiful example, as it seems to me, of "constellation," regarded as a creative element, is to be found in the study of the formation and development of myths. Everywhere and always man has had little other material on which to work than the phenomena of nature: the sky, the earth, water, stars, the storm, the wind, the seasons, life and death, etc. On each of these themes he has fashioned a thousand stories of explanation, which vary from the sublime to the most ridiculous childishness.

The reason of this is that each myth is the product of a human group that has worked according to the bent of its peculiar genius, and under the influence of the various moments of its intellectual culture. No process is richer in resources, more open to approach, better adapted to give what is expected from every inventor: the new and the unforeseen.

To sum up: the initial element, whether it come from without or within, calls up associations which no one can ever pre-
vise, because of the many directions that it is possible for it to take; a case analogous to that which goes on in the order of the will, when so many reasons for and against are present, for acting or not acting, in this sense or in that, now or later, that the

decision cannot be foreseen, and depends very often on causes that cannot be foretold.

V. THE PRINCIPLE OF UNITY.

The nature, psychologically, of the imagination would be very incompletely treated, should we conclude merely with the foregoing analytic study. Every creation, indeed, be it what it may, whether small or great, offers to us an organic character; it presupposes a principle of unity, a synthetic principle. Each of the three factors,—intellectual, emotional, unconscious,—does not work in isolation, and on its own account. These factors are of worth only when they combine with each other, and are of significance only when they converge. This principle of unity which every invention requires and exacts, is at one moment of an intellectual character,—a fixed idea,—and at another of an emotional character,—a fixed emotion, that is to say, a passion. These terms, fixed idea and fixed emotion, are a little general, and require certain restrictions and reserves, which will be made later on.

The distinction between the two is not absolute.

Every fixed idea is supported and held together by a need, a tendency, a desire, that is to say, by an affective element; for it is a chimera, that is, this belief in the persistence of an idea which, according to our hypothesis, would be a purely intellectual state, all dry and cold. The principle of unity under this form predominates of course in certain modes of creation; in the practical imagination, where the end is perfectly obvious and the representations are direct substitutes for the things themselves, where the invention is subjected to very rigorous conditions under the penalty of a visible and palpable check,—the scientific and metaphysical imagination, which acts on concepts, and is under the discipline of the laws of rational logic.

Every fixed emotion must assume a concrete form in an idea or image which gives it a body, systematizes it, without which it

remains in a state of diffusion; and all affective states can reclothe this permanent form which introduces into these states the principle of unity. The simple emotions, such as fear, love, joy, sadness, etc., and the complex or derived emotions (the religious, æsthetic, or intellectual sentiments) can equally monopolize the consciousness in their interest.

We see, therefore, that these two terms, fixed idea and fixed emotion, are about equivalent; for they imply two elements that are inseparable, and they serve only to indicate the preponderance of the one or of the other.

This principle of unity, which is the centre of attraction and the fulcrum of every operation of the creative imagination,—that is to say, a subjective synthesis which tends to become objective,—is the ideal. In the full sense of the word, the ideal (not restricted to æsthetic creation, or made synonymous with perfection as in ethics) is a structure in images which aims at becoming a reality. If, as has sometimes been done, the imaginative creation be compared with physiological generation, we may say that the ideal is the ovule which awaits fertilization in order to begin its evolution.

Let us examine now the various forms of this principle of coagulation, as we pass from the lowest form to the highest, from the unity that is but dimly perceived, to the unity that is an absolute and tyrannical master. According to a method which seems to me better adapted to these questions, which have suffered so much in the answering, I shall indicate only the principal forms, which I reduce to three: unstable unity, organic unity, or mean unity, extreme or semi-morbid unity.

1 The unstable form has its direct and immediate point of departure in the purely reproductive imagination, without creation. It gathers up somewhat at random, and patches together the shreds of our life; it ends only in essays, in attempts. The principle of unity lies in a momentary disposition which unceasingly changes and vacillates at the beck and call of exterior

impressions, or of the various modifications of our humor and our manner of being. Let us cite as examples of this unstable unity the condition of the dreamer as he builds his castles in the air, the delirious constructions of the demented, the inventions of a child, which follow all the fluctuations of chance or caprice, the semi-coherent dreams which seem to the sleeper to contain a germ of creation. In consequence of the extreme fragility of the synthetic principle, the creative imagination does not succeed in finishing its work, and remains in an intermediate state between association of ideas, pure and simple, and creation, properly so called.

2 The organic or mean form may be offered as the type of the unifying power. It may be reduced, in the last analysis, to attention, and presupposes nothing more than this; because, owing to this process of "focalization," which is the essential sign of attention, it creates for itself a stable centre of attraction which groups around the master-idea, images, judgments, associations, tendencies, voluntary efforts. "Inspiration," said the poet Grillparzer, "is a concentration of all the forces and aptitudes upon a single point, which during this moment is to represent rather than envelop all the rest of the world. The reënforcement of the state of the soul arises from this, that its several powers instead of being scattered over the whole world are found contained within the limits of a single object, and touch, sustain, and reënforce each other reciprocally."¹

What the poet claims for æsthetics alone may be applied to all the organic forms of creation, that is to say, to all those which are dominated by an indwelling logic, and as such resemble the productions of nature.

That we may leave no doubt as to the identity of attention with the imaginative synthesis, and show that it is in normal cases the true principle of unity, we may observe as follows:—

(1) Alzelt-Nervin, *ibid*, p. 49.

The attention is at one moment spontaneous, natural, fixed without effort, depending simply on the interest which a thing arouses in us, lasting as long as the thing has any attraction for us, and then ceasing; and at another moment it is voluntary, artificial, vacillating, and intermittent, maintained with effort,—in a word, laborious.

The same is true of the imagination. The moment of inspiration is dominated by a unity that is perfect and spontaneous; its impersonality causes it to approximate the forms of nature. Then comes the personal moment, the work of detail and resumption, which is long, painful, and intermittent, and whose grievous vicissitudes so many inventors have described. The analogy between the cases cannot, as it seems to me, be disputed.

Let us observe, next, that psychologists always bring forward the same examples when they wish to explain, on the one side, the processes of persistent, tenacious attention, and, on the other, the process of incubation, without which creation does not attain to its fruition. "Genius is only an immense capacity for patience," as Buffon said. So Newton: "By always thinking of it."

We have similar confessions from D'Alembert, Helmholtz, etc. And naturally, because in both cases the fundamental condition is the presence of a fixed idea, which is always vivacious, keenly alert, in spite of its remissions, and its incessant disappearances into the unconscious, but to return again to the conscious.

3 The extreme form, which is from its very nature half morbid, becomes in its highest degree unreservedly pathological. The principle of unity passes over into the state of obsession.

The normal condition of our mind is a plurality of the conscious states (polyideism). Through the instrumentality of association, there is a radiation in all directions. In this total of coexisting representations, no one representation holds for any length of time the first place; the idea is driven out by others,

which are in their turn displaced by still others that emerge from the penumbra.

On the contrary, in the state of attention (relative monoideism) a single representation usurps for a long time the ruling part, and when banished, ever seeks to return and resume its sway. Finally, in the state of obsession (absolute monoideism) the fixed idea defies all rivalry, and reigns as absolute despot. Many inventors yield to it as to a grievous tyranny, and strive in vain to break its bonds. But the fixed, ever tormenting idea will not allow itself to be dislodged, unless with great difficulty, and only for the moment. And even then, it is dislodged but in appearance; for it persists in the unconscious life, into which it has so profoundly cast its roots.

At this point, the principle of unity, though it may serve as the leaven of creation, ceases to be normal. This question, therefore, very naturally arises: What is the difference between obsession, as we observe it in the inventor, and the obsession that appears in abnormal cases, and which most frequently destroys instead of creating?

The nature of fixed ideas has much engaged the attention of contemporary alienists. On other grounds, and in their way, they also have been led to divide obsessions into two classes: intellectual and emotional, according as the idea or the affective state predominates; and then to enquire which of these two elements is the first in the order of time. Some hold that it is the idea; others (the larger number, as it seems), that the affective state is, in general, the primary fact: obsession always rests on a basis of morbid emotion, and retains the imprint of this emotion.

But whatever the opinion adopted, the difficulty in establishing a line of demarcation between the two forms of obsession remains untouched. Are there characteristics peculiar to each of them?

It has been claimed that the fixed physiological idea, in its

normal state, is willed, occasionally even sought, at any rate accepted, and that it does not break the continuity of the self. It does not impose itself in fatal tyranny upon the conscious; the individual knows the value of it, knows whither it is leading him, and shapes his conduct according to its requirements. (Example: Christopher Columbus.)

On the contrary, the fixed pathological idea is parasitical, automatic, discordant, irresistible. The obsession is only a special case of psychic disaggregation. The victim of the obsession is as a person possessed, one whose self has been confiscated entirely to the profit of the fixed idea, and who painfully yields to the pressure of his situation.

In spite of this parallel, the criterion of distinction between the two is an exceedingly precarious one, because of the numerous transitions from the sane to the insane idea. We are constrained to admit that in the case of certain inventors, who are dominated by the elaboration of their work rather than masters of it sufficiently to direct, leave, and resume it at will, an artistic, scientific, or mechanical, conception comes finally to persecute the mind, to plant itself on the mind without possibility of expulsion.

Pure psychology, indeed, is unable to discover a clear and positive difference between creative obsession, and the other forms; because in the two cases the mental mechanism is at bottom the same. The criterion must be sought elsewhere.

To this end, we must part company with the inner world, and proceed objectively; we must judge the fixed idea not by itself, but by its effects. What does it produce in the æsthetic, scientific, moral, social, religious order? Our reply is that it is worth what its fruits are worth. If one denies us this change of position in order to confine us to the strictly psychological point of view, one must nevertheless concede this as beyond dispute, that when the fixed idea passes a certain limit, which is difficult to determine, it profoundly troubles the mechanism of the mind.

Among those who are dowered with a strong imagination this often happens, and serves to explain why the pathological theory of genius has been able to rally so many adherents, and to marshal such a mass of facts in its favor.

In concluding this article, it behooves us to observe that we have studied the nature of the imagination but in a single way, that is to say, resolving it by the analytic method into its component elements. To exhaust the subject, much still would have to be done. We should have to follow the imagination in its ascendent *evolution* in animals, in children, in those primitive myth-building peoples in whom it attains to its golden age, and then in the higher forms of creation as these appear in men of genius. Finally, we should have to attempt a *concrete* study of the divers forms of the imagination; we should have to determine by observation its principal types, and the features peculiar to each species, whether æsthetic, scientific, philosophical, mystical, practical, mechanical, industrial, commercial, military, etc.; each of these forms with the varieties that it includes. This could be done only in a long work.



AMERICAN LITERARY CRITICISM AND THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION

WILLIAM MORTON PAYNE, *Chicago.*



HERE are times in the history of modern culture when the controlling thought of a considerable period of years finds expression in some brief phrase, or even in a single word—the watchword of those who march in the van of intellectual and social progress. These words betoken stages in the restless activity of the Earth Spirit, as it fashions upon the roaring loom of Time the living garment of Truth. That vast and complex regeneration of old-world impulses and ideals which we call the Renaissance provided the fifteenth century with such a watchword. The century following was preëminently that of the Reformation, which again shook the foundations of thought, but only to establish them the more securely. Toward the close of the last century the clouds that had long been gathering broke over the old organization of society in the tempest of Revolution, which swept away the ancient landmarks, and, its fury subsiding, left a new bow of promise arching the horizon of the human spirit. So potent was this watchword of progress that for more than fifty years it stimulated the ardors and dominated the aspirations of the noblest men of the time, until its work was done, and it had created a new literature, a new social order, and a new sense of the brotherhood of man.

These are among the most striking examples of the controlling ideas that have shaped modern culture in the critical stages of its development. Other examples, subtler in their workings, but in the end no less far-reaching in their effects, may be found in the triumph of the heliocentric astronomy, and the rehabilitation of the inductive method of investigation. The former placed man in his proper relation to the universe; the latter taught him to understand the forces of nature and subdued them to his purposes. The latter, also, prepared the way for that crowning synthesis which has been worked out in our own time, and which is summed up in the single word, Evolution. Of all the watchwords that from time to time have dominated modern thought this is probably the most comprehensive in its inclusiveness. Others have related to single phases of intellectual activity; this has controlled them all. Mr. Herbert Spencer has taken all knowledge for his province in a wider sense than any of which Bacon could have dreamed. Moreover, this master-key to the secrets of nature and human life has been produced at a time when, first in the history of thought, there have obtained a comity of intellectual life throughout the world, a degree of organization among the workers, and a willingness to accept whatever results investigation may disclose and reason approve, such as could not have obtained at any earlier period than this closing half of the nineteenth century. Giving to us first a new biology, the doctrine of evolution has also given us, among other things, a new geology, a new anthropology, a new sociology, and a new psychology. Has it also given us a new criticism of literature; or, to be more explicit, and leaving subjective criticism for the moment out of the question, has it shifted the emphasis from the deductive to the inductive aspect of literary study, thus making criticism essentially the natural history of literary productions, rather than the application of rigid standards to every work upon which judgment is to be passed? This is the problem with which our group of papers is concerned, and the special task of the present

writer is to pursue the inquiry into the field of American literary criticism.

There are many reasons why this inquiry may be expected to yield more positive results in European than in American criticism. Criticism with us has not as yet become a branch of creative literature, it has hardly reached the point of realizing that its true mission is the application of general ideas to literature. We number among our critics of the past no Lessing, no Sainte-Beuve, no Matthew Arnold; no critic now among us writes from so broad and philosophical an outlook as does M. Brunetière, or Dr. Brandes, or Signor Carducci, or speaks with a voice of like authority. And yet there is a large aggregate amount of critical energy at work in our present-day literature, an amount far greater than the superficial survey discloses; but it has been dissipated by too much diversity of application, and has flowed in many narrow channels instead of uniting in one swelling stream. Some of it, for example, has gone into the preparation of critical editions, such as the monumental studies in English balladry of the late Professor Child, the "Variorum" Shakespere of Dr. Furness, the Shelley of Mr. Woodberry, and the Poe of Messrs. Woodberry and Stedman. Some of it has been made merely ancillary to a gentle social philosophy, as in the voluminous fragmentary writings of George William Curtis, Colonel T. W. Higginson, and Mr. Charles Dudley Warner. A great deal of it is to be sought out (not without difficulty) in collections of miscellaneous essays and the columns of the more serious periodicals. Much of it, finally, has never got beyond the walls of college class-rooms, or no further beyond them than into the pages of elementary manuals prepared for the instruction of youth.

Again, there are few Americans who have pursued literary criticism with sufficient singleness of aim to achieve results of definite and commanding significance. Our foremost living critic is also a poet, and at the same time a busy man of affairs. The one whom we most honor in the past was at once critic,

poet, teacher, diplomat, and spokesman of the higher patriotism. Some are critics by way of diversion from their true function as writers of fiction. Some bend their talents to the exigencies of journalism, and rarely find an opportunity to do the best that is in them. Some, bound to the routine task of teaching, are forced to compromise with conscience for the ever-postponed *magnum opus* by putting forth their conclusions in occasional fragments—the chips of the workshop rather than the finished cabinet. For these reasons, and others, the type prevailing among our men of letters is that of the general practitioner rather than that of the high specialized authority, or, if we find the latter, his specialty is apt to be so narrow that he makes no appeal to the general audience of cultivated readers. The particularly unfortunate consequence of this condition of things is that almost any writer of moderate intelligence may set up as critic, without fear of a too close examination of his credentials, sustained by that overweening confidence in the value of his own opinions which is the chief intellectual vice of men who have breathed from their birth the ozonized air of democracy.

If we turn now to the men whose critical calling, as shown by their accomplished work, has had a more peremptory and insistent character, we still find their equipment defective in important particulars. For criticism, in the highest sense of the term, is a serious matter. It must rest upon the broad foundations of a generous culture, and must also exhibit that intuitive insight into the real relations of things which is the attribute of genius. In the first place, it must know the method of science, and seize the full import of its message. Goethe was a better critic of art and literature because of his researches in optics and morphology, and Lowell, frankly confessing that he “hated science,” confessed also, however unconsciously, to a weak joint in his armor. Now few of our critics have had the scientific discipline, and the lack of its salutary restraints is marked in the loose logical texture of their thought. Either they have chafed at all such restraint,

and allowed an unregulated fancy to lead them into mistaking the merest impressionism for criticism, or they have been content to work within the limits of whatever set of ethical and æsthetical concepts they may have affected. Equally important, no doubt, and more immediately related to criticism than the principles of pure science, are those very principles of ethics and æsthetics which have just been mentioned. A solid ethic and a solid æsthetic are the twin pillars by which criticism must be supported; what is at present urged is that these pillars must rise from the bedrock of science. Lacking that foundation, they are themselves uncertain props, and the historical course of criticism shows many such lying shattered by the wayside. The ethic that had no more lasting basis than the dogmatic theology of the mediæval church, and the æsthetic that was grounded upon a narrow interpretation of the Aristotelian philosophy, are striking cases in point. In one or all of the above-mentioned respects, examination will show our critics to be seriously wanting. Yet this is no counsel of perfection, for many men have, in other times and countries, met these requirements in measurable degree. As far as the intellectual development of the age permitted, Aristotle met them; in our own time they have been met by such men as J. A. Symonds, M. Brunetière, Dr. Georg Brandes, and Mr. Theodore Watts-Dunton. Matthew Arnold nearly met them, although he was at great pains to conceal the fact. One further demand may reasonably be made upon the serious critic—the demand that he acquaint himself with the body of world-literature. It is only through an intimate knowledge of at least the masterpieces of other literatures than his own that a critic can fairly estimate the productions of his own countrymen. In this respect, American criticism makes a creditable showing. The wide range of Emerson and Lowell needs only to be mentioned. Lanier's eager and receptive mind was working in the same direction up to his untimely death. Bayard Taylor's studies in German literature, Mr. E. C. Stedman's acquaintance with the Greek

idyllists, Professor C. E. Norton's profound and exact Italian scholarship, the familiarity of Professor Brander Matthews with the French drama, and the predilections of Mr. Howells for Spaniards, and Russians, and Scandinavians, are but a few of many examples of our critical cosmopolitanism that will come to the mind of every reader. Our criticism assuredly does not suffer from the provincial outlook, and the tendency of our education to separate, and even to bring into antagonism, the scientific discipline and the humanistic culture, may at least be counted upon to keep our horizon free, although perhaps at some cost to the stanchness of our scientific and philosophical moorings.

The subject-matter of the critic must be, to a large extent, the literature of his own country, and in this fact there is an evident obstacle to the development of American criticism upon the broad lines of the evolutionary philosophy. For evolution is a slow process, and American literature has not had time to illustrate its more characteristic phases. We have had literary fashions, like the rest of the world, but the great secular transformations, the emergence of new types and the disappearance of outworn ones, the passage of literary forms through all the stages of their natural history—from birth to efflorescence, from ripeness to decay—all these phenomena must be looked for in other literatures than our own. It is only when considered as an offshoot from the whole of English literature that our own product becomes invested with any large significance; considered within its own limits, the changes which it has undergone are mere variations, rather than generic or even specific transformations of type. For it is only within the last three quarters of a century that our literature has possessed a character sufficiently distinctive to make profitable the investigation of its movements and interactions. Such a study as Mr. James Lane Allen's charming treatment of the "Seven Waves of Literature" that have swept over us during the past fifty years or so illustrates, at least for the lighter aspects of literature, the sort of investigation that is possible in

this field. But this is essentially a study of fashion, not of typical form in any but a minor sense. The well-intentioned effort of the Rev. Greenough White to expound a "Philosophy of American Literature" comes to little for the simple reason that adequate material for such a philosophy is not offered. American literature before "Thanatopsis" is so obviously a belated imitation of English models—and for the most part of arid and worthless models—that its examination reveals nothing more than persistency of type in a changed environment. "Ought one to wonder," asks Professor Tyler, "if in the American literature of the seventeenth century he shall find the distinctive traits, good and bad, which during the same period characterized English literature? How could it be otherwise? Is it likely that an Englishman undergoes a literary revolution by sitting down to write in America instead of in England; or that he will write either much better or much worse only for having sailed across a thousand leagues of brine?" What is here said of our first century of detached life applies with equal force to our second, and it is not surprising that Professor Tyler's exhaustive history of our colonial literary period should be made up of a succession of studies of individual writers, chronologically arranged in the groups suggested by an elementary classification of their subject-matter.

All the foregoing considerations—the dissipation of our energies, our lack of singleness of aim, the defective discipline of our critical writers, and the restricted field provided for a broad criticism by our own national product—are ample to account for the absence from American criticism of any considerable amount of work of a high synthetic character. We have, of course, the whole literature of the mother country to fall back upon, and all English literature previous to the seventeenth century is as strictly ours as if our forefathers had not sought out a new home in America, but our writers have not availed themselves of this inheritance for the production of any widely comprehensive work. No American writer has dealt with the history of English

literature upon a larger scale than that of the school-book. And it is only within recent years that our writers have ventured so far as to deal with important single epochs or movements in the development of that literature. It may be said parenthetically, and by way of consolation, that Englishmen are open to nearly the same reproach, having abandoned the broad domain of their general literary history to such foreigners as ten Brink and Taine and M. Jusserand. Yet these negative conclusions should not blind us to the fact that American scholarship must still be credited with a great amount of critical work of the highest value, work in one sense all the more valuable for the very reason that it has been performed within narrow limits, and has aimed at intensive rather than extensive ideals. The critical scholarship that is now at work in the midst of us, in our private and public libraries, and especially in those of our schools that hold it poor economy to exhaust the vital energies of the instructor in the work of teaching, is of a character to command respect wherever it is known, and it is every year producing books which are making it increasingly known wherever literary pursuits are held in respect.

The present inquiry has thus far directed attention chiefly to the reasons why an evolutionary philosophy of literature, or indeed any philosophy, is less likely to be found in American than in European criticism. But there is another side to the shield, and this it now becomes necessary to present. In many periods of the past the thoughts of men have been widened with the process of the suns, but probably never in so many directions at once as in our own period—the period which has witnessed the establishment of the evolutionary principle. A frequently quoted passage from one of the letters of Dr. Ibsen runs to this effect: “Men still call for special revolutions—for revolutions in politics, in externals. But all that sort of thing is trumpery. It is the human spirit that must revolt.” Now the human spirit has revolted in our own age, with evolution for its watchword, not

violently or even noisily, as the dramatic instincts of the Norwegian social pathologist would have urged, but with the quiet putting forth of a persistent and irresistible force that has carried all opposition before it. Evolution, in fact, could hardly stultify its own ideal by acting in any other way. The transforming influence of this concept upon the human intelligence has been incomparably great. Other watchwords of progressive thought have had effects more or less circumscribed; the effect of this has been all-embracing. It has so entered into the tissue of all our thinking that it is well-nigh impossible for a man born during the half-century just ending to put himself into what was the characteristic state of the intelligent mind fifty or a hundred years ago. Questions which were then debatable are now closed forever; positions which might then be held in all seriousness now seem the merest childishness; the animistic view of nature, the cataclysmic geology, the special-creation hypothesis, the notion that ordered government originated in a social contract—these things, and a host of others like unto them, all of which once swayed the minds of able men, are now swept into the intellectual rubbish-heap. The disciplined intelligence can no longer think in those terms. When we seek to understand some phenomenon of nature or of human life, we instinctively ask how it has come about; we are not content to posit some gratuitous basis, and rest the argument upon that. Those men who are old enough to have lived through the period of this transformation of thought, following the successive onslaughts of the evolutionary principle upon the strongholds of irrationality, eagerly anticipating its certain conquests, and now witnessing its undisputed dominion, have enjoyed one of the most enviable experiences ever known to the human intellect. And the younger men, who have missed the sharp stimulus of the struggle, have had at least the advantage of being born to the rich inheritance of its fruits.

“We are all socialists now,” said an English statesman not long ago, and in much the same spirit it may be averred that we

are all evolutionists, whether conscious of the fact or not. This being the case, it would be fair enough to take high *a priori* grounds in dealing with the subject of American literary criticism, and declare outright that it must have been influenced by the doctrine of evolution. But this summary fashion of disposing of the matter would hardly answer the present purpose, which is to be as concrete as possible. Yet before we put the question direct to one individual writer after another, and start out upon the search for actual illustrations of this influence which we may be sure will be found somewhere, although perhaps in disguise, a considerable further amount of preliminary inquiry is necessary. In order for a search to be successful, the searchers must know what they are looking for, not vaguely, but with all possible exactness, and, in the present case, with some knowledge of what has been said upon the general subject by those who have most deeply felt its importance. We must have a clear understanding of what is meant by an evolutionary treatment of literature, of the marks which should distinguish it from the older forms of treatment, of the extent to which it is admissible to employ terms borrowed primarily from the vocabulary of biology, and of the limitations imposed upon the use of those terms by the special nature of the discussion into whose service they are pressed.

To begin with, we need to outline some sort of classification for literary criticism. The fundamental division, no doubt, is that which separates the criticism which is subjective from that which is objective. Subjective criticism derives its chief interest from the play of the writer's mind upon and about the works with which it is concerned. Its interest will depend mainly upon the acumen, the temperament, and the richness of the mind at play. It may have a high value as literature on its own account, and little or no illuminating power as far as the work with which it deals is concerned. Usage compels us to give it the name of criticism, although it may mock at every accepted critical doctrine.

Objective criticism, on the other hand, is based upon fixed principles of some sort. They may be principles of ethics, of æsthetics, of rhetoric, or even of linguistics. They tend toward a scientific form of expression, which may be broad or narrow, according to the lines upon which the mind of the critic works most naturally. Professor H. M. Posnett's "Comparative Literature," and Professor L. A. Sherman's "Analytics of Literature" may be named as illustrating these extremes of the scientific method. Practically all of the writing that counts in the history of criticism is predominantly objective in its treatment. Principles are more lasting than individual impressions, and the more completely the personal element is eliminated from criticism the more enduring its influence will be. Objective criticism thus assumes an Olympian attitude, standing aloof from sentiment and prejudice; or perhaps a Rhadamanthine attitude, judging with impartial severity the works that are brought before its inexorable tribunal. This distinction between the two fundamental types of criticism results, of course, from logical analysis rather than from actual observation. As a matter of practice, the most subjective of critics has principles of some description lurking somewhere in his consciousness, and he cannot help making an unwitting application of them. And the most sternly objective of critics has an individual personality which is sure to leak into his opinions at some unsecured point, coloring them against his will. If this were not so, criticism would become as ideal (and as dry) as mathematical analysis, and the reader, rather than seek its guidance, would trust to his own unregulated instincts. What we find in practice then, is that critics of one class hold the objective aim chiefly in view, while those of the other class, with frankly subjective intention, take the reader into their confidence, and endeavor to persuade him into their own likings and dislikings by the charm of their manner rather than by the cogency of their reasoning.

Those who take the evolutionary principle for their guide in the study of literature clearly have to beware of the subjective

critic. He, at least, can have no help for them in their quest. They seek to understand the complex play of forces that have brought a given work, or a given literary form, into being; he has nothing for them but the record of its influence upon his own mind. It is rather when we go beyond this primary classification of criticism, and try to separate from each other the several distinctive types of objective criticism, that we are brought face to face with the real question at issue between the evolutionist and, we will not say his opponents, but rather those whose work has been done in the imperfect light of the preëvolutionary conception of nature and man. The classification of the late J. A. Symonds will serve us here, for it is made with a clear comprehension of the divergent methods of the old and the new critics, and is stated in plain terms. According to this acute thinker, there are three types of critic, those of the judge, the showman, and the natural historian. The critic as judge was the accepted type from classical times almost down to our own. The very word critic means this and nothing more, etymologically considered. "The critic claimed to rank as umpire, trained by special studies for pronouncing on the merits of authors and of artists. He supported his decision by appeal to precedents, established canons, accepted definitions. Some difference of opinion existed as to the validity of certain rules; but no one doubted that the critic was a judge, or that it was his function to apply rules. As in jurisprudence law is made by the decision of judges, so in criticism the code of taste was formed by the dicta of eminent experts." The conception of the critic as showman is a modern development. "It is not his function to pronounce from the bench on what is right or wrong, to acquit or to condemn, to apply canons and extend the province of orthodox taste by enforcing laws. On the contrary, he ought to be content with studying and displaying the qualities of things submitted to his intellect and senses. He must unfold the 'virtues' of the works of art with which he has been occupied. He must classify

and describe them, as a botanist the plants with which he has to do. In a certain sense, he may also take rank among creators by reproducing the masterpieces of poet or of painter with engaging rhetoric, or by eloquently exhibiting his own sensibilities in animated prose." It will be observed that in this definition of the critic as showman there is a slight confusion of thought. The definition is made broad enough to include subjective criticism through a failure to realize that there is the most important kind of a distinction between being the showman of other men's minds, as was Sainte-Beuve, and the showman of one's own, as is M. Anatole France. But this logical defect does not deprive the definition of its value. The third type of critic is that with which the present essay is concerned. "He must become the natural historian of art and literature, must study each object in relation to its antecedents and its consequents, must make himself acquainted with the conditions under which the artist grew, the habits of his race, the opinions of his age, his physical and psychological peculiarities. Only after having conscientiously pursued this method may he proceed to deliver judgments; and these will invariably be qualified by his sense of relativity in art and literature." These three types of criticism, which Symonds also styles classical, romantic, and scientific, are admirably exemplified in French literature by the names of Boileau, Sainte-Beuve, and M. Brunetière. Summing up, our author says: "According to etymology, the fundamental function of criticism is judgment; and during the classical period no doubt was cast upon the critic's right to judge. In the romantic period this function was disputed, and the rules by which a verdict could be pronounced were opened to discussion. In scientific criticism the idea returns to itself again, but on an altered basis. The critic arrives at conclusions after preparatory studies in history, psychology, scholarship, by means of which he hopes to ground his judgment on sufficient demonstration." The Hegelian twist given to this statement should not prevent us from admitting its fundamental soundness.

Scientific criticism, in the sense implied in the above quotations, and elsewhere explicitly stated by the same author, is clearly criticism controlled by the doctrine of evolution as a guiding principle. Some one will probably say that all this is nothing more than a restatement of the theories of Taine. So it is, but with a difference. Taine's famous doctrine of literature as the product of racial characteristics and environment was elaborated in the pre-Darwinian days, and found its most thoroughgoing application in the "*Histoire de la Littérature Anglaise*," published in the early sixties. When we take the date into consideration, we may realize something of the astonishing nature of Taine's achievement. What he did was to anticipate in large measure the evolutionary philosophy as applied to literature before that philosophy had been developed by its acknowledged sponsors. Taine's method consisted, as has elsewhere been said by the present writer, "when applied to the study of a whole literature, in analyzing the conditions of soil and climate under which the literature was produced, the prevalent social conditions that attended its development, and the ideal tendencies of the race that gave it birth," and when applied to the individual writer, in taking "further account of his special circumstances, of his ancestry, his place of birth, and his education, and of the particular tendencies of the age into which he was born." It is obvious that this is a large part of what the evolutionist has to say about the matter; in fact, only one addition is needed to make the statement entirely satisfactory to him. This is the "difference" to which reference has been made, and in it is the kernel of the whole discussion. In speaking of the doctrine of Taine, it has become the merest critical commonplace to say that it took no account of individual genius. This is the indeterminate factor of the problem which evolution itself has to take for granted. It is what one writer calls "the inexpressible monad," another "the inexplicable residuum," and still another what is "irreducible and incommensurable." Now the individuality of a writer,

whether he be a genius or not, is the psychological analogue of what is known in biology as the "sport" or spontaneous variation. It is the very corner-stone of organic evolution; it makes the starting-point of the whole theory. The biologist says: "Every species tends to vary in many directions. The eggs of an animal, the seeds of a plant, develop into individuals not exactly like their parents, and not exactly like each other. Why this is so, our present knowledge does not inform us. But given this fact, we can show you that environment (aided perhaps by certain secondary influences) is competent to do the rest; that is, to perpetuate some of these variations, and cut short the life of the others. This we call the survival of the fittest, and natural selection is the chief agency by which the survival is assured." Thus far the biologist. The evolutionary critic of literature, for his part, closely follows the line of reasoning thus given him for a model. He accepts the many spontaneous variations that arise in literature, discerns the fitness of some particular variation to survive, and proceeds to show how, by virtue of that superior fitness, it displaces its competitors in the struggle for existence, until in the end, either by reason of a changed environment or the emergence of a variation still more fit to meet the existing conditions, it becomes transformed into a new species, or disappears altogether. If Taine had done his work in criticism twenty, or even ten years later than he did, he could hardly have failed to feel the impact of this new and fruitful conception, and it is fair to presume that his theory of literature would then have included that one element that was needed to make it scientific in the most modern sense.

In this attempt to set forth exactly what is meant by an evolutionary criticism of literature, we are bound to seek our authorities wherever they may be found, and, whatever illustrations of the practice may occur in American writings, we find in them no such definite expositions of the theory as have been made by European critics. Symonds has already been quoted as planting

himself firmly upon the evolutionary principle, but an even clearer exposition of what it means for literature is made by M. Brunetière, whose "Manuel de l'Histoire de la Littérature Française" is confessedly based upon it. In the special preface written by him for the English edition of this work there is a page which must be reproduced here, because, although only three years old, it must take the rank of a *locus classicus* upon the subject. After affirming the primary importance of the individual in literature, and after clearly stating the theory of natural selection as it works upon the variations which we must accept without pretending, in the present state of knowledge, to account for them, he proceeds as follows: "Let us now apply this theory to the history of literature or art. A given variety of literature, the English drama of the sixteenth century, or the French comedy of the seventeenth century, or the English novel of the eighteenth century is in process of development, slowly organizing itself under the double influence of the interior and exterior environment. The movement is slow and the differentiation almost insensible. Suddenly, and without its being possible to give the reason, a Shakspeare, a Molière, or a Richardson appears, and forthwith not only is the variety modified, but new species have come into being: psychological drama, the comedy of character, the novel of manners. The superior adaptability and power of survival of the new species are at once recognized and proved, indeed, in practice. It is in vain that the older species attempt to struggle; their fate is sealed in advance. The successors of Richardson, Molière, and Shakspeare copy these unattainable models until, their fecundity being exhausted—and by their fecundity I mean their aptitude for struggling with kindred and rival species—the imitation is changed into a routine which becomes a source of weakness, impoverishment, and death for the species. I shall not easily be persuaded that this manner of considering the history of literature or art is calculated to detract from the originality of great artists or great writers. On the contrary, as

is doubtless perceived, it is precisely their individuality that is responsible for the constitution of new species, and in consequence for the evolution of literature and art. Such, in my eyes, is the chief advantage of the application of the evolutionary doctrine or method to the history of literature or art. Other advantages could be enumerated, but this is the principal: the combination or conciliation of 'hero-worship,' as understood by Emerson or Carlyle, with the doctrine of slowly operating influences and the action of contemporary circumstances." This is the evolutionary view of literature as M. Brunetière understands it, and, while it may be urged that his confession of faith is an afterthought, expressed only after the accomplishment of the work that has earned for him so great a critical reputation—like Poe's explanation of the genesis of his "Raven"—its value as a piece of analysis, as an illustration of what may be called the higher apperception, is unquestionable.

The extent to which the terminology of biology should be employed in dealing with the extensions of the evolutionary philosophy to social and intellectual phenomena is a question which calls for careful discrimination and delicate taste. The critical writer who should make an obtrusive use of the special vocabulary of Darwinism would incur the danger of relapsing into a jargon that would prove at once inadequate and repellant. It is, in fact, a part of his business as a literary artist to disguise the purely scientific phraseology while holding fast to the scientific principles involved. On the other hand, the arts have long made a practice of borrowing phrases from each other, and the sciences likewise; if now the relations between art and science are to become, as seems in the highest degree probable, more intimate than ever before, their vocabularies are bound to be merged, to a considerable extent, in a common form of speech. Considering the case now in hand, it is obvious that the critic of literature may properly and effectively use such fundamental phrases of the biologist as "natural selection," "the survival of the fittest," and "the

struggle for existence." Indeed, these phrases have long since passed out of the special keeping of biology, and taken places among the most widely-used of the counters wherewith men exchange their ideas upon all sorts of subjects. The concept of the sport, or spontaneous variation, also, is one which the new literary criticism finds indispensable, for reasons that have already been adduced. The biologist attaches much importance, in his phylogenic arrangements of species, to those intermediate forms or synthetic types in which the direction to be taken by evolution seems as yet undetermined, and this also is a helpful conception for the critic. The "periods of transition" in literary history, as M. Brunetière is careful to point out, are deserving of the closest attention. "They explain the other periods because they pave the way for them, and they are quite unexplained by the other periods; and in this way they transform into a genealogical link the connecting link of history, which would otherwise be chronological or solely logical." Again, Symonds calls our attention to the concept of the hybrid as one of the greatest importance to an evolutionary criticism. He affirms that the literature of Rome was a hybrid literature, and that the modern novel is "no less certainly a hybridisable genus than the Orchis." In the sense that "since the Renaissance there has been no pure and unmixed manifestation of national spirit in any art except music," his position is measurably sound, but the term hybrid, used in the strictest scientific sense, is not susceptible of the wide application which Symonds makes of it. For the essential thing about the hybrid is its sterility, and Symonds, speaking of the "complicated heredity" resulting from hybridisation, has rather in mind that blending of slightly (not specifically) divergent individualities which takes place whenever a new generation is launched, and which, whether we take sides with Mr. Spencer or Professor Weismann upon the secondary problem of acquired characteristics, is admitted by all evolutionists to afford the starting-point for those modifications of type which

eventually become sufficient to be called specific. Nevertheless, the concept of the hybrid is a useful one for the critic, and helps us to understand such writers as Landor, and Heine, and Rossetti. One further principle needs to be mentioned before closing this examination of the essential aims and methods of an evolutionary criticism. In dealing with the history of any literature, it must be recognized that some writers express far more fully than others the inmost ideals of their nation. "Writers of the centre," Matthew Arnold styles these faithful exponents of the genius and aspirations of their race. Such writers in English literature are Chaucer, Shakspeare, Gray, and Tennyson. Such writers Swift, Byron, and Carlyle are not. In French literature, M. Brunetière makes much of the similar distinction between Bossuet, Pascal, Racine, on the one hand, and Rousseau, Lamartine, and Hugo, on the other. It thus becomes an important function of the evolutionary critic to emphasize what is racially or nationally typical in writers of the former class, and to trace the alien influences that have shaped the thought of writers of the latter class. Finally, the evolutionary critic will be ever on the lookout for parallelisms in the course of different literatures at corresponding periods of their development. Such illustrations of the essential uniformity of the process bring the strongest possible support to his thesis; he perceives in the allied phenomena of English Euphuism, Italian Marinism, and Spanish Gongorism the workings of an actual if untraced law, and he is unwilling to regard the Alexandrian periods that succeed the creative periods in so many literatures as merely fortuitous happenings. The comparative method of study, then, allies itself directly with the evolutionary principle, enforcing its validity at many points.

One of the surest touchstones of a critical method is provided by some novel literary phenomenon, such as the appearance of a daringly original writer, or the attempt to develop a new form of composition. When dealing with subjects that for many years have been under discussion, and concerning which a certain con-

sensus of opinion has long since been reached, critics fall into a habit of repeating the conventional phrases, and their method is more or less obscured by this fact. But give the critic a fresh subject, forcing him, as it were, to retreat within himself, and his quality is quickly revealed. It may be well to pause for a moment to consider a case of this sort. The dealings of criticism with the work of Walt Whitman afford an admirable *crux* for the testing of its different methods. The sternly judicial critic, finding the work utterly unlike any of the accepted models, exclaims "this will never do," with all the air of a Quarterly Reviewer engaged in the performance of a painful duty. The showman-critic, on the other hand, delighted to browse in these new pastures, and bent upon interpretation of whatever message the work may contain, seeks first to make its intimate acquaintance, and then, his own curiosity satisfied, takes the public into his confidence, setting forth the aim and accomplishment of the author, and the interesting features and implications of his work. The critic as natural historian, however, without ignoring either the function of the judge or of the showman, endeavors primarily to account for the work, to view it with reference to the conditions that have attended its production, to consider it, sometimes as a natural development in an established line, sometimes as the expression of a new tendency born of a changed environment or a fresh impulse given to the human intellect. He is distinguished from the judge by the openness of mind with which he approaches the work, and by the catholic temper of the opinion which he finally records. He is distinguished from the showman by enlisting the philosophical interests of his readers, as well as their curiosity, in the task of interpretation. He may be all that the judge and the showman are, but he must also be something which they are not. He looks before and after, and views literary productions as members of a system rather than as sporadic appearances, as links in a causal chain rather than as isolated phenomena. Now the work of Whitman has been

subjected to every possible sort of critical inspection by his fellow-countrymen, and the voluminous literature that has grown up about it serves to illustrate with unusual sharpness the several methods. Leaving entirely out of our survey the shallow fanatics who have bespattered Whitman's reputation with words of empty laudation, he has been weighed and found wanting by the orthodox, explored by the curious, and explained by the philosophers. The point just now to be urged is that he has been made the subject of no inconsiderable amount of serious appreciation by such well-equipped American critics as Mr. E. C. Stedman and Mr. John Burroughs, and that the appreciations given us by these men, with many others, have shown a catholicity of temper, a readiness to seize the inner significance of the uncouth manifestations of his art, and a disposition to accept him upon his own terms rather than upon the terms consecrated by tradition, that would have been impossible a generation earlier. The talk about "true Americanism" and "the genuine spirit of democracy" has doubtless been overdone, by both our critics and our politicians, but it betrays the right instinct in the present instance, which, as far as it goes, serves to illustrate the influence of the evolutionary idea upon our judgments.



POPULAR HISTORIES, THEIR DEFECTS AND POSSIBILITIES¹

JAMES HARVEY ROBINSON, *Columbia University.*



IN the amplest sense of the term, history is everything true about everything which man ever did, or thought, or hoped, or felt. It is the limitless science of past human affairs,—a theme immeasurably vast and exceedingly vague. We are within the bounds of history whether we decipher a mortgage on an Assyrian tile, come at the value of the Diamond Necklace, or describe the over-short pastry to which Charles V. was addicted to his undoing. The tragic reflections of Eli's daughter-in-law, when she learned of the discomfiture of her people at Ebenezer, are history; so are the provisions of Magna Charta, the origin of the doctrine of transubstantiation, the fall of Santiago, the difference between a black friar and a white friar, and the certified circulation of the New York Journal upon February first of the current year. Each fact has its interest and importance, all have been carefully recorded.

Now when a writer opens and begins to peruse the thick, closely written volume of human experience, with a view of making an abstract of it for those who have no time to study the

(1) I have in the following pages borrowed somewhat freely from a paper submitted for discussion to the National Herbart Society and printed in its Fifth Year Book.

original work, he is immediately forced to ask himself toward what few things he should direct his readers' attention. He finds that the great book upon which he is to base his little one is grotesquely out of perspective, for it was compiled by many different hands, by those widely separated in time and in sentiment, by Herodotus, Machiavelli, Eusebius, St. Simon, Otto of Freising, Pepys, the Duchess of Abrantès, Sallust, Cotton Mather. The portentously serious alternates with the lightest gossip. A dissipated courtier may be allotted a chapter and the fall of a nation be left unrecorded. Consequently, so soon as the writer's first naïve pleasure in the very variety and the picturesque confusion passes away, he will begin to reflect upon the modicum of time and attention which even earnest and patient readers can give to the bewildering past of humanity. The more he ponders, the more disheartened he is likely to become, especially if he is at heart a teacher and hopes to do more than amuse. He must tell what is best worth telling and avoid everything that might confuse his readers or obscure the great issues.

It is clear that in treating history for the general reader and for the boys and girls in our schools and colleges the question of selection and proportion is momentous. Yet when we turn to our popular manuals the obvious, and pressing need of picking and choosing, of selecting, re-selecting and selecting again, would seem to have escaped most writers. (I speak now only of the books upon European history, as our own national experiences have recently been retold with admirable insight and a fine sense of relative values.) Those who deal with the history of Europe jot down nearly the same things that a mediæval chronicler might have presented to his readers. They slavishly follow, for the most part, an outworn tradition in their selection of facts. And although history may no longer be properly called a *fable convenue*, a mere romance that we all tacitly agree to hold true, it is still a *ricit convenu*, a thing of routine, and our so-called "general histories" furnish only a sadly inadequate and misleading review of

man's interests in the past. Some of the noblest phases of history are constantly ignored through a failure to perceive the real up-shot of the tale. And a general misconception of the true intent of historical study,—a misconception which writers of undoubted scholarship have consistently fostered,—has resulted in a well-nigh universal misapprehension of what the real "elements" of history should be.

Of what should an "outline," "compendium," "text-book," "introduction," "handbook," of history consist, which aims to introduce the reader to the past of Europe during, let us say, the last millennium? One would suppose that it should endeavor to tell what is best worth knowing,—or at any rate, very well worth knowing,—about the great achievements of mankind during a thousand long years, a period in which the Europe of Charlemagne, Erigena, Nicholas I., and the False Decretals, has slowly grown into that of Bismarck, Darwin, Edison, and Leo XIII. We should expect, of course, to discover a considerable divergence among even the best works, due to the particular tastes and training of the several writers. One might be more conversant with the Church than with Feudalism, another might emphasize the economic, another the political, another the educational phases of his vast theme, but all might be expected to furnish a judicious, rational and pertinent account of the most signal achievements of mankind during the period and within the countries treated.

With this somewhat general and naïve preconception of the scope of an historical compendium destined for those who have no time for special research, let us turn to the short chapter of a well known "outline" which deals with one of the most momentous revolutions in human culture, the Italian Renaissance.

"Robert the Wise (of Anjou) (1309-1343), the successor of *Charles II.* of Naples, and the champion of the Guelphs, could not extend his power over Sicily, where *Frederick II.* (1296-1337), the son of *Peter of Aragon*, reigned. Robert's grand-

daughter, *Joan I.*, after a career of crime and misfortune, was strangled in prison by *Charles Durazzo*, the last male descendant of the house of Anjou in Lower Italy (1382), who seized on the government. *Joan II.*, the last heir of Durazzo (1414-1435), first adopted *Alfonso V.*, of Aragon, and then *Louis III.*, of Anjou, and his brother, *René*. Alfonso, who inherited the crown of *Sicily*, united both kingdoms (1435), after a war with René and the *Viscounti* of Milan.”¹

This is not, as we might be tempted to suspect, a mere collection of data for contingent reference, no more intended to be read than a table of logarithms. It is a characteristic passage from the six pages which a distinguished scholar devotes to the Italy of Dante, Petrarch and Lorenzo the Magnificent. In preparing a guide for more advanced pupils the author's purpose was, he tells us, “that it should present the essential facts of history in due order, * * * that it should point out clearly the connection of events and of successive eras with one another; that through the interest awakened by the natural, unforced view gained of this unity of history and by such illustrative incidents as the brevity of the narrative would allow to be wrought into it, the dryness of a mere summary should be so far as possible relieved.” Now, in treating the Italian Renaissance, Professor Fisher has chosen barely to mention the name of Francesco Petrarca, but devotes a twelfth of the available space to the interminable dynastic squabbles of southern Italy. We may assume that this illustrates his conception of “the essential facts of history presented in due order,” for the extracts quoted above can hardly be an example of “illustrative incidents” wrought in to relieve the dryness of a mere summary.

I open a very good recent volume which treats of the whole of Europe in the last century, as it approached the momentous

(1) *Outlines of Universal History* designed as a text-book and for private reading by George P. Fisher, pp. 337-8.

crisis of the French Revolution. The writer could hardly fail to realize the necessity of most critically sifting his material, in order to make clear the regenerative workings of the new spirit of enlightenment amid conditions essentially difficult for us to understand. He does not hesitate, however, to insert such statements as these: "Zinzendorf died in 1742, Stahremberg in 1745, Kinsky in 1748. While Uhlfeld became on Zinzendorf's death nominally chancellor, Barntenstein remained from 1740 to 1753 Minister of Foreign Affairs, and had the greatest influence in the secret conference of Ministers." Very true, but were there not, perhaps, other things better worth telling about an ill-understood century than the dates of the deaths of the members of an Austrian cabinet?

An able historian of the French Revolution who finds no time to tell us how it all came about, cheerfully devotes many paragraphs to matters like the following: "The bailliage of Aunis claimed to be independent of Saintonge, the royal bailliage of Nivernais asserted that it included the ducal bailliage, and the old quarrel between Upper and Lower Auvergne again broke out. Similar rivalry appeared between the cities of Riom and Clermont-Ferrand, each claiming to be the capital of the bailliage of Lower Auvergne, and between the towns of Clermont-en-Argonne and Varennes; Chateauneuf-en-Thimerais asserted that it was a royal bailliage, and not dependent on Chartres."¹

It is not simply the presence in our manuals of such dry detail which I would emphasize. The tendency to catalogue mere names of persons and places which have not the least importance for the reader, or which for want of space must be left as undetermined as *x*, *y*, and *z* in an unsolved equation, is, indeed, almost too universal to require illustration. The fundamental question is, why are such seemingly irrelevant and unedifying matters included in our histories? Sometimes doubt-

(1) H. Morse Stephens, *The French Revolution*, I, 24-25.

less from mere thoughtlessness. The names mean something to the writer, who mistakenly infers that they are eloquent in themselves. Or he may suppose that they give greater vividness to his tale, or will form the nucleus about which future knowledge may crystallize. Names but once mentioned, however, add no vividness to a story, but only obscure it; and it is safe to say that the mention of Durazzo, Clermont-Ferrand, Kinsky, and René are little likely to stimulate farther historical research, but rather to promote a general obfuscation.

It is, however, often urged that even the hastiest and driest chronicle of the chief events in the world's history is a good thing,—that we get at least a chronological outline which we carry about with us to guide us in our future acquisitions, and which enables us to put our knowledge in its proper relations. We learn important dates so as to read later intelligently of events of which in schools we learn only the names. We prepare ourselves to place our contingent knowledge of literature, philosophy, institutions and art in what is called an historic setting. Many of us have, however, come to suspect that such an outline amounts to very little. It recommends itself only as the easiest kind of history to teach; it requires no thought, only memory. I recently had occasion to ask a college professor of great erudition and culture, who has resided several years in the Orient, the date of the Hegira, which, with that of Marathon and the battle of Crécy, is generally regarded as a part of the equipment of every educated gentleman. He did not know the date, however, any better than I did, and we looked it up in a dictionary. We might, indeed, have saved a minute or two if we had the information at our tongue's end, but we had never missed it before.

A sensible carpenter or plumber does not carry a saw in his hip pocket, or a coil of lead pipe over his shoulder, in order to be ready for a distant emergency. He very properly goes to his shop and his tool chest to do his work. No more, in these days of cheap and convenient books of reference, need the student go

heavy-armed for intellectual encounters. Let him learn his trade, and not faint under the burden of tools whose use is only remotely contingent. Of course all knowledge, even that which is well forgotten, may beget a certain habit of accuracy and sense of proportion, but formulas should follow knowledge, as they do in our best mathematical text-books: in historical instruction we have ordinarily given our formulas first.

Yet the really fundamental reason for hastening to introduce the reader as early as possible to the son of Peter of Aragon, to Zinzendorf, and that historic spot, Chateauneuf-en-Thimerais, is doubtless the venerable predilection for merely political events and persons, which has until recently completely dominated our writers of popular history. Carlyle's warning has passed unheeded, that far away from senate houses, battle fields and king's ante-chambers, "the mighty tide of thought and action was still rolling on its wondrous course." Elaborate attempts have indeed been made to justify this seemingly disproportionate fondness for political and military affairs. We are bluntly told by Mr. Freeman that "History is past politics," and one of our most distinguished universities has inscribed his words upon the walls of its historical seminar. To Ranke the purpose of history was to clarify our notions of the origin and nature of the State, which forms the basis of the continuity that we believe we observe in human development. Another German scholar claims that for thousands of years the State, the political organism, has been the chief and predominating theme of historical research and should remain so.¹

It is impossible to discuss here the intricate question of the

(1) A bitter war has been waging for some years among German scholars over the question of the proper scope of history, whether the State, or general culture is its proper theme. Professor Schmoller denounces somewhat incoherently the effort to assert the exclusive claims of political history as "*jene Neigung enger bornierter Geister, die ihre Blößen mit Scheuklappen zudecken um einen Rechstitel für ihre Unwissenheit auf den Nachbargebieten zu haben.*" *Jahrb. f. Gesetzgebung*, etc. —vol. xiii. 1484.

rôle of the State in the past. Nor is it necessary to do so, for no one denies its great importance or would advocate its neglect in our historical manuals. The real question is, has not our bias for political history led us to include a great many trifling details of dynastic and military history which merely confound the reader and take up precious space that should be devoted to certain great issues hitherto neglected? The winning or losing of a bit of territory by a Louis, or a Frederick, the laborious piecing together of a puny duchy destined to speedy disintegration upon the downfall of a Cæsar Borgia, struggles between rival dynasties, the ambitions of young king's uncles, the turning of an enemy's flank a thousand years ago,—have not such things been given an unmerited prominence? Man is more than a warrior, subject or princely ruler; the State is by no means his sole interest. In the Middle Ages he organized a church more permanent, more penetratingly powerful, by all accounts, than any government ever seen, even that of Rome itself. He has, through the ages, made voyages, extended commerce, founded cities, established great universities, written and read books, built glorious cathedrals, painted pictures, and sought out many inventions.

If we consider not only the modern broadening of historical research but the development of the cognate subjects of political economy and sociology, the inexpediency of treating history as first and foremost a chronicle of political events will become still clearer; the political historian, once the only kind of historian, has now found many co-workers. Not only do we know more about the past than was known fifty years ago, but our interests have so changed that the older works do not contain what we ask, and neglect what to our age and generation seem the essentials. We are, for example, no longer exclusively or even primarily, interested in political, dynastic and military history. We would discover and teach something more fundamental than the succession of Henrys and Edwards, Ottos and Fredericks,

the shifting of boundary lines, and the concentration and movements of troops.

History is

“An orchard bearing several trees,
And fruits of several taste,”

not simply a question of military expeditions, treaties, and disputed successions. We cannot afford to confine ourselves to “past politics,” for if we do, how are we to learn anything of the other equally important phases of social activity and interest; of the mediæval church-state, of commerce, of art, of intellectual and material progress? These must, it would seem, be treated if at all, in works on history, and until they are included along with the political changes history will remain a poor, inadequate, ill-understood subject.

A second and much more fundamental weakness of our history books is unfortunately only the natural outcome of the traditional conception of the purpose of history. History, as commonly understood, concerns itself not with the normal conduct and permanent achievements of mankind in the past. Like a sensational drama it purposely selects the extraordinary, the picturesque, the lurid as its theme. The newest book on France, issued by a hitherto peculiarly discriminating publishing house, and received with much good will by a facile press, well illustrates this view of the past. The annals of France, Mr. Watson observes,¹ will always command especial attention. “No other modern nation has undergone changes more frequent, more radical, more sudden, bloody, and dramatic.” Then, too: “No land has given birth to men more great, more good, more brave; none has been cursed with men more vile. No people have climbed higher in the arduous pathway of victory; none have been so pitilessly stricken down in defeat.” In short “France has furnished the epic poem of modern history.” Mr. Watson would therefore convince us

(1) *The Story of France*, New York, 1899; vol. i, pp. 13, 14.

that the more prodigious the occurrences narrated, the better the history. A distinguished chemist once told me that it seemed to him that the certitude of history varied in inverse ratio to what we knew about it. He might have added, with Mr. Watson's concurrence, that, in common with the black art, its intrinsic interest appeared to vary in direct ratio to its gruesomeness.

Ought history however to busy itself by preference with exceptional and romantic persons and episodes? Should it be an epic poem, or a serious consideration of the great contrasts between different ages and different peoples,—an effort to make plain the enduring rather than the fleeting? Ought the romantic events and conspicuous actors to be considered for their own sakes, just because they are romantic and famous and hence, it is assumed, worth knowing about, or ought they to be selected and presented so as most efficiently to illustrate the life of the people, their institutions, limitations, and habits of thought?

It is obvious, to one who has read the most popular works on European history, that their writers have not asked themselves this question. While some things are described because they are obviously important, many persons and events are included for no other reason than that they are striking. Marat will find a place where there is no room for Turgot. As much space will be given to the fall of the Girondists as to the invention of printing. Our best book for high schools and colleges gives about the same space to Charlotte Corday as to the Italian Renaissance of Art; the expedition of Charles V. against Tunis is given a page, a half page is deemed sufficient for the mediæval universities and a few lines more for the "Rise of Modern Languages and Literature."

In no other subject is fortuitous prominence accepted as a measure of educational value. The teacher of chemistry does not confine himself to pretty experiments, but conscientiously chooses the most typical and instructive ones. Metallic potassium and liquefied air are less common in the laboratory than water, lime

and sulphuric acid. What would be the opinion in regard to a clinical lecturer who dwelt upon leprosy and the bubonic plague for fear his students might be bored by a description of the symptoms of measles and typhoid? In every study except history the teacher seeks to make the important clear at any cost. All his expedients are directed to that one end. The rule, not the exception, is his object.

It is noteworthy, too, that we generally recognize the misleading character of descriptions of contemporaneous conditions in which only the sensational events are narrated. A full account of romantic marriages and tragic deaths; of the doings of poisoners, adulterers, and lunatics; of the cases of those who have swallowed needles to find them coming out at unexpected places years after; who have taken laudanum for paregoric, or were run over by beer wagons, furnishes, after all, but a partial, if diverting, picture of the life of a great city to-day. Yet Mr. Watson's description of the feudal system scarcely extends beyond dungeons,—“Oh how damp, dark and cold!”—knee-clamps and thumb-screws. The mediæval church was, we might infer, little more than the clever device of evil men to gratify greed and lasciviousness, and abounded in “humbugs, frauds, and bogus miracles.” To make true statements is not necessarily to tell the truth. We may, like the “yellow” journalist, narrate facts, but with such reckless disregard of perspective, and with such a consistent anxiety to startle at any cost, that unvarnished fiction would be preferable. A writer who, instead of endeavoring to make plain the true greatness of the church, says “Miraculous oil was common, portions of the true cross plentiful, and such objects as St. Anne's comb and the Virgin Mary's petticoat were accessible to the devout,” is guilty of gross misrepresentation within the bounds of formal accuracy.

Here a natural objection must be met. It may seem to the reader that I am advocating a necessarily ill-starred attempt to substitute the philosophy of history for history itself. This I

emphatically deny. The history I would favor must be concrete, vivid, intelligible. We ought, it is true, to select only instructive things from the unlimited treasury of the past, but the more interesting they are the better, so long as they make for an understanding of the period or country with which we are dealing. I would ardently recommend for educational purposes a different set of facts from those conventionally selected, but they would be facts none the less. To repeat an illustration of my own: "Heresy was long looked upon by the state as a crime worse than murder or high treason and treated accordingly," is a statement of fact, not a philosophical theory, and it is surely more significant than the statement that Charles VI. of France died in 1422, or that the battle of Marignano was fought in 1515. The one fact is a permanent acquisition, which serves to explain much that would otherwise be ill-understood; the others we may never have any use for, they are not self-luminous, and even professional students of history would in nine cases out of ten have to verify the dates in a book of reference.¹

As an illustration of what might be called the philosophy of history I cite a paragraph from Professor Patten.² "It is often stated that the Reformation was an offshoot of the Renaissance, but this implies a misunderstanding of the social forces that were reconstructing society. In a reversion the motor reactions of longest standing create the dominant motives, and force into a secondary place the newer motor tendencies that are the outcome of the economic pressure of the preceding epoch." Probably this idea could not be stated so simply that it would become appropriate for an outline of European history. Turning over a leaf or two we come, however, upon a bit of philosophic history which could, and should, be made plain to the general reader. "Judged by Protestant standards the church

(1) *Cf. Educational Review*, June, 1898.

(2) *The Development of English Thought*, pp. 86, 17.

of the fifteenth century was a failure. Yet these standards are partial, and those who use them judge an old civilization by the standards of a new one. Judged by the old standards the church of that time may be regarded as a success. * * * To view the church of that period primarily as a religious or a moral organization puts it in a wrong light. At bottom it was a civil institution, and it should be judged according to its civil and economic program. Each age has its aims and ideals, and if the church of the Middle Ages realized the social program set by the conditions of its time, it may justly claim to have been a success. The ideal of the church was to secure peace, and it rightly demanded obedience as a means to an end. The first duties of men were unquestioning obedience and humility in the presence of church authorities. It would have been impossible for the church to awe nations, to restrain rulers, to prevent local quarrels, and to check the aggressions of the strong except by educating every person to be obedient and humble when the authority of the church was interposed between him and the objects of his desire. The economic aims of the church were also fairly well realized. It provided food and shelter for workers, charity for the unfortunate, and relief from disease, plague, and famine, which were but too common in the Middle Ages."

In this second passage there is nothing inherently obscure or abstract in the ideas; they could be made plain and interesting by a simple re-statement and the use of illustrations. The thought is a momentous one, absolutely essential to an understanding of European history, whereas the causal relation between Renaissance and Reformation is an academic question, the solution of which is of no consequence to the general reader.

Professor Patten's warning that we must not judge the past by present standards suggests another fault of too many of our historians, both big and little. It is a want of that sympathy without which we can never see the past in its true light. It is easier to make sport of what now seem to us perverse habits and

institutions than to explain them. It is not the function of history to condemn off-hand long-enduring institutions like the celibacy of the clergy, the Inquisition, and the divine right of kings, but to discover on what ground they were supported by the best and most thoughtful men of old.

The most obvious defects, then, of the "Introductions" to European history at present in use are: (1) the careless inclusion of mere names which can have no possible meaning for the reader and which instead of stimulating thought and interest merely weigh down his spirit: (2) A *penchant*, more or less conscious, for the recital of political events, which precludes a comprehensive treatment of other equally important matters: (3) The narrative of extraordinary episodes, not because they illustrate the trend of affairs, or the life of the people, but simply because they are conspicuous in the annals of the past. This results in the absurd disregard of perspective which gives a demented journalist like Marat more space than Erasmus: (4) The application of nineteenth century standards to eleventh century expedients and a consequent failure to judge and explain the great enduring institutions of the past by the causes which gave rise to them.

A glance at the new histories of the United States, published in the last few years, will show better than anything else what must be done in order to bring the handbooks of European history up to the same standard. The writer who would blush with shame if he were surprised beginning the consideration of our Civil War with the fall of Fort Sumpter, or starting to trace our Revolution from the engagement at Lexington, will unquestionably open his account of the Renaissance with the fall of Constantinople, of the Reformation with Hallowe'en, 1517, and of the French Revolution with May 5th, 1789. When our books on European history have received that thoughtful, thorough-going revision which those relating to our own country are undergoing at the hands of highly trained specialists

and successful teachers, then we can hope to reap that abundant harvest of wisdom which comes from the study of other nations than our own. There are, indeed, some encouraging signs, but it will require the combined efforts of all those working in the vast field of continental history to solve the problem of producing an introduction to the subject at once cogent, intelligible, interesting, and true.

The partiality exhibited by our popular writers for certain classes of historical facts is obviously no proof that other and more pertinent facts should not be brought to the reader's attention. For it may be, as we have seen, that events are narrated simply because they are pleasing, or dramatic, or highly exceptional; or they may be mentioned because it is deemed proper that an educated man should know that Philip Augustus became king in 1180, and that the Battle of the Boyne was fought in 1660. But neither of these reasons is very weighty and a writer who is governed by them in his selection of material will naturally produce a book in which famous episodes and mildly diverting anecdotes are given a didactic seriousness by a proper admixture of dry, traditional information.

The business of an introduction to mediæval and modern European history destined for students and the public at large, whether it be in one volume or a dozen, should be the description and explanation of the most signal achievements of western civilization during the past thousand years; its purpose should be to make clear the salient characteristics of the culture of the Middle Ages and of the great changes which have since taken place, especially those we call the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Revolution; to tell how they came about and what they meant. Now, in order to accomplish this purpose, two great and fundamental innovations must be introduced which would, I believe, completely revolutionize the conceptions usually gained hitherto by the high school and college student and the history-reading public from the general works at their disposal. We must,

in the first place, devise some way of making plain the habitual conduct of mankind during each period, not simply man's exceptional and abnormal performances and the disasters which overtake him from time to time. Second, historical writers should not only emphasize the crises in human affairs, they must endeavor to elucidate the neglected transitional periods as well.

The fundamental defect of our accounts of Europe's past is that they treat the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, Reformation, and Revolution merely as a series of events, a record of heroic and shameful deeds. No serious effort is made to render the essential characteristics of the period or transformation clear. The natural result is that while the average intelligent reader may learn that Luther posted up his Theses on October 31st, 1517, that Charles V. was the grandson of Maximilian, and of Ferdinand and Isabella, that he was elected emperor in 1519, and fought with Francis I. over Milan and Burgundy,—while he may have heard of Adrian VI. and Clement VII., of the battle of Pavia, and the Diets of Worms and Augsburg, he may nevertheless be absolutely ignorant of the real character of the Protestant Revolt, and may never have heard of the accompanying conservative reformation. There is no time, and perhaps little inclination, to explain the root of the matter. It is carelessly assumed that the fundamental issues are self-explanatory and that only the notable occurrences need be enumerated in order to give a satisfactory and adequate conception of the time.

We are ordinarily taught to view mankind as in a periodic state of turmoil. Historical writers do all they can, by studied neglect, to disguise the importance of the lucid intervals, during which the greater part of human progress has taken place. They skip lightly from one commotion to another. They have not time to explain what the French Revolution was by rationally describing the ancient régime, which can alone give it any meaning, but after the quotation from La Bruyère regarding certain fierce animals, "black, livid, and burnt by the sun," and a repetition of

that careless phrase, "After us, the deluge," they hasten on to the Reign of Terror as the be-all and end-all of the bloody affair. And in this way we make a second St. Bartholomew's of one of the grandest and, in its essential reforms, most peaceful of changes which ever overtook France, or Europe. For the real revolution which deserves to be ranked with the Renaissance, the Protestant Revolt and the Catholic Reformation was practically accomplished by 1790. Obviously the significance of a revolution is to be measured by the extent to which conditions were changed and new things substituted for the old. The old must, therefore, be studied quite as carefully as the new—more carefully, indeed, since our sympathies are ever with the new, and our knowledge of the more recent is fuller than that of the more remote. Hence we might far better busy ourselves with the reasons why arbitrary imprisonments, the guilds, the sale of offices, and so forth, were defended by many thoughtful, earnest citizens, than waste time in a gratuitous denunciation of them.

I know that at this point the perfectly natural objection may and will be raised, that while institutions and gradual developments may be very legitimate objects of study for those already trained in historical work, they are not proper subjects for any one except a university student or an occasional serious-minded and long-suffering general reader. Only conspicuous events and striking crises are, it is ordinarily assumed, within the scope of natural human interest, and the influence of the personal element must, it is urged, be exaggerated, simply because the general trend of development and progress offers nothing which the mind can easily grasp. We therefore substitute for the real historical continuity a factitious continuity and string our events upon a line of kings,—Magnus VI. (1263–1281) followed by Erick II. (1281–1299), followed by Hakon V. (1299–1320), followed by Magnus VII. (1320–1365). No one will deny, however, that most of the names in even the best known dynasties remain mere names, and even if we learn that Emperor Rudolph II. was a

learned man and an astrologer and his contemporary Henry III. of France "a debauched weakling," this knowledge in no way aids us in grasping the most fundamental and valuable truth which the past has to teach us, that of historical continuity.

Those therefore who would view with the greatest distrust any attempt radically to alter our current methods of presenting general history, would probably withdraw their opposition to a change if some scheme could be devised by which conditions and institutions could be made interesting and comprehensible, and a real casual continuity be substituted for the kingly *nexus* with which we now bind the past together. Now I firmly believe that "institutions" (which are after all only national habits) can be made interesting. I use the word "institutions" in a very broad sense to include the ways in which people have thought and acted in the past, their tastes and their achievements in many fields besides the political. Events are the more or less clear expression of "institutions" in this sense, and the events properly selected will serve to make the "institutions" clear.

Hitherto we have dealt with events for their own sake; a deeper insight will surely lead us, as time goes on, to reject the anomalous and seemingly accidental occurrences and dwell rather upon those which illustrate some profound historical truth. And there is a very simple principle by which the educationally relevant may be determined and the irrelevant rejected. Is the fact or occurrence one from which some valuable conclusions may be drawn which will aid the reader to grasp the meaning of any great period of human development, or the true nature of any momentous institution? It should then be cherished as a precious means to an end, and the more engaging it is the better, its inherent interest will only facilitate our work, not embarrass it. On the other hand, is an event seemingly fortuitous, isolated and anomalous, like the story of Rienzi, the September massacres, or the murder of Marat? We should then hesitate to include it on its own merits, for, interesting as it may be as an heroic or terrible inci-

dent, it will take up space in a short work, every line of which will be needed to make tolerably clear the prevailing interest and preoccupations and the permanent achievements of the past.

It will obviously be impossible, in rewriting our histories with this broader program before us, to satisfy those who cling to the belief that the main value of the study of history is to furnish an outline of events, chiefly political. Yet, while events cannot be narrated for their own sake, many of the most cherished incidents may be used, like lantern slides in a properly illustrated lecture, to make historical conditions and institutions plain and living to the reader.

Having now indicated the most conspicuous vices of the long accepted mode of introducing the reader to the study of history, European history in particular, and having suggested certain principles which must be acted upon if the study is to yield its full benefits, I will venture, most tentatively indeed, to give a few examples of the class of subjects which it seems to me might profitably be selected. I shall choose my illustrations, as hitherto, from the several stages in the progress of European culture since the Middle Ages.

We can already see the beginning of a hopeful revolution in our methods. No one, for example, can read Professor George B. Adams' "Civilization During the Middle Ages" without perceiving the great gulf which is fixed between the old and the new conceptions of what is best worth knowing of Europe in the past. How could a teacher be better occupied than in imparting and illustrating such a truth as the following? Mediæval history is the history of "the process by which the German was brought into the classical world and by which out of the two,—the Roman civilization and the German energy and vigor and productive power, and new ideas and institutions,—a new organic unity was formed—modern society. This was the problem; to make out of the barbarized sixth century stagnant and fragmentary, with little common life, without ideals or enthusiasms, the fifteenth

century in full possession again of a common world civilization, keen, pushing and enthusiastic. This was what the Middle Ages had to do and this was what they did."¹

In order to follow this process we must know something of mediæval institutions, we must at least have a correct, if elementary, notion of the two greatest and most characteristic products of the Middle Ages, feudalism, and the mediæval church; for not only are the Middle Ages a blank without them, but the history of Europe down to the French Revolution is inexplicable unless we understand them. They are the two keys which alone can unlock the past.

By illustrations, examples, and typical incidents, the salient peculiarities of the feudal organization, which it took Europe so many centuries to outgrow, ought to be made clear and comprehensible. The fundamental characteristic of feudalism, the association of personal, governmental, and property relations, should be contrasted with our modern notion of citizen and state, and our simple system of land tenure.

As to the church, no intelligent student of the past will be inclined to question the statement that it is incomparably the most important single institution with which we have to deal during the period of which we are speaking. The reader must learn how there came to be a pope who was in stern reality "a king of kings," who deposed emperors and might "absolve subjects from their fealty to wicked men." He should behold the church militant "as an army encamped on the soil of Christendom, with its outposts everywhere, subject to the most efficient discipline, with a common purpose, every soldier panoplied with inviolability and armed with the tremendous weapons which slew the soul."² When once he grasped this idea, however imperfectly, he will possess the secret of a great part of European history

(1) *Op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

(2) *Lee's History of the Inquisition*, vol. i, p. 4.

down to our own century. Without it his picture of the past must unavoidably remain blurred, distorted, and absurdly inadequate. When Hamlet is left out, the conduct of the rest of the actors will seem but meaningless gesticulation. Yet how fantastic is the description in our shorter histories of this most majestic and powerful of all historic human creations,—in which the inmost life and highest social and intellectual aspirations of western Christendom during ten long centuries are mirrored.

Instead of viewing the church as the very center and embodiment of mediæval culture it is represented as little more than an arrogant conspiracy of worldly-minded men to usurp the powers of a beneficent and divinely ordained state. The future was, indeed, with the state, but that should not blind us to the fact that it was the church rather than the warring secular rulers which made for peace, good order, and the fundamental benefits of security of person and property. The theory of certain churchmen that civil government was devil-born, the invention of Cain and Nimrod, doubtless seemed to an impartial observer of the eleventh century amply borne out by experience. It was the church, not the incipient and still chaotic state, which established the Truce of God. When our Protestant writers come to the Lutheran Revolt they must necessarily speak of the church again, but a page or two on indulgences, dispensations, and drunken monks, an allusion to "the chained Bible," and the veneration in which the "comb of St. Anne and the Virgin's petticoat" were held, suffices to explain Luther and the revolution named after him. Of course it is not easy to see from this data why a great part of Europe never accepted Luther's ideas, why upright, conscientious, and clear-sighted scholars perversely clung to the absurd anachronism of the mediæval church, or gladly returned to its bosom after a temporary enthusiasm for the teachers of Wittenberg. Nor can this possibly become intelligible until the traditional partisan conception of the church is replaced by an impartial, scholarly estimate of the true greatness of the majestic

organization under whose auspices Europe advanced from the barbarism of the tenth to the enlightenment of the sixteenth century.

The subject is undeniably a difficult, and to some it will seem a ticklish, one. Yet its importance forces us to attempt to overcome the obstacles, the seriousness of which can easily be overestimated. For there is much that is concrete and readily understood in the cunningly devised constitution of this most singular international institution, and the sources and extent of its power can be illustrated in a thousand ways. The governmental, economic, and educational functions of the church should be emphasized, and only such dogmas as played a conspicuous historical rôle and exercised an obviously practical social and political influence should, of course, be discussed. Every effort must be made to represent the mediæval church as the natural and inevitable outcome of the times in which it attained its highest development, and to show that it enjoyed the practically unanimous recognition of high and low, in the same way that all of us today, except the anarchist, acknowledges the right of the state to be. If the historian will keep in mind that the church, in spite of the evil conduct of some of its officials and the acknowledged defects in its constitution, was cherished by all loyal Christians, just as we honor our federal Constitution and yet bitterly denounce the policy of individual senators or members of the cabinet, he will be able to make the history of Huss and Luther intelligible even to the school boy.

Our treatment of the Middle Ages should, then, be so ordered that both church and feudalism should seem real and plausible. We are, as I have already said, too prone to emphasize the evils of institutions which have passed away or are not in accord with our modern conceptions. While the abuses in a system may to some extent explain why it was discarded or modified, they can never explain why it existed. For example, the sources of dissatisfaction with the church and the terrible misuse by its officials

of their prerogatives ought in the interest of historic truth to be presented in proper relation to the advantages of the ecclesiastical organization which the thoughtful men of the period, with very few exceptions, agreed in believing to be far more essential to mankind than the civil government.

In no way can the strength and weakness of the mediæval church be so advantageously and fairly presented as in connection with that hopeful but unsuccessful effort to reform the church at the Council of Constance. Every one was then anxious to better the church, the abuses and the scandalous conduct of its officials were discussed without any reservations and yet with a profound conviction that its constitution and its fundamental doctrines were unimpeachable because divinely ordained. Hence by studying the situation at Constance, we can get some inkling at least of how the right-minded, clear-sighted observer of the Middle Ages viewed the most powerful of the institutions under which he lived. Without such an inkling the Protestant Revolt must remain inexplicable. Protestant polemic, upon which we consciously or unconsciously rely for our views of mediæval church, may explain why Luther and Calvin led their revolt but it can never explain the persistent loyalty to the "scarlet woman" of many equally good and wise men,—of whole nations, indeed,—in no way inferior in enlightenment to the people of Northern Germany or England.

But feudalism and the mediæval church are not the only things which Europe has been outgrowing during the past five centuries. One who is intent upon learning something of the great achievements of mankind must have a general idea of the intellectual conditions preceding the Renaissance, of that wonderful enthusiasm for learning in the thirteenth century which produced the universities. He should know what studies were reckoned highest in those days, what old books were most esteemed and oftenest read, and what kinds of new books were written, such as the encyclopedias, the wonderful "Summa" of

Aquinas, and the treatises of Roger Bacon. The reading of a few of the "Carmina Burana" might, I venture to think, remove more fundamental illusions from the mind of the average reader than a volume upon the political changes of the thirteenth century. Our idea of the reawakening of Europe from its long winter sleep at Petrarch's call (or, as is still commonly taught, by the advent of the Greeks after the fall of Constantinople) will have to be modified, of course, as we come to see that people had been wide-awake for a century or two earlier. A study of the Renaissance nevertheless gives an admirable opportunity for contrasting mediæval and modern thought in their more easily comprehensible phases. Petrarch's letters give a picturesque account of the difficulties of readers and writers before the invention of printing, and there is plenty of other material so vivid and concrete that there should be no difficulty in arousing the interest of even an indolent or immature mind, and in making clear the great essential changes of the time, literary and artistic. When we come to base our "introductions" on Dante's "Banquet," Petrarch's "Letters," Vespasiano's and Vasari's "Lives," Machiavelli's "Prince," Castiglione's "Courtier," and Cellini's "Autobiography," we shall be on the high-road to gaining what is best worth knowing about the Renaissance, even if we do not know whether Sicily belonged to Aragon or Naples in 1405, or when Florence seized Pisa.

The development of the towns and the significance of urban conditions are peculiarly important matters and are easily made comprehensible. The spirit, organization and influence of the guilds can be made clear and interesting and a little knowledge of them must form part of the ideal "introduction." Nor can we neglect sundry economic influences such as the effects of a wider use of money and the extension of commerce and industry.

In treating the Reformation it is important to show how patriotic, financial and political motives combined with the purely religious in promoting the revolt. The conservative reformation

which was in progress, especially in Spain and Germany, before Luther's public appearance, should be described and the aversion aroused by Luther's doctrine of exclusive justification by faith and consequent rejection of "good works," explained. The reader must not, moreover, be left with the totally erroneous notion that Protestantism originally stood for toleration and intellectual enlightenment, or that progress has been confined mainly to Protestant countries. Luther, Melanchton and Calvin were as scandalized by the blasphemous suggestions of Copernicus as any of their Catholic contemporaries. The formulation or reassertion of certain dogmas at the Council of Trent would furnish an appropriate close to the discussion of the elements of the religious struggle.

Any outline of modern European history would naturally include a brief review of the territorial and dynastic struggles culminating in the war of the Spanish Succession. Here the accumulation of the Hapsburg possessions and the foreign policy of France serve as a type of much of the political history which we have been forced to omit for want of space. The two really important points for the general reader to grasp during the succeeding period are, first, the reform movement in France, culminating in the decree abolishing the feudal system, in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and in the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, for these represent permanent gains; second, the manner in which the Napoleonic régime laid the foundation of the Europe of today.

The unification of Germany and Italy, the development of the Eastern question, and the other political phenomena of this century, are usually more satisfactorily treated than any portion of continental history. In regard to this period I have no suggestions to make. We are likely to get an idea of the all-important industrial development of our time in considering the history of our own country.

The foregoing suggestions are not intended to serve as a guide

in rewriting the history of Europe; they are only illustrations of a broader conception of the "elements" of history, hints of the resources which we may draw upon when once we free ourselves from the trammels of tradition. It would therefore be unfair to reject the ideas which underlie the sketch as fantastic and impracticable simply because the examples used seem infelicitous or show, it may seem to some, a false perspective. Much experimentation will doubtless be necessary before the elements of European history, in the deepest and truest sense, can be clearly and comprehensively presented. The observation, however, of a few hitherto neglected principles would insure a hopeful progress on the part of writers and teachers.

These principles may be summed up as follows: European history should not be regarded as primarily a chronicle of past events nor should it be exclusively, or chiefly, political. It should, on the contrary, be so treated that the reader might acquire some understanding of the greatest achievements of western Europe during the last millenium in *all* the more important fields of human interest. The Greek grammar of Chrysoloras is quite as well worth knowing about as the Peace of Basle; Raphael as John of Gaunt. The institutions of the past, social, political, educational, artistic, economic, such as the feudal régime, absolute monarchy, the mediæval university, the guilds, above all the church must be carefully and sympathetically explained, for otherwise history becomes a mere confusion of names and dates. The Middle Ages, Renaissance, Reformation, and Revolution should be dealt with not as a series of events but *an und für sich*, with the aim of making clear the nature and spirit of each. Transitional periods during which a great part of human progress is made should be given due consideration. The importance of past facts should no longer be measured by the traditional, popular standard of conspicuousness but should be so selected and presented as to increase and clarify the reader's understanding of the prevailing conditions of a given period, and,

conversely, "unorganizable" facts, as Spencer calls them, from which no corollaries can be deduced, should be consistently omitted.

Lastly it must never be forgotten that the reader will often make no farther systematic study of the subject after he lays down his "introduction." In that case he should obviously be provided not with a scheme of classification to be filled out later, but, so far as is possible, with the results themselves. My whole contention may be summed up in the plea that the general reader and the boys and girls in our high schools and colleges be brought directly in contact with the living past, in the generous hope of immediate fruition. "The outlines of history," its "leading facts," as usually conceived, constitute at best the viaticum for a journey—a journey, too, which is frequently never taken.



SOME ASPECTS OF RECENT BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

EDMUND B. WILSON, *Columbia University.*



It is now nearly twenty-five years since Huxley, in his introduction to an address on the border-land between animals and plants, made the assertion that "In the whole history of science there is nothing more remarkable than the rapidity of the growth of biological knowledge within the last half century, and the extent of the modification which has thereby been effected in some of the fundamental conceptions of the naturalist." In passing this judgment the great English naturalist seems to have had in mind, first, the assured triumph of the theory of organic evolution and the profound impress it had set on every field of thought; second, the discovery of the fundamental relations between animals and plants, and third, the establishment of the cell-theory and the recognition of protoplasm as the physical basis of life. In the popular view there is probably nothing in the history of the past twenty-five years of biological research to surpass or even to equal these three achievements. And yet could Huxley to-day review the immense progress that has been made since those words were spoken he would have good reason to repeat them with an added emphasis; for at no period in the history of biology have more searching and varied inquiries been made into the organization and activities of living things, and if

the resulting discoveries have thus far attracted less general attention than those of a somewhat earlier period it is only because they lie in a field further removed from the realm of common experience.

Among these discoveries those which have done most for the advancement of biology in its more general aspects and opened the greatest number of new lines of research, relate to the structure and physiological activities of protoplasm and the nature of the microscopic structural elements known as *cells*, of which every living part of the body consists. The cellular structure of plants and animals was dimly perceived two centuries ago by those pioneers of microscopical research, Leeuwenhoek, Malpighi, Grew, Hooke, and their followers. It was not, however, until the wave of modern scientific inquiry, set in motion during the first three decades of the nineteenth century, was under full headway, that a clear view was attained of the limitless vista of research in this field that had been disclosed to the naturalist by the microscope. The story of the foundation of the cell-theory by Schleiden and Schwann in 1839-40, of its development by Remak, Kölliker, Nägeli, Virchow and other investigators of their time, has often been told; yet even to-day, when that theory has become the very foundation of biological study and has produced results of which its founders could not have dreamed, one returns again and again, almost with a sense of envy, to the record of that earlier period of its history, so full of fresh interest to those who were the leaders of research, and of such abiding significance to all who in later years followed the paths that they marked out.

It would, however, lead us too far afield to trace the history of the discoveries that led to the identification of protoplasm as the physical basis of life and of the cell as the immediate arena of its manifold activities. We need only recall that this had thirty years ago become one of the most essential parts of the established groundwork of biological science. The cell had even then established its position as the last court of appeal for the decision

of every question relating to the deeper problems of life. It had been shown that the body of every higher plant or animal is composed of a vast host of microscopic protoplasmic masses, the cells, while in the lowest and simplest organisms the entire body consists of one such cell; that out of cells, or their products, every part is built; and that, widely as they vary in the details of structure and function, all the cells are constructed upon the same general plan and exhibit the same fundamental modes of activity. Cells were thus recognized as primary structural and physiological units in the activities of which lie the sources of the normal bodily functions, while to their perversion may be traced the causation of disease. Beyond this the pregnant fact had step by step become established that cells never arise *de novo*, as a crystal forms in the mother-liquid, but are formed only by division of preëxisting cells. All the cells of the body have thus arisen by unbroken descent from their common progenitor, the egg-cell, and the latter is itself but a division-product of a cell preëxisting in the parent-body. Microscopical research thus brought to light the wonderful fact that the cell is not only the seat of vital activity, but is also the vehicle of hereditary transmission; and further, that the life of successive generations of living beings shows no breach of continuity, but forms a continuous vital stream in which, as Virchow said, rules an "eternal law of continuity."

In the early seventies, while these discoveries were still fresh, the interest of biologists was from every side focused upon the cell; but even then a sense of the immensity and importance of the field still unexplored had hardly dawned in the minds of investigators. It was through the microscopical studies of a small group of observers at that time that the revelation was made of a complex organization within the cell, which forms a field of research as vast as that existing in the more obvious structures and activities of the organism. Foremost among these new researches were those of Auerbach, Fol, Bütschli, Hertwig,

Flemming, Strasburger and Van Beneden; and it is significant of the newness of the branch of investigation that they founded, that all but the first two of these observers still live to see the fruit of their labor and hold their place among its recognized leaders. The significance and fruitfulness of these researches lay in their intensive character, in their aim to penetrate further into the mechanism of the individual organism, rather than to generalize from the more superficial comparative study of many forms. The surprising revelations thus made of the finer structures and activities of the living body, gave an impetus that has urged cellular biology forward at ever increasing pace during the past twenty-five years, and inaugurated a new era of research whose horizon is steadily widening at the present day. No less important than this morphological work were researches on the chemistry and physiology of the cell, begun nearly at the same time, which at the present moment are assuming proportions of the first magnitude and have led to some of the most remarkable discoveries of recent years.

In attempting to indicate to the non-professional reader the general nature and bearing of these researches I shall consider a few of the results attained along the following three distinct though related lines of work: (1) The structure of protoplasm and the cell and the functional relations of its different parts; (2) The physiological relations of the cell to its environment; (3) The physiological relations of the individual cell to its fellows and to the whole organism of which it forms a part. As will appear these subjects involve the significance of the cell not only as a member of the living adult body, but also as the essential element in development and inheritance.

A cell is rarely what the name indicates, a hollow chamber, but is essentially a minute solid mass consisting of a mixture of highly complex substances collectively known as *protoplasm* and containing a smaller rounded body known as the *nucleus*. The protoplasmic mass is in many cases surrounded by a wall or cap-

sule; but this is often wanting and forms no essential part of the cell itself. Protoplasm and nucleus form a living unit, and both are necessary to the complete and continued life of the cell. This has been proved by "microscopical vivisection." Minute and susceptible as living cells are, they have in many cases been dissected apart in such a way as to separate protoplasm and nucleus. This seemingly impossible operation has been performed in various ways. One-celled animals one fiftieth of an inch in length or less, (infusoria and rhizopods) have been actually cut by the scalpel into two pieces one of which alone contains the nucleus; and the same operation has been performed upon the still smaller egg (which is a single cell) of the sea-urchin and other marine animals. The same result has been attained by shaking living eggs to pieces, or by subjecting the cells of plants to the action of sugar and other solutions by which they are "plasmolyzed" and thus induced to break to pieces. All these experiments have afforded the same general result. In every case the piece of protoplasm that is deprived of a nucleus loses the power of nutrition and growth and ultimately perishes. On the other hand the cell-fragment containing a nucleus, or even a fragment of a nucleus, heals its wounds, restores the integrity of all its parts and continues its activity unimpaired. We are thus justified in the conclusion, which doubtless applies to all forms of cells, that both nucleus and protoplasm are essential to complete cell-activity. The experiment gives, however, another and not less important result. Balbiani, Hofer, Verworn and Gruber made the highly interesting discovery that although the protoplasmic fragment (of an *Amoeba* or an infusorian) deprived of a nucleus ultimately dies through loss of the power of nutrition, it may nevertheless for many days continue to move, to swim, or creep about, and to respond to stimuli from the external world. It is thus demonstrated that although a mass of protoplasm, devoid of nucleus lacks some of the most essential properties of life, it nevertheless retains for a time such characteristic powers as

contractility and irritability; and since both the latter involve the liberation of energy by destructive chemical action we may further safely assume that such a protoplasmic fragment performs also the functions of respiration and excretion, both of which are the necessary accompaniments of destructive action in protoplasm. In the absence of the nucleus protoplasm lacks, however, one of the most characteristic of all vital activities; namely, the *constructive power* by which the waste is made good, and new protoplasm formed, and by which the nucleated cell-fragment is rebuilt into a perfect cell. We thus reach one of the most fundamental results thus far attained by cell-research, namely, that the nucleus plays some essential rôle in the synthetic cell-processes, involving not only the chemical operations of constructive metabolism but also the coördination of growth and other factors of morphological (as opposed to chemical) synthesis.

The full significance of the above conclusion only becomes apparent when we turn to the phenomena involved in the origin of cells. As early as 1855 Virchow generalized the facts up to that time determined in this direction in the aphorism *omnis cellula e cellula*, which has now become one of the watchwords of biological science; for all later researches have sustained the conclusion that every cell arises by division of a preëxisting cell, and in no other way. But beyond this it was even at that time probable and has since been abundantly demonstrated that division of the cell involves division not only of the protoplasmic mass as a whole but also that of the nucleus; in other words, the nucleus, too, is never formed *de novo* but arises only by division of the nucleus of the mother-cell. From this it follows that every nucleus of the body is a descendant of that of the egg which in its turn is derived by division of a nucleus in the parent-body.

This conclusion leads to a consideration of a capital discovery, relating to the fertilization of the egg, with which the modern era of cell-research may be said to begin. This discovery, for which ground had been prepared by the observations of Warneck,

Bütschli and Van Beneden, was made by Oscar Hertwig in 1875 in the egg of the sea-urchin, and has been confirmed by innumerable subsequent observers in animals and plants representing almost every known group. The essential fact is that in the fertilization of the egg a single cell derived from the father, (the spermatozoön) unites with a single cell (the egg) derived from the mother, while the *paternal nucleus unites with the maternal*. By continued division of the single cell thus formed arise all the cells of the body. If now we examine the details of this process we find one remarkable difference between egg and spermatozoön, namely, that while the two contribute equally to the *nucleus* of the fertilized germ, the whole, or very nearly the whole, of the remaining cell-substance (protoplasm) is supplied by the egg. We have thus a substantial basis for the conclusion that the protoplasm of the embryo is derived wholly or mainly from the mother, while the nuclei are equally derived from both parents. If this result be placed beside those derived from microscopical vivisection, described above, we gain for the first time a clear if superficial view of the mechanism of inheritance, and can form a definite mental picture of the manner in which it is effected. The studies of Darwin, Galton and others, have shown that there is no peculiarity of structure or function in any part of the body too slight to escape the influence of either parent or both by inheritance. The physical correlative of this conclusion lies in the fact that the cells of which every part of the body is built contain nuclei derived by unbroken descent from a nucleus that is equally of paternal and of maternal origin. On this fact Hertwig and Strasburger based the conclusion that the nucleus must be regarded as the vehicle of inheritance; and this result is made intelligible through the experimental evidence that the nucleus is especially involved in the constructive activity of the cell through which new protoplasm is formed. We are thus enabled to form some conception, however imperfect, of the manner in which both parents affect the whole development of the child and may exert an influence upon every detail of its organization.

Hertwig's conclusion was strongly supported by the work of Van Beneden, whose results have suggested innumerable further problems. Building upon the basis laid by Flemming, Hertwig and Strasburger the great Belgian observer followed in detail, in 1883 and 1887, the transformations of the nucleus itself during fertilization. The object employed by Van Beneden was the highly favorable egg of *Ascaris*, a thread-worm parasitic in the horse; but his splendid discoveries, confirmed and extended by Boveri and many others, have been found to hold good for so great a number of other animals and plants that there can be no doubt of their general applicability throughout the plant and animal kingdoms. As the paternal and maternal nuclei approach each other within the egg each undergoes a complicated metamorphosis and finally resolves itself into a number of rod-like or worm-like bodies known as the *chromosomes*, which are exactly equal in number and similar in form in the two. At this period, therefore, the egg no longer contains two nuclei but in their place two precisely similar groups of chromosomes, which are respectively paternal and maternal in origin. As the egg undergoes its first division to form the first two cells of the embryo, every chromosome in each group splits lengthwise into exactly similar halves, which separate and pass one to each of the daughter-cells. Each of the latter, therefore, receives two similar groups of daughter-chromosomes, paternal and maternal, which are exactly duplicated in the other cell; and from these two groups, in each cell, is built a daughter-nucleus shown by its mode of origin to be equally derived from both parents. At the second division the chromosomes reappear, again split lengthwise, and the halves are again equally distributed to the daughter-nuclei, and so on throughout the entire growth of the animal. Even before Van Beneden's work Flemming and Strasburger had observed the formation and splitting of the chromosomes in the division of tissue-cells ("karyokinesis" or "mitosis"); and later observers have demonstrated that this is a phenomenon of general occur-

rence. One remarkable fact has fixed the attention of all later observers, namely, that the number of chromosomes is always the same in a given species; and further, in sexually-produced organisms this number is *always an even one*—for example, twenty-four in the lily and the frog, sixteen in the onion, thirty-four in the snail, thirty-six in the shark, and so on. This fact becomes at once intelligible in the light of Van Beneden's work; for the even number of chromosomes seems only explicable under the assumption that they are the direct descendants of those in the fertilized egg, and the latter are necessarily even in number since equally derived from two parents. We have thus strong ground for the conclusion that all the nuclei of the body are equally derived from those of the two parents, and this conclusion has received most convincing support from a large number of experimental and other researches too extended to be here reviewed.

It would be impossible to give, even in the briefest form, a review of the vast number of researches that followed along the path marked out by Van Beneden's memorable discoveries, but we may briefly consider one further point that leads directly to an inquiry into the ultimate organization of living matter. There is no feature of living bodies more remarkable or characteristic than their origin by the division of preëxisting bodies of the same kind; and upon this fact rests not only hereditary transmission, as indicated above, but the unbroken continuity of life itself. Upon what does this power of division depend? Before giving a possible answer to this question we may glance at the broader problem of the fundamental organization of protoplasm. A considerable number of biologists have held, and many still hold, that we have no reason to ascribe to living matter a structure different in kind from that of non-living matter. Protoplasm is conceived by them as a complex mixture of substances differing from inorganic matter only in their high molecular complexity. But on the other hand a still greater number of biological thinkers have concluded that many of the vital phenomena, such as

those of growth, of protoplasmic contractility, and especially those of reproduction, drive us to the assumption of ultimate protoplasmic units or elements that are not single molecules but groups, perhaps very complex groups, of molecules. This conception, a prototype of which is found in many of the earlier writers, was first systematically developed by Herbert Spencer in his acutely reasoned hypothesis of "physiological units."¹ It was elaborated and raised to the rank of a weighty working hypothesis by the botanist Nägeli,² who concluded that the phenomena of growth are only explicable under the assumption that protoplasm consists of molecular groups, or "micellæ" surrounded by layers of water. The hypothesis of Spencer and Nägeli, while postulating a highly complex structure in protoplasm, still assumed nothing more than a difference of degree between this structure and that of other substances. But to this hypothesis a second assumption has been added by other writers which, if well-founded, ascribes to living matter an organization for which it is difficult to find a parallel in the structure of non-living matter. This assumption appears in somewhat vague form in Darwin's theory of pangenesis,³ but was first systematically developed by De Vries and Wiesner and still further expanded by Weismann. It is namely, the view that the ultimate protoplasmic units possess the powers of *growth and division*, and that we must here seek the ultimate source of the power of division that is universally characteristic of the cell as a whole.

Space does not suffice for a review of the evidence pointing towards this hypothesis which was primarily suggested by the facts of heredity and variation; but we may briefly consider that derived from the facts of cell-division. As has been shown above, the cell does not simply divide as a whole

(1) *Principles of Biology*, 1864.

(2) *Theorie der Abstammungslehre*, 1884.

(3) *Variation of Animals and Plants*, 1868.

but through the separate division of both nucleus and protoplasm. The nucleus, too, does not undergo a mere mass-division but resolves itself into dividing units of a lower order, namely, the chromosomes. But research has not halted here; for it has clearly shown that in some cases, at least, the chromosomes themselves are compound bodies, consisting of still smaller masses, arranged like beads on a string, which in their turn divide and thus cause the splitting of the chromosome. These smallest visible dividing elements are of extreme minuteness and it is only a matter of conjecture whether they in turn consist of bodies smaller still. However this may be, our study of nuclear division reveals to us, not a homogeneous dividing mass but a descending series of dividing elements which, as if seen through an inverted telescope, recede from the eye almost to the limits of microscopical vision. There is no reason to place the limit of this series at the point where it vanishes from view, and we are thus almost irresistibly driven to the conclusion that the division of the nuclear substance as a whole must be the result of division on the part of invisible elements, by the aggregation of which the visible structures are formed, and which can only be called molecules by considerably amplifying the meaning of the word.

A similar conclusion has been reached in case of the protoplasm or extra-nuclear part of the cell; but the evidence is here less obvious and convincing than in case of the nucleus, and this must be recognized as the present weak point in the hypothesis. It is, however, certain that the protoplasm of some forms of cells contains minute bodies that multiply by division, examples of which are the so-called "plastids" (including the green chlorophyll-grains and the starch-forming corpuscles) and a remarkable body known as the "centrosome," the nature of which is now under active discussion. The plastids are sometimes very numerous and very minute; and this was one of the principal facts on which DeVries and Wiesner were first led to the general hypothesis under consideration. There are, however, many forms of

cells in which no plastids or other dividing protoplasmic bodies have been observed, and it must be admitted that observation gives us but scanty direct evidence of such a protoplasmic organization as the hypothesis assumes. As applied to the extra-nuclear cell-substance the hypothesis rests mainly on indirect evidence which at present seems hardly sufficient to justify the elaborate speculative conclusions which Hertwig, Weismann and others have based upon it. The general hypothesis remains, therefore, without adequate proof; yet it has so many facts in its favor that it must be recognized as a strongly supported working hypothesis, and one which suggests many interesting lines of further research. Should it be sustained it would give us one of the clearest lines of distinction between the living and the non-living substances.

We turn now to a widely different line of inquiry relating to the physiological relation of the cell as a whole to the environment; and it is here that some of the most beautiful results of physiological experiment have recently been obtained. That the adjustments between organism and environment are brought about through the agency of cells has long been a familiar conception; but only within the past decade have physiologists fully awakened to the fundamental importance of experiments upon the isolated cell. The cell, like the organism at large, maintains a state of moving equilibrium with the environment, continually receiving chemical and physical stimuli from the latter, continually responding to those stimuli by modes of activity conditioned by its own organization. These relations have been studied of late years especially by means of experiments on organisms consisting permanently of a single cell (Protozoa, and so forth), and on the egg-cell, which is an organism temporarily one-celled. So numerous and so novel have been the results thus attained that we have witnessed the foundation of what may almost be regarded as two new biological sciences, namely, cell-physiology and experimental embryology. We can here do no more than glance

at one or two of the results thus attained, which must serve as illustrations of the methods employed.

Foremost in interest among these stands the recent discovery of Loeb that the egg may be fertilized by chemical stimulus, without participation of the male element. The first definite experiments on the effect of chemical solutions on the egg were made by the Hertwig brothers thirteen years ago and have been continued especially by Herbst, Richard Hertwig, Morgan, and Loeb. The experiments of Herbst in particular, gave an almost startling revelation of the profound effect upon the egg produced by apparently insignificant alterations in the chemical environment. If, for example, the eggs of sea-urchins be allowed to develop in sea-water containing a very slight excess of potassium chloride the development of the embryo is greatly altered, no skeleton is formed, and a larva results which though living and vigorous is of widely different form from the normal ones. If, in place of potassium chloride, lithium chloride be added to the water, the changes are still more remarkable, the embryo never infolding the cells which normally give rise to the alimentary canal but developing, as it were, inside out. These monstrous forms are of course incapable of nourishing themselves and ultimately perish; but the result is of high interest as opening the possibility of creating wholly new organic forms by varying slightly the conditions of development. The way for Loeb's discovery was paved by the experiments of Richard Hertwig and Morgan who showed that if unfertilized eggs be treated by weak solutions of various substances, such as sodium chloride, magnesium chloride, or strychnine, they undergo some of the preparatory changes of division, and Morgan showed that they might actually divide, though without producing an embryo.

In experiments carried on last year at the Wood's Hole Biological Laboratory Loeb finally succeeded in rearing large numbers of perfect larvæ from eggs which, without fertilization, are first treated with a weak solution of magnesium chloride and

then transferred to normal sea-water. Carried out under rigidly controlled conditions, these decisive experiments show that the egg is capable of complete development, without union with a spermatozoön, as a result of chemical stimulus; and they indicate that even in normal fertilization we must regard the stimulus to development as being given by a specific substance or substances carried by the spermatozoön. This result is less surprising than it seems at first sight; for it has long been known that the eggs of a number of animals, (bees, plant-lice, some crustaceans) are capable, under certain conditions, of development without fertilization,—*i. e.*, by “parthenogenesis,”—and it is probable that here, too, the stimulus may be due to changed chemical conditions affecting the egg through the processes of nutrition. Loeb’s highly interesting further experiments, together with the slightly earlier ones of Herbst, indicate that the normal equilibrium of the egg depends upon an equilibrium of chemical conditions in the protoplasm which is maintained by the conditions of the environment. The experiments give ground for the remarkable conclusion that the substances dissolved in the sea-water are individually poisonous to the egg but are normally so balanced as to neutralize one another’s injurious effects and maintain the equilibrium of the egg. If this armed neutrality be disturbed the egg responds, undergoing degenerative changes and dying if the change be too violent, passing through an abnormal development and giving rise to monstrous embryos if the new conditions be less unfavorable, but under appropriate stimulus being as it were released from bondage and rendered free to run its normal course of development.

It is certain that new results of the highest interest, relating to the chemical conditions in living matter, may be looked for along the lines of research thus opened. One of the most interesting specific problems in this direction is the long-standing one of sex-determination. Experiments on insects, frogs, and rotifers

have already given good ground for the conclusion that sex is in these cases determined by conditions of nutrition, which again in the long run are reducible to chemical conditions. The possibility is thus opened that we may yet succeed not only in fertilizing the egg by chemical means but also in rendering the organism male or female by analogous methods. A highly interesting question, still undetermined, is whether organisms produced by artificial parthenogenesis, as above, are capable of reaching the adult condition and of further reproduction. Individuals thus produced lack the paternal nuclear material and must possess but half the normal number of chromosomes. What the ultimate result of this deficiency may be is still a matter of conjecture.

Did space suffice it would be interesting to review some of the numerous recent experiments on the one-celled organisms, showing the remarkable and definite reactions that they make to light, heat, gravity, electricity and chemical or mechanical stimulus. These experiments are throwing a flood of light on the activities of the lowest forms of life which are of the highest general importance as giving a key to those of the higher and more complex forms. Especially suggestive are the investigations on the so-called "psychic" activities of the one-celled forms. Though closely simulating those which in the higher forms are performed by means of the nervous system these activities take place in the one-celled forms in the entire absence of a differentiated nervous mechanism. Recent experiments on the infusoria, rhizopods and other simple animals of this type, give good ground for the conclusion that their apparently psychic activities may be analyzed into a comparatively few and simple responses to stimuli which are so coördinated through the organization of the cell as to maintain a continued adjustment to the environment. These responses are of such a character that there seems to be no more ground for the assumption of an accompanying conscious or psychic element than in the case of other forms of protoplasmic activity. Yet it can hardly be doubted that these relatively

simple reactions of the one-celled forms, far down in the scale of life, near the base of the series, form the fundamental basis in which the complex psychic life of even the highest form takes its root. Experiments in this field possess, therefore, as high an interest to the psychologist as to the physiologist; and they have now entered upon a phase characterized by a precision and thoroughness heretofore unattainable.

We may finally glance at another field of inquiry which in a way surpasses in interest any of those already considered, since it bears even more directly on the general problem of the nature of life. This is the subject of the physiological inter-relations of the cells, which has come into the foreground of discussion during the past decade through experimental researches on growth, regeneration, and embryological development. Schwann, the father of the cell-theory, conceived the multicellular body as a composite or mosaic work, as a congeries of coöperating but still independent units, namely, the cells. "The whole organism," he said, "subsists only by means of the reciprocal action of the single elementary parts." To him the life of the body was like that of a swarm of bees or of a human community, in which the activities of the individual units coöperate toward a common end. Developed by Virchow and Haeckel this conception became so firmly established as to form the very foundation of much of our biological teaching and research. There are some forms of cells, such as the wandering leucocytes, that seem in fact to lead an almost independent existence in the body, their life being strikingly similar to the free-living one-celled organisms such as the rhizopods. Even the cells of the fixed tissues often show a high degree of independence and may perfectly retain their individual characteristics if transplanted to another part of the body or even grafted upon another organism. Despite facts of this kind the drift of opinion has of late been strongly towards the conclusion,—which, it may be observed, was nearly approximated by Huxley a half century ago,—that, broadly viewed, the life of the organism must be regarded as

a whole; that the cell is not primarily an independent unit, coöperating with its fellows like a soldier in an army, but rather one of a vast number of secondary centres of activity into which the body resolves itself. This conception, which is not entirely easy to grasp, becomes clearer when we consider the nature of embryological development. The egg is a single cell which is as truly a living organism as the animal to which it gives rise. During development the egg progressively splits up by division into cells among which its energies are distributed; yet there are many grounds for the conclusion that the life of the many-celled adult differs only in degree, not in kind, from that of the egg. There are species of plants in which the growing regions do not split up into cells until the characteristic form of growth is fully established—a fact which De Bary happily characterized in the aphorism “The plant forms the cells, not the cells the plant.” In animals the same principle is shown in a different way. If an egg be shaken to pieces, each nucleated piece, if not too small, may form a perfect dwarf embryo, restoring itself precisely as does a nucleated fragment of a one-celled protozoan. In like manner there are many adult animals, such as the little fresh water polype *Hydra*, of which a fragment may restore the entire body. Cut a planarian flat-worm transversely into two pieces and each in a few days moulds itself into a perfect animal, the hinder half forming a new head and the front half a new tail. Cut the animal in two a little further forwards and the same result follows; but in this case the new head of the hinder piece is formed from the same cells which in the first case would have formed a new tail. Again, in the normal development of a sea-urchin or *Amphioxus* egg each of the first two or four cells gives rise to one half or one quarter of the adult body. If, however, the two or four cells be separated by shaking them apart, each, as Driesch first showed, gives rise not to a fragment of a body but to a complete dwarf of one half or one quarter the normal size; or, if the separation be incomplete, grotesque double, triple, or quadruple monsters are formed in the

abortive effort to produce separate individuals. In all these and similar cases, of which a large number might be cited, the activity of the individual cell is shown to be not a fixed and independent process but one that is subject to some law that rules the activity of the organism as a whole and produces a typical result even though the normal relations be altered.

Recent studies on regeneration in the one-celled and the many-celled organisms have rendered it more and more clear that this coördinating and unifying factor in the many-celled organism must be of the same nature as in the individual cell; for the formation of a complete embryo from an egg-fragment (which is a cell-fragment) is clearly analogous to the formation of a complete *Hydra* or worm from a body-fragment. Whether we conceive the cell as a complex mixture of molecules, a composite of micellæ, or a congeries of invisible self-propagating units, we encounter the same problem. It is not sufficient to say, as some investigators have said, that the various operations of cell-life are the result of protoplasmic activities which are themselves reducible to chemical and molecular actions. This is doubtless true, but it is not the whole truth. Chemical analysis proves that protoplasm is not a single chemical substance but a highly complex mixture of many highly complex organic compounds which undergo continual chemical transformations—indeed a living cell is doubtless the arena of the most complex chemical operations taking place in nature. But the more complex these transformations the more imperative becomes the assumption of a coördinating factor that determines their orderly sequence and coöperation in the ever recurring cycle of cell-life. It is a similar factor that must be recognized as the coördinating and unifying element which brings about a typical result in the development of the many-celled organism from the egg, or its regeneration from a fragment of its own body. The physiologist who defines life as “metabolism” or the “metabolism of proteids,” therefore, leaves out of account that factor which to many naturalists seems at once most characteristic and most difficult of comprehen-

sion. Regarding the nature of that factor we are still almost wholly ignorant and can only say vaguely that it lies in the inherited organization which has been derived historically from a pre-existing organization of the same kind, developing under similar conditions. In the adult body we perceive an organization like that of a machine designed to perform specific operations, and physiological research has given us a tolerably clear comprehension of the manner in which the machine performs many of these operations. When we turn to those subtler operations involved in the cell-activities, particularly in case of the germ-cells, and the developing organism, we find ourselves almost wholly in the dark. So difficult is it to conceive these activities by the assumption of a machine-like organization of the cell that Driesch, one of the foremost leaders of the experimental embryologists, has recently expressed the conviction that we must assume the existence of a determining and a coördinating factor or group of such factors (specifically, in the egg-cell and the developing embryo as a whole) for which no analogue exists in the inorganic world; and on this basis he does not hesitate to make use of a term which has fallen into disrepute among modern naturalists and to announce his acceptance of "vitalism."

A tendency towards a similar conclusion appears in the recent writings of a considerable number of investigators. It is, perhaps, to be regretted that these writers should make use of the term "vitalism," even when qualified as "neo-vitalism," for the word has carried with it from a much earlier period unscientific connotations at which the modern biologist is bound to look askance. But unlike the early vitalists the "neo-vitalists" do not postulate the existence of a "vital force" incommensurable with the forces of inorganic nature and not inter-convertible with them; for it is admitted that the vital activities must take their ultimate source in the chemical and molecular changes of protoplasm. What is maintained is that the adaptive and coördinating activities of the organism have not actually been traced to such a source,

that we are at present unable to conceive their nature, and that we have as yet found no real analogy between them and the operations of non-living matter. In this sense we can only regard the views of the neo-vitalistic school as a healthy reaction against the crude and superficial conceptions of an earlier period, and one that places in a truer perspective the nature of the great problems still before us. It is a happy augury for the future of biology that it is apparently entering upon a new constructive phase characterized by frank recognition of ignorance, by a decline of baseless theorizing, by steadily increasing thoroughness and range of observation, and above all by the extensive application in every direction of exact experimental methods to subjects which have hitherto, hardly been approached along this path.



THE BUBONIC PLAGUE

CYRUS EDSON, M. D., *New York.*



THE old saying that "familiarity breeds contempt" is particularly true in the case of disease. Thousands of persons die in the United States every year from communicable lung diseases, from diphtheria, scarlet and typhoid fevers, yet the fact attracts no particular attention. Let, however, a single case of bubonic plague appear, and the entire country is aroused. And the same is true in regard to cholera and leprosy. It is the unknown, the unfamiliar that we fear. In countries where the plague is endemic it is dreaded, of course, and feared, but not to the extent that we dread and fear it here. From time immemorial the bubonic plague has been, *par excellence*, "the plague"; we have had epidemics of all kinds, but none have been comparable in the devastation they wrought with that accomplished by the bubonic plague.

Hereafter in this article I shall simply designate the disease as "the plague," following the example of other writers who have written on this subject.

That the plague was caused by a specific germ was predicted as early as 1879. This prediction was based upon analogical reasoning and was made, I believe, by Virchow. The prophecy was realized in 1894 when Kitasato, the Japanese bacteriologist, who was sent from Japan by the Japanese government to Hong

Kong for the purpose of studying the disease, succeeded in isolating the bacillus which is now recognized to be the specific cause. This bacillus Kitasato found constantly in the blood, in the fluids of the various tissues, and especially in the enlarged glands of persons who had died of the plague. Even the blood taken from the finger tips of persons who were still alive but who were suffering from the disease, contained this bacillus. What is of very great importance in ascertaining the means by which the disease is spread, was the fact that the bacilli were also discovered in the bodies of rats and mice found dead in the localities where the disease was raging. This bacillus was named by Kitasato the "bacillus pestis." In shape it is rod-like, being slightly rounded at both extremities. These bacilli have a tendency to form in chains and may be stained with all the aniline stains, after which they are not easily discolorized. Their movements are not active, but slight and difficult to notice. Some of the bacilli seem to be surrounded by a thin capsule, while in others this cannot be seen. The bacilli pestis grow readily in gelatine and in broth made from beef, on the cut surfaces of potatoes and in other media.

Experiments made in laboratories clearly demonstrate that mice, rats, guinea-pigs and rabbits are all readily infected with the disease; after being inoculated they sicken in the course of twenty-four to forty-eight hours, develop the symptoms characteristic of the plague, and die in from two to five days according to the amount of virus with which they were inoculated. Animals fed with the bacilli develop the disease exactly the same as those inoculated, though the experiments made for the purpose of showing that the disease may be inhaled have thus far been unsuccessful. Birds do not seem to be susceptible.

Like diphtheria, the bacilli produce a poison or toxine in the culture. This poison is fatal to the bacilli themselves as well as to animal life. This shows that the disease, like other acute, contagious ailments, is self-limiting, and the fact is borne out by the observations of the disease itself; in other words, if a person

is strong enough to withstand the disease, it runs a definite course and ends in recovery. It is not always necessarily fatal, although the mortality from it is very high; higher than that of any other contagious disease.

Kitasato found that animals could be made immune against the plague by injections of the attenuated virus. He obtained the same result by injection of virulent cultures of the bacilli that had been sterilized by heating to sixty degrees C. The blood of animals made immune by this means he found contained anti-toxic properties exactly as does the blood of animals made immune against diphtheria, a fact of the greatest practical importance to the human race. He even found that the disease itself, if treated early, could be cured by injections of the plague anti-toxine, just as diphtheria is cured by injections of diphtheria anti-toxine.

Experiment after experiment on guinea-pigs inoculated with the disease was made, and it was shown beyond question that these infected animals which would otherwise succumb to the infection within forty-eight hours, were saved by the injections.

Now that we have seen how modern science can cope with the plague, we may, without very grave apprehension, study the disease. The person who does this and judges what may happen in the future by what has happened in the past may well be filled with alarm; for on more than one occasion the plague has well-nigh destroyed the entire human race.

The disease presents three different types: first, the glandular type; second, the septic type, and third, the pneumonic type. The lines dividing these different forms are not sharp and well defined, nor are all these forms brought into distinct prominence in all epidemics. The commonest of them is the one named first, the glandular type, which has given the name "bubonic" to the disease. Like other contagious diseases, we divide its course into periods.

First, the period of incubation; second, the prodromal or pre-

monitory period; third, the period of invasion, fourth, the period of full development, and fifth and lastly the period of convalescence.

All observers unite in fixing the period of incubation of the disease between two and eight days, though a case has been mentioned in which the incubatory period could not have been less than nine days. This stage of invasion is of great importance in practical application to sanitary arrangements for the prevention of the spread of the plague. It is fortunate for us that the Pacific Ocean is so wide that a longer period is occupied in the voyage from the Eastern countries where the plague is prevalent than this period of incubation, for cases of the disease that have been "caught" in China must make their appearance during the voyage and are consequently recognized, isolated, and proper precautions taken on the arrival of the vessel at the American port. And the same is true in regard to Mediterranean ports which are much more likely to be attacked than those of Northern Europe.

In some cases premonitory symptoms of the disease are entirely absent, or they may be so slight that the patient himself does not notice them. When they are present they may last for a few hours only, or this period may extend over two or five days.

The patient feels dull and sick; has vertigo, headache, the appetite is lost, there may be some nausea; occasionally there is diarrhœa during this stage. Pain and stiffness in the joints are felt; palpitation and chilly sensations occur. Of all the premonitory symptoms the pain and tenderness in the groins and in the arms are the most significant.

The stage of invasion is marked by pronounced chills, though in some epidemics this symptom may be absent. The patient is extremely prostrated mentally and physically, from the very beginning; he suffers from headache and frequently there is vomiting and diarrhœa. These symptoms may last for a few hours or a few days before the disease becomes well established.

After this stage fever is the most pronounced symptom, ranging from 102.5 to 106 F., and even above this latter point. In cases that are not severe the fever continues for three or four days, and recovery may be marked by a critical period like that which occurs in pneumonia; the patient has a profuse perspiration and convalescence sets in suddenly. In more severe cases the fever may continue for a week or more, or even as long as three weeks. At first this fever is continuous, the patient has it all the time without remission; later if the patient survives, it becomes irregular.

The lymphatic glands, especially those in the axilla and groin, are tender and swollen. This swelling may be delayed until after the sixth day of the disease, though it usually occurs much earlier. All the lymphatic glands may be affected or only those of the axilla and groin. The swelling increases rapidly so that in a few days the glands may become as large as an egg or even larger. Gradually the outlines of the glands, the swelling still continuing, become obliterated until there is only a great mass of swollen tissue. In very favorable cases these swollen glands get well without suppurating. It is more common, however, for suppuration to occur. This suppuration, as a rule, does not occur till the eighth or tenth day of the disease, while most of the bad cases terminate in death before the seventh day. A few rare, light cases have been observed where suppuration has occurred as early as the third day. Sometimes in individuals who are peculiarly susceptible, gangrene occurs and the entire glandular swelling is destroyed by this action.

Such are the characteristic symptoms of the plague; there are other external appearances which have no direct importance in affecting the diagnosis and which are common to most contagious diseases of the acute type.

The face is flushed from the beginning, gradually becoming dull and having an anxious expression. The eyes are bright and

bloodshot; the pupils dilated or they may be unequal. When the latter occurs brain complications may be suspected. The throat is congested and often ulcerated. The skin is hot and dry and sometimes covered with an eruption. Black and blue spots are rarely seen in outbreaks of the plague at the present day. In the Middle Ages, however, in the earlier outbreaks of the disease, this was a peculiar characteristic. Great areas of black and blue extravasations were seen; it was this that caused the name "black death" to be applied to the disease.

Kitasato noted that at the beginning of an epidemic of plague the cases were always more grave, as also at its height, and then became lighter until the decline of the outbreak.

Headache and vertigo are constant symptoms at the beginning, and on account of the great muscular weakness the patient staggers as if he were drunk. Delirium usually develops on the second day and like the delirium of other diseases, is worse at night. This delirium is of a low, muttering character; though an active form accompanied by mania may occur. In some cases the sufferer is in a state of stupor, and in others the mind may remain clear throughout the course of the disease. It is probable that the mental characteristics of the individual affect or determine the manner in which his mind is affected by diseases, which like this, tend to unbalance the mind. When the disease is ushered in with vomiting, the latter does not usually last long, but quickly subsides. Diarrhœa is looked upon as unfavorable. There is nothing characteristic in the appearance of the tongue in plague; it is moist, coated at first with raw edges, and afterwards becomes dry, brown and parched.

The pulse varies between ninety and one hundred and thirty beats. If the glands in the neck are involved the patient usually suffers from difficult breathing and shortness of breath. When the disease appears in the septic or blood poisoning form, death occurs within a few hours after the onset or within two days at the latest. The mortality in such cases is one hundred per cent.

The pneumonic form of the disease usually comes suddenly and resembles pneumonia with this difference; the shortness of breath is not so marked and there is no disturbance between the ratio of the pulse and respiration such as characterizes pneumonia. Moreover, the lesion in the lungs is not lobar but more general and less sharply defined. This form of the disease is usually fatal and is considered to be extremely contagious, which is probably due to the elimination of swarms of microbes in the sputum. In the pneumonic plague the glandular affections are not so marked as in the other types of the disease.

Just as smallpox has been divided into variola and varioloid, so the plague is divided into "pestis major" and "pestis minor", and under the latter designation we occasionally find cases which are very slight in character. A light fever lasting a day or two with prostration, tender glands, soon passes off with complete recovery.

The rate of mortality in the plague ordinarily ranges from eighty to ninety per cent.

The treatment has been mainly symptomatic and expectant. No specific until Kitasato's discovery, was known; we relied more upon good nursing than upon the use of drugs. Since the discovery, however, of the microbe and Kitasato's more important discovery of the anti-toxine, we have been enabled to treat the disease with much greater confidence and with a greater certainty of good results. The discovery has been too recent, however, to show its efficacy by means of statistics. Yersin, of the Pasteur Institute in Paris, who also prepared a curative serum from the plague bacilli isolated by him, has had this remedy tried extensively in Bombay where it appears to give very encouraging results. Three anti-plague serums have been produced for the purpose of vaccination against the disease and for its cure; these are Kitasato's and Yersin's just mentioned, Ferran-Haffkine's and Lustig and Gaelliotti's. These anti-toxines are essentially sterilized virulent cultures of the microbes or attenu-

ated serums, the attenuation having been obtained by passing the sterilized cultures through the systems of animals, and using the blood serum of such creatures. These serums seem to possess different therapeutic values. Those generally adopted by the profession and in most extensive use are Yersin's and Ferran-Haffkine's. The former is a true anti-toxine and is produced by passing virulent sterilized cultures of the bacillus pestis through the system of an animal. Its action is more prompt but less lasting than the Ferran-Haffkine's serum. Moreover, it is a most excellent curative agent while the Haffkine serum can only be safely used for prevention as it is produced directly from cultures of the bacillus and contains toxic material which, if the patient had the disease, would add to its effects.

To minutely describe the experiments which have led to the production of these serums would require more time and space than can be devoted to it here.

It is interesting to study the historical phase of the plague which teaches us that the disease spreads always along main lines of travel, and that neglect of sanitary conditions is a most potent factor in assisting its development. The first great epidemic of the plague of which we have a reliable historical account, occurred during the reign of Justinian and was called the "Justinian plague." It originated in Egypt about 542 A. D., passed through Constantinople, and finally reached Marsailles in 588; from thence it spread rapidly over entire Europe. As an example of its ravages, it is said to have killed ten thousand persons in Constantinople in a single day. It was during the next great outbreak, that of the fourteenth century, about 1334 A. D., that the disease received the name of the "black death"; this time it appears to have had its origin in China. It reached Europe by way of India and Persia about 1349. It is hard for us to realize, living as we do in modern security, the magnitude of these pandemics. To those who are interested in the study of the disease and who wish to enjoy one of the

strongest pieces of descriptive writing in the English language, I would recommend Defoe's account of the plague in London. In this fourteenth century epidemic it was estimated that over half the population of the world died of the plague within a very few years. Compared with this great outbreak all subsequent epidemics appear of but minor importance. Some of these latter are as follows:—

	YEAR.	
Marsailles,	1720,	86,000 deaths,
Moscow,	1770-71,	80,000 deaths,
Constantinople,	1803,	150,000 deaths,
Constantinople,	1813,	110,000 deaths.

In the province of Astrakan, in Russia, 1878-9, an outbreak occurred which was not very serious in character and of a much less malignant type. Its source in this instance is still an unsettled and much disputed subject.

While Europe has practically for a long time enjoyed immunity from the plague, Asiatic, African and South American countries have suffered very considerably from its ravages. Between the years 1783 and 1844 twenty-one epidemics of plague occurred in Egypt. In India for a long period the plague has been even more common than the cholera. The present prevalence of the disease is believed to be due to the outbreak that occurred in Bombay in 1896-7. It seems more probable, however, that the doubtful distinction of having started the epidemic belongs to China, which has always been the fountain head of the plague and where it has always existed. The great tidal waves of the disease that have started on their devastating careers from some province in China, finally overwhelming distant cities of continental Europe, teach us that the welfare of our most distant neighbors is intimately bound up in our own, and that the microbe is indeed "a social leveller." It is a well established fact that all infectious diseases find their most prolific conditions in unsanitary localities and among ignorant peoples. It was

formerly believed that filthy conditions actually caused the disease. We now know that while these may favor the spread of the infection, they cannot develop the disease *de novo*, and that a case of plague can only come from a previous case of the same disease.

Experience teaches us that the plague does not respect age, sex, nor occupation, and it is less a respecter of race than is any other contagious disease. We also know that individual predisposition plays but little part in determining its spread; the degree of exposure alone being the factor to be reckoned with in case of the plague.

I am indebted to Dr. Charles B. Fitzpatrick, of New York, who studied the very interesting outbreak of the plague in Vienna in 1898,—which was the result of carelessness in connection with laboratory cultures of the bacilli,—for the following facts:—

In October, 1898, Franz Barrish, an attendant at the Pathological Institution of Vienna, was suddenly taken sick. Attending physicians diagnosed the case as one most probably of influenza, and in order to definitely ascertain the fact, sent a specimen of his sputum to be examined bacteriologically. This examination occupied three days and it was positively shown that the bacillus was that of the bubonic plague. Barrish died after having been sick three days with the pneumonic form of the disease. One of the female nurses, who attended him, contracted the plague and died shortly afterwards. Dr. Müller, who attended Barrish's case, also contracted the disease and died in a few days. Müller was an eminent physician and a member of the Austrian Commission which studied the plague in India.

The investigation which followed showed that this little outbreak was due to carelessness on the part of Barrish, who had been on a debauch and was thereby rendered specially susceptible to infection. Moreover, the rooms in which the plague cultures were kept and where experiments with them were carried on, were not properly isolated from the other rooms of the Bacterio-

logical Institution. The rapid spread to two attendants was assumed to have been caused by inhalation and was probably due to the pulmonary character of the infection, which caused the germs to be scattered by expectoration. No other cases than these developed and the epidemic was readily controlled by ordinary disinfection.

Dr. Fitzpatrick has handled the germs repeatedly in preparing serum for its prevention and cure, and, with ordinary precaution, has escaped illness.

The preventive measures to be employed against the spread of the disease are: first, isolation of the sick and those who care for them, and this in order to be efficient must be enforced to the last degree. Early recognition of the disease is of the greatest importance in order to effect isolation. Second, thorough disinfection of all articles that have been in contact, directly or indirectly, with the sick. This is, of course, very essential. Heat is the most effective agent for this purpose, the boiling point of water being absolutely destructive to the germs. Fresh chloride of lime is as good a general disinfectant for houses as can be used. Dead bodies should be cremated or deeply buried in chloride of lime. The bodies of rats and mice that have died in the dwelling houses should be burned.

After the patient has apparently recovered, he must be allowed a period of at least a month before he is permitted to associate with others, because the bacilli have been found in the blood during convalescence at as late a period as three or four weeks after apparent cure.

General preventive measures may be summed up by stating that clean streets, clean dwellings, good drainage and perfect water supply are not only preventives against plague but against the other zymotic diseases which we have always with us.

I am indebted to Surgeon-General Wyman, of the United States Marine Hospital Service, for most of the following data concerning the present status of the plague. For many reasons

it is impossible to obtain exact figures indicating the number of cases and deaths from the disease. The character of the populations that have been afflicted through ignorance or resistance to sanitary authority, has made it difficult to gather statistics. It would not be excessive to place the total number of cases occurring all over the world since January 1st, 1899, at over one million. Assuming this to be correct the total number of deaths would be not far from eighty per cent. of that number.

Since the first of January of the present year, the plague has been reported from the following widely separated localities: Arabia, Argentine, Australia, Brazil, China, Formosa, Hawaiian Islands, India, Japan, Madagascar, New South Wales, Paraguay, Philippine Islands, Portugal, South Africa, and Spain. Since May 25th new cases of the plague have been reported in Rio de Janeiro. At Manila the first death of a white man from the disease occurred on May 21st. The man was a government teamster. That the disease has recently occurred in San Francisco seems certain, but reports are so conflicting that we can form no exact idea of its prevalence. Chinatown is undoubtedly an infected place and most stringent means should be taken to thoroughly clean, disinfect and isolate it. The whole country is interested in the proper performance of this work, the necessity for which is emphasized by what is now occurring at Sidney, N. S. W. This latter city may fairly claim to be in every respect a healthy place and a fair type of a modern civilized community, on a plane in that respect with San Francisco or any American town of similar size. Yet the plague has found a very firm foothold in Sidney. There have been over two hundred and fifty cases of the disease there, eighty-seven of which have resulted fatally. New cases are constantly occurring and the disease is far from being under control. In the Hawaiian Islands, the epidemic at Honolulu having been stamped out, no new case has been reported since March 25th. From December 12th to March 31st there were seventy cases of the plague in this locality, of

which sixty died. At the end of March there was but one case in the hospital, and that was in a convalescent state. It is estimated that the cost of stamping out this outbreak will be at least two million dollars. This is another illustration of how much cheaper it is to prevent than to cure. In Manila the disease has prevailed for about four months; during the first two months two hundred cases occurred with eighty per cent. mortality.

The higher the plane of general knowledge and good sense of a community, the less the danger from plague and from all other pestilences. The most important factor in the success of preventive measures is the attitude of the people in regard to sanitation. By submitting to what may seem hard and unjust action against personal rights on the part of the health officials, much is accomplished.

It seems probable that during this year a considerable number of sporadic cases of the plague will occur in this country, beyond this I do not believe that grave danger exists, at least so far as the United States of America are concerned.



LIBRARY, 1845
JAN 18 1845

THE TREND OF MODERN AGRICULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES

GEORGE WILLIAM HILL, *Washington.*



It is difficult to imagine more extensive changes than those which occurred in the agricultural industry about the middle of this century. The transition from days of scythe, sickle, and flail to those of mower, reaper, and thrasher; the practical obliteration of distance by modern facilities of transportation and the consequent settlement of the then far western states and territories; the extension of territory resulting from the Mexican war and the widespread influence of the California gold discoveries; the expansion of mining in the west; the "striking oil"; the changes following the civil war; the influences of the era of industrial activity and speculation to which these several causes gave rise; the marvelous increase in foreign immigration; and, finally, the application of steam to ocean transportation and the rapid development of our foreign export trade, seventy-five per cent. of which consisted of agricultural products, all these combined to effect changes amounting to a positive transformation, and yet these far-reaching influences may almost be said to have had their origin and chief development in the comparatively short period of twenty-five years from 1845 to 1870. In no single branch of our industrial life were the effects of these great movements so widely and strongly manifested as in that of agriculture.

Inventive genius, so conspicuous in the improvement of agricultural implements and machinery during this period, multiplied the producing power of the agricultural worker until the laborer of 1870 was able to produce as much as a score of his fellows of 1845. The substitution of the railroad for the primitive means of transportation, which had satisfied the people in the first half of the century, supplemented by homestead laws and the railroad land grants, practically opened up a new country, and in twenty years (1850 to 1870) one hundred and ten million acres were added to the agricultural domain in the West and Southwest, mainly of a fertility unsurpassed by any and equalled in but few portions of the farm area of 1850, while during the same period the number of farms in this vast territory increased by nearly one million.¹ In the same period also, making due allowance for difference in value of currency,² the increase in value of these farm lands, with fences and buildings, was, in round numbers, over two thousand seven hundred million dollars, of implements and machinery eighty-four million dollars, and of live stock four hundred and six million dollars, an aggregate addition to the agricultural wealth of the country of three thousand one hundred and ninety million dollars, without taking any account of the increase in annual production.

In this enumeration only those sections of the country affected by influences tending to expansion and development have been considered; namely, those states and territories included according to the eleventh census classification, in the divisions known as North Central, South Central, and Western as follows: North Central,—Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minne-

(1) The figures cited in this paper are to be credited, when not otherwise stated, to the *Abstract of the Eleventh Census*, revised edition, 1896.

(2) Values for 1870 are expressed in currency which was at a discount in gold. For purposes of comparison they should be reduced by one fifth.—Note on page 99, *Abstract of the Eleventh Census*.

sota, Iowa, Missouri, the Dakotas (then Dakota territory) Nebraska, and Kansas.

South Central,—Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas.

Western,—New Mexico, Utah, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, and California.¹

The conditions prevailing in the North Atlantic and South Atlantic divisions differed so widely from the foregoing that it is necessary to consider them separately.

Farm values in the North Atlantic division (comprising the whole of New England, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) showed a considerable increase during the period under consideration (1850–1870) but this was not due, as in the other divisions, to the addition of new and hitherto unexplored territory, but rather to the proximity of farm areas already occupied to rapidly developing industrial centres and to the wonderful increase in the urban population of the region. During the twenty years only a small fraction, over thirteen per cent., was added to the total farm area of the North Atlantic division, and this increase was almost entirely in the states of Maine, New York, and Pennsylvania, the increase in New Hampshire, Vermont, and New Jersey being insignificant; Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut showing an actual decrease. In these latter states, moreover, we find during this period an even greater decrease in the improved than in the unimproved farm area. With the exception of Massachusetts and Rhode Island, however, all show an increase in the number of farms, while, as before stated, there was an increase in farm values which aggregated, for the whole division, in lands, fences, and buildings, one thousand seventy-two

(1) All of the above states and territories showed increase in both farm lands and farm values, save Alabama and Louisiana, but owing to their inclusion in the South Central division in the Eleventh Census figures, it seems best not to segregate them here. No figures are available prior to 1870 for Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, Arizona, and Utah.

million dollars, in implements and machinery thirty-five million dollars, and in live stock, one hundred and fifty-five million dollars; total, one thousand two hundred and sixty-two million dollars—an increase of seventy-five per cent. in values by comparison with an increase in total farm area of thirteen per cent., and in the area of unimproved farm lands of twenty-one per cent.

In the South Atlantic division, comprising Delaware, Maryland, Virginia (which in the censuses of 1850 and 1860 embraced West Virginia) North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and the District of Columbia we find conditions varying materially from those of the other divisions. With a great increase in the number of farms, there was a slight decrease in the aggregate farm area of this division, mainly in the Carolinas; the improved area was practically the same, about thirty million acres, and the increase in farm values aggregated in lands, fences, and buildings, thirty-four million dollars, and in live stock five and one-half million dollars, but as an offset, there was a decrease of four and one-half million dollars in farm implements and machinery, resulting in an aggregate increase of barely thirty-five million dollars. This want of progress was not the result of a continuous downward movement, but was wholly due to the enormous decline in both farm areas and values during the decade from 1860 to 1870, consequent upon the civil war, and succeeding a period (1850-1860) of almost equally remarkable increase.

In this division the farm area had increased from ninety-three million acres in 1850 to one hundred and six million acres in 1860 and the total number of farms showed an increase from two hundred and forty-eight thousand one hundred and ninety-six to three hundred and one thousand nine hundred and forty. In values, the rise from 1850 to 1860 had been even more marked; farm lands, fences, and buildings having increased from five hundred and seventy-six million to one thousand and eight million dollars; implements and machinery from twenty-four million to thirty-four

million dollars; and live stock from one hundred and five to one hundred and sixty-four million dollars. On the other hand, in the succeeding decade the total farm area had fallen to ninety million acres, and the values as already recorded aggregated only thirty-five million dollars over those of 1850. Yet, in spite of this marked reduction in farm area and values, the number of farms had increased during the decade from three hundred and one thousand nine hundred and forty to three hundred and seventy-four thousand one hundred and two, the average size of farms having fallen from three hundred and fifty-three to two hundred and forty-one acres. The conclusion is obvious, namely, that a very large number of the former slaves had themselves become farmers either on shares or as renters.

Accompanying these changes in the conditions of the agricultural industry in these various sections of the country, there had been a steady growth in the foreign demand for our agricultural products, while the increasing demands of our home markets are shown very conclusively by the increase in the total population from twenty-three million one hundred and ninety-one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six in 1850, to thirty-eight million five hundred and fifty-eight thousand three hundred and seventy-one in 1870, over sixty-eight per cent.

It has been necessary to go over these somewhat tedious details in order to enable the reader adequately to appreciate the magnitude of the changes affecting agriculture during the first two decades of the last half of the century, without which no intelligent discussion of the trend of our modern agriculture is possible.

One of the first conclusions to which we are impelled by a consideration of the subject is, that during the transition the farmer had been rather a passive than an active factor in the agricultural development of the period, being influenced to a very great extent by extraneous circumstances beyond his control; nor was this fact due solely to the potency of the circumstances themselves. A marked change had taken place in the character of the

farming class; foreign immigration had greatly increased, and many foreigners who had been mere laborers in Europe, taking advantage of the inducements offered settlers in the western states and territories, had become farmers in America. Many of the most intelligent, energetic, and ambitious of the younger generation of farmers in the Atlantic states had been either lured away altogether from farm life by the attractive inducements and opportunities of acquiring wealth afforded by the wonderful growth and activity of industrial life in those states, or had succumbed to the fever of western expansion and had taken up new lands or embarked in other and more congenial money-making enterprises in new sections.

In the South, as we have seen, the great increase in the number of farms spoke of a transition in many cases from slave to tenant farming, while the planters themselves were but slowly recovering from the disasters of the civil war. In the West and South, at least, the question of the hour was how to secure present subsistence, while a certain restless uncertainty as to the future characterized the farming community generally. Hence, careless farming, and apparently reckless indifference to the future, as manifested in the treatment of the soil and often in a tendency to trust too exclusively to some one staple crop; oftentimes this inefficient farming was due to excess of land and deficiency of capital. In many sections of the country the farmer was not seeking to build up a permanent home, but was constantly looking for a purchaser, with a view either to exploiting new fields or, perhaps, to giving up farming altogether and joining the ranks of the middlemen or the speculators. Rates of interest were high, and capital tempted by the larger profits offered in commercial and industrial enterprises was not easily obtainable for farming pursuits. In a word, the period had been one of transition, with all its advantages and disadvantages, and the spirit of speculation and of "booms" permeated all classes, including the agricultural, which was largely swayed by, rather than controlling, the circumstances that surrounded it.

The ill effects of unsystematic effort, of reckless farming, and of inadequate capital were largely and fortunately discounted for a time by the rapidly increasing demands of the home and foreign markets, and from 1870 to 1880 we find a great material development in agriculture, the growth of the cattle industry especially being almost phenomenal under the favoring conditions of free and unlimited range in the far west and of rapidly increasing demand abroad.

Gradually and surely, however, warning notes were sounded. The development of ocean transportation which had afforded us an extension of foreign markets, continued in all directions until it developed foreign competition, and, in due time, Russia, India, and Argentina, confronted the United States in the foreign wheat markets. The energy and intelligence of other countries, aided by dishonest practices in our own country, destroyed our growing dairy export trade, or at least relegated our dairy products to a very low place in the world's markets. Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina began to loom up as possible rivals in animal production. At home erstwhile fertile soils began to show signs of exhaustion, and finally a day came when the possibility that almost all the lands in the country available for agriculture would be taken up ere the century closed, began to be seriously discussed.

Reduced prices for many of his products and reduced yields in many of his crops taught the farmer some useful lessons, chief among which were the unprofitableness of haphazard farming, the danger of trusting almost exclusively to one staple crop and the necessity for judicious diversification, the value of manure, the need of well-balanced rations in feeding, and the importance of breeding and selection.

At the same time other influences were at work which had a marked effect upon the general character of our farming community. Foreign farmers, or at least their children and successors, had undergone a process of intellectual development which we like to describe as becoming Americanized, and the

opportunities for rapid acquisition of wealth in other industries had diminished, so that the attractions to the more intelligent and ambitious young farmers to leave the farm were less numerous. Thanks to these circumstances the farmer of today is rapidly becoming a thinker, a reader, and a student, convinced that knowledge is power and determined to acquire that knowledge so that he may exercise an intelligent and influential part in the control of his own destinies. This determination really supplies the key to the trend of modern agriculture.

Chief among the influences which have aided to bring about this change in the farmer himself must be reckoned the establishment in 1862 of a Department of Agriculture in the national government and the passage of the Agricultural College Act, approved July 2 of the same year.

In the act providing for a Department of Agriculture under a commissioner, the duties of the proposed new department are thus defined:—

“A Department of Agriculture, the general designs and duties of which shall be to acquire and diffuse among the people of the United States useful information on subjects connected with agriculture in the most general and comprehensive sense of that word, and to procure, propagate, and distribute among the people new and valuable seeds and plants. * * * *”

This new department was the development from an humble beginning which originated in the United States Patent Office in 1837. Commissioner of Patents, Hon. Mr. Ellsworth, undertook the collection, mainly through United States consuls abroad, of useful seeds, the distribution of which, in the absence of any appropriation therefor, was largely effected under the franks of members of Congress. From this small beginning there grew first a Division of Agriculture in the Patent Office, and next a department under an independent commissioner, which became in 1889, a full executive department under the control of a secretary and member of the president's cabinet.

To the work of this department more than to any other one cause, perhaps, is due whatever ability is possessed by the farmer of

today to meet the many difficulties that confront him. Not only has the department, with its magnificent corps of scientific workers, been the leader in the great work of making (to quote the late Secretary Rusk) "science the handmaid of agriculture"¹ but it has, through its important administrative work, greatly furthered our agricultural interests at home and abroad. To enumerate the various methods by which these objects have been accomplished would more than fill an entire number of this magazine, but the claims made above call for at least a brief reference to the evidence upon which they are based.

The introduction of many valuable seeds, plants, and trees, such as sorghum, the sugar beet, the navel orange, and many others, including some of the most valuable varieties of our cereals, has done much to efface the stigma attaching to a great deal of the free seed distribution. In addition there is the work of the department in developing through its division of chemistry our domestic sugar production, the practical results of its investigations in plant pathology and the discovery of efficient remedies for many of the most destructive plant diseases. In the study of and discoveries concerning insects injurious to agriculture, the entomologists of the United States Department of Agriculture are concededly in the van, no country excepted; the practical saving from destruction of the orange industry of California by the successful introduction of a parasite to prey upon the scale insect is a notable example of their services to agriculture. The investigation of animal diseases in the bureau of animal industry of this department has been of infinite service to the cattle growing interests. The discovery of the curious manner in which the disease commonly known as Texas fever is communicated by ticks; the determination of the hog cholera bacillus and the

(1) The great nations of Europe strain every effort to make science the handmaid of war; let it be the glory of the great American people to make science the handmaid of agriculture.—J. M. Rusk, *Annual Report*, Department of Agriculture, 1889.

application of inoculation in mitigating its attacks; the discovery, preparation, and distribution of blackleg vaccine; of tuberculin for determining the presence or otherwise of tuberculosis in cows;—these are some samples of the bureau's scientific work, while in its administrative work may be cited its wonderful struggle with and final control and complete repression of contagious pleuro-pneumonia; its control of cattle infected with Texas fever and the protection afforded by it to the channels of the cattle trade at home and abroad; its cattle and meat inspection, including the microscopic inspection of hog meat and its efficient supervision of the cattle-carrying ocean steamers;—all of which, or, indeed, any one of which, has already saved the country in actual money return more than enough to pay the entire expenses of the department during the past ten years. To this department are due the important discoveries of the division of soils which have called a halt in the injudicious and wasteful use of water in sections where irrigation is practised and where every drop of water is precious. Statistical investigations were undertaken by the new department from the beginning and have been continuously maintained. These have covered all branches of agricultural economics, and seek to place at the disposal of the farmers information for which they would otherwise be dependent upon commercial channels, which, being controlled by those whose interest it is to buy the farmers' products as cheaply as possible in order to sell them subsequently as dearly as possible, could hardly be expected to serve him always impartially. These investigations have been especially active of late years in regard to foreign markets for American agricultural products. Almost all parts of the world have been visited in recent years by the explorers of the department, seeking new and economically useful plants, trees, and seeds, that may be advantageously introduced into our own country. Such are a few of the many services of permanent, practical benefit to the farmer rendered by the United States Department of Agriculture.

It is true that very many farmers are still ignorant of or indifferent to the work of their special department in the national government, but it has not been possible for all this work to be accomplished without arousing the attention and enlisting the interest and sympathy of hundreds and thousands of them. That such is the case, is amply testified, indeed, by the fact that the number of its publications, through which the results of its work and investigations are made known to the public, has increased from seventy-five in 1890, aggregating a little over two million copies, to six hundred and three in 1899, aggregating over seven million copies.

Only a short time ago in answer to certain inquiries the present Secretary of Agriculture, the Hon. James Wilson, replied that during the barely three years of his administration there had been issued from his department over one thousand five hundred different publications aggregating twenty million copies, and yet it had been found impossible to supply the legitimate demands for information. One can hardly, in the face of such figures, hesitate to conclude that the trend of modern agriculture in the United States is an intellectual one.

But step by step, though along different lines, there has been the onward movement initiated, as previously stated, by the act establishing the agricultural and mechanical colleges, the purpose of which is thus stated by the originator of the bill, the Hon. Justin S. Morrill, of Vermont, then chairman of the committee on agriculture in the House of Representatives:—

“The bill proposes to establish at least one college in every state upon a sure and perpetual foundation, acceptable to all, but especially to the sons of toil, where all the needful sciences for the practical avocations of life shall be taught; where neither the higher grades of classical studies nor that military drill our country now so highly appreciates will be ignored, and where agriculture, the foundation of all present and future prosperity may look for troops of earnest friends, studying its familiar and recondite economics, and at last elevating it to that higher level where it may fearlessly invoke comparison with the most advanced standards of the world. The bill fixes the leading objects, but, properly, as I think, leaves to the states considerable latitude in carrying out the practical details.”

Under this act ten million acres of the public lands have been awarded to the several states to furnish endowments for these colleges, which are coming to be generally known as "agricultural colleges," the results of a policy which seems to tend more and more to instruction in the sciences especially relating to agriculture. At present writing these colleges exist in every state and territory of the Union, and the liberal endowment mentioned above has been further supplemented with an allowance to each from the national treasury of twenty-five thousand dollars annually. The members of the several faculties in 1898 aggregated two thousand six hundred and eleven, made up as follows: For preparatory classes, two hundred and fifty-four; for collegiate and special classes, one thousand five hundred and sixty-four; and in other departments, eight hundred and eighty-nine. The students in agriculture in 1898 numbered four thousand one hundred and eighty-one; in veterinary sciences, four hundred and forty-nine; in household economy, one thousand two hundred and ninety-eight, and in engineering, architecture, and other branches, many thousands more, the total number of students of all classes, graduate and post-graduate, being in the year named thirty-one thousand six hundred and fifty-eight. The total aggregate value of the permanent funds and equipment of the land-grant colleges and universities in the same year was estimated at over fifty-three million dollars, while the income of these institutions from all sources, including state appropriations, was six million eight thousand three hundred and seventy-nine dollars and twenty cents.¹

Supplementing these institutions we now have, again through the liberality of the national government, state experiment stations for original scientific investigations in the service of agriculture. These are attached to the colleges, very often under the same

(1) These figures are taken from the latest report prepared by Dr. A. C. True, Director of the Office of Experiment Stations of the United States Department of Agriculture.

direction, and endowed under the act of March 3, 1888, with an annual income of fifteen thousand dollars each.

These institutions have, since their establishment, undertaken investigations along almost all lines of practical husbandry, and have contributed most of all, perhaps, to the solution of questions pertaining to fertilizing, dairying, and feeding. In many cases important work has been carried on by them in coöperation with the United States Department of Agriculture. If, as in the case of the department, we seek to gauge the avidity of the farmers for information by the demand for their publications, we find that the experiment station publications in 1899 aggregated four hundred and forty-five annual reports and bulletins. Moreover, many of the stations issue press bulletins, which are widely reproduced in the agricultural and country papers, and station officers contribute many articles on special topics to agricultural and scientific journals.

Excluding branch stations, there are now in the United States fifty-six experiment stations which receive the appropriation provided for by act of Congress. The total income of the stations from all sources for 1899 was one million one hundred and forty-three thousand three hundred and thirty-four dollars and ninety-three cents, which included the seven hundred and twenty thousand dollars received from the national government.¹

So much for the influence upon the trend of modern agriculture of agencies due to the national government. But state governments also have lent their influence in the same direction, as witness the commissioners of agriculture or state boards of agriculture or other official organizations, such as the farmers' institutes, by which state governments seek to benefit agriculture.

Encouraging, however, as may be these evidences of interest on the part of the government, both national and state, in this

(1) From report of Dr. A. C. True, Director of the Office of Experiment Stations of the United States Department of Agriculture.

most important of all our industries, perhaps the most encouraging feature in our modern agricultural development is the development of the farmer himself, and the gratifying activity which he is manifesting in the work of self culture and intellectual progress.

From the earliest times, going back at least to colonial days, there have been agricultural and horticultural associations and societies seeking to benefit the farmer by continued efforts in collecting and diffusing information in relation to his calling, but there has never been a time when these and kindred organizations have displayed so much activity as in the past twenty years. The annual meetings, at which officers are elected and the business of the associations is disposed of, have been made the occasion for frequent and full discussions of the subjects their members are most interested in, and oftentimes of late years, advantage has been taken of their occurrence, to secure the presence and counsel of men of wide experience and recognized success in their several lines of farming. From these meetings of live stock growers, dairymen, horticulturists, and others, have sprung another class of gatherings, not confined to members of any organization, but appealing to farmers generally, and open for the discussion of all topics bearing upon farming in all its branches. These meetings, known as "farmers' institutes" have become common in a majority of states, in many of which they have secured official recognition and are organized under the general direction of a superintendent, who is a state official and who has at his disposal a fund from which to pay the expenses of a corps of "institute workers" made up mostly of practical, experienced farmers. These institutes are sometimes connected with the agricultural colleges, and in all cases, they receive the active support of the college professors and the workers in the experiment stations. As far as practicable the services of the scientists in the United States Department of Agriculture are made available for these meetings. Some of the institute workers

have attained an almost national reputation, and it is no uncommon thing to find their services in demand in half a dozen different states during the winter season.

One of the good effects of agricultural associations is to be found in the establishment of libraries containing the best books on agricultural subjects, and generally including all the publications issued by the National Department of Agriculture. Of course, every agricultural college and experiment station possesses such a library, and many of the state boards of agriculture have been careful to establish one. In this line of work much has been done by the National Grange. One of the latest plans devised to extend library work to the farmer is that of "traveling libraries," composed of several collections of useful books, each collection being deposited in turn for a time in some local centre for the benefit of the residents in the neighborhood, thus making a comparatively small number of books serve a very large number of people, and reaching many localities which do not usually enjoy library privileges. Reading clubs and reading courses are becoming common in farming districts, and many of the latter embrace a special course of reading on agricultural topics under the direction of some college professor.

The effect of all this is to elevate the "book farmer" from the contemptible place he held in the estimation of the farmers of a past generation. Today the most intelligent and successful farmers are those who, to energy and experience, add intelligence, and to intelligence, study, and who are able to, and do, appreciate the work of science on behalf of agriculture. On the other hand it has come to be generally recognized that the farmer who neglects study can, rarely, in these days of fierce competition, attain success. On the contrary he will, in the majority of cases, sink to comparative failure or at least attain but very mediocre success. Hence, if on the one hand there was, twenty or thirty years ago, a tendency to depreciate farming which the farmer himself did much to justify, the past twenty-five years

has witnessed in him a steady improvement which will surely lead, and is, indeed, already leading, to a higher appreciation of the dignity, the importance, and, we may add, the intellectual requirements of his calling.

That many farmers will and do fail "to keep up with the procession," as the slang phrase inelegantly but expressively puts it, is undoubtedly true, as true as it is in every other calling which demands brains and study as conditions of success, and in which are to be found a score or more, often a hundred, mediocrities to one leader. It is easier to find men fit to be captains than men fit to be generals and much easier to find men fitted for the ranks than for captaincies. In this new country circumstances for many years favored even the poor farmer, but that time has passed away, and while the poor farmer in this country may never sink to the level of the European peasant or English farm laborer, he will, it is to be feared, gradually fall to a comparatively low level, very near the plane of subsistence, and will often find it profitable to work for his successful competitor. Moreover, when all available land has been absorbed by private owners, a consummation which cannot long be postponed, there is bound to be a rise in land values. With all available public lands gone and an addition of forty or fifty million people to our present population, such a result will be unavoidable. Then land will be too dear to permit of poor farming, and it will inevitably come under the control of those who can make it pay.

Two questions arise as a result of the foregoing considerations: (1) What are the material evidences of the farmers' intellectual development? and (2) What are the defects in our system, still calling for remedy?

One, and perhaps the chief, evidence of material benefit due to greater intelligence is to be found in the combination of an increased product with greater economy in production. This is especially evident among stock growers and dairymen, horticulturists, truck farmers, and others, specialists in agriculture. In

breeding and selection, in systematic and intelligent feeding, many of the stock growers in the United States have no superiors. Cattle are now matured on an average a year or more earlier than was the case twenty years ago, and scientifically balanced rations make every ounce of feed count. In dairying the progress has been extraordinary. The average product of a dairy herd is probably twice as great as it was twenty years ago, and the quality of the product has improved in almost equal proportions, while on many farms, thanks to an improved system of feeding, twice as many milch cows are kept as formerly. In the production of fruits and vegetables, a care and intelligence prevails among many growers exceeding those practiced by many of our leading manufacturers. The substitution of domestic for imported products has advanced almost as rapidly as the growth in our exports of agricultural products. The use of fertilizers, the saving of barnyard manure, judicious crop rotation, the absence of which was so sadly conspicuous in the seventies have been comparatively common in the nineties.

At the same time the farm area had grown from four hundred and eight million acres in 1870 to six hundred and twenty-three million acres in 1890 and the percentage of unimproved land had fallen in the same period from 53.7 to 42.6, so that while the increase in the total farm area had increased in the twenty years scarcely more than fifty-two per cent., the increase in the improved area had been very close on ninety per cent.¹ The

(1) In this connection, certain figures given in a recent article by Mr. John Hyde, Statistician of the United States Department of Agriculture are of special interest: "The addition of one hundred and twenty-eight million three hundred thousand acres, or 31.48 per cent., to the area in farms between 1870 and 1880 only increased the area per capita of population from 10.57 to 10.69 acres. By 1890 the area notwithstanding a further addition of eighty-seven million one hundred thousand acres, or 16.25 per cent. amounted to only 9.95 acres per capita, and the census for 1900 will almost certainly find it under nine acres."—*North American Review*, February, 1899. At the same time in the improved farm area there has been a slight advance amounting to 0.8 acre per capita of population.

aggregate increase in farm values during the same period had been as follows: farm lands, fences, and buildings, five thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine million dollars; implements and machinery, two hundred and twenty-five million dollars; and live stock, nine hundred and eighty-eight million dollars, making a total aggregate increase of seven thousand eighty-two million dollars.

Once more in reviewing these figures we must segregate from the grand total, the North Atlantic division (the New England states, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania). In this region alone we find progress arrested between 1870 and 1890. We find here a slight decrease in farm area, the increase between 1870 and 1880 having been more than offset by the decrease between 1880 and 1890. The only states in this division showing an increase in 1890 over 1870 were Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Maine, and even in those states there was a falling off between 1880 and 1890, this falling off occurring in the improved as well as in the total farm area. In Massachusetts the falling off in improved area was so great as to bring it down far below the improved area in 1870.

In this division, moreover, there was a marked falling off in the values of farm lands, fences, and buildings between 1880 and 1890, sufficient to offset all the increase between 1870 and 1880. On the other hand, values of implements and machinery and of live stock showed some increase, this being due in the case of live stock to the increase in the number of milch cows, of horses, and of swine. Other cattle, and sheep showed a decrease, these being fewer in 1890 than even in 1850.

In spite of steadily increasing competition, our export of agricultural products has continued to grow and a comparison of the figures for the five years ending in 1898 with the five years ending in 1878 show an increase from an average of five hundred and eight million dollars to six hundred and sixty-three million dollars. The exports of agricultural products for the year 1898

were phenomenal, amounting to more than eight hundred and fifty-eight million dollars, while the exports for 1899, though considerably less, have still greatly exceeded the average for the five years ending in 1898.

On the whole, then, we are not without many satisfactory evidences of the material benefits to agriculture and to the country at large of the farmers' intellectual development. Still, a decade is but a very short span in the life of a nation and the effects of the latest development in the agricultural world are only beginning to be revealed to us. Much remains to be done and the application of intelligence to farming must be greatly extended in order to elevate this industry to the place rightly belonging to it.

In the average yield per acre of many of our principal crops we are still far behind many of the countries of the old world. Although we lead the world in aggregate wheat production, in yield per acre, we are far behind the most enlightened countries of Europe and stand next in order, and but little above the average attained by the miserable ryot of India or the but lately emancipated serf of Russia. In sugar, wines, fruits, hides, wool, tobacco, and cotton we still import millions of dollars' worth of products which we could certainly produce profitably at home. Though some of the finest cattle in the world are to be seen in our stock yards, there also are to be seen cattle which cannot be sold at a profit to the grower. Though we make millions of pounds of the best butter and cheese in the world, we still expend time and energy in producing tons of stuff hardly worthy the name of butter. Many a dairy herd still exists where loss on the poor cows offsets profit on the good ones. We still have to build up our reputation in many markets where it has suffered by the unscrupulousness of some of our farmers and shippers. We still have to learn the lesson that the tastes and whims of foreign consumers must be studied and catered to if we are to compete with the intelligent producers of Denmark, Canada, and Australia.

Those who are teachers and leaders in the intellectual development of the farmer must realize that the economics of agriculture demand as much attention and study as does the science of agriculture. To increase the product and reduce the cost of production is not all, we must also be sure to produce that for which there is an available demand.

The great educational forces now existing for agriculture, liberally endowed as they are by both national and state governments must carry intelligent coöperation much further than has yet been reached.

Indeed so much is there yet to be done that, looking forward, some may falter at the magnitude of the task before us, but anyone who has watched the trend of agricultural development and noted the progress made during the past twenty years, especially in the development of the farmer himself, will therein find good grounds for hope and encouragement.



AMERICAN LITERARY CRITICISM AND THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION

WILLIAM MORTON PAYNE, *Chicago.*

[PART II.]



IN the preceding section of this essay the way has been prepared for an intelligent examination of American literary criticism as influenced by the doctrine of evolution. The introductory discussion has been somewhat elaborate, but no more so than seemed necessary for the elucidation of the argument that was to follow and to hinge upon the introduction. We have learned what we are to look for, and have also learned that we must not expect any very striking results from the examination. Our present task, then, is that of surveying the critical writing produced in this country during the latter half of the nineteenth century. It will not, however, be out of place to begin with a few prefatory words about the critical writing that precedes the evolutionary epoch. "Of colonial criticism," says Lowell, "there was none, and what assumed its place was a half provincial conceit, half patriotic resolve to find swans in birds of quite another species." These words apply almost equally well to the criticism of the first half of our own century. Dealing with native writers, it made overmuch of them, and its attitude toward foreign writers (other than English, at least) was that of the discoverer

of new regions rather than that of the explorer of familiar ones. The alternations of wonder and delight with which the intellectual leaders of old Cambridge and Concord approached the great European writers are interesting to us in their naïveté, almost making us wish that we too might have lived in a time when Dante and Kant were novelties, when the message of Goethe was still fresh, and when the trumpetings of Carlyle were too strange and new to sound harshly upon the sense. But this attitude was as incompatible with the riper criticism as was that of the men who were busily occupied in boasting of what America had already done in literature. What Nichol calls "The amiable weakness of indiscriminate admiration" was only too characteristic of the critical writers we then had, leading, for example, to such extravagances as Griswold's statement that the writings of Whipple "combine the strength of the 'Areopagitica' with the liveliness of the 'Spectator.'" A most portentous combination, forsooth! Now Whipple was an amiable and highly respectable writer, besides being the most distinctly specialized critic of his time. But his work is too old-fashioned to concern us here. Although his activity was extended well down into our own period, his mental habits had become fixed at an early date, and he found no better use for the doctrine of evolution than to make it a target for cheap witticisms of the kind that were current in the seventies. George Ripley is another example of the old-time critic. He was a conscientious and industrious writer of the showman sort, and deserves his place among the men whose lives are told in the "American Men of Letters" series of biographies. But we know him now by that biography alone; his own writings have passed into oblivion. He, too, was with us as recently as twenty years ago, but his critical habits were formed in the early days, and the scientific interpretation of literature was not for him. To such men as Ticknor and Tuckerman, Curtis and White, Reed the Wordsworthian and Hudson the Shakspearean, our literature will always be grateful

for stimulus and guidance at a time when such helps were most needed, but these men were chroniclers, philologists, æstheticians, and moralists ; they were not critics in anything approaching the modern scientific sense. The great names of Emerson and Poe, likewise, have now slight concern for us, however greatly American literature is indebted to them for extra-critical reasons.

It would be possible, no doubt, and instructive, perhaps, to find in the pages of our earlier critical writers some adumbrations of the evolutionary idea. Every great conception that has transformed the face of thought has had its forerunners, its prophets who have half-divined, in some illuminating moment, the results that were destined to be worked out by more rigorous methods at some later date. In the dictum *natura non facit saltum*, which has haunted the deepest thinkers of many ages, there lay slumbering the germinal idea of all evolutionary philosophy, but it required the patient and exact observational methods of the nineteenth century to unfold the full significance of that simple phrase. The penetrating sweep of Poe's intellect, for example, was so great that it could hardly fail to perceive, in flashes of insight, something of the larger meaning of literary history. "Particular judgments apart," says Mr. J. M. Robertson, "there is a general pressure of reasoning power in his critical writing which is really not to be found in the works of later men, English and American, whose title is taken for granted by some of those who make light of Poe on this side." Had his critical powers turned to synthesis, instead of remaining predominantly analytical, he might have become the forerunner of the new criticism. In Emerson, also, with his habit of viewing things *sub specie æternitatis*, one might easily find phrases and suggestions indicative of a more comprehensive conception of literature than that which is content to work within the limits offered by the book or author under discussion. When he declares, at the close of the essay on "History," that "broader and deeper we must write our annals," he gives us a potential expression of all that is meant by the

evolutionary criticism. But we must be content merely to note such foreshadowings and anticipations as might be sought out in men like Poe or Emerson, and pass on to the consideration of the critical writers who come more definitely within our purview.

Turning first of all to James Russell Lowell, who must be reckoned the foremost of American critics (besides being a great poet and a still greater man), we find little evidence of the evolutionary influence. Indeed, we find rather the expression of an old-fashioned conservatism, fearful lest the new wine should corrode the old bottles, and willing to echo the superficial flings which in the seventies were thought sufficient to dispose of the pretensions of Darwinism. The wit, and even the beauty, of such a poem as "Credidimus Jovem Regnare" cannot blind us to the fact that its author's face is set resolutely toward the past, and that his faith is not large enough to feel assured that in the shifting of the grounds of knowledge, nothing that is really precious in man's ethical and poetical inheritance can possibly be lost. He speaks with pathetic regretfulness of the time when

"Everywhere from haunted earth
Broke springs of wonder, that had birth
In depths divine beyond the ken
And fatal scrutiny of men ;
The hills and groves and streams and seas
Thrilled with immortal presences,
Not too ethereal for the scope
Of human passion's dream or hope."

But the "springs of wonder" are not sealed in that deeper view of the world-process which we call evolution; rather is earth haunted by more solemn mysteries than any bequeathed to us from the age of fable, and the

"One far-off divine event
To which the whole creation moves"

may afford a finer inspiration to the clear-visioned intellect than the most cherished myth of the anthropomorphic consciousness.

Even Schiller, uttering the same plaint at a time when science had not fairly begun its destructive work, had the prescience to imagine a new poetry rising from the ruins of the old, and the faith to declare that the truth must be beautiful, however forbidding its guise. When Lowell says, in the poem above-mentioned that

“Noll had been more effective far
Could he have shouted at Dunbar,
‘Rise, Protoplasm!’ No dourest Scot
Had waited for another shot,”

or when he writes to a friend, “I think the evolutionists will have to make a fetich of their protoplasm before long. Such a mush seems to me a poor substitute for the Rock of Ages—by which I understood a certain set of higher instincts which mankind have found solid under their feet in all weathers,” one cannot help feeling that the satire is unworthy of its author, that it should have been left in the exclusive possession of the professional bigot and the cheap theologian. These extracts serve well enough to show what was the attitude of our best critic toward the evolutionary philosophy, or rather to show how defective was his comprehension of that system of thought.

But for all that, Lowell was a great critic, although not of the type for which we are now searching. He was a great critic for the same reasons that made a great critic of Matthew Arnold; by virtue, that is, of a richly-stored and fertile mind, and of certain sane and unshakable prepossessions in the ethical and the æsthetical domains. And yet the charge brought against Arnold by Mr. Frederic Harrison would apply with equal force to Lowell, and would doubtless have been accepted by him with equal urbanity. He was certainly not the master of “a philosophy with coherent, interdependent, subordinate, and derivative principles,” but rather a writer of fine scholarship, having an exquisite gift of appreciation, and endowed with a personality that commanded both love and reverence in the fullest

measure. The subjective element in his critical writing was doubtless considerable, but in such a case one would not have it otherwise, for direct contact with minds of his type is one of the most precious privileges that literature affords. He touched nothing that he did not adorn, and he could discourse of Dante and Chaucer and Shakspeare in so genial a way that the subjects seemed fresh in his handling. Still, he did not always, any more than did Matthew Arnold, escape the danger that attends upon the substitution of personal feelings for objective views, and his estimate of the poetry of Mr. Swinburne must remain, like Arnold's estimate of the poetry of Shelley, a monumental example of the occasional blindnesses of the most clear-sighted of men, and a solemn warning to every critic who will not allow his judgment to be controlled in some measure by the consensus of his fellow-craftsmen. Lowell's criticism has little to say about the long stretches of literary history, and it is clear that his mind was not of the cast to take a comprehensive, philosophical view, not to say an evolutionary one. "Chaucer had been in his grave one hundred and fifty years ere England had secreted choice material enough for the making of another great poet." This is the kind of thing Lowell is apt to write when he has a gap to span. It is very pretty, but it is not scientific. His critical work is made up almost wholly of individual studies, and here his peculiar powers find their fittest scope. Mr. Watts-Dunton says of the "Dryden" that "there is scarcely a sentence in the essay that does not coruscate with intelligence," and the remark is almost equally true of all the other essays. Even where there is a touch of perversity about it, there can be no question of the intelligence itself. And our country still awaits a critic of the more philosophical type with anything like Lowell's faculty for the application of ideas to literature.

Living a life almost exactly conterminous with Lowell's, as far as chronology goes, the rugged figure of Walt Whitman next commands our attention. But how differently it was bounded

upon its social and intellectual horizons, and how different the form of its expression in literature! Yet the points of contact should not escape us, and the more closely we look, the more evident these become. It was not accident that made Lincoln the hero of both singers, and that deserved for the threnody of the one and the ode of the other Mr. Stedman's opinion that they are "the most notable elegies resulting from the war and its episodes." Nor was it accident that brought the "Vistas" of Whitman and the Birmingham address of Lowell into essential community of thought. Both men had an exultant faith in democracy and were not ashamed to confess it. Lowell's expression of this faith was academic, and Whitman's was apocalyptic, but they reduce to nearly the same formula. Whitman's attitude toward the evolutionary philosophy was frankly sympathetic and generous. "Joyfully accepting modern science," he writes: "The great current points are perhaps simple, after all: first, that the highest developments of the New World and Democracy, and probably the best society of the civilized world all over, are to be only reach'd and spinally nourished (in my notion) by a new evolutionary sense and treatment; and, secondly, that the evolution-principle, which is the greatest law through nature, and of course in these States, has not reach'd us markedly for and in our literature." Again, "poetry, largely consider'd, is an evolution, sending out improved and ever-expanding types—in one sense, the past, even the best of it, necessarily giving place, and dying out. For our existing world, the bases on which all the grand old poems were built have become vacuums,—and even those of many comparatively modern ones are broken and half-gone. For us to-day, not their own intrinsic value, vast as that is, backs and maintains those poems—but a mountain-high growth of associations, the layers of successive ages. Everywhere—their own lands included—(is there not something terrible in the tenacity with which the one book out of millions holds its grip?)—the Homeric and Virgilian works, the interminable ballad-

romances of the middle ages, the utterances of Dante, Spenser, and others, are upheld by their cumulus entrenchment in scholarship, and as precious, always welcome, unspeakably valuable reminiscences." A biologist, discoursing technically of the persistence of certain established types of organic structure—*Limulus*, let us say, or *Equisetum*—could not present the subject more clearly than this. Yet Whitman was by no means a doctrinaire in his acceptance of the biological analogy. "I am the more assured in recounting Hegel a little freely here, not only for offsetting the Carlylean letter and spirit—cutting it out all and several from the very roots and below the roots—but to counterpoise, since the late death and deserv'd apotheosis of Darwin, the tenets of the evolutionists. Unspeakably precious as these are to biology, and henceforth indispensable to a right aim and estimate in study, they neither comprise or explain everything—and the last word or whisper still remains to be breathed, after the utmost of those claims, floating high and forever above them all, and above technical metaphysics." The exception to Carlyle (which does not seem altogether well-taken) in the above passage is based upon his alleged "lack of a soul-sight of that divine clue and unseen thread which holds the whole congeries of things, all history and time, and all events, however trivial, however momentous, like a leash'd dog in the hand of the hunter." Although Whitman is zealous in devotion to his own country, and to the ideas for which it stands, he is singularly free from the tendency to over-magnify our literature, *in majorem Americæ gloriam*. He quotes approvingly, on more than one occasion, Margaret Fuller's saying: "It does not follow that because the United States print and read more books, magazines, and newspapers than all the rest of the world, that they really have, therefore, a literature," and, speaking on his own account, he says: "America has yet morally and artistically originated nothing," and "The States, in the field of imagination, present not a single first-class work, not a single great literatus." These

things sound harsh upon ears accustomed (as ours are by newspapers and politicians) to every variety of adulation, but their truth must be admitted if we are to take the world-view of literature that the evolutionary doctrine demands. That Whitman, as far as his culture permitted, took this world-view is a proposition that might be illustrated by a hundred extracts. Especially did he have the sense of the international reactions of literature. "Indeed, it is time we should realize and fully fructify those germs we also hold from Italy, France, Spain, especially in the best imaginative productions of those lands, which are, in many ways, loftier and subtler than the English." "I see that this world of the West, as part of all, fuses inseparably with the East, and with all, as time does—the ever new yet old, old human race." If these passages give expression to the fundamental unity of literary development, a passage like the following reveals a deep sense of the influences that shape the individual work. "No great poem or other artistic or literary work of any scope, old or new, can be essentially consider'd without weighing first the age, politics (or want of politics) and aim, visible forms, unseen soul, and current times, out of the midst of which it rises and is formulated: as the *Biblic canticles* and their days and spirit—as the *Homeric*, or *Dante's* utterance, or *Shakspeare's*, or the old *Scotch* or *Irish ballads*, or *Ossian*, or *Omar Khayyam*."

It will be evident by this time that Whitman is as characteristic an exponent of the evolutionary criticism as we are likely to find among American writers. He clearly conceives of literary history as a process and of the "literatus" as a product. His survey of the past is broad enough to realize the sweep of the "main currents," and to avoid being misled by the eddies and surface-ripples. His chief critical defect is that he rides the hobby of "democratic art" too hard, and creates out of his own imagination the bugbear of "feudalism" for the purpose of tilting against it. It is in the prophetic rôle that he most delights to

appear, and, since his forecastings of the coming literature rest upon an intelligent recognition of the principle of evolution, they are as pertinent to our present inquiry as are his envisagements of the past. Here is a significant passage: "To my mind America, vast and fruitful as it appears to-day, is even yet, for its most important results, entirely in the tentative state: its very formation-stir and whirling trials and essays more splendid and picturesque, to my thinking, than the accomplish'd growths and shows of other lands, through European history, or Greece, or all the past. Surely a New World literature, worthy the name, is not to be, if it ever comes, some fiction, or fancy, or bit of sentimentalism or polish'd work merely by itself, or in abstraction. So long as such literature is no born branch and offshoot of the Nationality, rooted and grown from its roots, and fibred with its fibre, it can never answer any deep call or perennial need." Again we read: "In the prophetic literature of these States, Nature, true Nature, and the true idea of Nature, long absent, must, above all, become fully restored, enlarged, and must furnish the pervading atmosphere to poems, and the test of all high literary and esthetic compositions. I do not mean the smooth walks, trimm'd hedges, poseys, and nightingales of the English poets, but the whole orb, with its geologic history, the Kosmos, carrying fire and snow, that rolls through the illimitable areas, light as a feather, though weighing billions of tons." And once again, in still more inspired strain, we have the following: "Grand as to-day's accumulative fund of poetry is, there is certainly something unborn, nor yet come forth, different from anything now formulated in any verse, or contributed by the past in any land—something waited for, craved, hitherto non-express'd. What it will be, and how, no one knows. It will probably have to prove itself by itself and its readers. One thing, it must run through entire humanity (this new word and meaning Solidarity has arisen to us moderns) twining all lands like a divine thread, stringing all beads, pebbles or gold, from God and the soul, and

like God's dynamics and sunshine illustrating all and having reference to all." Whitman's prose writings abound in such passages as these three, and they all bear tribute to the hold upon his imagination, at least, if not of his understanding in the narrowly scientific sense, of the "cosmic philosophy" of evolution.

But our definite historical inquiry would make slow progress were we to remain "rapt above the pole" by such soothsayings as these, and it is time to find ourselves once more "standing on earth." The critical writing of Mr. E. C. Stedman must now claim our close attention. Mr. Stedman's three volumes:—"Victorian Poets," "Poets of America," and "The Nature and Elements of Poetry"—constitute the most important body of systematic and coherent literary criticism thus far produced by any American writer. The date of Mr. Stedman's birth, which made him fourteen years the junior of Lowell and Whitman, combined with the fact that he was upwards of forty years old when his first book of criticism was published, brings the writing of these volumes within the two decades of the seventies and the eighties; that is, exactly within the period when the impact of the evolutionary principle upon a student of literature might be expected to be most forcible. Here, then, we find a man, himself approved among his country's poets, bringing to the study of poetry a mature and brilliant mind, well-equipped in all essential ways, at just the time when the evolutionary doctrine was passing out of the stage of contention, and becoming generally accepted as an organon for the investigation of questions having a historical aspect. Here, if anywhere, we should naturally look for that broadening of the old-time bases of criticism which we do not look for in Lowell, and which rather takes us by surprise when we find it in Whitman. We shall not be disappointed in our expectations, for Mr. Stedman's volumes illustrate very fully what we understand by the new criticism that has grown up in the light of the evolutionary principle. But we should hasten to add that his is a well-balanced criticism, too wise to disregard the

æsthetic canons of an older method, and not carried outside the line of sanity by an exaggerated attachment to the new system of thought. He thus defines it for us: "Only of late have we begun to look for criticism which applies both knowledge and self-knowledge to the test; which is penetrative and dexterous, but probes only to cure; which enters into the soul and purpose of a work, and considers every factor that makes it what it is;—the criticism which, above all, esteems it a cardinal sin to suffer a verdict to be tainted by private dislike, or by partisanship and the instinct of battle with an opposing clique or school." At the very outset of his first volume, Mr. Stedman makes it clear that he has taken the one step needed to complement the method of Taine, and give full weight to the fact of spontaneous variation. "In reviewing the works and careers of these singers, especially of the large number that may be classed as minor poets, we naturally shall be reminded of a process to which M. Taine has made emphatic reference in a history of previous English literature, and in his analysis of the one poet selected by him to represent the quality of recent song. This process is the insensible moulding of an author's life, genius, manner of expression, by the conditions of race, circumstance, and period, in which he is seen to be involved. But on the other hand, and chiefly in our recognition of the few master-spirits whose names, by common and just agreement, hold the first places upon the list under review, we shall observe with equal certainty that great poets overcome all restrictions, create their own styles, and even may determine the lyrical character of a period, or indicate that of one which is to succeed them." Enlarging upon this theme, the author goes on to discuss the twofold province of the critic. "He must recognize and broadly observe the local, temporal, and generic conditions under which poetry is composed, or fail to render adequate judgment upon the genius of the composer. Yet there always are cases in which poetry fairly rises above the idealism of its day. The philosoph-

ical critic, then, in estimating the importance of an epoch, must also pay full consideration to the messages that it has received from poets of the higher rank, and must take into account the sovereign nature of a gift so independent and spontaneous that from ancient times men have united in looking upon it as a form of inspiration."

Let us look for a moment at some of the marks that a scientific method has set upon Mr. Stedman's criticism. The fundamental thesis of the "Victorian Poets" is that the half-century period under consideration forms a distinct epoch in the history of English poetry. To this conception the author recurs again and again, and notes the signs, multiplying with the final years of the century, which indicate that the epoch is rounding to its close. In the "Poets of America" the same idea finds reiteration. "It is rare that an epoch so definitely begun and ended can be selected as the object of synthetic examination. The reader is invited to study a period as distinct in literature as our Constitutional period in politics, or the Thirty Years' War in history; one, moreover, in which poetry bore closer relations to the life and enthusiasm of a people than it often has borne in other lands and times." These words, specifically applied to American poetry, apply well enough to Victorian English poetry also, and they fix the key-note for both volumes of criticism. Again, the period in question is, in an important sense, a transitional one, and thus peculiarly fit for the evolutionary critic. In the first volume we read: "The Victorian poets have flourished in an equatorial region of common-sense and demonstrable knowledge. Thought has outlived its childhood, yet has not reached a growth from which experience and reason lead to visions more radiant than the early intuitions. The zone of youthful fancy, excited by unquestioning acceptance of outward phenomena, is now well passed; the zone of cultivated imagination is still beyond us." And in the second volume, the thought takes this shape: "The new learning—the passage from the childlike and phenomenal

way of regarding things to the absolute, scientific penetration of their true entities and relations—has directly told upon the work of the poet, requiring new language, imagery, invention, as he adapts himself to a deeper purpose and the hope of a sublimer faith." The age, moreover, has had a markedly composite or eclectic character. "As if in despair of finding new themes to suit their respective talents, yet driven on to expression, we discern the Victorian poets,—one copying the refrains and legendary feeling of illuminated missals and black-letter lays; another recasting the most enchanting and famous romances of Christendom in delicious language and measures caught from Chaucer himself; others adopting the quaint religious manner of Herbert and Vaughan; a host essaying new and conscientious presentations of the undying beauty of Greek mythologic lore." In America, similar phenomena are visible, although here complicated with the struggle for emergence of a distinctive national type as yet only locally realized, probably because our national character has not yet become distinctive and homogeneous enough to make the wider literary evolution possible. "A nation's literature will not appear out of season," truthfully says our critic, but "when a time is ripe there are found both idealists and men of action to represent it,—springing up as when, in the physical world, the pines and fir-trees of a virgin forest have been cleared away, and a novel flora suddenly appears, whose germs have been hidden in the under-mould, awaiting their own season of room and light and air." Other points to be noted in Mr. Stedman's treatment of poetry are the attention which he pays to minor singers, who often supply the missing links in the chain of some literary development; and his constant care to point out wherein a poet either conforms to the national type of character or diverges from it, thus recognizing in Tennyson a true "poet of the centre," and finding in Whittier a more intimate Americanism than in Whitman. In "The Nature and Elements of Poetry," he insists upon giving science its full recognition, saying: "Nor can any

work henceforth be an addition to a literature of the subject which fails to recognize the obligation of treating it upon scientific lines." Again he urges "that the poet's technical modes, even the general structure of a masterwork, come by intuition, environment, reading, experience." He once more calls upon us to "reflect for an instant upon the simultaneous appearance of a certain phase, such as Preraphaelitism, in the plastic, structural, and decorative arts, in imaginative literature, and on the stage itself," and to realize the large bearings of such frequently recurrent phenomena. And he eloquently urges that "every race has its culminating or concurrent ideal of beauty, which is affected, again, by the conditions of life in the different regions of the race's establishment," that "each nation, like a rose-tree, draws from the soil and air its strength, and wealth, and material sustenance; it puts forth branches, and leaves, and sturdy thorns, and battles with the elements and with the thicket that hems it in; finally, with all its hardier growth assured, it breaks into flower, it develops an ideal; its own and perfect rose of beauty marks the culmination, the intent, the absolute fulfillment of its creative existence." All of these things are expressions of the view of literature that embraces the process no less than the accomplished result, and that puts the evolutionary stamp upon the author's criticism. Finally, like Whitman, Mr. Stedman forecasts the future from the teachings of the past, and predicts, for both England and America, that "a creative poetic literature, adapted to the new order of thought and the new aspirations of humanity, will speedily grow into form."

Among "the inheritors of unfulfilled renown" in the critical field, as well as in that of creation, Sidney Lanier deserves more than a passing mention. His eager and receptive mind turned instinctively toward the light from whatever direction it came, and the message of science found in him a willing listener. How painstaking was his endeavor to bring his work into conformity with the most exact scientific knowledge may be illustrated by

these words from a letter to Bayard Taylor: "In the poem I've just sent you,—'The Bee,'—it occurs to me that I have carelessly used the pronoun 'him,' referring to the bee,—forgetting that, although the worker bees were formerly thought to be sexless, they have recently been found to be imperfectly developed females." This meticulous attention to the smallest details shows us how much there was of the art that conceals art in the seemingly "careless rapture" of Lanier's lyric. It also suggests that the man who had so taken to heart the scientific lesson of accurate observation was not likely to ignore the broad generalizations of science. He once said of a fellow-poet: "The trouble with Poe was, he did not *know* enough. He needed to know a good many more things in order to be a great poet." Lanier realized, as Mr. W. H. Ward says, that "the world is opening to the poet with every question the crucible asks of the elements, with every spectrum the prism steals from a star." His passion for knowledge brought him into direct relations with the spokesmen of evolution, and he accepted that system of thought as valid in his own artistic provinces. But he was careful to make the necessary reservations on behalf of individual initiative. He insisted upon the significance of personality, "there being absolutely no precedent conditions by which the most ardent evolutionist could evolve William Shakspeare, for example, from old John Shakspeare and his wife." That this is an unimpeachable proposition, even to the "ardent evolutionist" himself, he argues by quoting from Mr. John Fiske, to the effect that "the social philosopher must simply accept geniuses as data, just as Darwin accepts his spontaneous variations." Lanier once wrote to Mr. E. C. Stedman complaining that "in all directions the poetic art was suffering from the shameful circumstance that criticism was without a scientific basis for even the most elementary of its judgements." It was toward the removal of this reproach, and the advent of the day when

"Science to art as a man to a woman shall yearn,"

that he felt impelled to make the contribution of his two books of criticism, "The Science of English Verse" and "The English Novel and the Principle of Its Development." The former of these books, being a study in abstract æsthetics, does not provide us with illustrative material, but the latter, with its significant title, is an excellent example of the sort of modern criticism that has the idea of evolution somewhere in the background, although it does not make of it a doctrinaire application. Had Lanier lived, we should doubtless have from him further critical work of the synthetic kind, informed with a deeper sense of the process by which literary species come into being.

One difficulty, already alluded to, that besets our present inquiry, is found in the fact that the great bulk of American criticism consists of studies, often highly intensive, of individual writers or of single works. One might easily have the most advanced private convictions on the subject of literary development, and view the whole subject in the light of the evolutionary philosophy, but unless he were to take up a whole literature for study, or some considerable period of a literature, his readers might never discover his attitude toward the broad historical problem. Now our American writers have not attempted much work of this wide inclusiveness. Ticknor's "History of Spanish Literature" remains our one first-class achievement in dealing with foreign nations. Our classical scholars hold their own with the scholars of England and Germany, but not one of them has undertaken a history of either Greek or Latin literature upon the scale of Mahaffy or Symonds, of Cruttwell or Simcox. Nor has any one of them dealt with a Continental literature in other than the most cursory fashion. Of our parent English literature much the same thing must be said, although in this case the subject is vast enough to give the most ambitious pause, and neither England nor America can point to any treatment of their common literary heritage, the product of a single brain, which equals in comprehensiveness and philosophical grasp the splendid work

of Taine. Our own American offshoot from the great English trunk is not in much better case, as far as a general historical treatment is concerned. The largely-planned work of Professor Tyler is, and seems likely to remain, a torso. Our other historians, with the one notable exception of Professor Richardson, have given us excellent hand-books and school manuals, but nothing more. Two histories of a more serious character are now promised us,—one by Professor Trent and one by Professor Wendell,—but even they will be limited by the conditions of the uniform series in which they are to appear, which will prevent the writers from exercising their full opportunities. The simple truth remains that such small European countries as Denmark and Norway,—to say nothing of the larger ones,—can boast the possession of historical surveys of their literatures more liberally appointed than any to which we in America may lay claim. One cannot glance at the two huge volumes of Hansen's "Danish Literature" or the three stout octavos of Jæger's "Norwegian Literature" without feeling something akin to humiliation at the thought that our own literary history should have fared so poorly in comparison. We make up for it, in a way, by a great amount of excellent work done in lesser fields, but this does not quite cancel the obligation to deal more adequately with the entire area of our literary production.

From such critical studies as we have, dealing with the whole of American or other literatures, or with extended periods of particular literatures, it is not difficult to show that the evolutionary spirit has been influential in determining the modes of their expression, and is shaping the mental habit of their writers. In Professor C. F. Richardson's "American Literature," the most extensive and thoughtful treatment of the subject yet given us, we find this declaration: "We have had enough description; we want analysis," and this question: "What has been and what is the environment of our literature?" The author shows a distinct realization of the controlling force of environment when he

says: "It was, in a true sense, harder for Mrs. Bradstreet to be Mrs. Bradstreet than for Emerson to be Emerson," and a clear recognition of the indebtedness of writers to their predecessors when he calls Bradford and Winthrop the intellectual ancestors of Emerson and Hawthorne. Dr. B. W. Wells's noteworthy studies in French and German literature show the evidence of the evolutionary idea at many points. In a chapter devoted to Marivaux we find such sentences as these: "There is a whole group of episodes that connect the 'Vie de Marianne,' on the one side with the picaresque fiction of Le Sage, and on the other with the crass realism of some modern naturalists." "From our modern point of view the great fascination of Marivaux is that he was thoroughly modern, and to be modern in 1730 was to have already the symptoms of that intertwining of sentiment and lubricity that marks all the fiction of his immediate successors." "To me he seems to be a natural link in the evolution that was leading from a healthy though crass naturalism to those miasmatic gardens which grow only the brilliantly exquisite *fleurs du mal*." "The interest that Marivaux has for us will always be the interest that we feel in literary origins rather than in literary beauty. His praise must be that without him many of the most striking works of later fiction would not be what they are." Professor Henry A. Beers, in his recent history of the "English Romantic Movement" says of that phase of literary development that "it would be unphilosophical to consider it as a merely æsthetic affair, and to lose sight altogether of its deeper springs in the religious and ethical currents of the time," and his entire treatment of the subject is in consonance with the view that the study of literature is an investigation into the natural history of ideas and literary forms. The same general characterization may be made of Mr. Thomas Sargent Perry's "English Literature in the Eighteenth Century," a work which expressly and repeatedly asserts that literature, no less than society, is subject to the law of progressive and orderly development. Mr. Horace E. Scudder, embracing his-

tory as well as literature within his purview, speaks of "the impulse which is sending our students to the search for the beginnings of institutions, laws, and organisms," and of the "wiser understanding" which makes it now impossible to consider the American product apart from the European. It is equally true of literature as of politics that "a truly philosophical history indicates those undercurrents of race, law, and institutions, which make the nexus of the new world with the old, and act as interpreters of the later history, wrought out under more separate influences." But, on the other hand, while "the Atlantic Ocean has been contracting its space ever since the first Virginians rowed across its waters, * * * yet all this while a myriad forces have been at work on either side of the ocean moulding national consciousnesses, and producing those distinctions which are hard to express but perfectly manifest." The outlook of American criticism in this matter of development may best be stated in the words of a very recent and highly important book upon "Methods and Materials of Literary Criticism," by Professors C. M. Gayley and F. N. Scott. These authors say: "Histories of literature are, of course, common enough, and the tendency at the present time is to connect in some way the biographical and critical fragments of which they mainly consist with the growth of religious and political institutions; but to set forth explicitly the nature and value of this connection, to show that the birth, rise, culmination, and decline of literary movements are manifestations of a general law, or to point out 'any tolerably permanent principle of social evolution round which the facts of literary growth and decay may be grouped,'—this has been the task of but a very few." It may be added that this is the underlying aim of the work from which the extract has been taken.

Quotations of this sort might be multiplied indefinitely. The number of our writers who view literature in this spirit is already large, and is constantly increasing. But the prevalence of the scientific method has come about by such slow degrees that it

requires some effort to realize how great is the total transformation that has been wrought. We need to have the contrast sharply presented to us, as by comparing a random selection from the critical writings of a generation ago with a similar selection from the writings of our own day. Tested in some such way as this, the difference would appear very marked. In the modern work there is a broader outlook, a larger introduction of the comparative element, a deeper recognition of the play of hidden forces. There is a closer scrutiny of slight modifications and a more persistent attempt to account for them. Attention is given to minor productions and transitional phases as well as to definitions of the achieved type and study of the acknowledged masterpiece. There is also an implicit recognition of the fact that a literary work has many relations upon many sides, and that all of these relations must be taken into account if we are to understand it fully. Now, these characteristics of the modern criticism become intelligible only when they are considered as manifestations of the evolutionary leaven which is working in our thought, whether we are aware of its presence or not; it is only when referred to this fundamental concept that their real significance becomes discernible. We have frequently styled this sort of criticism scientific, using the term as synonymous with philosophical or evolutionary, and meaning thereby to distinguish it, on the one hand, from the impressionism of the subjective critic, and, on the other, from the empiricism of the undisciplined intellect. The Rev. Mr. Fleay makes the following admirable statement of the indebtedness—although not in the widest sense—of literary criticism to science: “We must accept every scientific method from other sciences applicable to our ends. From the mineralogist we must learn by long study to recognize a chip of rock at once from its general appearance; from the chemist, to supply systematic tabulated tests to confirm our conclusions; from both, to use varied tests—tests as to form, as for crystals—tests as to materials, as for compounds; from the botanist we must learn to

classify, not in an empirical way, but by essential characters arranged in due subordination; finally, from the biologist we must learn to take into account not only the state of any writer's mind at some one epoch, but to trace its organic growth from beginning to end of his period of work; remembering that we have only fossils, and even fragments of fossils, to work upon, when our object is to restore the whole living animal. When these things are done systematically and thoroughly, then, and then only, may we expect to have a criticism that shall be free from shallow notions taken up to please individual eccentricities." Unfortunately, the term scientific criticism has also come to have another and less admirable meaning than this, a narrow meaning which we must repudiate as resolutely as we adhere to the broader one. The late Edward T. McLaughlin has some well considered and sensible remarks upon this subject. He says: "The scientific age was sure to come to the gates of literary criticism with hands full of method and systematization. Finding how difficult it is to induce students to get at the heart of a poem (and, it may be, sharing in the difficulty themselves), many earnest and well-meaning students have settled upon the close and thorough study of literature from the standpoint of information and analysis. They teach and they make editions with an eye to grammatical, rhetorical, and linguistic instruction. They present clear formulated methods for examining style or argument. They present other authors' exegeses as matter for direct acquisition or as models for application to similar criticism. They annotate texts with elaborate explanations. Their treatment may appear satisfactory; for anyone can memorize, and learn how to apply formulas." What this author calls "the startling contemporary growth" of the sort of scientific criticism thus described has nothing to do with our present subject; it leads to a narrow and superficial interpretation of literature instead of the broad evolutionary interpretation which alone truly deserves the name of scientific. It bears to evolutionary criticism about

the same relation that the old-fashioned collecting of eggs or shells bears to evolutionary biology.

The study of literature in the evolutionary sense tends more and more to become a comparative study. Just as the geological series of deposits, confused or abruptly broken off in one country, may be found continued elsewhere, so some line of development among the *genres* of literature, clear up to a certain point in the product of one nation, may from that point on be better traced by transferring the scrutiny to some other field. The natural history of the epic, for example, is best illustrated at one stage by the Celtic genealogical poem, at another by the balladry of Scandinavia, at another by the "Kalevala", and at another by the Homeric lays. This comparative study of literature has many possibilities for the future, and their unfolding has only begun. Already the comparative method of investigation has found a firm foothold in some of our American universities, where distinct courses and special chairs are dedicated to its pursuit. It is being reënforced from several directions by anthropology and philology, as well as by the growing cosmopolitanism of our literary interests, which is really one of the most striking phenomena of the past quarter-century, reaching all the way down from the strata of serious scholarship to the strata of the casual public of readers. And this wider outlook over the domain of literary endeavor brings with it that best of critical gifts, the catholic mind. The relativity of our ideals, whether in æsthetics or in ethics, becomes ever clearer to the philosophical intelligence, and the most absolute-seeming standards appear as stadia in the progress of taste rather than as the ultimate goals of the spirit. If this does not lead—to borrow Nietzsche's phrase—to an *Umwertung aller Werthe*, it does lead to a modification of all critical values, as we come to view them in the more diffused light of the better science of today. Thus is pointed out to us the way of growth and of hopefulness; we recognize that growth is the inevitable law of literature, and that hopefulness is the inalienable heritage of man,

"As he stands on the heights of his life with a glimpse of a height that is higher."

And now, having passed in review the chief exponents of literary criticism in the United States, with glances at some of those lesser writers whose work may be even more significant, as regards the general trend of the critical current, than that of the more authoritative interpreters, there remains to us the task of summarizing the results of our investigation, and of making some sort of general statement of the conclusions reached. A hasty judgment may reckon these results as negative, seeing that American criticism offers no example of a writer who takes his stand firmly upon the evolutionary principle, declaring it to be of primary importance, and absolutely essential to an intelligent comprehension of literary art. It must be admitted that our writers have recognized this principle mainly by indirection, and, even when paying tribute to its efficiency, have done so instinctively rather than consciously, impelled by the outward pressure of the *Zeitgeist* rather than by the inward spring of the inevitable logical postulate. A superficial judgment, likewise, may assert that in all this marshalling of illustrative extracts, this labored effort to read into criticism a meaning foreign to the conscious intent of its authors, there is really nothing discernible, no implicit doctrine which an equal determination might not read into almost any criticism of the pre-Spencerian period. Was not the earlier criticism wont to deal with such figurative counters as the infancy of literature, its growth, blossoming, and decay, and was not this as complete a use of the analogy from biology as any to be found in the criticism of our own time? This opinion will doubtless be held in the best of faith by many, who would remain unconvinced in the presence of tenfold the array of citations that have here been adduced. Yet we must hold this view to be but superficial, for it begs the whole question at issue. The contention of the evolutionary critic is, not that he has made a nicer and more detailed figurative employment of the language of biology than

was made by his predecessors, but that this language upon his tongue, and in the light of our modern knowledge, has become something more than figurative, that it is the language of fact rather than of figure, that it no longer invokes, for the explanation of literary history and productivity, a fanciful analogy with rhetorical intent, but claims the right to annex to its own province the terms hitherto held in fee by the biologist, and to apply them in a sense no less scientific and exact. That the scope of the terminology in question has become thus widened might reasonably be maintained from an examination of American criticism alone, and appears a certainty when we examine the still clearer evidence that may be drawn from contemporary European sources.

In the logical order, the development of literary criticism is something like this:— There is first a subjective stage, in which critical deliverances are nothing more than statements of what an individual likes or dislikes. Then there is an objective stage, in which fixed principles crystallize, serving as norms by which personal impressions are tested, and defended or rejected as may happen. Then there is a scientific stage, in which even fixed principles regain something of their former fluidity, not as before, however, receiving shape from the mould of the individual mind, but responding to the pressure of those forces that form a race of men or a period of human history. Both individual writers and national schools of criticism tend to occupy these stages in this order, although in the case of the individual progress may be arrested before the third stage is reached. In our own criticism, for example, Mr. Howells has remained at the first stage, while Lowell was at least well on his way toward the second. “My Literary Passions,” that book of impressionist reflections which the personality of Mr. Howells makes so charming, is the frankest possible confession of faith in the validity of subjective criticism. The author discourses appealingly of “the criticism that enlightens and ennobles,” contrasting it with the criticism that impales, and maintains that because the latter “is the ideal of most critics,

criticism still remains behind all the other literary arts." But if criticism is to attempt its function of enlightening and ennobling with any assurance of success, it must rest upon a firmer foundation than that provided by the shifting sands of personal caprice. Lowell, who at times trusted overmuch to that foundation, still moved habitually upon the higher philosophical plane of the following quotation: "Unless we admit critical principles as fixed beyond question, we shall be able to render no adequate judgment, but only to record our own impressions, which may be valuable or not." As for our third stage of criticism, which recognizes that the most seemingly fixed of principles are subject to the cumulative effect of separately insensible modifications, and which admits the inherent relativity of all æsthetical and ethical standards, it is exemplified in American literature by most of the writers who have been discussed in the foregoing pages; the purpose, in fact, of all our inquiry has been that of showing how this view of the critical obligation has insinuated itself into our critical writing, until it has come to determine the characteristic mode of thought of the younger generation.

To prevent the study of literature from falling into disrepute among the serious thinkers who keep abreast of their age, it was absolutely essential that it should be infused with something of the scientific spirit of investigation. Professor Posnett, one of the most earnest spokesmen of the modern method, sounded, several years ago, a much-needed note of warning: "To our friends the men of literature," he remarked, "we would say that nothing has contributed more largely to lower the value of their studies in the eyes of thinking men than the old-fashioned worship of imagination, not merely as containing an element of mystery, but as altogether superior to conditions of space and time; that, under the auspices of the irrational worship, the study of literature tends to become a blind idolatry of the unknown, with a priesthood of textual pedants, who would sacrifice to verbalism the very deity they affect to worship." This warning

still calls for heed, although the danger is lessening year by year. We are coming to understand more and more clearly that, as has before been suggested, the history of literature is the history of a process, and the study of a work of literature is the study of a product. To this, in the last analysis, the evolutionary conception of literature reduces, and to this complexion the profoundest and most enduring of our latter-day critical writing, American no less than European, is fast coming, if it has not already come. But the process is one of such infinite intricacy that its unfolding will never be wholly accomplished, and the incalculable character of many of the forces that shape the product will always leave an unexplained residuum for the gratification of that sense of mystery to which literature still makes its appeal, despite the best that science can do. The contrast between the older method of absolute judgments based upon the consummate types of excellence to which reference is had, and the newer method, which Amiel calls the "philosophical and morphological mode of embracing and expounding literary history," is distinctly made by that acute thinker in a passage which must be quoted. "The latter," he says, "is the antipodes of the French method of proceeding, which takes, as it were, only the peaks of the subject, links them together by theoretical figures and triangulations, and then assumes these lines to represent the genuine face of the country. The real process of formation of a general opinion, of a public taste, of an established *genre*, cannot be laid bare by an abstract method, which suppresses the period of growth in favor of the final fruit, which prefers clearness of outline to fullness of statement, and sacrifices the preparation to the result, the multitude to the chosen type." It is the acceptance of the evolutionary principle that has discredited the formal method of triangulation and artificial contour, and has brought about a transformation of the spirit of criticism in our own generation. That this transforming influence has been felt and acted upon in our own country has already been shown by an array of examples, and must be admitted by every careful student of our recent critical literature.

RECENT ADVANCE IN PSYCHOLOGY

E. B. TITCHENER, *Cornell University.*



It is but a few years since psychology made her *début* among the sciences. Hence a review of recent psychological work cannot begin in the middle, as a review of recent work in physics or chemistry might do, but demands a sort of apologetic preface,—the saying of something that shall justify the reader's outlay of time and attention upon what is to follow. There has been a good deal of boasting about the new psychology, and some men are never tired of flaunting her perfections; on the other hand, there has been a good deal of unnecessary abuse, and some men will go out of their way to meet her, for the opportunity of a blank stare of non-recognition. Yet there are a few moderates, to whom the new psychology is neither goddess nor demirep; and if their judgment does not carry the immediate weight of the extremist views, that is not to say that it is less just or less able to endure the test of time.

It is useless to quarrel about terms. But, whether or not we admit the advent of a new psychology, at least we cannot deny the consummation of a great and far-reaching change in psychological aims and methods. The character of the change may be roughly summed up in three propositions. In the first place, mind has been stripped of its meaning, as a useful tool or set of useful tools in the service of the organism, and has come to be regarded for its own sake, as something that merely exists or goes

on, apart from any use or meaning whatsoever. It is not easy for the layman to realize the import of the change. It amounts to this: that mind, instead of being dissected and classified, in purely logical terms, into static bits of knowledge (ideas) and empty faculties of knowledge (memory, imagination), is looked upon as an organic structure, *i. e.*, as a structure that has grown or developed, to be investigated by analytical and genetic methods. What mental processes mean or stand for, and how they came to possess meaning at all, that is another problem, to be dealt with by the philosophical discipline of epistemology. Secondly, the last half-century has witnessed the introduction of the experimental method into psychology. It is often said that experiment has come in to oust the old-fashioned method of introspection or self-observation. But such statements are due either to blind partisanship or to ignorance. What experiment does is to control introspection, to standardize the conditions under which introspection takes place, and so to guarantee the comparability of introspective results over the two hemispheres. Experimentation has lifted the 'facts' of psychology from the plane of opinion to the plane of knowledge; but it has not achieved or attempted the impossible,—an alteration of the nature of mind itself. Yet that must be done, if introspection is to be ousted. Lastly, modern psychology is keenly attentive to the correlation of mind with body. It works upon the hypothesis that there is, as Huxley puts it, no psychosis without neurosis; and no sooner has it analyzed a mental complex than it begins its search for the neural substrate of the elementary conscious processes. So there have arisen, by a sort of hybridization, two intermediate sciences,—psychophysics and physiological psychology,—which have taken their share, too, of overpraise and of ridicule, but which are none the less healthily alive and steadily moving. Now these three changes may or may not suffice to constitute a 'new' psychology, ranking alongside of the new physiology of Ludwig and the new chemistry of Ostwald and

van t'Hoff; at any rate, they mean that modern psychology has gained results in the present and has outlined a programme for the future, of which the older psychology never dreamed.

Let us pass to some of the results, and let us begin, as is natural, with the psychology of sensation. There has been marked advance, both in the collection of facts and in the elaboration of theories, all along the line. Consider psychological optics. There has long been a feud between the rival theories of Helmholtz and of Hering: Helmholtz starting out (and we cannot enter further into details here) from the fact that colors mix, that blue and red, for instance, produce violet or purple, and Hering from the fact that colors cancel, that blue and yellow, for instance, produce grey. The great objection to Hering's view has been that black and white, which he regards as antagonistic colors, do not cancel out when mixed, but fuse to give an intermediate grey. The difficulty has been cleared up recently by G. E. Müller, Lotze's successor at Göttingen, who has shown that the grey-mixture is a central and not a peripheral matter, a process of the brain and not the eye. Or turn to psychological acoustics. If Helmholtz stands for an antiquated theory of vision, his theory of audition,—that the ear is a little piano, upon which the air particles play, striking different notes according to their rate of vibration,—holds its own easily enough against the half dozen rival theories of the last decade. Just lately, indeed, it has received striking confirmation in the discovery of well-defined regions of musical deafness, 'tonal islands,' as they are called, which may coexist with normal hearing over all the rest of the musical scale. Smell, the most unselfish of the senses, the cloak that covers the nakedness of taste, comes to its rights at last; it has a whole volume of three hundred pages octavo. Can one imagine what there is to be said of smell, that should take up three hundred pages? And yet the psychology of smell is only in its first beginnings. Taste, stripped to its four qualities of sweet, salt, bitter and sour, has attracted a few patient workers, and we now

know something about taste contrasts, and taste mixtures, and taste compensations. And the skin, oldest and most deceiving of organs, has taken its place in the new psychology under a title all its own; there is now a science of haptics, a younger sister of optics and acoustics. Here the new ideas are newer, perhaps, than they are anywhere else in sense psychology. The skin has revealed itself as a mosaic of separate organs, pressure spots, cold spots, warm spots, pain spots; and heat has been shown to result from the mixture of warmth and cold.

So much for sensation. But does not modern psychology stop short at sensation? Is it not true, as the critics politely put it, that the experimental method has proved most successful to the sphere of sensation?—meaning thereby that it has done nothing outside of sensation. Well! I can see no reason why a man should not devote his life to sensation and call himself a psychologist, any more than I can see a reason why one should not devote oneself to the worms, and call oneself a zoölogist. Some men do their best work under such specialization. Only, as a matter of fact, the science does not specialize. It is most distinctly untrue that modern psychology has halted at sensation. Here are some of the proofs.

There is a great class of visual space perceptions, known by the general name of “geometrical optical illusions.” Thus a perfect square looks to be higher than it is broad. A couple of lines cutting each other obliquely in the plane of the paper, seem to be a rectangular cross, standing upright in tridimensional space. Draw two equal horizontal lines and put an arrow-head at each end of the one, and two arrow-feathers at each end of the other. The feathered line stretches; you have to measure to convince yourself that the two are really of the same length. These cases are typical of scores of others. Now many attempts, and ingenious attempts at that, have been made to account for particular illusions; but until recently we have had no systematic treatment of the whole group of phenomena. The years 1897

and 1898, however, saw the publication of two exhaustive monographs. Wundt of Leipzig, the father and founder of experimental psychology, seeks to explain optical illusion in terms of peripheral processes,—fixation, eye movement, retinal image; Lipps of Munich, the most brilliant representative of the modern Herbartian school, seeks to explain it in terms of central processes,—we see aright, but we judge wrongly. And we do this, Lipps says, because we read into inanimate objects, even into lines and points, activities and struggles and resistances which are shaped after the pattern of our own efforts and arrests: the vertical line is trying to ascend, as we look at it; the limiting points of the figure are holding it from spreading and collapsing. The two theories are still under the judge, and we cannot yet strike a decision between them; though it would seem that the former falls better into line with current psychological ideas, while the latter is colored by an æsthetic appreciation of form. Haptical space perception is also receiving its due meed of attention; we have a book, describing the conditions under which the skin perceives position and direction, distance and movement. And then there is the wide field of qualitative perception, within which is included the doctrine of tonal fusion,—itself a subject to which a man might devote the best part of his life, and not exhaust it. Sound two tones together: in some cases, you get an approximation to sensation simplicity (octave, fifth); in others, an unmistakable duality of impression (second, seventh). What degrees of ‘fusion’ lie between these two extremes? How does degree of fusion vary with the number of components fused, with the distance apart of these components in the musical scale, with the clang-tint (*i. e.*, the peculiar composition) of the components, with direction of the attention, with the relative intensities of the components? What do we do when we ‘analyze’ a chord, recognize it as *c-e-g*? What is the psychological difference between musically trained and musically untrained hearing of tonal complexes?

And we can pass to higher complexes than perceptions. It has long been a dogma that attention to an impression means merely the inhibition of other impressions; that attention is thus, in a sense, a negative matter; the object of attention is clearly seen or clearly heard, simply because other and conflicting impressions are kept out of the way. We now know, both from physiological and from psychological evidence, that there is a positive reinforcement in attention; the object attended to becomes intrinsically clearer, at the same time that the other contents of consciousness are blurred and obscured. No small gain, this, towards an understanding of the mechanics of mind! And again, it has long been a dogma that the process of recognition consists in the recall of a 'memory image,' and the comparison of this image with the presented object. Thus, when I recognize a friend after an absence, I am supposed, first, to call up a mental picture of him from my memory storehouse, then to hold up this picture "in the mind's eye" for comparison with its original, and finally to decide, after evidence considered, that this is verily the man I knew. Truly, a pretty logical construction; and, truly, a way in which the mind might have functioned, had the fates so willed. But we saw that logical construction and introspection are now at odds. And it is but rarely that introspection tells us of any memory image. We recognize our friend, not from any conscious full-length portrait,—not in terms of visual consciousness at all; we recognize him by a mere 'feel,' a twitter of the stomach, a wrinkle of the forehead. Such are the short-cuts to mental function, and so shamelessly lazy is the noblest part of man!

Nor must we forget the controversy that is raging about the 'form qualities,' as they are called. Suppose that I shake five oranges out of a bag upon the table, and contemplate the scattered fruit. I see,—so the argument runs,—more than five orange-units; I see these five units in a group. They are somehow bracketed together, merged in a unity wider than the unity of the unit

they form a five-fold whole for ideation. What, then, has happened? Is it really true, that, if I invest five orange-stimuli in the bank of mind, I draw out five orange-perceptions *plus* a certain amount of mental interest, an added idea (the idea of form) or an added attribute of idea (quality of formedness)? Or are the five stimuli worked over into the group-idea in the limbo of the Herbartian unconscious, before they come to consciousness at all? Or is there just nothing there but the mental togetherness which is the natural and necessary result of the simultaneous presentation of five like stimuli? In one sense, a very old question; in another, the latest of psychological problems. And, we must confess, a question which still goes unanswered, unless we reply to it by a *parti pris*. Only, we need no longer build our arguments on the quicksand of mere ratiocination; it is simply a matter of time, until the experimental method lays hold of the issue and reads the riddle.

We turn now to feeling, the affective side of consciousness. The orthodox view of feeling has been that there are but two simple affective qualities, pleasantness and unpleasantness, or, as the English school named them before the discovery of the pain sensation with its special cutaneous organ, pleasure and pain. Wundt has lately propounded a very different view. The part-colored woof of the sense qualities, he says, is shot through and through with a warp of affection that is every whit as variegated; indeed, if we take the full tale of qualitative *nuances*, feelings are even more numerous and manifold than sensations. Classification is difficult, but within limits possible; for the shuttle carries six principal threads, pleasantness and unpleasantness, tension and relaxation, excitement and tranquilization or depression,—and these six qualities are the dominant colors of the whole pattern. The evidence for this theory is of three kinds. We may appeal to the verdict of a trained introspection, carrying our experimental caution over into a region where direct experimentation is as yet unavailable. We may try to isolate the separate strands of

feeling by 'suggestion,' with or without recourse to the hypnotic state. And we may search the records of bodily 'expression' of feeling; the curves of volume, of pulse, of respiration, which vary with variation of the affective consciousness. The results are scanty and ambiguous. Yet there can be no doubt,—and the point is sufficiently curious,—that there is in modern psychology a rather general tendency to admit a multiplicity of affective qualities, and to brand the belief in pleasantness and unpleasantness alone as a prejudice, a scholastic dogma, a traditional attitude, and not a psychological conviction. The fact is that we have no 'theory' of feeling; we do not know the conditions under which the affective qualities appear; and, until we do, until we can experiment, nothing can be finally settled. We must either suspend judgment, or say that we think thus and thus because it is thus and thus that Wundt or Lipps, Ladd or James, is thinking for us.

The orthodox theory of emotion has also been put upon the defensive. It is now more than a decade since the psychological world was startled by the James-Lange theory of emotion, the theory which said, in its crudest form, that we are sorry because we cry, and are frightened because we run,—just reversing the plain man's idea of the sequence of phenomena. The theory has been thoroughly and appreciatively discussed, and its great merit—its insistence on the organic sensations of crying, panting, shrinking, and what not, as integral factors in the emotive whole—universally admitted. But the outcome seems to be that the orthodox view stands its ground. The emotion is not a simple matter of bodily reverberation; it includes the exciting or depressing situation, a mass of perceptions and ideas, as well as the feeling proper, and the organic sensations set up by the bodily attitude with which the situation is met. Here, as always, an extreme position has done good service, in putting the conservative centre upon its mettle.

This bald outline must suffice, as regards current work in analytical psychology. If the psychological reader notes, with some resentment, that important topics—the development of the theory of action, the beginnings of a valid psychology of time, the explication of memory types—have been omitted from our list, this is rather a compliment to the science than a criticism upon the present writer, who has his space limits.¹ We pass, then, to genetic psychology.

Here we have, in the first place, Baldwin's two volumes on "Mental Development in the Child and the Race." The work, as its title shows, is ambitiously planned; it purports to sketch both the phylogeny and the ontogeny of mind. It leans heavily upon biological conceptions; so heavily, indeed, that we may fairly criticize it as being less a history of the mind than a history of the reactions of a motor organism. However, we know more of the evolution of life than we do of the evolution of mind; and even if the full force of the criticism be allowed, we must admit also that there is not a chapter in the two volumes that does not sharpen the point of some definitely psychological problem. To say that a book is 'suggestive' is, ordinarily, to damn it with faint praise. Baldwin's books are suggestive in the right sense; they ask specific questions for later specialists to answer. In France, Ribot, the president-elect of the Congress of 1900, has lately published a volume on the evolution of general ideas. Stanley Hall's pupils at Clark University are carrying out his view, that the mind like the body is a developed organism, with vestigial organs and functions that give the skilled investigator a glimpse of its prehistoric past, in a series of monographs upon water

(1) It may, perhaps, be noted here that the last few years have witnessed the launching of a round half-dozen systematic treatises—Rehmke, Jodl, Höfler, Cornelius, Stout, Ebbinghaus (Pt. i.)—of one school or another, to say nothing of a whole flotilla of text-books and primers. The beginner in psychology can take his pick of a very fair number of books, though still of nothing like so many as are at the disposal of the physicist or zoologist.

psychoses and tree psychoses and the like. And Hall himself has just penned a delightful article upon early memories, which ought to inoculate every reader with the enthusiasm of the genetic standpoint.

So far we have been dealing, whether in analytic or in genetic psychology, with broad currents, general trends of thought and investigation. In animal psychology, while we have a record of really brilliant work, the later contributions to knowledge stand somewhat apart, still awaiting inspection and organization. We mention a few of the most important.

Jennings has shown, by minute and patient observation, that paramecium and certain other unicellular organisms are endowed with but a single, typical motor reaction to all forms of stimulation. If the animal seems to seek food, to avoid obstacles, to evade dangers, this is all but a seeming; in actual fact, it responds to changes in its environment by one and the same stereotyped movement. It functions, in a word, as a strip of isolated muscle might function. This is not to say, of course, that the creature has not had a mind; the reflex movement is, probably, a degenerated conscious (impulsive) movement, and not an ultimate property of living matter. As in the course of the individual lifetime we reduce walking and bicycle-riding to automatisms, so in the life history of the race have actions, originally voluntary, become involuntary and mechanical. Nor is it to say that, even as things are, the typical movement is unaccompanied by a vestigial consciousness. Learning by experience, change of reaction with change of surroundings, is a good criterion of the presence of mentality; but the lack of such learning does not carry with it any logical inference to the absence of mind. In Germany, Bethe, working in the same cautious and painstaking way upon ants and bees, tends to the conclusion that even these examples of industry and order are mere automata! He conceived, for instance, the ingenious idea of tracing the path of an ant towards a lump of meat or sugar at some distance from the nest, by laying

down a sheet of smoked paper between the two terminals. He found that the ant moved out at random, in purposeless loops and circles, until it chanced to hit upon the food-supply. The path from nest to food was then gradually straightened in a very simple manner; the ants held a direct course past the circles,—as why should they not, seeing that the path was as continuous in that way as if the circles were included,—and pushed out little by little, accident by accident, until they had forded the mouths of the loops. So the zigzag became a straight line; and all that is needed to explain the straightening is a single chemo-reflex. Another experiment consisted in making a paper bridge from nest to food, a bridge so constructed that its middle section could be swung round through one hundred and eighty degrees, the right-hand end thus becoming the left, and the left-hand the right. When the ants had made a trail in a given direction, and the bridge was swung round, they were entirely at a loss to advance; they could not follow the reversed 'scent.' Again, a chemo-reflex is all that explanation requires. Another experiment served to explode the theory that ants 'recognize' friends and foes. A member of a strange nest, dipped in a mess of pounded ants from the home nest, was received by its 'enemies' with all friendliness; the chemo-reflex again! And so with bees; though Bethe confesses that the homing 'instinct' still obdurately resists interpretation. These results, like those of Jennings, must not be pushed too far. They show that ants may be reflex machines, for all that appears to the contrary; they do not show,—no results of the kind can show,—that the animals have not possessed and do not possess some sort of consciousness.

On the whole, however, the animal mind stands examination but poorly. Thorndike's work with caged kittens relieved *felis domestica* of the burden of many of our complex processes; and though Wesley Mills, an observer of wide experience, inclines to think more highly of animal faculty, the trend of experimental work seems to be against him. At any rate, the days of

Romanes and his anecdotes are over. We may note that Kline has recently published fairly full suggestions towards a laboratory course in comparative psychology, ranging in material from the amoeba to the white rat.

Modern psychology has cast its net over a wider area than the individual mind. We have today the beginnings of a social psychology, a science of the collective mind. Not that there can be a 'social mind' over and above the separate minds of the individuals constituting a society, an objective *Zeitgeist*; but simply that, when individual minds clash in the intercourse of a common life, mental formations appear which are explicable only by reference to society, and which are apt to be lost sight of by analytical treatment. Baldwin and Royce, for instance, following in the footsteps of Tarde, have attacked the questions of imitation and invention. How is it that a man shoots ahead of his mental environment, invents? Why do we not all remain passive, at the level of imitation? The answer seems to lie in the notion of the mental system or mental organization. When we have reached a certain level of thought, our knowledge at that level organizes itself, takes on a certain unitariness, instead of remaining in so many detached bits of information. This process is intrinsic to mentality. But organization means that we see what we lack, become aware of the imperfections of our system; and so we meet environmental variation half way, and pass the borders of imitation. It is tempting to compare this racial curve of imitation and invention, unconscious in aim and yet steady in direction, with the curve of consciously directed individual practice. Both alike show the organization-platforms and the subsequent quick rise to a higher plateau; and neither is explainable except in terms of organization itself.

A word may be said here of Le Bon's newly translated "Psychology of Socialism." The reader shall judge its merits for himself; at least, he will find it entertaining.

Social psychology suggests that much-discussed topic, the relation of psychology to education. I shall not weary the reader with any enumeration of titles. Some good things have been written, and much foolishness. No sane man can doubt that there is a relation between the science of mind and the art of teaching; and there now seems to be, fortunately, what at one time there was not, a pretty fair consensus of opinion that one cannot go ahead and apply the science off-hand to the art, but that the "expert middleman," or "consulting psychologist," and the "educational laboratory," are needed for the work of applied psychology. For the rest, we may hope that the tide of ephemeral literature on this subject is now ebbing. It is a good deal easier for the aspiring psychologist to pen a vague and eloquent essay on the relation of his science to education, than it is for him to sit down in the laboratory and turn out a creditable piece of research work; and we must confess that the pressure upon him to write has been almost crushingly heavy. But the seniors have spoken their minds, and the reaction is setting in.

The most important publication in this field is, of course, James' "Talks to Teachers on Psychology." It is an eminently sound little book; but it requires a discriminating reader. For it contains, after all, the expressed wisdom of the large two-volume "Principles of Psychology," in its application to the work of teaching; and no one can properly understand it who has not wrestled his way through the thinking of the earlier book.

Mental pathology and "psychical research" lie outside of our province. We may note briefly, under the former head, that Kraepelin continues with unabated zeal to apply psychophysical methods to the analysis of the abnormal mind, and that Janet and Raymond's "*Névroses et idées fixes*," published in two large volumes in 1898, marks a distinct step in advance. As for psychical research, the wave of hypnotism is subsiding and the wave of telepathy,—with all its crude analogies of Röntgen rays

and Marconi telegraphy,—is upon us. And just as the deep waters of science were left unstirred by the surface flutter of hypnotism, so will it be with telepathy. In the meantime, it speaks well for the open-mindedness of science at the latter end of the nineteenth century that this and other ‘occult’ matters are receiving thorough investigation.

We conclude with reference to a book which lies, it is true, upon the borderland between psychology and philosophy, but which has a distinct psychological interest, is from the hand of a psychologist, and, above all, shows the vigor and self-assertiveness which friends and enemies alike declare to be characteristic of modern psychology,—Münsterberg’s “Psychology and Life.” “I do not want to entertain by these papers,” says the author, “I want to fight”; and fight he does. As for the purpose of the book, “the chief aim is the separation of the conceptions of psychology from the conceptions of our real life. Popular ideas about psychology suggest that the psychological description and explanation of mental facts expresses the reality of our inner experience. These papers endeavor to show that psychology is not at all an expression of reality, but a complicated transformation of it, worked out for special logical purposes in the service of our life.” Statements rather anti-psychological than psychological, the reader may think! But psychology, we find, “has a right to consider everything from its own important standpoint,” though it has nothing to say “in regard to the interpretation and appreciation of our real freedom and duty, our real values and ideals.” Psychology is given “an absolute freedom in its own field.” Münsterberg is thus attempting, among other things, to lay an epistemological foundation for psychology; and the attempt, successful or unsuccessful, is one of high concern to the psychologist. It is set forth in six interconnected essays, on “Psychology and Life,” “Psychology and Physiology,” “Psychology and Education,” “Psychology and Art,” “Psychology and

History," and "Psychology and Mysticism," of which all but the second have appeared in magazine form.

Technical criticism must be left to the philosophers. On the whole, criticism has been damnatory but friendly; the author's constructions have not found acceptance, but the originality and thoroughness of his conception have been admired and appreciated. And, surely, an author has done a great deal, if he has made his readers think. Whether or not they follow his own path of thought is a comparatively indifferent matter.



MAN AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
A STUDY FROM THE PARIS EXPOSITION

PATRICK GEDDES, *Edinburgh.*



IN every age men ask themselves the same questions:—What is the relation of man to nature? How far is he her master?—how far her slave? In every age we meet the same contrast of answers; written, here in personal suffering or struggle, there in polity or politics, again in philosophies and in religions. Ever some strong soul rises victorious over the difficulties and the limitations of his personal and social life, above the prejudices of age and country, and breaks the fetters of environment and of tradition to proclaim man again “man and master of his fate.” Yet again the iron grasp of circumstance closes upon the individual or the race, till some new set of conditions appears, or some new ideal arises to transform the world afresh. Since the dawn of literature men have watched and wondered how, here the merest outward incident may suddenly divert the whole course of life even for the strongest; how, there again, some wholly individual and inward revelation or conversion, resolution or revolution, call it what we will, may even more fully shape anew the course of biography, and thence of history.

As our problem begins to state itself more clearly, the many attempts at its solution begin to range themselves in historic order, and these varying interpretations are seen to pair them-

selves off into contrasting groups along the perspective of the past. Here fate and freedom, there the doctrines of kismet and of redemption, there again the strife of fore-ordination and free-will, or now of heredity or personality. So one insists on social, and another on personal responsibility; one sees history as the play of social forces, the inevitable resultant of economic processes; another as essentially the product of the succession and the strife of its individual great men, and this in temporal as in spiritual power. From the Greek tragedian to the modern dramatist, from Calvinistic and Lutheran theologians down to the contemporary rivalry between the novel of circumstance and the novel of character, the same question is ever restated, however the phraseology of the times may change its form, however the pressing problems may alter. It is the same dispute whether we turn to the physicians dealing with the theories of disease, to the biologists for those of organic evolution, or to the sociologists with their applications on the human and social level; politicians or criminologists, literary critics or concrete geographers, are all alike in discord. For one generation Montesquieu, for another Buckle or Taine, makes out his widely persuasive interpretation of laws and institutions, of religious temperament or of literary production, in terms of natural environment. Next some new poetic or philosophic interpretation, some new social or moral force, appears to deliver us from narrowing submissiveness to the external order. Then in turn we forget the claims of the natural order altogether; hence the professed philosophers and moralists, the practical politicians or educationists, who have never seriously given a thought to the influence of environment or of occupation at all.

But how shall we undertake so vast a survey, when not only scholar and critic, not only philosophers and theologians, but the historians of them all alike have as yet but sketched out each a portion here and there, as here of the doctrine of necessity and free-will, or there of Christianity and Islam. Enough if we can

also approach this problem of problems in our turn from our own standpoint, and express it in the language of our own day. This done, or at least fairly begun, we shall be better able to appreciate the solutions of the past. Let us leave, then, for the time the dramatists and the philosophers, the religions and the theologians, even the school of evolutionists, seeing only how much they are all akin.

But to understand we must analyze, we must look fairly at both sides. At which side of the problem are we to begin? With man as modifying nature, or with nature as modifying man? With the cosmic or with the human drama? With the unchanging uniformity of universal law, or with the central fact of personal consciousness? Noting that at whichever side we first place ourselves, we are next bound in justice to ask what is to be said for the other. We may best avoid all argument as to which opening is better in the abstract, by beginning ourselves from the side for which life and studies have more especially prepared us. And so the present writer, without thereby denying the possibility of the idealistic approach, must needs begin from the side of nature, and seek with the inductive school to reach the other side,—the freedom of spirit and not merely the conquest of nature,—through first obeying nature. And instead of first making a historic and literary survey which would exhaust our space in doing justice to previous writers, let us simply look around us and see things for ourselves, without supposing, much less suggesting, that these are, therefore, seen for the first time.

Let our starting point, then, be that of natural science and anthropology in our own day; but note that it therefore sets out by recognizing the relation of each special order of facts to the world as a whole. Though it fully continues, and even intensifies the specialism so characteristic of the last generation, it has increasingly broadened also; thanks to the doctrines of energy, to the doctrine of evolution, general conceptions are becoming more

and more interesting to men of science. Yet the past and passing generations were deeply interested in synthesis also; witness the profound influence of Comte, the widespread popularity of Spencer. Granted; but the distance between the abstraction and generality of the scientific philosopher and the minute detail of the average investigator had still to be bridged. The concrete mind demands its synthesis as far as possible also in the concrete. This concrete synthesis is the world itself, not merely its particular groups of phenomena, and so for the world of contemporary science, progress has gone on, and is even now more and more actively going on, by the transformation of the man of science from specialist,—chemist, physicist, botanist, zoölogist, anthropologist, and so on,—into geographer.

Thus the geologist passes into the study and interpretation of concrete scenery, and the astronomer reconstructs the theory and history of the tides; the zoölogist leaves the anatomy for the distribution of animals, or sails forth upon a "Challenger," or an Arctic expedition; the botanist leaves the enumeration or cultivation of species for the study of characteristic plant formations, and maps out the regions of forest and heath, of desert and jungle; the meteorologist rises above the perplexities of his local observations by mapping out the weather of continents and oceans; the physician investigates the regional and climatic varieties of disease; the hygienist seeks not only to reorganize the water supply or the drainage of cities, but begins to plan the reclamation of the malarious tropics, or prepares a new reorganization of Italy. So for the anthropologist, for the student of language or of folk-lore, of religion or philosophy, all studies are becoming not only evolutionary and therefore historical, but geographic, also,—*Historiae altera sculus geographia*.

Even though professed men of science may thus become geographers nowadays, how can we attempt to observe and travel first and only read afterwards? Simply enough. Just as our small personal libraries are completed by the great public ones,

so the great museums and collections, and the great city itself, are at hand to help out the insufficiency of our personal world-survey. But the educated world so much at home in libraries, is as yet all too untrained in using its museums, still more in interpreting its immediate environment; most of all in dealing with the multifarious geographic and social accumulations of an international exhibition. Hence, as the writer happens to have lately had the opportunity of observing, the academic community, not only of America, or of the, in this respect, more conveniently situated Britain, but even of the French universities, of the Sorbonne itself, furnishes proportionally fewer and less interested visitors to the present Paris Exposition than almost any other class. Hence, too, the comparatively scanty interest and sympathy of the men of letters and of the press of all countries, not only foreign but even French; since our generation has been so largely trained to mental activity in presence of printed or written page, but to mental passivity, if not, indeed, to complete repose, in the open air and in presence of the facts themselves. Education having lain mainly in the school-room and the lecture-room, in the study and the library, the opportunities of museum and exhibition and of travel commonly come too late to be of much real use. Here, as in some other respects, our children are more fortunate, and are having not only a better time at school now, but are obtaining a better preparation also. They are going to the museums, to the city and to the country; they are often learning first to observe keenly, to remember vividly, to interpret shrewdly and to question eagerly, to read hungrily afterwards.

Yet the times have definitely changed, and to the scholar who asks, as a distinguished Hellenist, a social as well as a moral philosopher, did the other day, "Tell me, now, frankly, *is* there really anything to see in all this great Exposition"?—the obvious reply is, Has not even your venerable Sorbonne, your oldest and greatest academic centre of abstract thought and classical learning, come to take some real interest in antiquities as well as

archives, in the Louvre as well as in the Bibliothèque Nationale? Has not your faculty of letters its schools at Athens, its mission to Mesopotamia; your faculty of science, its anthropologists in the Soudan or the Pacific, nay, even its zoölogical station by the seaside, its botanic garden and its experimental field,—all fully parallel to the hospitals of the school of medicine, to the current cases of the school of law. All this means that tradition is increasingly making room for actuality, and that here as everywhere throughout the world, the historic university of the past is becoming more and more a university of the present also, in which your erudition of the past is becoming vital through contact with the present, your active interest in the present rationalized by your contact with the past.

But where shall we do this most fully? Little though our Sorbonnist or Oxonian or Harvardian may always recognize it, imperfectly even though our "intellectuels," our politicians or even our journalists are realizing it, it is here in this very Exposition of Paris. Here is not simply the fullest muster and conspectus of the educational resources of the world, but the latest result of archæological research, side by side with those of psychological inquiry; the latest finds at Delphi, the latest diagrams of child-study from Massachusetts, are almost in the same gallery. The history of mathematics or of astronomy, the best and latest moon and star photographs, are alike at hand. Here is a concrete encyclopædia of all kinds from the monuments of the Middle Ages and of their decline, to the representation of the present state of affairs of Cuba; the contour and relief, the landscape and climate, the occupations and the people, something, too, of the economic history and ideas, of the art and education of Iceland or Siberia, of Dahomey or Egypt, of Mexico or Japan, may all be quickly learned.

An exposition has many sides. It is no doubt a fair, a bazaar of unexampled magnitude; call it if you will an interminable shop-window, a monumental restaurant; the eye sees what it

brings the means, the habit, of seeing; and most, if not all, clear ideas are at least partially true. So let us return to the world's greatest treasure-houses, to the Louvre, the British Museum, since these are happily unvulgarized, and look at them once more. Note the differing methods of arrangement in different galleries and collections; here by mere convenience of size and space, by the order of acquisition; there sometimes isolated in solitary state, there picturesquely grouped as bric-a-brac, there again regularly classified like the specimens of an herbarium, or at best arranged for study in historic order. Numbers there are, labels too, and catalogues, but seldom a map, though the British Museum for instance has of late years doubled the intelligibility (and, therefore, the educational value) of its most impressive gallery to the public, by hanging up a single little map of Egypt, ancient and modern.

Obviously these collections are primarily regarded as the illustrative material, as "*the pieces justificatives*" of works of learning, of books of Egyptology or what not; and to appreciate them we must read first, and understand and enjoy the collection afterwards. Despite a certain orderliness, even taste in arrangement, the general idea is scientific not artistic; it is adapted to the analysis of details, and seldom to the production of a general effect; in a word it is analytic, not synthetic. Yet the artistic ferment, the synthetic spirit is at work in these great museums also; and naturally most conspicuously in the Louvre and in those of its collections which have been most recently acquired and arranged. No scholar, no bookman but must feel this when he comes to the magnificent rooms containing the results of Dieulafoy's excavations at old Susa. Here are not simply the historic bricks and tiles, like those of any other investigator, but they are built up so as to give a clear and unforgettable impression of the gorgeous decoration, the spacious passages and columned halls of the great king, such as no record or literary description, however gifted, no fragments, however cased and classified, could

ever bestow. Next a relief model of the region gives us a complete and precise reproduction of the site and position of the ancient city, of the vast rubbish heaps which cover it today and of the spots excavated by our traveler. In the next room this landscape is developed beyond this geographic basis into a panoramic frieze whose color gives at once the desolation and the beauty of the actual scene;—while the centre of the room is occupied by a large scale model of the actual palace actually reconstructed from the materials already shown. Here, then, the claims of science and art, of accuracy of detail and completeness of imagination, are all fully met, with a result from which we cannot but hope that the keepers of older collections, the conservators of other museums, may ere long take example, and ere long do the same for all the cities and culture-centres, the shrines and palaces of the past.

But now return to the Exposition and look once more at the confused picturesqueness of the Trocadero gardens, the magnificent medley of the Rue des Nations. Here obviously is little of mere bazaar, still less of shop-window; it is an attempt and no mean one, indeed, on the whole the fullest and the most picturesque in the history of culture, to represent the life and civilization of the actual nations of Europe, some at the present day, others again at some chosen period of their past. Here in short is the same artistic spirit which we saw coming into play at the Louvre; then why not recognize it as such? To spare our scholarly friends as much shock as possible from the undeniably jarring elements of modern life, let us continue in the ancient world as long as may be, and so set out from the vast and striking Palais de l'Egypte with its columned temple-front, its sculptured walls, its subterranean gallery of tombs. Where before in the western world has anyone been able to see anything approaching in completeness this splendid reproduction? Now that we have it, its use is plain; we return to the Egyptian rooms of the Louvre,

we send for photographs of those of the British Museum; we read Perrot and Chipiez, Maspero and all the rest; we question the skilled friend who can explain our difficulties; the artist traces for us the history of the lotus ornament, and the student of religion makes the cult of Isis live for us once more. Our very children become Egyptologists; they take mental photographs of what is actually before them, and they go to the Louvre to take more; they pick up the simple convention of Egyptian art and even devise little pictures of their own. With this active interest once aroused, and supplied with due wealth of impressions, (not, of course, pushed to fatigue) observation and memory, reason and imagination all go quietly on doing their work; and thus even knowledge and accuracy, worthy to be called Egyptological, may come in time.

But the vulgar elements, the bazaar and the music-hall features! They are after all not so bad as in Egypt itself, where the student soon learns to disregard them; why not learn to do so here also? If by a mental abstraction, which needs no physical expression, we can drive these money-changers from the temple, and see again the mighty dead, and hear again the voices of the undying past, why not elsewhere, anywhere? Does not the whole Exposition begin to appear as a vast if incomplete museum, of which the Louvre, the British Museum are but the vestibule, the store-house, the materials for consultation and construction? And despite its many deficiencies, its obvious blemishes, have we not here the boldest attempt, the richest wealth of suggestion for a true world-museum, an at once encyclopædic and artistic presentment of man in his place in history, in his place in geography, in his place in nature? To anyone who knows the advance of this Exposition upon its predecessors, and especially in this geographic and historic spirit, such a further progress is far from inconceivable; nay, its attempted realization may be taken as reasonably certain; though whether next time in France, or it may be in America after the present (preparatory)

movement of founding schools and universities and museums, is another matter.

Is it not time, then, to get rid of the impression that either the university man or the schoolboy is leaving serious and fruitful study to come to the Exposition; time indeed, to see that he has perhaps never been so near finding more serious studies and more fruitful ones? May we not work our way through the Exposition in this spirit,—taking at one time the unfamiliar countries like Siberia or Java, at another the comparatively familiar ones like Italy or Canada or England, and see how much our best book-knowledge is enriched, indeed transformed, by this contact with the facts, this object-lesson, this presentment, however incomplete, of man and nature, with man in his place in nature, with nature coming under the power of man?

But are we not wasting time in persuading the scholar to look at the Exposition, when the man of action, the workman and the artist, the engineer and the manufacturer, the merchant and the financier, the colonizer and the politician are there already, with all the world and his wife? Not at least for the present purpose, which is precisely that of the student, who, after this freshening and stimulating plunge into a world of new impressions, must needs reënter his study and there bring his experience to bear upon his familiar inquiries, his most abstract problems. Upon none of these do they bear more obviously than upon our present problem of the interrelation of man and his occupation, of man and his environment. Has this been done already, and from the actual standpoint of the Exposition? Assuredly; it has even been predicted before the days of expositions at all. Thus in the first half of the century the investigator whose life of patient excavation and luminous interpretations literally opened for us the caverns of the past, and established for us the antiquity of man, with Lyell and all subsequent writers as his exponents,—M. Boucher de Perthes,—was no mere collector of flint implements. “Man and the tools I sing” was the central idea

of his life-work ; and that, too, he was wont to develop as clearly as we can do today. From the very dawn of civilization, he used to urge, we see the intimate relation of man with his tool ; we see progress a function of the tool, the tool, too, as a function of progress. So it is still, and so it must be ever ; here, then, in these prehistoric collections you have the rudest tools of primeval man, yet here already variety, invention, art, progress. Hence, then, a need of orderly arrangement of these tools in our museums of antiquities, the need of comparison with those of other countries. So we must do for the whole progress of the tool ; from this flint, at once tool and weapon, onwards and upwards to all the modern mechanisms and appliances of peace and war ; and so from this little cave-museum, through historical collections, up to modern museums of industry, regional, national, even international. All this was well-nigh twenty years before the first great International Exhibition of 1851.

This foresight, these suggestions probably bore no direct fruit ; for expositions were arising independently. Let us turn to a more actual and a more recent instance, that of a man, perhaps the man at once most fruitfully associated with the study of man in reaction with environment and occupation, and appropriately also with the design and arrangement of those intermittent museum-displays, commonly called International Exhibitions. This was Frederic Le Play, an economist whose name is strange to most people, even to most Frenchmen, but whose thought has none the less been in many ways widely and popularly active throughout the century, and has been and is even now silently working in many channels ; at first mainly practical, but now also theoretic and speculative. There are social workers and social students who would estimate his influence on action and his impulse towards thought as alike quite among the very greatest in actual value and in probable usefulness which the nineteenth century is handing towards the twentieth, and this with no disrespect to or forgetfulness of its many great and better-known

personalities and forces; though to justify these large assertions in detail would, of course, need volumes, yet some indication may be rapidly given.

The head of the *Ecole des Mines* under the Second Empire, his services were borrowed by the Russian government to reorganize the mines of the Oural, and in this capacity he had for a time under his control as many as forty-five thousand men. The Paris Exhibitions of 1855 and 1867, of which he was Commissary General, have perpetuated his influence to all subsequent ones, so that the visitor to the departments of all subsequent exhibitions has in no small measure been in Le Play's museum of industry. The increasing recognition of social economy, both in exhibits and in congresses, in all seriously designed exhibitions up to the present one, is the direct result of his initiative. A still more obvious expression of his doctrines, though his name has here again largely fallen out of sight, has been manifest during the last quarter century in the more sympathetic attitude towards labor, of both the Roman and the Greek churches. Thus the industrial policy of Leo XIII., and the interest of Cardinal Manning in the condition of the London laborer, as notably in the famous Dock Strike, have alike been frankly and generously acknowledged to Le Play, as similarly the more social attitude of a thoughtful minority in conservative politics in France; outside these, however, for the most part and in Protestant countries altogether, the real inspirer of this progressive ferment has passed almost unnoticed. Similarly in Russia, the agrarian policy of M. de Pobedonostzeff, so favorable to the peasant, would be frankly credited by him to Le Play as his master, while even his persecution of the Jews, like other persecutions before, is a product of the misapplication of a good doctrine. A few British and American students of economics no doubt have long known Le Play's "*Ouvriers Européens*," and after a generation its doctrine and method is now reaching the English-reading public, thanks to kindred monographs like Mr. Charles Booth's "*Life and Labor*

in London." But few readers realize how the current, complete, and revolutionary change from the traditional economist's exclusive insistence on production to the concrete study of consumption, and from his general discussion of the money wages of the worker, to the special and statistical observation of the real well-being of the whole family. The family budget, in short, is the direct continuation, adaptation and development of Le Play's "Monographies Sociales." A man of affairs and travel rather than of the study, his best teaching was conversational rather than literary, and his many books have undeniably the defect, unpardonable in a Frenchman, of diffuse and prosy style, while his midway position, as an advanced sociologist and a friend of labor among political and religious conservatives, and consequently as a good deal of a conservative in scientific and progressive circles, naturally delayed his influence and limited his renown. In 1879, however, he founded the Societe d'Economie Sociale, with its organ the "Réforme Sociale," in which Cheysson, Janet, and other leading disciples have continued his monographs of labor and his conciliatory attitude in industrial affairs. A younger group,—and here is the point most important to the present paper,—has especially followed Le Play upon his scientific side, as one of the keenest and shrewdest of observers of geographical and social conditions, and the boldest interpreter of their interdependence. This school has its leader (M. de Tourville, a student-recluse) somewhat in the background; but it has been coming to the front of late years, with its journal "La Science Sociale," and its occasional monographic volumes, like M. Paul de Rousiers' "La Vie Américaine" or his study of the condition of labor in Britain. Its good fortune lies in having at length produced the long-needed, brilliant, and fervid, yet lucid popularizer in the person of M. Edmond Demolins, whose lectures of recent years in Paris and in Edinburgh have not only awakened wide interest among younger sociologists, and have thence spread through the universities and cities on both sides of the

Channel, but have culminated in the almost worldwide popularity of his "*A quoi tient la Supériorité des Anglo-Saxons*," and have found a more substantial expression in his "*Les Français d'aujourd'hui*."

What, then, is the doctrine which is thus at length finding its way into general expression? To outline it clearly we must seek to avoid the extremes into which Le Play and his exponents hitherto are apt alternately to fall, that of too general yet involved statements, and that of too minutely monographic accumulation of details. Many vivid illustrations of Le Play's outlook and its applications might be borrowed alike from his books and his successors; but in this year, that of the greatest of those universal expositions upon which he has left so deep and so enduring an influence, and in that very *Palais des Congrès et d'Économie Sociale* which is his most distinctive monument, it is well to take an illustration from the Exposition itself; the more so since this is following his example and precept,—to observe for ourselves.

As we saw the halls and collections of the Louvre arranged in all different ways and at all different levels, from temple to loot-heap, from picturesquely ordered bric-a-brac to rationally ordered herbarium, and finally in geographic and historic survey, in regional and artistic presentment, so the Exhibition also presents all these and more; and that in more perfection,—from the merest bazaar and petty show outside the Louvre altogether up to the fullest combination of scientific plan with artistic execution, up to unified perfection of presentment towards which the best exhibits of the Louvre, like that of Susa, are but beginnings and steps. Thus, for instance, behind the stately façades of the great nations, with their retrospective architecture and decoration, or their modern merchandise, people are more and more finding their way to the small pavilion in which the little nationality of Finland has sought to express and to justify its existence. Here are plain walls, low roof, broad windows, spacious, hospitable

doorways, all utilitarian as they should be. Yet from between each window pops up a great frog, quaintly and fitly expressing, almost voicing, its land of marshes and lakes. A land of wintry forests, too, with its pine cones and squirrels, its great, prowling bears; yet above all these rises one of the simplest, daintiest spires in the Exhibition, which at home in Finland is obviously a landmark in vivid contrast and complement to the natural environment, just as the naturalistic ornament is the frank and charming expression of it. Whether consciously or unconsciously, is not this architect something of a sociologist? His colleagues, in their grander buildings, of Belgium or of Hungary, of Spain or of America, are they not mainly but historians, continuing their respective traditions, and not first expressing, then transcending their natural environment?

Inside the buildings the same contrast holds, and is worth study. There are fine things everywhere; thus even the inconspicuous house of England holds treasure, the like of which there can be none in Finland,—the pictures of Sir Joshua Reynolds in which her race has best blossomed, the pictures of Burne-Jones, the tapestries of Morris, in which her recent ideals and their expression in craftsmanship are alike fitly shown. But the Finns show you their country, their maze of lakes and lakelets, their heaths and peat-mosses, and how they are toilsomely and valiantly reclaiming them into pasture and field. They show their fish-traps and their forest ways, their clothing and their dwellings; like hospitable Northmen, they guide us not only through their country but into their homes; they show us in a word (Le Play's word) their Place, their Work, and their Family,—or in Spencer's later phrase, Environment, Function, and Organism. We see at a glance how their regional environment determines their occupations, and how these occupations determine the material condition of the family; with a little further study of Le Play, we should see how these determine its type and status, its relations to the world. But keeping to what

is plainly set before us, note how in this homely life with its hard struggle for existence, neither ideas nor ideals are lacking; see how large the development of school, how noteworthy that of university, how large the output of books, how copious and numerous the Finnish press. Finally, in the little dome, see the nobly designed and firmly painted scenes from the Kalevala, their ancient national epic, in which the boatman bravely faces the shrieking harpies of the storm, in which the toiler ploughs sturdily on despite crowned and creeping serpents rising on either hand. Here, again, the artist is plainly teaching us perpetual lessons by his craft and life, how man first obeys nature, then expresses her, finally conquers her, and thus reaches the fullest expression of himself.

Here we might return to Le Play, or to his exponents, or (as indeed in the first draft of this essay) attempt to recrystallize the essentials of this theme afresh. But we might thus, and only too easily, take the letter for the spirit, too soon begin to apply the abstract principles before more fully observing and understanding things in the concrete. Hence, let us make one more visit in the Exposition, and to another national exhibit, though not in the Rue des Nations at all, but only one among the innumerable side-shows which run for miles along the sides of the great Exposition,—the Swiss Village. Here, then, we pass under the towered gateway of an old walled city into a little street or place with a quaint mediæval fountain, and note on either side the old burgher houses, some marked with historic and familiar names; here, for instance, Rousseau was born, there Napoleon set forth to his crossing of the Alps. Thence we wander out into the village, with its worn shingle roofs with their heavy eaves, with its massively framed windows, its carved balconies and outside stairs, to the little old village church with its gilded sixteenth century altar, its half-joyous, half-pathetic chimes. Here we get out into the country; and here and there stands a farmhouse, with its spacious byre; out there streams the noblest

procession, the most chosen herd of great, white cows one has ever seen, each with her great bell tolling or clanging around her neck; in the neighbor's byre we have a herd of the prettiest little fawn colored cows, and elsewhere other breeds. Above the farms mountain and lake, rock and cliff, brook and cascade are all represented, and with a truly marvelous fidelity; the Alpine flowers are all blooming as at home; there are the pine trees and the firs, there are the buttercups and the milfoil among the pasture grasses; the stratification and plication, the weathering and dissolving of the limestone cliffs are all represented with as much accuracy as skill. Descending again towards the town we cannot but more and more admire the perfection of the illusion, yet see its secret in there being so little illusion, for almost all is reality. The old chalets and the fences are genuine ones, brought in numbered pieces and accurately put together; the foreground rocks are as genuine as their flowers; and though, of course, plaster comes into the larger buildings and cement into the cliffs, their surface and their coloring are so instinct with architectural sentiment and naturalist feeling that there is not even that slight break of continuity inevitable in the best panorama. The people and their costumes, their accent as well as their aspect are as genuine as are their cows; and on one's way back through the village one may go through it anew, more admiringly or more critically as temperament or temper incline; noting impressions in one's sketch-book, or verifying and locating its historic houses with one's Baedeker. So by help of the relief model and the panorama concealed behind the rocks we may extend our idea of general aspect, or with the collection of Alpine flowers carry it into detail, or again with the study of folk-songs and proverbs and patois; in short, we may specialize at will, spending our day as busily as in the country itself, and go home feeling that we have intelligently and enjoyably visited or revisited the real Switzerland. Furthermore, now that our interest has been aroused or refreshed, we are more willing and

more able to extend it in any direction, to scenery or to history, to people or to politics, till even encyclopædia article or statistical summary becomes easily read, even its details remembered. There can be no better illustration of the advantage of beginning with the visual and artistic mode of instruction over the conventional auditive and informational one; that is, of the positive pedagogic superiority of the Exposition with all its faults over school and college, over university and even museum, with all their virtues.

But though we have all such knowledge, visual and auditive alike, and are walking encyclopædias of Switzerland and everywhere else, though we speak with the tongues of Baedekers and all other guides and guardian angels, we still, in Le Play's sense,—that is in the evolutionist's sense, though he never called himself by that name,—know nothing so long as we have not unity. We do not really understand what we have been seeing, we do not understand how it has grown to be what it is. So long as we do not see any simple organic relation among our various facts, the more we have of them the poorer in science we are, since a science is not a mere heap of facts, however separately valuable, however ingeniously and artificially piled one upon another for this purpose or for that. Science is a rational presentment of our facts as a living and dramatic unity, as an historic and organic growth, as an unfolding from simple to complex; in the organic sciences, and surely, therefore, in the social science, we see it as a progress from its determination by pressure of circumstance, towards an increasing freedom, increasing domination of circumstance; we see in the progress of all organic growth, the influence of things outward yet their domination also of the inner life. Leave, then, the books which begin with boundaries and inventories, with territory and population, with picturesque aspect or incident, even with the heroic history of the cantons or with the sublimity of their eternal snows and roseate dawns, and let us ask for the elemental common-sense, the natural

evolution of that whole group of cosmic and human phenomena and their relations, which we call Switzerland. To make matters clear, let us consider how we should teach something of Switzerland, its geography and history to a child, trying to picture the village as it grew, and grows. Familiar as this doubtless may seem to the reader, its outline repetition will serve all the better as a starting-point. There, then, it is in that mountain streamlet, that patch of verdant pasture, that little herd of cows, that big boy bringing them home. That this pasture is the central fact everyone knows, since the word Alp, of course, means hill-pasture, and though thence extended to include their whole mountain framework, should not, therefore, lose its essential meaning. That limestone soils bear good grass, at least wherever well watered, is again a common-place, as also that summer brooks can never be wanting in a region of melting ice and snows. See, too, how the severe Alpine winter rapidly disintegrates the rocks, so that one can see everywhere the hard edges which mark their splintering by the frost, as well as the rounded edges which show the progress of their solution in the ever running water, so in every way assuring constant renewal of the mineral elements of the soil, and continued richness of the well-watered pasture. But with such rich, well-watered pastures we can have cows and not sheep; we shall be herdsmen and not merely shepherds, as upon the poorer Eastern steppes or upon the Scottish hills. In summer we shall drive our cattle up to the Alpine pastures; our boys shall stay with them in rough chalets which they can easily build with their axes out of the nearest pine wood without so much as needing a nail. They must milk the cows, must make the cheese which they can send to market, to buy all else. A few goats will browse the places which the cattle cannot reach, and here in the lower valley, where we shall have to keep them for the winter we must be making our preparation betimes. So arises that double home, that two-fold life, of summer upon the mountain, of winter in

the village in the valley, which we find, too, in Norway, and which is so full of opportunity alike to health and to intelligence, to the discipline and to the joy of life. Imagine ourselves setting out upon our first ascent to the high pastures with our father's herd; and add to that physical pleasure of toiling upwards into keener air, to that exhilaration of widening landscape which every climber knows, the sense of responsibility, of having a man's work to do, a man's part to play in the labors of the year, a man's hopes of love and homestead upon his return. Little wonder that the Swiss becomes the mountain-guide to holiday-making Europe, in its hungry search for pastures new; the explanation is simple; our guide is a picked herdsman who naturally adopts us as his cattle, whom he is ready comfortably to house and faithfully to guide and tend; so we may be well content to pay him in such substitutes for milk as we can offer, alike of human kindness and of silver coin. But when enough of the young men have moved up the hill, those for whom the native valley is too narrow must needs be moving down. So begins that perpetual stream of emigration which has always characterized Switzerland, and which to this day so notably fertilizes the racial vitality and the social life of the surrounding countries, France and Germany alike. Would we explain their history as mercenaries in war time? Begin rather with their functioning in peace,—their faithfulness, their occupational discipline from childhood at once so practical and so kindly, in cow-feeding and calf-tending, with its sense of responsibility in small things, and its clear understanding of how they make up great ones, as the day's milkings make up the year's cheese. Where else shall I get such a man to take care of my affairs, of my house, of all that is dear to me in my absence? Other things equal, this Swiss has had better training than any of my townsmen to be steward and caretaker of all that I can entrust to him. And so it is that on many of the old houses of Paris you can still see painted at the entrance "*Parlez au Suisse*"

instead of "*Parlez au concierge*" as it means. That is why after the Scots parted from France Swiss guardsmen took their place, and how on the 10th of August, 1792, as the Lion of Lucerne reminds us, they died at length around their poor bovine king, their adopted charge, as faithfully as brave men have ever done, even with a more inspiring cause. The Vatican guard to this day, the ubiquitousness and efficiency of the Swiss bank clerk or cashier, the Swiss waiter, are thus mere obvious differentiations of this elemental and central occupational fact of youthful attendance upon the cow. And if these things be so, where shall we get our children with all their pitiful "advantages" of town imprisonment, such an education? We townsfolks,—parents and teachers, university professors and education-ministers alike,—all think of a cow as merely for giving our children milk, and never of her as giving to the cow-feeder's children every day of their lives one of the very best elements of a moral education; yet is she not silently offering as no small element in the complex explanation why the farm boy with his supposed rustic disadvantages so constantly outstrips our own polished weaklings, who have never had the chance to set foot or the sense to set hand within a byre? Is there not a point here worth considering, ye conventional educators, whether clerical or lay; an opening for a study of boy life, ye novelists, akin in its way to "*Captains Courageous*"? In shrinking from giving our town children the homely, manly experience of the herdsman, in seeking to give them only the sincerest milk, the richest cream of our refined and domesticated city education, are we really raising them into the higher class we intend? Or are we not rather so far definitely lowering them below the herdsman, nay, literally below his cow, for what are such educational methods but a serious and only too successful endeavor to restrict the education of schoolboy and collegian to that of the fatted calf, with the only difference that we continue the process for years and years?

This is, of course, a mere excursus, and not canonical; however, it may serve as an illustration and may help to indicate how Le Play, and those who follow out his way of thinking, are not wholly enamored of the schools, and why M. Demolins has almost left writing and lecturing first for farming, and then for setting up a country school where the Parisian young nobleman may work his way up into a man alike with hands and head.

How this flow of milk, this store and export of cheese develops into well-being and culture as of the Swiss cities might again be traced step by step beyond the limits of the superficially obvious, and conversely we may begin with every sympathetic tourist to interpret the regional evolution both of poverty and of disease which darkens the beauty of many a valley, noting the sad effects upon a manly race of an age-long struggle with the direst poverty, inevitable at these literal margins of subsistence,—the poorest soils for pasture and forest, the remote and unsunned valleys,—the slow poisoning too often by unwholesome waters, and, gravest of all, the cumulative degeneration through the perpetual loss by emigration of the most vigorous types. And so we have the first and easiest, the most obvious example of how *comprendre c'est pardonner*,—a principle which will deliver us from all that thoughtless or Pharisaic criticism, which throughout history, and to this day, prevents all good understanding between different nationalities and social types. The evolution of the beauty of Swiss architecture from the homely woodwork of pine log and mountain chalet,—that of the Swiss clock from wood-working and water-mill, with its cog-cutting, so that the Geneva watch is but a pocket time-mill,—and many evolutions more, up to those of national independence, cantonal federation, referendum, and all the rest, may be traced by the reader at leisure, every one as rational, that is as regional, as is that contemporary change from rude water-mill to perfected turbine and dynamo, which is so rapidly in progress, and which in turn is bringing new transformations in its train, and those of society no less than of scenery.

All this is but elementary geography ? True, but if so, is it not time we found it in our elementary geographies and in Baedeker itself ? Every intelligent tourist sees this ? So much the better, then let him systematize it, and apply this way of looking at things all round, and to all times and countries. But it is just those who have reached this geographic and evolutionary attitude most fully who will most appreciate, as a real and gratifying surprise, the genuine sociological insight and significance of the brief preface to the little guide-book of the village ; it is not, indeed, a likely place in which to find fresh ideas and initiative, and will have little weight with the dignified and official type of mind, which expects no good thing out of Nazareth. Yet let us cite the essential passage, which runs as follows :—

“The designers have wished to make more than a Swiss village ; their aim has been to realize the synthesis of an entire country, to give material expression to a whole nature. They have taken a hostelry at Lucerne, a house at Berne, a chalet at Brienz, and so on ; and they have united, grouped and fused these elements, apparently distinct, but really proceeding from one characteristic and general type. In the same way they have taken here a peak and there a pass, there a grotto, and there a rock-slide ; they have planted the pine, the fir, the juniper ; and out of these elements they have made something which is Switzerland as a whole, which sums up its very spirit into this synthesis of landscape, architecture, and life ; and they have thus made their village the expression of their love and devotion to their native land.

“The material force of a country and its real wealth do not find their true expression in its cities ; for these are themselves but resultants, but manifestations ; they are not causes, but effects. It is the country which is the primordial and the characteristic element ; thence comes the force which is expended in the towns, there is the source from which they draw their energies. The great merit of the designers of the village is to have understood this. They might have reproduced this or that village here or there, and it would have had its interest like the Street in Cairo, like the Old Paris or Old London familiar in exhibitions, but their work would not have had the same bearing, the same significance for art and for education. This is, so far as we know, the first time that such an attempt has been made. Let the artist, let whoever is accustomed to observe and to reflect, say if it has been successful.”

To the writer, of whose own life-pilgrimage and its resultant ideas this ramble from the Sorbonne to the Louvre, and thence through the Exposition to the Swiss Village, has been a kind of summary, the success of this union of sociology with art appears

so complete as amply to justify the apparent paradox of putting this popular show at the climax of a pedagogic scale, of which the upper grades are best represented in the Exposition; while the schools and universities are still only at the beginning, when indeed so far, and upon which the great museums are only creeping up. The contemporary progress of natural history museums may conveniently help us to develop and illustrate the idea. Beyond occasional survivals which illustrate the confusion of natural science before Linnaeus, we have the systematic collections for which his great work is still the fundamental classic. Next we have the collections of skeletons and the rest, illustrative of the comparative method specially associated with the name of Cuvier; and now we have beginning everywhere fresh collections inspired by the evolutionary attitude, first, of course, the specimens and models illustrating the phases of individual developments, but next also attempted reconstructions of genealogical trees. Most living and most important, most interesting, too, alike to the professed naturalist and to the ordinary public, to the philosopher and to the child, are the collections such as those of which the great hall of the British (Natural History) Museum at Kensington offers, perhaps, as yet, the most striking example illustrating the relations of living things to their climate and surroundings, arctic, temperate, or tropical, aquatic or desertic, and displaying the relations both of animals and of plants, as of food, of shelter, or of mutual adaptation, as of flowers and insects. Here we may study the individual drama of organic lives, in the relations of sex and family and incipient society in their relations, also of species to species, as of hunter and prey, of parasite and host, and from competitive to coöperative, and also learn to trace the strange interrelations of which nature is so full, but of which those long ago expounded by Darwin are still the best to begin with as of cats and red clover, of browsing cattle and insects, of goats and the destruction of forests. Here are examples of that intimate relation of biology to sociology which has

been so long preached, but as yet so little practiced in the concrete; and it may be claimed for Le Play that he especially has taught us to approach and to interpret the complex web of everyday social relations in the same way as Darwin has done for the web of nature; much, too, as Lyell has done for the geologic process. Neither Darwin nor Le Play apparently knew anything of the other, but their modes of thought or investigation are at length beginning to unite; thus simple observations like that of the extraordinary destructiveness of the goat, which historian and naturalist have so long hitherto separately noted, acquire new interest when the question of disforestation becomes realized in its full magnitude,—geographically as a main factor in the decadence of the Mediterranean countries from Spain to Syria,—historically also when we come to know the Turkish invader not only fundamentally as a shepherd, but as degenerated through the keeping of goats upon impoverished areas, and as having acquired the beginnings of his nomadized, militarized, and predatory character very largely in association with this inferior type of pastoral civilization. Anyone who cares to observe the relations of the goat-herd to the peasant, around any upland village in the East, may soon satisfy himself that here is no small element of the initial and intimate detail, of the cellular pathology as it were, of the Eastern Question. Between those who apply this geographic mode of study and those who retain that abstractional one for which the literary, the legal, the economic education prepares, there must necessarily be war, hence the polemical tone of these pages; hence the sharp insistence upon the aggressive thesis that through this pilgrimage from school and university, by way of museum and exposition, to the delectable mountains of the Swiss village, our intellectuels of Paris, our academic generation everywhere, must needs pass, as a happier and younger generation is, indeed, even now doing. To any again, who may be disposed to look further into this mode of study, and see how, upon this very matter of the Eastern Question, naturalist and scholar become of

one mind, a recent and accessible discussion may be submitted.¹ To any who have mastered this mode of approach in some detail, we may venture briefly to outline a final summary which would need volumes, indeed, fully to justify, yet which is but an obvious synthesis of familiar elements. Imagine once more the geographic relief of the East from snows to sea, and place each at its levels the appropriate natural and agricultural products, from the forest with its game and its hunters, the hill-pastures with their sheep and shepherds, the river alluvials with their plough-oxen and corn-fields and peasants, their terraced slopes with vine-grower and olive-yard, their warmest levels with their palms. Then study afresh upon their concrete regions and with the every-day common-sense of Lyell's method, the sculptured and the written records of the doings and minglings, the thinkings and sayings of Assyrian hunter and Chaldean peasant, of the Egyptian villager, the Phœnician merchant, the Greek adventurer, of the Hebrew shepherds and peasants, of the fishers of the Galilean lake. Work out these to their fullest presentments, not only in temporal power but in spiritual also; see upon the actual bas-reliefs how far the Assyrian, the vulture of carnage, evolves both to eagle-standard and to guardian angel and to tribal god. Again from its part pastoral but mainly peasant origins let us unriddle the seasonal astronomy, the gentle magic of the Chaldean, the wisdom of the Egyptian, nay, somewhat of the ancient learning of China and its Confucian ethic. Again we may see Dionysos leaping from the vine, Pallas amid her olive grove as of old, Poseidon upon the wave. Nay, more, see again there reappears to the most doubting of inquirers the good shepherd, how again there returns the sacredness of homely bread and wine, again the assured cleanness of all within the fisher's net. Now, indeed, in

(1) P. Geddes, *Cyprus, Actual and Possible*, "Contemporary Review," June, 1897. W. M. Ramsay, *The Eastern Question*, "Contemporary Review," August, 1897.

the very lands where once this symbolism was shaped and unified, the shepherd is nomadized into the too common Turk and Kurd, the peasant abjectized into the too common Armenian, or banditized into yet worse, the shipman piratized into the too common Greek, and thus the very East whence once came the world's light is now the centre of that "Levantine morality," perhaps the phrase which best expresses that synthesis of all things evil in which all our cities have too much followed. Yet it is much to be reaching, or rather recovering, as in this very generation we are, some real, concrete, and intimate comprehension of the relation between environment and occupation, family and ideals; for these once clear may we not reverse the chain, and carry somewhat of the ideal back into occupation and into life? If one process be practically and logically possible so also must the other. The naturalist, the concrete geographer, the student of museums and exhibitions, may thus work out to the full, and upon the level demanded by each contemporary science, this restatement of the thesis of determinism, yet no longer to the exclusion of its complementary doctrine of freedom, effort, and sacrifice, but rather in the very interest of this; for this is no doctrine of Fatalist submission, of *laissez-faire*, but the reverse. Its practical application is in a literal and a concrete promised land, reforested, replanted until the wilderness again blossoms as the rose, and with this the associated family life, the institutions, the ideals blossom also. It is a doctrine not of despair, but of culture, and this no longer content with its current academic definition "to know the best that has been thought and done in the world," but reaching also to the peasant's understanding of it,—that of producing the best that may be done and thought also. In short, then, as every science must needs rise into application and art, from our concrete reinvestigation of Place and Work and Family, we see the beginnings of a no less definite construction,—that of a Eutopia, not Utopia,—of which this fairy city, this little village by the Seine offers us a suggestion and a forecast.

MODERN POLITICAL GERMANY¹

THEODOR BARTH, *Berlin.*



THE influence of the *economical* development of a country upon its *political* form has always been great, but never so great as in the present period, not yet ended, of revolution in methods of transportation and production. Steam and electricity have become not only the greatest economic forces, but also the greatest political forces. Kings and parliaments are only the unconscious agents of these world-ruling powers. When two generations ago Alexis de Tocqueville prophesied that the American Union would fall asunder as soon as its vast domain should be divided into forty separate states, unless it should happen "*que les hommes aient changé de nature et se soient complètement transformés,*" he did not dream what a state-cementing force lay in the railroad, on which the clumsy locomotives of that day were making their first feeble efforts. Since then the great American republic has brought the extensive districts of Texas and California under the control of the starry banner, and has gained a footing in Alaska, and lately in Cuba and the Philippines; and the prophecy of the fine French thinker seems to us today a curious historical blunder, because the force of steam and the electrical current have completely changed the conditions of social life.

(1) Translated by Professor A. L. Daniels, of the University of Vermont.

The same forces which keep the American Union from dissolving into a band of independent states have furthered the most important of those recent political organizations in Europe,—the notable consolidation of the Italian nation, and the founding of the German Empire. It is assuredly not a mere accident that in both of these countries a century old national dream should be realized, just when, under the influence of totally new means of intercommunication and modes of production, human intercourse and the exchange of goods and ideas had begun to assume such unprecedented proportions. In this view we are not ignoring the great services of a Cavour and a Bismarck; we are only noting the close connection between economical and political development.

In the history of Germany this appears with marked clearness in so far as the *political* union of Germany sprang immediately from the *Zollverein*, that is, from her *economic* union.

The chief upholders of the idea of German unity were the Liberals, whose popular propaganda continually and effectively emphasized the prodigious economic advantages of a closer national union.

The irony of history would have it that these liberal ideas should be brought to realization by a representative of the most reactionary wing of the Conservatives, by a member of the Prussian squirarchy, by the *Junker* Otto von Bismarck. The men of his rank and station were not a little astounded when the leading fighter in the Prussian *Militärkonflikt*, whom they regarded as the strongest supporter of their reactionary views, suddenly blossomed out as a revolutionist, overturned several thrones, and hand in hand with his former opponents, the Liberals, first formed the North German Union, and then erected the German Empire, whose constitutional basis was universal suffrage.

The Reichstag, elected by universal suffrage, was at first entirely under liberal influences. Even though the liberal parties did not take part formally in the government, yet the laws were

framed in essential accordance with their wishes. This was especially true in the case of laws bearing on economical questions. Bismarck's right hand in this part of domestic politics was Rudolf Delbrück, an enlightened bureaucrat from the old school of the Prussian *Zollverein*, who along with the general expansion of affairs had grown into a prominent statesman, and who now carried through a truly liberal system of economic politics. In those times was laid the legislative foundation of the modern industrial state which Germany has come to be. It is difficult now for us to form any conception of the confusion that reigned in Germany in the domain of economics only a lifetime ago. No uniform postal system, no uniform weights and measures, no uniform currency. In rapid succession the old pigtails of the craft of economists were cut off; rational weights and measures, a convenient currency, the gold standard, the full right of change of residence, were introduced; a powerful government bank founded, patent laws revised, the passport system abolished, imprisonment for debt done away with, the customs duties reformed in the free trade sense;—in short, a wider freedom created in all directions for business enterprise.

About the middle of the seventies this zeal for reform began to cool, and the reaction slowly set in.

On the first of June, 1876, Rudolf Delbrück, the reform minister, retired "on account of his health," although he seems today, after twenty-five years, to be hale and hearty. He would not follow Bismarck along the path of economic reaction. This reaction had many causes.

Every period of reform seems to be followed by a drowsy season; the people's receptive capacity becomes exhausted; the multitude of changes introduced has disturbed old habits and deep-rooted interests; the slower elements, less able to adapt themselves quickly to the new order, feel lost; the sharper competition forces them to the wall. They all complain of the legislation that has so ruthlessly made an end of the good old customs.

Such has been the experience in all lands after every great period of reform. In Germany, however, there were several special causes which furthered the reaction. Immediately after the war of 1870-71, under the influence of a war indemnity of five thousand million francs, a wild speculation developed which led to the starting of numberless enterprises of every kind, especially in the form of stock companies. The tide was soon to ebb. The world crisis of 1873 demanded untold sacrifices in Germany too. An economic depression set in which made itself felt especially in the iron industries. The great industries under such conditions called more and more zealously for tariff protection.

The landholders, so far, had been zealous free traders; so long as Germany, and in particular Prussia, remained chiefly an agricultural country producing in excess of the home demand, the landowners could draw no benefit from an Agrarian tariff, and would only lose by an industrial tariff. But as Germany developed from an agricultural into an industrial state, and the consumption of agricultural products increased so far that a notable importation of foreign products became necessary, then, the interior agricultural element began to look with more favor on the theories of protection. In particular the Prussian squirarchy, that was closely connected with the great land interests, began to revise its traditional free trade convictions. Prince Bismarck, the all-powerful imperial Chancellor, felt on this point precisely as did his old political friends, and the men of his class. In addition, the *entente cordiale* which had existed between Bismarck and the Liberals in the early years of the Empire was no longer present in the same degree; for the liberal party was making an intelligent endeavor for the further constitutional development of Germany, while Bismarck showed not the least inclination to share his unlimited power with any political party whatsoever. Bismarck saw, therefore, without the least displeasure, that through the newly awakened protectionist leanings of the great industries,

for the most part liberal, the political influence of the Liberals, who were in the main free-traders, was weakened. To weaken the liberal party became more and more, then, the aim of Bismarck's domestic politics.

While he attacked the right wing of liberalism by the ever-growing aid of protectionist forces in the circles of the industries and the Agrarians, he endeavored to weaken its left wing by weaning the masses of the labor party from their allegiance. In the laborers, especially those in the industries, free trade liberalism had found its chief support. The social democracy arose in the sixties, but even in the seventies had hardly got out of the political kindergarten. A dreary radicalism dominated the social democracy. Men like Most and Hasselmann could play a rôle as leaders of the social democracy, and a dogmatic collectivism completely ruled the party. This socialistic movement frightened especially the middle classes. When, in 1878, two attempts in rapid succession were made upon the life of Emperor William I., Bismarck seized the opportunity to tack the would-be assassins Hödel and Nobiling on to the coat-tails of the social democracy, and to place the social democrats under a special law. This was the heaviest blow that could be inflicted on the Liberals, as Bismarck saw in advance. The story goes that, when news of the assault was brought to Bismarck, he shouted: "Now I have them." "Whom, your Highness? The social democrats?" But the answer was, "The Liberals." A great majority of the Liberals had voted in favor of the laws directed against the social democrats in the Reichstag, because the middle classes, who formed their chief support, blindly believed that the social democrats were to be held responsible for the attempts at assassination. By this they estranged not only the hundreds of thousands of social democratic laborers who were immediately affected by the socialist law, but also, in an ever increasing degree, the whole mass of industrial laborers. The socialist law seemed more and more to these circles to be exceptional and directed against the laborers as a class. The result

was that the socialist law, which stood twelve years, and only fell when Bismarck himself was overthrown, caused the social democratic party to gain continually in adherents, so that at the Reichstag elections in 1890 the number of votes had already risen to nearly one million and a half.

This process of the development of the social democracy, which shows in the last decade of the century an ever-increasing progress, so that today the social democracy appears as the most numerous political party of the German empire, although it can count only fifty-seven out of three hundred and ninety-seven representatives in the Reichstag, has taken place mainly at the cost of the old liberal party, and has been chiefly responsible for that party's remarkable loss of immediate influence in Germany.

Thus far, Bismarck's political speculation founded on the socialist law has proved thoroughly successful. Prince Bismarck did, however, a third thing which tended to weaken the Liberals. He had early in the seventies undertaken with their assistance that struggle against the ultramontane rule in the Catholic church, which has gone into history under the popular name of the "Kulturkampf." The repressive laws, too, of this period had the same successful result as the socialist law, that is, they closed up the ranks of the persecuted party, taught them discipline, and so formed them into a compact political power. This was, of course, not Bismarck's intentions; but when he noticed that the central party kept growing stronger under the repression, he deserted his old comrades (in the struggle against the Ultramontanes), the Liberals, and, without any scruples, made peace with the Clericals on the basis of a protective tariff policy directed against the Liberals, and in favor of the Agrarian and industrial interests. In this way, he secured a majority in the Reichstag composed of conservative Agrarians, recruits converted to protectionism, and the more liberal Industrials, and the Clericals, who under the skillful leadership of Windthorst placed themselves at the disposition of Bismarck, partly from their leaning towards protection,

partly from the hope of profiting by the favorable political conjuncture.

In this way, came about the tariff of 1879, which formed the basis of the further reactionary economic policy of Prince Bismarck, and which estranged from Bismarck the best elements of liberalism. Prince Bismarck now steered the ship of state still farther into the sea of his reactionary policy. He again became reconciled with the Prussian squirarchy, as soon as his policy turned energetically against the Liberals. The Agrarian tariffs, especially the tariff on breadstuffs, were raised in 1885 and 1887; the tariff on wheat and rye, which amounted to only ten marks per ton in 1879, was raised in 1887 to fifty marks per ton. This ruthless disregard of the enhancement of the cost of living to the laboring men naturally contributed not a little to strengthen the social democracy, which continued to develop at an ever greater ratio under the socialist law. By the introduction of the legislation for compulsory insurance,—at first against sickness, then against accident, and, lastly, against old age,—Bismarck hoped to put a check on the development of the social democracy, but in vain. The socialist law proved, finally, also the immediate cause of Bismarck's fall. The Emperor, William II., who after his father Frederick III's short reign of one hundred days, succeeded his grandfather on the throne, had ideas as to the economic policy which ought to be followed with which Bismarck had no sort of sympathy. Serious doubts seem to have arisen in the Emperor's mind as to the advisability of continuing the socialist law, while Bismarck in the beginning of the year 1890 went so far as to dissolve the Reichstag in behalf of the same law.

The new elections showed that the opponents of the socialist law were materially stronger, and a few weeks later Bismarck was released from office. In his place came General von Caprivi, a statesman who united in himself the best qualities of the Prussian civil and military officer, and who in the three and a half years of his chancellorship developed, under most difficult

surroundings, an activity of the first significance. If it was difficult to find a man with the international prestige of Bismarck to conduct the foreign policy of Germany, it was quite as difficult to settle the complications in domestic politics which were Bismarck's bequest. The socialist law expired in October, 1890, and was not renewed. An old desire of the Liberals to have the time of military service reduced from three years to two was gratified, and, finally, and that was his most important work, Count Caprivi negotiated commercial treaties with nearly all the neighboring states: in 1892 with Austria-Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, and Roumania; in 1894 with Russia. These treaties included numerous tariff reductions, according to the agreement of the contracting parties, and were to continue in force to the end of the year 1903. The most important concession made by Germany with special respect to Austria-Hungary and Russia was the reduction of the duty on grain, especially that upon rye and wheat, from fifty marks to thirty marks per ton (one thousand kilograms).

This commercial policy of Count Caprivi has shown itself to be extraordinarily rich in blessings for the industrial development of Germany.

Germany has had since 1894 a most astonishing economic development, — more than any other country of Europe. Although it were certainly too hasty a judgment to attribute these gains exclusively to Caprivi's policy in the matter of commercial treaties, still it remains true that his freer commercial policy, which came in force in the year 1894, has been exactly in line, in the highest degree, with German economic interests.

Germany has today a foreign commerce in round numbers of ten thousand million marks, including an export trade of four thousand million marks. Since the year 1894, this international trade has increased more than thirty per cent, while in the whole period from 1880 to 1894 the increase was only about twenty five per cent. The ocean trade comprises about seventy per

cent of the whole foreign commerce. The merchant shipping, second in importance to that of England, has expanded since 1894 by more than a third in tonnage capacity. The productive capacity of our industries has not lagged behind the development of our export trade; our banking system has expanded enormously, especially in assisting German capital to participate in foreign enterprises. Also the wage-scale has continually risen; emigration has sunk to a minimum; the death-rate has declined; the demand for labor has become so great that foreign laborers in increasing numbers have been attracted from Russia and Austria.

Germany, with her at present approximatively fifty-six millions of inhabitants, with a yearly growth of more than three quarters of a million, stands a picture of marvelous economic thrift in every direction. The agricultural interests alone seem to have ground for complaint; and this brings us to the point of view from which modern political Germany must be observed.

Thirty or forty years ago, agriculture in Germany was in a high state of prosperity, a fact sufficiently evidenced by an astonishing advance in the price of land. But oversea agricultural states were rapidly growing, and this, in connection with modern facilities for transportation and distribution, made the international competition decidedly more acute, especially in grain and meat. The consequent fall in the prices of agricultural products was, of course, severely felt by those who had but recently paid high prices for their land. The crisis that developed from these conditions affected especially the land-holding squirarchy of Prussia, who during the flush times had got to living beyond their means. They became involved in debt, and less and less able to maintain financially their social position. This Prussian squirarchy has always looked upon the best places under the government and in the army as among their own special prerogatives. A danger to their economic safety threatened at the same time their official holdings. The entire political prestige of

the order was at stake. They viewed, therefore, with increasing anxiety the rapid transition of Germany from an agricultural to an industrial state. This shifting of the centre of gravity in the direction of the industrial interests has gone on year by year, until at present scarcely a third part of the population is immediately dependent on the cultivation of land. The growth of Germany in population and wealth has been almost wholly in non-agricultural directions. The Agrarians,—the Prussian squirarchy at their head,—cannot help seeing that this process of development must eventually deprive them of political power.

The circumstance also that Germany is outgrowing her position as a strictly continental power dependent on land armies, officered mainly by the Prussian squirarchy, and is getting to be a world power, requiring a fleet equal in standing and importance to the army, naturally filled the Agrarians with dismal prognostications. They say to themselves, if Germany's future lies, as Emperor William II. expresses it, "on the water," the great Prussian land-holders can no longer hope to play the first violin in German politics. Everything that favors the development of Germany as an industrial state fills the Prussian squirarchy with distrust, and awakens its opposition. Count Caprivi's commercial treaties, inflicting upon them a reduction of the tariff on grain from fifty marks to thirty-five marks per ton, inflamed their rage to the highest pitch; and there is, perhaps, no name so hated in the circles of the Prussian squirarchy to the present day as the name of the noble general who succeeded Bismarck as imperial chancellor.

The whole study and endeavor of the squires is now aimed at preventing the continuance in force of these commercial tariffs beyond the year 1903.

The question as to the continuance in force of Caprivi's commercial tariff policy has stood since then in the centre of the whole of German politics, internal as well as external. Whenever the Agrarian party succeeds in imposing higher duties upon grain

and meat, this artificial rise in the price of foodstuffs means a depression of the scale of living, and thereby of the productive capacity, especially of the laborers. Even now with our present scale of tariffs on the necessities of life, the yearly amount which in the form of artificially raised prices is paid by the laborers to the great land-holders amounts to hundreds of millions of marks. In the same degree as the industrial interests of Germany outgrow the agricultural interests in importance, any such enhancement of the very necessities of life in order to increase the Agrarian ground-rents is more unwillingly submitted to. Any addition to this injustice by increasing still more the cost of living, would, as a matter of course, essentially increase this unwillingness, and make itself felt politically by a growth of the social democratic influence.

The social democratic party, that in the parliamentary elections of 1898 already polled more than one fourth of all votes cast, could not ask a better means for agitation than a farther rise in the tariffs on foodstuffs.

The social democracy in Germany is frequently viewed abroad as it was twenty-five years ago; but it has changed its inner character in the same degree as it has extended itself outwardly. Collectivism forms, indeed, even today, the centre of its official programme; but in practical politics this collectivist dogma plays as good as no rôle at all any longer. In fact, the social democracy with us today is a radical labor party which, indeed, still bears some fragments of the collectivistic egg-shell about it, but, so far as practical politics are in question, is not essentially different from other radical political parties. Our social democrats are fond of calling themselves "revolutionary"—in politics the *mots sonores* play a great rôle, as everybody knows,—but they are not thinking at all of overthrowing the existing order by *violence*. They emphasize most sedulously the fact that they intend to employ only *legitimate* and *peaceable* means to reach their goal; and when now and then anarchistic elements creep into the ranks of the social democracy, they

are shown the door with great dispatch. Their reputation for upsetting things, the social democracy does not owe to its acts, nor even to its speeches, but to its political opponents, who for many years have utilized the "red spectre" for their reactionary plans. The more effectively the quiet citizen could be frightened by the "red spectre," the more safely they could reckon that at the elections he would throw himself into the arms of the reactionaries. The plan worked well for a long time; but for some years past popular belief in the dangerous character of the social democracy has been shaken. This explains also the strong successes of the social democracy at the polls. The more than two million votes cast at the last Reichstag elections for the candidate of the social democracy came, in great measure, not from social democrats proper, but from voters who wanted to give energetic expression to their disapproval of the ruling politics in this way, by voting for the most radical candidate in the field.

In this way is consummated very gradually, once more, an approach of the social democracy and liberalism. The process is quite similar to the one which has taken place in Belgium. There, too, the old liberalism was so much weakened by the going over of the labor masses to the social democracy that the reactionaries were able to seize the leadership. Gradually, however, in Belgium also the parties approached each other by means of the middle class radicalism. The old mutual distrust became weaker, and a new comradeship in arms is arising. In Germany, as far as we can see, the development will be a very similar one; and the prospective battles over the raising of the tariffs on food-stuffs will particularly contribute to establish a common line of attack on the reactionaries. In politico-economic legislation the liberal Manchester men have, so far, almost always gone hand in hand with the social democrats. Together they have resisted the attempts to limit the laws relating to apprenticeships and the right of change of residence; together they have contended for a more liberal form for the right of new parties to organize and hold

meetings; together they have successfully warded off the attacks of the Agrarians upon our gold standard and our imperial bank; nay, even, they have together defended against the Agrarians the arrangements of the *Börse*, as, for example, the purchase of grain for future delivery; also in the debates on the commercial treaties of 1892 and 1894 they supported together the policy of Count Caprivi. The struggle against the raising of the tariffs on foodstuffs can only serve to give to this community of effort a more intimate form.

But now further, it appears likely that every rise in the tariffs on meat and grain will also hinder the renewal of the commercial treaties. The most important tariff treaty which Germany has contracted is the one with Russia, made in the year 1894. The result has been an extraordinarily strong development of commerce with Russia. Germany's trade with Russia,—import and export together,—has gradually risen to more than one thousand two hundred million marks yearly. This is almost as much as her trade with the United States of America. Only with Great Britain does Germany maintain a more extensive exchange of wares. It is evident of what eminent economic significance it is for Germany not to let her commerce with her neighbor Russia shrink to small proportions. In the Russo-German commerce the place of first importance is held by grain, especially rye. It is, therefore, very unlikely that Russia will be inclined to negotiate a new commercial treaty, if the German government yields to the wishes of our Agrarians, and insists on raising the tariffs on grain, which were moderated in 1894. Indeed, the danger is great that in such a case a new commercial treaty between Germany and Russia will not be made, but that a period of tariff war will succeed to the present period of commercial treaties. Our Agrarians are steering straight towards such a war of tariffs; they would not shrink even from a tariff war with Russia and the United States at the same time.

The question is now whether there will arise in Germany any


government so conscienceless and so shortsighted as to join in such a suicidal policy. Emperor William II. at one time characterized the commercial treaties negotiated by Count Caprivi as "an act of rescue," and on various opportunities he has pointed out the significance of the commercial treaty with Russia in the friendly shaping of our *political* relations with that country. The grounds of the foreign policy which must induce Germany with regard to revanche-seeking France to cultivate friendly relations with Russia are today the same that they were six years ago. The renewal of the commercial treaty with Russia seems, therefore, from purely political considerations, to be an act of statesmanlike shrewdness, even entirely aside from its economic significance.

It is equally evident, on the other hand, that for all questions of the greater world politics, particularly for the world politics that is unfolding itself in Eastern Asia, it lies in the interest of Germany to maintain friendly relations with the United States, and, in common with the American Union, to come out in favor of an open door policy. A narrow-hearted Agrarian policy which should involve us finally in a political war of tariffs would, from this point of view also, be indefensible.

It lies, therefore, in the interest of our internal as well as of our external politics not to yield to the longing of our Agrarian reactionaries for an increase in the tariffs on foodstuffs. In these struggles very much will depend on the attitude of the German government. In weighing up the interests of the great feudal landowners against the interests of a model industrial state, the scale into which the influence of the government is cast must go down. If the government weakly yields to the onrush of the Agrarians, it will conjure up an economical and political crisis in Germany that must have most fatal results; if it yields to the modern demands of the industrial state, that will be the beginning of the end of the political influence of the Prussian squarchy.

The present German Emperor is, in general, a modern man, thoroughly penetrated with a sense of the meaning of a powerful industry, a highly developed international commerce, a strong fleet. The men immediately about him, however, belong to the Prussian nobility, which is bound up in Agrarian interests, and continually seeks to influence the king in behalf of Agrarian interests. The present imperial chancellor, Prince zu Hohenlohe, is an unprejudiced *grand seigneur*, to whom the political importunities of the Prussian squirarchy are, in reality, detestable; but he is an old man of eighty years, and he has never developed any especial initiative. He is not now the man, nor would be even if younger, to direct an energetic battle against a wild and enraged Agrarian squirarchy. The secretary of state for foreign affairs, Count Bülow, and the state secretary of finance, Baron von Thielmann, formerly ambassador at Washington, are men of deep insight, who, without any doubt, perceive the whole dangerous significance of an Agrarian victory; but both of them also lack that statesmanlike ruthlessness which is imperative in order to fight a heavy political battle through to the end. The state secretary of the interior, Count von Posadowsky, and the most influential man in the Prussian ministry, the minister of finance von Miquel, agree with the Agrarians in every way.

Under these circumstances, it seems not impossible that when it comes to the decisive struggles the Agrarian influence in the government will win. The event will be determined by the degree of energy which the broad masses of the population display in the political agitation of the next few years. Public opinion rules in the end in Germany, as in all modern states; it is only necessary that the people should take an energetic part in the questions.



THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIA: ¹

PROBLEMS OF THE EAST AND PROBLEMS OF THE
FAR EAST.

ALFRED RAMBAUD, *Paris*.



WE fail to discover, however far back we go towards the beginnings of the Russian State, any indication that this was ever destined to become a maritime power. In the ninth century, the Slavic tribes that were to form the first political organization designated by the name Russian,—the Slavo-Russian tribes,—occupied a territory securely shut in on the west by the Poles and the Lithuanians ; on the north, by the Finnish tribes, the Livonians, the Tchudis, and the Ingrians ; on the east, Finnish tribes again, the Vesi, the Merians, the Muromians, and two Turkish tribes, the Meshtcheraks and the Khazars, that occupied all the northern coast of the Black Sea ; allowing but a single one of the Slavo-Russian peoples to hold a position upon its shores. Except at this point, these Slavo-Russian tribes nowhere had access to the coast. The shores of the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean were Finnish ; those of the Baltic, Finnish or Scandinavian ; those of

(1) Translated by Professor W. C. Kitchin, lately of the University of Vermont.

of the Black Sea were held by the Khazars, the Caucasian tribes, the Byzantine Empire, and the Bulgarians, a Finnish tribe that had imposed its name and sovereignty upon a certain number of Slavic tribes.

In the East and North, the Slavs were not to be found even in those regions where afterwards rose the Russian capitals, Moscow and St. Petersburg. Beyond began those immense spaces that stretch away into the depths of central Asia, and even to the Pacific Ocean, spaces peopled with Finnish and Turkish tribes, and other branches of the Uralo-Altaic family. Then, still further east, were to be found certain peoples of the yellow race.

THE ORIGIN OF THE RUSSIAN STATE AND NATION.

To speak now only of the Russia of Europe, how did the Slavo-Russians, who in the ninth century held scarcely a fifth part of their present territory, succeed in securing possession of it all? A two-fold change came about during the centuries. On the one hand, the Slavo-Russians, very venturesome in disposition, following, at first, the course of the rivers and their tributaries, spread out over the vast plains that stretch away to the Ural Mountains; founding everywhere cities, villages, and markets right in the midst of the territory of the aboriginal tribes. On the other hand, they absorbed the greater part of those tribes, and imposed upon them their language, religion, and even their manners and customs. A double colonization, therefore, took place, a colonization of the soil and a colonization of the native. The ancient Uralo-Altaic tribes, subjugated or absorbed by the Russians, have disappeared from the map of the empire. There persist still only some scattered remnants of them, surrounded by men of Russian race and speech, and destined soon to disappear. These aborigines are to be found in fairly compact groups only in those places where the severity of the climate, the barren character of the soil, the thickness of the forest, and the desert steppes check Russian civilization, an ethnographical medley, moreover, occupying only

a very small and indifferently valuable part of the European Russia of today.¹

Thus the primitive tribes of the Slavo-Russians formed an agglomeration which was everywhere well-nigh entirely shut off from any sea. This had a character essentially continental; the population was wholly agricultural in character, and, except as fleets of light boats descended the Dnieper in the tenth century to harass Constantinople and to commit piracy on the Byzantine shores of the Black Sea, there was nothing to indicate that it would one day come forth as a maritime power.

The Russia of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was scarcely European. She was bound to Europe only by her form of religion, and even that, borrowed from Byzantium, was an oriental, an almost Asiatic form of Christianity. When there came about in the eleventh century that rupture between the Latin and Catholic Church of the West, and the Greek and Orthodox Church of the East, a still higher barrier was raised between the two parts of Europe. To the Western Christians, the Greeks and the peoples that they had evangelized, the Bulgarians, the Serbians, the Moldavo-Wallachians, and the Russians, were only schismatics. Now, while the Catholic peoples of the West, thanks to more favorable historical circumstances, began to take shape as powerful nations in which an already well-advanced civilization went on developing, the schismatic peoples of Eastern Europe, assailed by successive invasions from Asia, and after having long served as a living bulwark against barbarism for ungrateful Europe, were checked in their historic evolution, and fell one after the other into servitude to pagan Mongols or Mohammedan Turks.

The country where the Slavo-Russians first established themselves was only a prolongation of the great plains which, scarcely

¹ Thus the Suomi, the Karelians, and the Laplanders in Finland; the Zyrians and the Permians, in the northeast; the Tcheremisa, the Mordva, the Votiaki, the Meshtcheraks, and the Bashkirs on the river Volga, or between the Volga and the Ural Mountains and river.

broken by the Ural Mountains, extend to Behring's Sea, Okhotsk Sea, and the Sea of Japan. Geographically, topographically, this primitive Russia was already Asiatic. Just as the winds from Asia swept unhindered all this immense plain, so could the migration of peoples and invading expeditions, at times originating near the Great Wall of China, pour unchecked over the Russian plains as far as the Carpathian Mountains and the Vistula.

One of those revolutions, so frequent among the nomadic tribes of Asia, brought together from 1154 to 1227 under the blue banner of Temuchin, called Jenghis Khan, numerous tribes of shepherds and mounted nomads. They adopted as their collective name that of the Tartar-Mongols. At their head "the Inflexible Emperor," "the Son of Heaven," conquered Manchuria, the kingdom of Tangut, North China, Turkestan, and Great Bokhara, and founded an empire which extended from the Pacific to the Ural Mountains. Under the successors of Jenghis Khan, these mounted hordes, maddened by the fury of war and conquest, crossed into Europe, fell upon Russia, then divided into numerous principalities, carried the capital cities by assault, annihilated, one after the other, the armies of foot and horse sent against them, and in 1240 converted all Russia into a mere province of the Mongol Empire. The Russian princes and the chieftains of the Finnish tribes became vassals of the Great Khan,¹ who held his court on the banks of the Onon, an affluent of the Amur, or at Karakorum on the Orkhon, a stream emptying into Lake Baikal. They were also more directly the vassals of one of his vassals, the Khan of the Golden Horde, who was stationed at Sarai on the lower Volga.

At this period the Tartar-Mongols, among whom Mohammedanism was not disseminated until about 1272, were still Budd-

(1) Consult Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, London, 1876. Wolff, *Geschichte der Mongolen*, Breslau, 1872. Leon Cahun, *Introduction à l'histoire de l'Asie*, Paris, 1896.

hists, Shamanists, or fetich worshippers; at heart very indifferent in matters of religion, and strangers to any thought of propagandism or of intolerance. They, therefore, left the Russians in undisturbed possession of their religion, their laws, and their own princely dynasties. They merely exacted tribute, and, in certain contingences, military service; and every new Russian prince must go to receive his investiture either at Sarai, or even by a journey that would occupy years, at the court of the Great Khan. There they were compelled to prostrate themselves at the foot of his throne, to defend themselves against the accusations of enemies, or of their Russian rivals; and the Khan disposed of their heads as of their crowns. Many Russian princes were executed before his eyes. Some among these, the Russian Church honors as martyrs.

Among the Russian princes who went there to prostrate themselves before the Horde were those who had founded round about a little market-town, the name of which is met with for the first time in 1147, a new principality, that of Moscow, one of the most insignificant of the Russian states of that period. It was established in the midst of a Finnish country, among the Muromians. It formed, therefore, a colony of primitive Russia. The princes of Moscow knew how to turn to their own advantage the Mongol yoke that weighed on all Russia. They were more adroit than the others in flattering the common master and the agents that represented him in Russia. One of them, George (1303-1325), even married a Tartar princess. In their struggles against other Russian princes, they always carried the controversy to the court of the Khan, who almost always decided in their favor, and sent them away with the heads of their rivals. They secured from the Khan the privilege of collecting the tribute, not only from their own subjects, but from the other princes of Russia. This function as tribute collector for the Khan raised them above all their equals; and the more humble vassals of the barbarians they showed themselves to be, the better did they establish their suzerainty

over the other Christian states. They succeeded thus in building up a very powerful state, which was called the "Great Principality" of Moscow. When they felt themselves to be strong enough, and perceived that the Mongol Empire had grown sufficiently weak through internal dissension and divisions to warrant the attempt, they turned against the barbarians the power that they owed to them. In 1380, the Grand Prince Dmitri, having refused payment of tribute, defeated Mamaï, the Khan of the Golden Horde, at Kulikovo on the Don. But the Mongols were not yet as weak as Dmitri Donskoï (hero of the Don) had thought. Tamerlane, or Timur-Leng, had just conquered Turkestan, Persia, Asia Minor, and North Hindustan. One of his lieutenants, Tokhtamysh, having vainly summoned the Grand Prince Dmitri to appear before him, marched against Moscow, captured the city and its Kremlin, sacked the other cities of the principality, and everywhere reëstablished Asiatic supremacy. Nevertheless, the Mongol yoke was not to survive long the heroic effort made at Kulikovo. The great barbarian empires founded by Asiatic conquerors quickly fall to pieces. This historical law was verified in the empire of Tamerlane, as in that of Jenghis Khan. Towards the end of the fifteenth century, the Mongol empire in Asia was divided into the Mongol empire of China, the Mongol empire of India, the Mongol kingdom of Persia, and a large number of khanates in Turkestan and Siberia; and all those states were scarcely any longer Mongol save in name. In Russia itself, the Golden Horde was broken up. From its debris were formed the czarate of Kazan on the middle Volga, the khanate, or czarate, of Sarai, or Astrakhan, on the lower Volga, the horde of the Nogais, and the khanate of the Crimea. In 1476, Akhmed, the Khan of Sarai, sent a demand for tribute to the Grand Prince of Moscow, Ivan the Great. Ivan put the ambassadors to death. Four years later, the Khan Akhmed marched upon Moscow with a large army. Near the rivers Oka and Ugra he met the army of Ivan the Great; but neither of

the adversaries dared force the passage of the two rivers. They remained there several days exchanging insults and darts from the opposite shores. Then a panic simultaneously arose in both armies; the one fleeing in the direction of Moscow, the other in the direction of Sarai. It was in this bloodless, inglorious way that the Mongol power in Russia came to an end.

The Mongol yoke had continued two hundred and fifty-six years (1224–1480). It left in Russia traces that were for a long time ineffaceable. Before the Tartar conquest, the power of a Russian prince was founded upon European origins. It recalled the patriarchal authority of the old-time chieftains of the Slavo-Russian tribes; the martial authority of the heads of the Scandinavian or Variagian clans, like Rurik and other Variagian chiefs, called into Russia, it is said, by the Slavs; and the authority, at once civil and religious, of the Byzantine-Roman Emperors, whom the successors of Rurik, like all the barbarian chieftains of Eastern Europe, liked to take as models. After the Tartar conquest, on the contrary, the Russian princes, and especially the Grand Princes of Moscow, selected as prototypes of their own authority the Khans and Great Khans with their autocratic power,—coarse, irresponsible, Asiatic. From that time forward, they treated their vassals as they themselves had been treated by the Khans. Between the Grand Prince and his vassals, and between these and the peasants, the relations were those of brutal masters and trembling slaves. The sovereign of Moscow did not differ from a Mongol Khan, from a Persian Shah, or from an Osmanli Sultan, save as he professed the orthodox religion. He was a sort of a Christian Grand Turk. When the title of Grand Prince seemed to him unworthy of his increased power, the title that his ambition chose was none of those that the Christian rulers of the West then bore; it was the one which the Khans of Siberia, of Kazan, or of Astrakhan had arrogated; it was the title of Czar, which, of course, has not any etymological connection with that of Cæsar, a fiction invented very much later. Such was the title

that the heir of the Grand Princes of Moscow, Ivan the Terrible, solemnly took in 1547. Many other facts attest the predominance of Asiatic influences over the Russia of the sixteenth century. The costumes of the Czar of Moscow and of the other great lords, the princes and boyars, were Asiatic; Asiatic was the servile etiquette of the court; touching with the brow the foot of the throne, and the humble formulas in which the highest personages declared themselves to be slaves; Asiatic was the seclusion of the women in the *terem*, which was a Russian harem;¹ Asiatic was the equipment of the royal cavalry with their high saddles and short stirrups; their boots with the toe in the form of an upturned crescent; their armor reminding one of that of the Chinese and Japanese; their curved swords, their bows and quivers, and their head-dress, which resembled a turban surmounted by an aigrette. All this oriental apparel was to continue in vogue until the time when Peter the Great, with the violent measures of an Asiatic despot, forcibly introduced into Russia the short clothing of the West,—“German dress,” that is, European. With this change in costume, he also brought in the fashion of shaving the face; the holding of social gatherings, which the recluses of the *terem* were compelled to attend; the etiquette of the Christian courts; the formulary of the German bureaucracy, and the uniforms, equipments, and tactics of the armies of the West.

While Russia was still groaning under the Mongol yoke, the Grand Princes of Moscow, utilizing their servitude as an instrument of power, caused the other princes to bow before the terror of the Mongol, and brought about “the consolidation of the Russian territory,” that is to say, they founded the unity of Russia. When the family line of the Grand Princes and Czars of Moscow died out in 1598, and when there began for Russia “those troub-

(1) However, it is proper to call attention to the fact that the servile character of the court etiquette may also have been borrowed from Byzantium, and that the Russian *terem* may have had its original in the gynæcium of the Greeks.

lous times (*smoutnoïé Vrémia*),” which the accession of the Romanofs brought to an end in 1613, the czarate of Moscow was already a very powerful state.

In the North especially, by the annexation of the territories of the ancient republics of Novgorod and Pskof, the Muscovite supremacy was extended to the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean. On the west, in a series of wars against the Lithuanians and the Poles to “recover” from them Russian territory which they had formerly conquered, the Moscow czarate had carried its power beyond Pskof and Lake Peïpus, and had reached the Dnieper at Kiev and Smolensk. In the south, it had reached neither the Black Sea nor the Sea of Azov, from which it was separated by the Ukraine that still belonged to the Poles, by a republic of adventurers and pirates called the Zaporovians, by the khanate of the Crimean Tartars, by the camping grounds of the Nogaian Tartars, and, finally, by the maritime power of the Ottomans on the Euxine. Eastward, Russian conquest and colonization had made great advances. The uniting of the old territories of Novgorod, and the annexation of those of the republic of Viatka, brought the Muscovite domination to the Ural Mountains. The conquest of the czarate of Kazan by Ivan the Terrible, in 1552, gave him all the region of the middle Volga, and the conquest of the czarate of Astrakhan, two years later, placed in his power all the lower Volga country, with a part of the coast of the Caspian Sea. Finally, the conquest of the khanate of Sibir, between the years 1579-1584, by the Cossack Irmak, carried the Russian eagles beyond the Urals, and opened before them the immensities of Siberia.

But the more extensive the Muscovite Empire became, the more it suffered from not having access to any sea which was all the year free from ice, or which would afford an outlet to the ocean. The harbors of the White Sea were closed with ice eight months of the year; the Caspian Sea is only a great lake without an outlet. To reach the Baltic Sea, it would be necessary to

battle against the Germans, the Poles, and the Swedes, the masters of all its shores. To gain access to the Black Sea, there were, again, the Poles to be fought, as well as the Tartars, the Zaporovians, and the Grand Turk. Now, the European neighbors of Russia were beginning to fear this great barbarian Empire. They were convinced that it would become truly a terror to them the day on which, by obtaining regular communication with the West, it could thereby learn something of their civilization, their industries, and, above all, their military art. They understood that the backward condition of its civilization was the only safeguard against its ambitions. They, therefore, closed against it their eastern frontiers, and barred it out of the Baltic. At the time when Ivan the Terrible, profiting by the decadence into which the Sword-Bearers, the religious military order of the Livonians, had fallen, took their lands away from them, and raised his flag at their port of Narva, Poles, Germans, and Swedes united against him; they incited fresh invasions of the Crimean Tartars, conspiracies and rebellion among his nobility; and, after a bitter struggle of twenty-four years, compelled him to abandon his conquest in 1582. So long as Narva was in the hands of the Czar, Sigismund, King of Poland, did not have a moment's peace. When English merchants began to resort there, he wrote threatening letters to Queen Elizabeth, summoning her to forbid that traffic. "Our fleet will seize all those who continue to sail thither; your merchants will be in danger of losing their liberty, their wives and children, and their lives." And this confession escaped him: "We see by this new traffic the Muscovite, who is not only our enemy today, but the hereditary enemy of all free nations, furnishing himself thoroughly, not only with our guns and munitions of war, but, above all, with skilled workmen, who continue to prepare equipments of war for him, such as have been hitherto unknown to his barbaric people. * * * It would seem that we have thus far conquered him because he is ignorant of the art of war and the *finesse* of diplomacy. Now, if this

commerce continues, what will there soon be left for him to learn?"

Thus, it was not merely unpropitious nature that kept Russia in a condition of blockade; but the jealousy of her neighbors mounted a most rigorous guard around these "barbarians" of the North. The Empire of Moscow remained condemned, like the agglomeration of Slavic tribes of the ninth and tenth centuries from which it had sprung, to a purely continental life. It was shut up to its vast northern plains like the Swiss to his mountains, and seemed to have as little chance of ever becoming a maritime power.

Hitherto, the Muscovite Empire with its military organization wholly Asiatic, with its noble-born knights and free peasants, with its infantry militia, the *streletsy*, with its old-fashioned artillery, with its irregular troops of Cossacks, Tartars, and Calmucks, had been able to withstand victoriously Asiatic forces; but it could not maintain a struggle against the regular troops and improved weapons of the Western nations. In order to make her mark in Europe, it was necessary for Russia to become European; but she could not become European if Europe persisted in holding her in a condition of blockade. It was a "vicious circle;" and it was reserved for the genius of Peter the Great to succeed in breaking that circle.

Henceforth we see Russian diplomacy, with tireless patience, with a shrewdness equal to its persistency, endeavoring simultaneously in all directions to pierce the blockade. She strives to secure access to the Baltic Sea; and we shall have the Northern war of Peter the Great, the partition of Poland under Catherine II., the Finland question under the Czarina Elizabeth, and under Alexander I. She strives to secure access to the Black Sea; and we shall have the Eastern question, in all its forms, from the first efforts of Peter the Great down to the war of 1877-78 of Alexander II. She strives to make herself mistress of the Caspian Sea, and the attempt made by Peter the Great will reach an

end only under Alexander III. She strives to secure access to the Indian Ocean, and we shall have the wars and treaties with Persia, Afghanistan, and England. She strives to secure access to the Okhotsk Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Pacific Ocean, and we shall witness the work of Siberian colonization and all the phases of the Far Eastern question. The matter of securing new territory concerns her much less. It has been the supreme end of her efforts, at times continued for centuries, to reach a sea,—a sea free from ice, a sea opening into the ocean.

THE NORTHWARD AND WESTWARD EXPANSION OF RUSSIA IN EUROPE.

We know with what energy and alternation of success and failure Peter the Great struggled against the Swedish masters of the eastern and southern shores of the Baltic. We are amazed when we reflect that a war, lasting more than twenty-one years; a war that convulsed all Europe; that brought the Swedes into the heart of Russia and the Russians into the centre of Germany; that brought about the creation of a Russian army and navy under the fire of the enemy, and that numbered a score of battles on land and sea,—should have ended in results apparently so meagre as were those gained by Russia in 1721 at the Treaty of Nystad; namely, the acquisition of four small provinces, Livonia, Esthonia, Ingria, and Karelia. But these provinces gave him on the Baltic the ports of Riga, Revel, and Narva; they gave him also the mouths of two rivers, the broad Neva and the Dūna, or Dvina (not to be confounded with the other Dvina that empties into the White Sea). It was on the islets of the Neva that Peter the Great had founded in 1703, on lands still disputed by the Swedes and by the floods, the capital of European

Russia, St. Petersburg, protected on the west by the maritime fortress of Kronstadt. Yes, "the Giant Czar" considered himself amply repaid for his efforts of twenty-one years by the fact that for his vast continental Empire, still wrapped in Asiatic darkness, he had been able "to open one window on Europe."

This window was still a very narrow one. It was somewhat enlarged by Elizabeth, when, after a war foolishly undertaken by Sweden, she made that country, in the Treaty of Abo, 1743, surrender some districts in Finland. Later, Alexander I., during his short-lived alliance with Napoleon, conquered from his recent ally, Gustavus III., all of Finland (Treaty of Fredericksham, 1809). Russia had now no longer anything to seek in that direction.

Westward, between Russia, already powerful and always warlike, and Prussia, now grown great in glory and strength, lay an extremely weak State made up of the kingdom of Poland, the grand duchy of Lithuania and some old-time Russian districts. The first three partitions of this State (1772, 1793, 1795), carried the Russian frontier to the Niemen, the Warthe, and the Dniester. Catherine II. completed these conquests by the annexation of Courland, which had been a vassal dependency of the fallen kingdom. It is to be noted, however, that in what is called "the partition of Poland," Catherine II. did not acquire any Polish, but merely Lithuanian territory that formerly had been Russian. If Napoleon I. had not attempted to reëstablish on the Russian frontier a Polish kingdom under the name of "the grand duchy of Warsaw," perhaps Russia would not have been ambitious to secure possession of any former Polish territory. After the fall of Napoleon, the Czar Alexander I. was obliged to appropriate a considerable part of this under the name of "the kingdom of Poland," were it for no other reason than to prevent an increase of territory upon the part of the two German powers. Henceforth the western frontier of Russia was fixed. It has not changed since 1815, and, to admit the possi-

bility of a change in the future, it would be necessary to admit the possibility of a total over-turning of the European balance of power.

RUSSIA'S SOUTHWARD EXPANSION IN EUROPE :

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

Though Russian expansion towards the north was stopped by the icy solitudes of Lapland, westward by the frontiers of states as firmly established as the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, yet for a long time a broad way remained open to Russia in the direction of the south. The decadence of the Ottoman Empire seemed to offer her the same favorable opportunities as did the decline of the Polish-Lithuanian Empire. In this direction, acquisition of territory promised to be infinitely more precious. The Russians could dream of the Black Sea, the Propontis, and the Ægean Sea becoming Russian lakes; of Christian peoples of the same religion (Roumanians and Greeks),—and of some of the same religion and race (Bulgarians, Serbians, Croatians, Bosnians, Herzegovinians, and Montenegrins),—welcoming the armies of a Liberator Czar, and joyfully accepting the domination of Russia in exchange for that of the Ottoman; and, finally, they could dream of Constantinople, the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire, freed from the yoke of the infidel, and of the cross taking the place of the crescent on the dome of Saint Sophia. Nevertheless, it was, perhaps, in the direction of the South that Russia, in her schemes for expansion, after some brilliant successes, found herself the most completely deceived.

For a long time the sovereigns that sat upon Russia's throne at Moscow, and then at St. Petersburg, were infatuated with this Oriental mirage. The Russian Orthodox church urged them on in this course through sympathy with the Orthodox Christians who were in subjection to the infidel. Even the Roman Catholic Church at a certain time encouraged them in the hope that the sword of the Czar might accomplish both the deliverance of

the Christians and *the union of the two churches*, that is to say, the subordination of the Greek Church to the Roman. It was Pope Paul III., who, at the advice of the Greek cardinal, Bessarion, offered to the Grand Prince of Moscow, Ivan the Great, the hand of his ward, Sophia Palæologus, the niece of the last Christian Emperor of Constantinople. It was at Rome that the marriage took place, and it was the Pope who gave a dowry to the heiress of the Cæsars of the East.¹ It is from the time of this marriage that the double-headed eagle of the Palæologus took its place on the escutcheons and standards of the Russian sovereigns. Paul III. was deceived in both his hopes; for the union of the two churches was never accepted at Moscow, and many years passed before a Russian army was able to advance a step southward. The second of the Romanoffs, Alexis, father of Peter the Great, set the first landmark southward in the Treaty of Andrussovo with Poland, in 1667, by acquiring a part of the Ukraine, extending as far as the upper course of the Dnieper. Vast spaces still separated the Russian and the Ottoman Empires. Nevertheless, in the coolest and shrewdest minds brooded the idea of a holy war against the infidel. Peter the Great, still young and journeying in Western Europe, learning its arts and himself wielding the carpenter's axe at Saardam, wrote, in 1697, to Adrian, the Patriarch of Moscow: "We are laboring in order thoroughly to conquer the art of the sea, so that having completely learned it, on our return to Russia, we may be victorious over the enemies of Christ, and by His grace be the liberator of the down-trodden Christians. This is what I shall never cease to desire until my latest breath."

Upon his return to Russia, however, his struggle with Sweden occupied all his attention. It was only in 1711, when his enemy, Charles XII., a refugee in the domains of the Grand Turk, earnestly sought to have the latter take up arms against Russia, that Peter

(1) Le R. P. Prerling: *La Russie et l'orient—mariage d'un tsar au Vatican*, Paris, 1891; *La Russie et le saint-siège*, 2 vols. Paris, 1896-'97.

the Great allowed himself to be tempted by the appeal which the *hospodars* of Moldavia and Wallachia, Montenegrin envoys, and Greek agents addressed to him in the name of Christians who were oppressed and ready to rise in revolt. He found immense spaces to be traversed; and crossed the Pruth with only thirty-eight thousand starving and harassed soldiers. He discovered that all the promises of the Levantines were unwarranted; he met neither allies nor help; and beset by two hundred thousand Turks, or Tartars, he had to consider himself fortunate to get back again across the rivers, after having signed the Treaty of Falksen, or of the Pruth, which restored to the Ottomans his first conquest, the city of Azov.

The second southward step of the Russians was the conquest of a bit of territory that was peopled with Serbian colonists, and that was called New Serbia. This acquisition was won by the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739; but it had cost the Empress Anna Ivanovna three years of war and useless victories, and nearly one hundred thousand men.

The third was a gigantic step. After the first war against the Turks, Catharine II. found herself checked by the intervention of Prussia and Austria, who compelled her to renounce nearly all her Eastern conquests, and to accept a compensation in Poland. Nevertheless, by the Treaty of Kaïrnaji, in 1774, she had ceded to her Azov on the Don, and Kinburn at the mouth of the Dnieper. She forced the Sultan to recognize the independence of the Tartars of the Bug, of the Crimea, and of the Kuban. This was to prepare for their annexation to Russia, which was successfully accomplished and sanctioned by the Constantinople Compact of 1784. All the north shore of the Black Sea and of the Dniester, as far as the Kuban River, now became Russian. The last Mohammedan states of Russia were converted into provinces or the Empire, and the last vestige of "the Tartar yoke" was effaced from Russian soil.

At once in the Tauric peninsula and at the mouths of the

rivers arose formidable fortressess, Kherson, Kinburn, and, on a bay of the Crimea, Sevastopol was made ready to control the Black Sea. An entire Russian fleet was built up, which could in two days cast anchor before the walls of the Seraglio. The conquest of the Turkish Empire, impossible to Peter the Great, seemed to become easy for Catharine the Great. In the triumphant journey that she next accomplished through the conquered provinces, her route was crowded with triumphal arches, bearing this inscription: "The way to Byzantium." She herself provoked the second Turkish war (1787-1792). The Russian armies, everywhere victorious, advanced to the Danube. The janissaries and spahis of the Sultan could not stop them in their course. But again did European diplomacy intervene. Catharine II. had to give up the Roumanian *hospodarates*, which had been entirely subdued, and be satisfied with Otchakov, and a strip of territory between the Bug and the Dniester, and with guarantees more explicit than those of 1774 in favor of the Roumanian principalities. This arrangement, accomplished at the Treaty of Yassy, 1792, established over these principalities a sort of distant Russian protectorate. Thus, although four Russian interventions had already occurred, not an inch of Christian territory had been wrested from the Sultan, and not a Christian tribe had been delivered from his yoke.

The fifth intervention took place under Alexander I. So long as his alliance, made at Tilsit in 1807 with Napoleon continued, his armies were victorious. The Roumanians were again conquered as far as the Danube; Bulgaria, conquered as far as the Balkans; and under George the Black (Kara-Georges), Serbia won her independence with her own forces alone. The rupture with Napoleon compelled the Czar to sign the peace of Bucharest with the Sultan in 1812. Of all his conquests, he retained only a bit of Roumanian territory, Bessarabia, between the Dniester and the Pruth—as also Ismail and Kilia on the lower Danube. The Roumanians and Bulgarians fell again

under the Ottoman yoke, and Serbia was abandoned to herself. Nevertheless, an amnesty was stipulated in favor of the Serbians, and guarantees were given in favor of the Roumanians. In 1827, Nicholas I., by the Akerman agreement, which was an explanation of the Treaty of Bucharest, caused the guarantees accorded the Roumanians to be clearly defined. As for the Serbians, crushed for a time by Ottoman retaliation, they had taken up arms under Milosh Obrénovitch, and, thanks to European intervention, they obtained, with certain restrictions, their autonomy.

The sixth intervention of Russia occurred on the occasion of the Greek revolution. On July 8, 1827, Russia, France, and England entered into concerted action by the Treaty of London. The united fleets of the three Powers annihilated the Turkish and Egyptian fleets at Navarino (October 20). While a French army was operating in the Morea to insure Greek independence, Nicholas I. took it upon himself to settle the rest of the Eastern Question. His European army again conquered the Roumanians and Bulgarians, invaded Thrace, and entered Adrianople. In Asia, his forces occupied Turkish Caucasia. The Treaty of Adrianople, concluded in 1829, guaranteed the autonomy of Moldavia, of Wallachia, and of Servia, and consummated the independence of Greece, which was formed into a kingdom. Thus were the hopes that Peter the Great had entertained respecting the Christians of the East partially realized; but Russia did not secure any territory in Europe except the isles of the Danubian delta; reserving for herself freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, and an open way through the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Only in Asia did she secure a territorial indemnity.

The second Eastern war, undertaken by Nicholas I., and which began like the others by the conquest of the Roumanians, brought about the intervention of France and England in the Crimea, which caused the Czar Nicholas to die of grief, and which ended in the Treaty of Paris (March 30, 1856). By this treaty, his suc-

cessor, Alexander II., had to renounce all the advantages gained in Europe by the Treaty of Adrianople; to give back the delta of the Danube; to consent to the limiting of his military power in the Black Sea; and to abdicate his exclusive right of protection over the Danubian principalities, which were henceforth placed under the collective protectorate of the great Powers.

When France found herself engaged in a bloody duel with the German Empire, Russia profited by the occasion to have a conference called at London in March, 1871, by which she secured the suppression of article two of the Treaty of Paris, which limited her military power in the Black Sea.

The last and the most decisive Russian intervention was the one provoked in 1877 by the Bulgarian massacres, the Bosnian and Herzegovinian revolution, and the uprising in Serbia and in Montenegro. In addition to the help of these different forces, Russia made sure of the armed assistance of the principality of Roumania, that had been formed in 1859 by the union of the two old-time *hospodarates* of Moldavia and Wallachia. She again made the conquest of Bulgaria and of a part of Thrace. This time, it was in plain sight of Constantinople that the victorious armies of Alexander II. halted. The Sultan had with which to oppose them only twelve thousand men, encamped on the heights of Tchadalcha. It seemed, therefore, to be in the power of the Czar to bring to an end the Ottoman domination in Europe, to proclaim the liberation of all the Christian peoples, and at last to plant the cross on the dome of Saint Sophia. But before the threatening demonstration of England and the disquieting attitude of Austria and Germany, he did not dare to do so. He contented himself with imposing upon the Porte the Treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878), which secured for the *protégés* of Russia an actual dismemberment of European Turkey. Montenegro saw its territory doubled in extent; Serbia and Roumania were declared entirely independent. The first received the districts of Nisch, Leskovatz, Mitrowitz, and Novibazar; the second acquired

Dobrudscha, but on the condition that it return to Russia the delta of the Danube, which Wallachia had acquired in the Treaty of 1856. Bulgaria was to form a vassal principality of Turkey. Her territory extended from the Danube to the Black and Ægean Seas, leaving around Constantinople and Salonica only some fragments of Ottoman territory. In Asia, Russia acquired the fortresses and districts of Batum, Kars, Ardahan, and Bayazid. Moreover, Turkey was to pay a war indemnity of three hundred and ten million rubles.

Thus Russia took, so to speak, nothing for herself in Europe. It was sufficient for her that Roumania, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria were completely liberated and organized. Of course, she hoped that these petty states that owed their very existence to her would be more docile to her influence than to that of the Sultan; less accessible to the hostile influences of the German and English Powers; that their ports would be open to her, and that their armies would constitute auxiliary corps of the Russian army.

An early disillusion came to the "Liberator Czar." The relative disinterestedness of which he had given proof at San Stefano did not foresee the jealousy of Austria, fostered as this was by Germany and England. Under threat of a general war, they demanded a revision of that treaty. England would have even desired that the treaty of 1856 should be taken as a basis for discussion, as if she could proceed with the victorious Russia of 1878 as she had done with the Russia of 1856, conquered in the Crimea. The Czar agreed to the calling of a congress in Berlin. The treaty that was signed there July 13, 1878, curtailed Montenegro of half the part assigned her, and forbade her having a navy; took back Novibazar and Mitrowitz from Serbia, and was particularly harsh towards Bulgaria; reducing her territory by one third, and carving the remainder into two provinces: Northern Bulgaria, with the title of "vassal principality," and Southern Bulgaria, under the name of the province of Eastern Roumelia, which continued under Turkish domination, but which

was to be administered by a Christian government. Increase of territory was granted to Greece by the addition of a district of Epirus (Arta) and almost all of Thessaly. There was even quibbling over the territory that Russia had retained in Asia. Bayazid was taken from her, and Batum was to be dismantled and to become an open port. What especially irritated the Czar was the fact that the two powers that were thus depriving him of the fruits of his victories found means to slice off a share for themselves. Under the pretext of administering their affairs, Austria secured Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, by a separate treaty, England had given to her by the Sultan the island of Cyprus (30th of May and 4th of June) and a controlling situation in Anatolia.¹

Emperor Alexander II. had run the danger of a European war in order to carry out his programme of "liberation." The danger still remained imminent, so long as he did not accept the provisions of the Berlin Treaty. There threatened to spring up again, at each of the manifold incidents that arose over the task of settling the boundaries of the ceded countries, armed protests, now by Greece, and now by the Albanians, against certain decisions of the Powers that were not to their fancy, and intrigues by Austria and England for the purpose of alienating from Russia the sympathies of the nations emancipated by her victories. In addition to this, the Panslavic agitation, which had been sufficiently strong in Russia to lead the government to run those risks in the East, did not subside. The most impetuous minds found cause of grievance against the Czar, that he had not carried out his undertaking to the end, and had his victorious regiments enter Stamboul, at the peril of a conflict with the English in the very streets of that capital. The Liberals made a pretext of the constitutions granted the Roumanians, the Serbians, and the Bulgarians, to demand a constitution for Russia. The Panslavist and Liberal agitation had, perhaps, some connection with the rise of another agitation which soon made its appearance, an

(1) A d'Avril, *Négociations relatives au traité de Berlin et aux arrangements qui ont suivi*. Paris, 1886.

agitation called Nihilism, of a character entirely revolutionary and subversive, and which fitly terminated on that tragic day of March 13, 1881, when the "Liberator Czar" became the "Martyr Czar."

For his successor, Alexander III., the results of the Eastern war were preparing another series of disillusionings. The only fruit that Russia could still expect from her sacrifices and her victories was the strengthening of her influence over the Christian peoples emancipated by her,—and their eternal gratitude. Now immediately after this war the most short-sighted Russian statesmen were constrained to confess that the success of their arms had just created on that "Way to Byzantium" which Catherine II. had so thickly strewn with premature triumphal arches, obstacles more insurmountable than those which the armies of the Sultan had ever been able to oppose to the armies of Alexander I. or of Nicholas I.,—more insurmountable than the Danube or the Balkans, formerly bristling with the fortresses of the Ottomans. These new obstacles consisted in the existence itself of the emancipated nations, and their attachment to their newly found freedom. Thus it was that France, after she had emancipated Belgium under Louis-Philippe and Italy under Napoleon III., found that she had raised up on her northern and southeastern frontiers barriers far more impregnable than the armies or the fortresses of Austria; that she had closed forever against herself those Belgian and Lombard battlefields over which her ensigns of victory had so often floated. In the formation of an Italian kingdom, France created the chief obstacle in the way of her own expansion on the shores of the Mediterranean.

The French have naturally and repeatedly denounced the ingratitude of Italy; nor can the Russians be blamed for their grief over the ingratitude of the Roumanians, the Serbians, the Bulgarians, and the Greeks. But such is human nature! The feeling of independence and of national pride among newly born peoples will always outweigh the feeling of gratitude

towards their liberators. In this respect there was no difference between the peoples joined to the Russians merely by religion, like the Roumanians and the Greeks, and those who were related to them both by religion and race, like the Bulgarians and the Serbians. In former times, when the Ottoman yoke rested upon them with its frightful burden, assuredly they would all have joyfully accepted the lordship of the Czar in exchange for that of the Sultan; but now, when it was a question of choosing between the domination of the Czar and their own independence, there could be no hesitation with any of them.

The Russians had done much for the Roumanians. Even when they had been unsuccessful in wresting their territory from Turkey, they had in the treaties of Kaïrnaji, Yassy, Bucharest, Akerman, and Adrianople, stipulated precious guarantees for their *protégés*, and then, later, secured for them an almost complete autonomy. In concert with France, in 1861, they had made the Sultan accept the union of Moldavia and Wallachia into one province. In 1878, they assured this principality of Roumania its full independence, and, in 1881, they consented to its being organized into a kingdom. But the new King of Roumania, Charles of Hohenzollern, and his new subjects meant to remain independent of every other power, to have their own army and navy, their own national policy and diplomacy, and to exercise the right, whenever their liberators showed themselves in the slightest degree meddlesome, to seek help even from Russia's rivals, Austria, Germany, and England, or, even more than this, from their old-time oppressor, the Sultan of Constantinople. More than once, the Roumanians raised complaint against Russia, because, in 1812, she had annexed the little Roumanian district of Bessarabia, and because, in 1878, she compelled them to give back to her the islands of the Danubian delta.

It was the same with the principality of Serbia, also made into a kingdom in 1882, and which, according to the needs of its national or dynastic policy, did not cease to oscillate between

Russian and Austro-German influences. It was the same also with the kingdom of Greece, which paid no heed to the remonstrances of Russia, when her national ambition was involved, and which had no scruples in troubling the peace of the East every time that it was possible for her to raise the question of uniting to the Hellenic state either Epirus or Northern Thessaly or Macedonia or Crete.

The country that was under the greatest obligation to Russia was Bulgaria. If France or England had at times assisted in the liberation of the Roumanians, the Serbians, and the Greeks, it was to Russia *alone* that the Bulgarians were indebted for this deliverance. Immediately after the "Bulgarian atrocities" of 1875, Russia had hastened to her help. From the condition of simple *raïas* oppressed by Turkey and cruelly treated by the Tcherkesses and the Bashi-Bazouks, she had caused them to be instantly raised to the dignity of a free people. At San Stefano, she had endeavored to unite them into one State, the most powerful of the Balkan peninsula; which would have extended from the Danube to the Black and Ægean Seas; and she accepted only with deepest reluctance the mutilation and dismemberment that the Treaty of Berlin imposed upon "Great Bulgaria." She gave the restricted principality of Bulgaria at least a constitution when she herself had none. It was the Russian commissioner in Bulgaria, Prince Dondukof-Korsakof, who, on February 23, 1879, convoked at Tirnovo the first "constituency assembly;" it was he who presided at the meeting of the first "legislative assembly," or *Sobranié*; it was he who espoused the cause of their prince, Alexander of Battenberg; it was he who organized a Bulgarian army of one hundred thousand men supplied with valiant Russian officers, well equipped, well drilled, and provided with excellent artillery. Nevertheless, this people and this prince, who owed everything to Russia, began at once to practice a policy in which the advice of the Czar Alexander III. was no longer heeded. They set out to remove the Russians who had

portfolios in their ministry and positions in their army. In spite of the Czar, they brought about the revolution of Philippopolis in September, 1885, which ended in the union of the Bulgarian principality and the Bulgarian province of East Roumelia, but which provoked a bloody war with Serbia, jealous at seeing her neighbor's increase of territory. When Alexander of Battenberg had to renounce his throne in 1887, it was a prince that posed as a client of Austria and of Germany, Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, whom the Bulgarians called to rule them. With his Prime Minister, Stambulof, he governed,—resolutely set against the influence of Russia; he discriminated against her partisans, and surrounded himself with her adversaries. And, thus, the liberation and the organization of Bulgaria, which the Czar had hoped to be able to direct, have gone on independently of him, and, in certain respects, in opposition to him. *Sic vos, non vobis!* Alexander III.'s resentment against Bulgaria and her prince was very bitter. The somewhat imperious and meddlesome affection of the early days soon turned into hostility. When Alexander III. died, in 1894, the rupture was complete between the intractable principality and the powerful empire.

Thus all the wars undertaken in Eastern Europe by Russia, from Peter the Great in 1711, down to Alexander II. in 1877, have ended, except in Asia and on the north coast of the Black Sea, so far as territorial expansion is concerned, in most meagre results. Seven great wars have brought her only a strip of Roumanian territory between the Dniester and the Pruth, and another Roumanian bit of land in the delta of the Danube. Even this last morsel, acquired in 1829 and restored in 1856, was won back in 1877 only at the cost of vehement fault-finding upon the part of the Roumanian people. Russia, whose fleets have twice—at Tchesme in 1770, and at Navarino, in 1827,—annihilated the naval power of Turkey, have never been able to secure even an island in the Ægean Sea.

Thus much for material advantages. As to satisfaction of a

moral character, the Russian soldiers have never been able to enter Stamboul, nor to pray in Saint Sophia ; and as to gratitude upon the part of the liberated peoples, we have seen what Alexander II. and Alexander III. could never have dreamed of.

Their successor, the present Emperor, Nicholas II., seems to have taken it for granted that in the direction of the Danube, of the Black Sea, and of the Ægean Sea the destiny of Russia is fixed for a long time to come. In these directions, she has no longer any moral or material advantages to gain, and the age of sentimental undertakings is also at an end. Unless there should come some European overturning, the famous "Eastern Question" will have for Russia only an archæological interest. All that Nicholas II. is doing seems to indicate that this is his conviction. He shows no interest in the party struggles and ministerial crises in the Roumanian and Serbian kingdoms ; towards the Bulgarians, he shows neither jealous affection nor the irreconcilable rancor of his father. Whenever the Prince and people of Bulgaria have manifested a desire for reconciliation with Russia, he has cordially welcomed them ; he sent a representative to the orthodox baptism of the Crown Prince Boris, but apparently without forming any illusions as to what he might expect of his *protégés*. When the Cretan insurrection occurred, and the war foolishly undertaken by the Greeks against Turkey was declared, he was careful not to assume a leading *rôle*, something that his three predecessors would not have failed to do. On the contrary, he seemed to sink Russia in the "European Concert," to associate her in all the decisions of the five other great Powers, and purely and simply to accept accomplished facts. Also, when the Armenian troubles and massacres took place, he did not attempt to intervene, nor to arrogate to himself, either by land or sea, the *rôle* of liberator of this other oppressed people. He has rather favored a temporizing policy, and has discouraged the plans formed by the other powers to send European fleets to the very walls of the Seraglio, and to impose by force reforms upon the Sultan Abdul-

Hamid. On the other hand, in certain other directions, in that of the Indian Ocean, in that of British India, and in that of the China and Japan Seas, Russia has followed a very formal, a very decided policy. At once very energetic and skillful in this policy, she has, at the same time, acted in entire independence of the "European Concert."

THE SOUTHWARD EXPANSION OF RUSSIA IN ASIA.

If the policy of the present Emperor of the Russias seems to be inspired by other principles than those of his predecessors; if this policy has shown itself to be essentially peaceable and disinterested in Europe; if it has shifted its sphere of activity from the West in order to devote all its efforts to Southern and especially to Eastern Asia,—this is perhaps due to the impressions made upon the Czar during his extended travels in the years 1890 and 1891, while he was still only the Czarovitch Nicholas. He visited Greece, Egypt, British India, French Indo-China, Japan, and China. Then, disembarking at Vladivostock, a powerful Russian naval station on a bay of the Sea of Japan, he returned overland to St. Petersburg, crossing the whole extent of Siberia. The Czarovitch, of course, did not give his impressions a literary form; but one of his travelling companions, Prince Oukhtomski has published his in two luxurious volumes, magnificently illustrated by the Russian artist Karazine.¹

The opinions of Prince Oukhtomski seem to reveal a new element in Russian policy. Formerly the Russians were indignant over Prince Bismarck's reported observation that "Russia has nothing to do in the West. Her mission is in Asia; there she represents civilization." Prince Oukhtomski is not far from holding the same opinion as did this envious foe of his country. For a few parcels of territory conquered with such difficulty in the West, what bloody wars has she not

(1) Le prince Oukhtomski: *Voyage de Son Altesse Impériale le Czarovitch en orient*, Paris, 1898.

endured? Her efforts to obtain access to the sea have been but half successful. The White Sea, blocked with ice; the Baltic, as much Scandinavian and German as Russian, closed to her on the west by the Sound and the Belts; the Black Sea, only yet half Russian, and closed on the southwest by the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles; and the Mediterranean itself, with England holding Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and the Suez Canal,—are these seas, so little available, sufficient for the needs of the expansion of the mighty continental Empire that Russia is today? In Asia, on the contrary, who knows whether by the Euphrates and the Persian Gulf, by Afghanistan and the Indus, she is not going to be able to open her way to the Indian Ocean? Who knows whether, already mistress of the Okhotsk Sea, she will not become mistress also of the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, both opening with broad outlets into the immensity of the Pacific? Now, the importance that in ancient times the Mediterranean had for mankind, and which the Atlantic possessed from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century, seems today to be shifting to the Pacific Ocean. Of all the nations bordering on this truly universal Ocean, the Russian Empire is destined to be one of the most powerful. As to territorial conquests, how are those that Russia won in little Europe, where every square mile cost her a battle, to be compared with those which, with infinitely less sacrifice and effort, she has already won, or can yet win, in Asia? Bismarck spoke in disdain of the mission of Russia in Asia. Prince Oukhtomski speaks of it with pride: "The time has come for the Russians to have some definite idea regarding the heritage that the Jenghis Khans and the Tamerlanes have left us. Asia! we have been part of it at all times; we have lived its life and shared its interests; our geographical position irrevocably destines us to be the head of the rudimentary powers of the East."

From the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, Russia was a province of the Mongol empire. Everything that constituted that Mon-

gol empire, however, is perhaps destined to become only a province of Russia. The capital will simply be transferred from Karakorum or from the shores of the Amur to the banks of the Neva. Asiatic in their mixture of races, Asiatic in their history (conquered in the thirteenth century, conquering since the sixteenth), the Russians possess to a higher degree than either the French or the Anglo-Saxons an understanding of things Asiatic. They have all the right that is possible to supplant "those colonies of the Germanic and the Latin races that are taking unwilling Asia under their tutelage." Moreover, the true successor in Asia of the old-time czars or khans of the Finnish race is not the Bogdy-Khan who rules at Peking, but "the White Czar who reigns at St. Petersburg." In one of the pagodas of Canton are to be seen, as Prince Oukhtomski assures us, four colossal figures, called "the kings of the four cardinal points," and Prince Oukhtomski felt confident that it was to "the King of the North" that the people rendered the greatest homage.

Laying aside these dreams of the future, let us see what, up to the present time, has been actually accomplished to bring about their realization. The efforts of the Russians throughout their history as an Asiatic power are connected with one or the other of two great movements: her southward expansion towards Persia and British India, and her eastward expansion in the regions bordering on China, Corea, and Japan.

In 1554, during the reign of Ivan the Terrible, the Russians gained a foothold on the Caspian Sea by the conquest of the czarate of Astrakhan and of the lower Volga. Towards the close of his life, Peter the Great waged war on Persia, captured Derbend on the Caspian, and occupied the provinces of Daghestan, Shirvan, Ghilan, and Mazandaran, and the cities of Rasht and Astrabad. The unhealthy character of these regions made them "the cemetery of Russian armies," and the successors of the great Czar had to abandon them. A war undertaken by Catherine II., also in the last years of her reign, ended in the same result, and her

son, Paul I., recalled the troops. In the region of the Caucasus, the Russians had gained a foothold, between the years 1774-1784, by the acquisition of the Kuban as far as the Terek, and, strangely enough, it was not on the northern slope of the mountains, but upon the southern that they were to begin the conquest of this Caucasus. In 1783, the King, or Czar, of Georgia, Heraclius, declared himself to be the vassal of Catharine II. in order that he might have her assistance against the Persians and the Ottomans. In 1799, his son, George XII.,¹ formally ceded his State to Paul I., although his son, David, continued to govern until 1803, when the annexation was consummated. This acquisition brought Russia into collision with the Persians and the Ottomans on one hand, and, on another, with the independent tribes of the Caucasus. By the Treaty of Gulistan, in 1813, Persia ceded to Russia Daghestan, Shirvan, and Shusha, and renounced all claims upon Georgia and other territories of the Caucasus. Another war broke out in 1826, which was terminated by the Treaty of Turkmanshai, February 22, 1828, by which Persia surrendered her two Armenian provinces², Nakhitchewan and Erivan. The same year, in the treaty of Adrianople, Turkey gave over to Russia the fortresses and districts of Anapa, Poti, and Akhalzikh, and all rights (bitterly contested by the inhabitants) over Imeritia, Mingrelia, and Abkhasia. Then began, in the new possessions, the task of pacifying the wild mountaineers of these regions, and, also the Tcherkesses, or Circassians, of the northern slope. The Circassians and the Abkhasui roused to fanaticism by the soldier priest, the *Imam* Shamil, held out against the Russians for nearly thirty years. In 1844, Russia had in the Caucasus two hundred thousand soldiers, commanded by her best generals. The capture of Védéni, in 1858, and the surrender of Shamil, a year later, assured the pacification of the Caucasus.

(1) Dubrovine: *Georges XII., dernier tsar de Georgie, et l'annexion à la Russie* (in Russian), St. Petersburg, 1897.

(2) Lord Curzon: *Persia and the Persian Question*, London, 1892.

The increase of territory that Russia made at the expense of Turkey, in 1878, by the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, included the districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Olty, and the port of Batum, and fixed the boundary line between Turkey and Russia as it has since remained.

Since the treaty of 1828, Persia under the Shahs, Fet-Aly-Khan, Mohammed, Nasr-ed-Din, and Muzafer-ed-Din, has fallen almost entirely under Russian influence. In 1837-38, the Shah Mohammed, with an army commanded by Russian officers, besieged Herat, defended by Afghans under the leadership of English officers. In 1856, the Shah Nasr-ed-Din, at the suggestion of Russia, besieged and captured Herat; but the English compelled him to abandon his prize, by making a descent on the Persian Gulf, where they captured the port of Bushire and the island of Karrack, which they have kept. In 1841, Persia ceded to Russia the Caspian port of Ashurada, near Astrabad; in 1881, Askabad was given to the same power, and, in 1885, Serakhs,—all three places very important strategic points on the Eastern frontier. Persia has also agreed to the building of Russian railroads that are to pass through her territory and terminate on the Persian Gulf. The present year, she has negotiated a loan of twenty-two million five hundred thousand rubles through the agency of the “bank of Persia,” established under Russian auspices. This loan is payable in seventy-five years, and the interest is secured by all the customs revenues of the kingdom, save those of the Persian Gulf. The Shah has bound himself not to seek further loans of any other European power, and has thereby placed himself financially in the hands of Russia. It is thus that Russia, by her diplomacy, by her banks, and by her railroads, making Persia her political and commercial vassal, has succeeded in furthering her scheme of expansion towards the Persian Gulf and the shores of the Indian Ocean.

Russian expansion towards British India was to seek still other channels. The conquests in the Caucasus, which we have been

reviewing, opened the way along the western and southern sides of the Caspian Sea. But for a long time the Russians had been endeavoring to turn the sea from its northern side. In the reign of the Empress Anna Ivanovna, hordes of Kirghiz, whose camping grounds lay to the east of the Ural river, submitted to Russia (1734). Her sway was then extended into Turkestan, that expanse of steppes and oases watered by the Jaxartes (Sir-Daria) and the Oxus (Amu-Daria), that empty into the Aral Sea, a region that is bounded on the west by the Caspian Sea, on the south by Persia and Afghanistan, on the east by the Chinese Empire, and on the north by Siberia. Here was located ancient Djagatai, the debris of former Mongol empires.¹

When the Russians saw these vast plains spread out before them, they at first thought that they were near British India, and that an entrance to that rich peninsula would be as easy to them as it had been to so many Asiatic conquerors that had gone forth from the steppes of Turkestan or the valleys of Afghanistan. From this conviction was born the first schemes that the Russians entertained for the conquest of Hindustan. Even Peter the Great thought of it. In 1717, he sent against Khiva an expedition under Peter Békovitch that perished on the way. A certain

(1) Subsequently it was broken up into numerous States, the principal ones being the khanate of Khokand, with its chief cities Turkistan, Tashkend, Tchimbkend, and Khodjend on the upper Jaxartes, or Sir-Daria; the khanate of Balkh (ancient Bactria), and the khanate of Samarkand, fallen into dependency upon the khanate of Bokhara, on the upper Oxus, or Amu-Daria; the khanate of Khiva on the lower Oxus; and on the Kashgar and Yarkand rivers emptying into Lake Lob-Nor, and the Ili flowing into Lake Balkash, khanates (Kashgar, Yarkand, and Kuldja) that belonged to China. Outside of the districts inhabited by a settled people are the deserts of sand over which wander nomadic tribes. To the north of the Jaxartes, are the Kirghiz, divided into several hordes, and the Turkomans, or Turkmens, on the east of the Caspian Sea.—Consult Krahmer, *Russland in Asien*, vol. I., *Transkaspien und seine Eisenbahn*; vol. II., *Mittel-Asien*, Leipzig, 1898-99. Makcheef, *Coup d'oeil historique sur le Turkestan et la marche progressive des Russes* (in Russian) St. Petersburg, 1890. Albrecht, *Russisches Central-Asien*, Hamburg, 1896. H. Mozer, *À travers l'Asie centrale*, Paris, 1885.

A. M. de Saint Génie proposed a plan for the conquest of Hindustan to Catherine II. in 1791; but the most celebrated of all these projects was the one that Paul I. submitted to Napoleon Bonaparte, then first Consul of the French Republic, whose ally against England he had become. The plan was to place two armies in the field. General Knorring, with the Cossacks of the Don and other Russian troops, was to march by Khiva and Bokhara to the upper Indus, while thirty-five thousand French and thirty-five thousand Russians, that Paul I., inspired by chivalric generosity, proposed placing under the command of Masséna, the conqueror of the Russians at the battle of Zürich, were to unite at Astrabad on the southern shore of the Caspian Sea. Thence they were to make their way by Herat and Kandahar to the upper Indus to join forces with the other army. Then, altogether, French, Russians, Persians, Turcomans, and Afghans, they would pour down into India, proclaiming to the princes and the people of the peninsula the fall of English tyranny and their independence. "All the treasures of India were to be their recompense." The execution of this plan was even begun. The Cossacks of the Don, under their *ataman*, Orlof-Denissof, were already across the Volga, when the news of the death of Paul I. recalled them to their camps.¹

The visionary character of this scheme has been demonstrated, during the present century, by the difficulties that the Russian armies have had to encounter in winning their way over a very small fraction of the immense journey marked out in 1800. At

(1) General Batorski, *Projets d'expédition dans l'Indoustan sous Napoléon, Paul I., et Alexandre I.*, (in Russian) St. Petersburg, 1886. H. S. Edwards, *Russian Projects against India*. On the Russian Expedition in Turkestan, see Hugo Stumin, *Rapports, Khi-va* (translated from the German), Paris, 1874; A. N. Kouropatkine (at present Russian Minister of War), *Turcomania and the Turcomans* (translated into English from the Russian by Robert Mitchell); Skobelef, *Rapports sur les campagnes de 1879-1881* (English translation, London, 1881); Marvin, *Russian campaigns among the Tekke-Turcomans* (from Russian official sources).

the cost of enormous effort, the oases of Turkestan, which in the mind of Paul I. were to be simply halting places in the long march, have had to be conquered one by one; one by one, deep valleys and rocky bluffs, defended by warlike tribes, have had to be captured and held. Today, even with these avenues of approach secured, the goal seems as far off as it did to the optimistic imagination of the Czar Paul I. In 1839, Nicholas I., wishing to punish the Khan of Khiva, who was capturing Russian merchants and pillaging Russian caravans, despatched a body of troops commanded by General Pérovski. The severe winters of the steppes and the deep snow compelled him, when half way to his destination, to return. Nevertheless, the Khan, intimidated by this demonstration, liberated the Russian prisoners (1840), and in 1842 consented to acknowledge the over-lordship of Russia. Two years later, the eastern Kirghiz also submitted. In order to protect these new subjects against the Khan of Khokand it was necessary to wage war with the latter. From 1860 to 1864, the leaders of the Russian troops, Pérovski, Kolpakovski, Vérévkine, Tchernaiëff, captured the fortresses of Ak-Mesjed, Turkestan, Aulié-Ata, Tchimkend, and finally, Tashkend, a city of one hundred thousand souls, and the commercial emporium of that region.

The Emir of Bokhara attempted to intervene, and had a "holy war" preached by the fanatical Mollahs; but he was conquered in the battle of Irjar (1866), and promised to pay a war indemnity.

However far the Russians might still be from the frontier of India, England, was nevertheless disturbed at their success. The official journals of St. Petersburg amused themselves with pacific declarations, announcing that there was no intention of conquering Bokhara; but the Czar organized the territories, already submissive, into "the general government of Turkestan," and General Kaufmann was placed in control. The Emir of Bokhara, having refused to deliver the war indemnity that he had promised, was defeated at Zera-Bulak, and was compelled to sign the treaty

of 1868, by which he ceded to the Russians the khanate of Samarkand and Zerafshan; recognized a Russian protectorate, and paid an indemnity of two million rubles. The khanate of Khokand became, likewise, a vassal state.

The Khan of Khiva continued to pillage caravans, and to hold in slavery Russian merchants. In 1873, three bodies of troops were sent against him; one coming from the shores of the Caspian Sea under General Markozof, the second from Orenburg under General Vérévkine, the third from Tashkend under Governor-General Kaufmann. The first, after a difficult march through the burning sands of the desert, was compelled to fall back. The other two entered Khiva almost without striking a blow. The Khan was obliged to acknowledge himself the vassal of "the White Czar," to cede all that part of his territory situated on the right bank of the Oxus; to grant the Russians the rights of navigation and commerce, and to submit to a war indemnity that exhausted his finances. The Khans that had yielded to the Russians were now the objects of the scorn and hatred of the more fanatical among their Mohammedan subjects. These did not cease to rise in revolt against them. The Khan of Khokand preferred to surrender his territories to Russia; and they were formed into the new province of Ferghana, in 1875. The same year, the Khan of Khiva offered to surrender his in exchange for a pension. The Russians did not wish to annex either this khanate or that of Bokhara, less through fear of English protests than because the existence of two vassal Khans would allow them to conceal the better their political plans. They maintain them on their thrones by paying them a pension. Today, the Khan of Bokhara is captain of a regiment of Terek Cossacks, and the Khan of Khiva is lieutenant-general of the Orenburg Cossacks.

In 1851, the Russians had obtained from China some commercial advantages in the Kuldja province. Twenty years afterwards a Mohammedan adventurer, Yakub-Khan seized the Chinese khanates of Kashgar and Yarkand, and incited a Mo-

hammedan rebellion in Kuldja. The Russians entered the province, giving China to understand that they would remain there until order was reëstablished (1871). They would gladly have annexed it; but Chinese troops had been despatched; and, after years of marching, they arrived in Kashgar (where Yakub had been assassinated in 1877), and upon the Kuldja frontier. The Russians first thought of resisting the troops and holding the province; but the territory in dispute did not seem worth the risk of a war with China. By the St. Petersburg Treaty of 1881, they gave back Kuldja, except one district on the river Ili, and renounced their military position in Kashgar in exchange for certain commercial advantages.

To complete the conquest of Turkestan, it remained for them to subdue the nomadic Turcomans (Tekke-Turcomans). This was the object of the brilliant campaigns directed by Skobelef, who carried by assault the fortress of Geok-Tepe on January 24, 1881, with a loss to the enemy of eight thousand men. Then he took Askhabad, which was afterwards ceded by Persia.¹

The agreement with Persia and the conquest of Turkestan brought Russia's power to the frontier of Afghanistan, which the English regard as the protecting wall of their Indian Empire. At every forward movement of the Russians, they protested or endeavored to secure guarantees against a new advance or tried to gain for themselves some new strategic point that would strengthen their position. They were not always successful. After the first siege of Herat by the Persians, in 1840, the English made the conquest of Kabul. Their army was driven out by an insurrection, and totally annihilated while retreating (1841). If, to save their honor, they afterwards recaptured Kabul, prudence led

(1) Colonel Malleson, *The Russo-Afghan Question*, 1864. Sir Henry Rawlinson, *Later Phases of the Central Asia Question*, 1875. Kouropatkine, *Les confins anglo-russes* (translated from the Russian by G. le Marchand), Paris, 1879. P. Lessar, *La Russie et l'Angleterre en Asie centrale*, Paris. Marvin, *The Russians at Merv and Herat, etc.*

them to abandon it as quickly as possible (1842). After the annexation or subjection of the khanates by the Russians, the English again made their way into Kabul, and left there a resident representative, Cavagnari; but a popular uprising, in 1879, brought about the murder of Cavagnari and eighty-seven of his retinue. The expedition sent to avenge this insult was led by General Roberts,¹ whom we see today in South Africa operating against the Boers. This expedition, however, brought about as little definite result as did the former intervention in Afghanistan.

In 1881, the English had gained from the Russians the assurance that they had no intention of annexing the city of Merv, a very important strategic point; but in 1884, the notables of that city presented themselves to the Russian commander at Askhabad, and made declaration that they accepted the lordship of "the White Czar." The English made complaint to the cabinet at St. Petersburg. They were answered that the action of the people of Merv had been a surprise to the Russians themselves; but that they believed that they would have committed a great mistake by rejecting a submission that was so entirely voluntary. The English had secured the appointment of an Anglo-Russian commission for settling the disputed boundaries, which was to decide whether Penjdeh, another very important point, belonged to their client, the Emir of Afghanistan, or to the Turcoman subjects of Russia. The English commissioners, presided over by General Lumsden, were the first to arrive at the place of meeting. They began by fortifying Herat and inciting the Afghans to seize Penjdeh. Seeing this, the chief Russian commissioner, General Komarof, at the head of a strong Russian force, occupied the Zulfikar Pass, and made ready to march upon Penjdeh. While on the way thither, he was attacked by the Afghans at Kushk. He slew five hundred of their men, captured two of their flags

(1) General, now Marshal, Lord Roberts has published a work, "*Forty-one Years in India.*"

and all their artillery (March 30, 1885). Then the English commissioners withdrew, charging Komarof with having been the aggressor. Great Britain was much irritated. Gladstone, who had the Egyptian Soudan and the Upper Burmah wars on his hands, called upon Parliament for subsidies. The belief was general that a war was about to ensue between "the whale and the elephant." Then England calmed down, and accepted the explanation of the Russians, that the fight at Kushk was the result of a "mistake." In 1885 and 1887, she agreed to the Russian occupation of Merv, Penjdeh, Kushk, and the Zulfikar Pass. The Russians were now within one hundred and twenty kilometres of Herat, known for so long a time as the "key of the Indies."

The question of the settlement of the boundaries was scarcely disposed of, when another question presented itself in the settlement of the boundaries of the Pamirs. These form a plateau of from four to five thousand metres in altitude, known as the "roof of the world," with a rigorous climate and sparse population. This plateau commands both Afghanistan and Cashmere, those two ramparts of India and Chinese Turkestan. It was broken up into petty khanates, over which the Khan of Bokhara, the vassal of the Russians, and the Emir of Afghanistan, the client of the English, laid claim to sovereignty. Neither of them had recognized until then the value of the territory. An "expedition for study," accompanied by six hundred Russian soldiers, made its appearance in Pamir in the summer of 1891, and aroused, by its presence there, the protests of the English. At the approach of winter, the Russians withdrew; but they again appeared the following summer, in larger numbers, under the command of Colonel Yanof. They claimed that they were insulted by the Afghans, for which they inflicted upon them the bloody defeat of Somatash (July 12), after which they fell back and took up their position at Kalabery on the Oxus. This clash of arms was succeeded by a diplomatic controversy. It

was not until 1895, after a keen discussion between the two great Powers, each contending for its own client, that they reached an agreement. The disputed region was divided between Bokhara and Afghanistan, the former receiving the little khanates of Shugnan and Roschan, and the latter the khanate of Wakhan, a narrow strip of territory, from twenty to thirty kilometres wide, which now forms "a buffer state" between the great empires of Russia and Great Britain. Even after this agreement, Russia found a pretext in 1899 for occupying the district of Sirikul, which belongs to Chinese Pamir, and which commands the source of the Kashgar and Yarkand rivers (March, 1899).

Great Britain having occupied in Arabia the island of Perim in the *imamate* of Muscat, in order to control the outlet of the Red Sea, and to establish a coaling station in her maritime route, Russia, in 1899, also endeavored to obtain from the *Imam* the grant of a coaling station on his coast. From this arose new complaints and strenuous opposition on the part of England. Russia also established herself, under color of orthodox proselytism, at a point quite as annoying to British interests, on the coast, and at the very capital of Menelik, Emperor of Abyssinia. A first attempt in this direction was made in 1889 by a Russian adventurer, calling himself Achinof, "the free Cossack." He took possession of the dismantled fort of Sugallo on the territory of the French colony of Obock. The former "*anounada* of Sugallo" drove him away, and the Russian government disavowed his action. The mission of Lieutenant Machkof (1889-1892), and the so-called "scientific mission" of Captain Léontief in 1894, thanks to the ready assistance of the French authorities, succeeded much better. Thus was Russian influence, in close harmony with French influence, established almost upon the British Nile. In 1898, the Russian Colonel, Artamonof, with some Abyssinian troops, endeavored to meet Major Marchand, who was moving upon Fashoda, and to reinforce him on the great river.

The English alternate between doubting and believing that these expansive movements of Russia by way of the Caucasus, by way of Turkestan, and by way of the Pamirs, are all directed towards one goal, the very one that the Czar Paul proposed to the first Consul Bonaparte in 1800; Alexander I. to the Emperor Napoleon (1807); and General Duhamel to Nicholas I. (1855), and the ardent Skobelev to his government. To many intelligent Englishmen, the goal of so much effort can be no other than the conquest of India. Now that the frontier of the Russian Pamir is not more than twenty or thirty kilometres from the kingdom of Cashmere, and now that Kushk, the terminus of the Turkestan railroad system, is only one hundred and twenty kilometres from Herat, the problem of invading India is infinitely more easy than it was in the time of Bonaparte and Paul I. Why have the Russians spent so much money and blood in the conquest of the impoverished and barbarous nations of those sandy deserts and almost inaccessible mountains, if they did not have before them, as a recompense for their sacrifices, what Paul I. called "all the riches of the Indies."

A recent historian of Russian expansion,¹ Alexis Krause, reviewing all the hardships endured by Russia and the thankless task that she has assumed, adds: "On its own account, the conquest of Central Asia is worthless. It was not done in ignorance, but by carefully thought-out design, as part of a programme, the execution of which its possession will assist. The capture of the khanates was attempted, not as a pathway towards the coveted Persian Gulf, but as a road which would lead to the Panjab and all that is beyond. And now that preliminary steps have been completed, the serious undertaking is about to be begun."

James MacGahan, one of the best informed men on Eastern affairs, wrote from the shores of the Oxus in 1876: "The Russians are steadily advancing towards India, and they will,

(1) Alexis Krause, *Russia in Asia, a Record and a Study*, London and New York, 1899.

sooner or later, acquire a position in Central Asia which will enable them to threaten it. Should England be engaged in a European war, then, indeed, Russia will probably strike a blow at England's Indian power."

Other Englishmen pretend to believe that the hypothesis of a conquest of India "is too preposterous to be entertained. It would involve the most terrible and lingering war the world has ever seen. On the day that a Russian army leaves Balkh or Herat for Kandahar, well may the British commander exclaim: 'Now hath the Lord delivered them into my hand!'"

It is thus that Lord Curzon, the present Governor-General of India, expresses himself. It seems, however, that he is but assuming a tone of assured certainty to conceal his deep anxiety. This plan of conquest that he considers "too preposterous to be entertained," has been discussed by other, and very competent persons, who do not reach conclusions so optimistic as regards Great Britain.¹ Perhaps, however, the Russians are at present pressing so closely towards the frontier of British India in order to have at their disposal a means of intimidation, or even of coercion, for use in those very frequent occasions in which Great Britain sets herself in stubborn opposition to Russia's plans in other parts of the world. For, at the present moment, the Czar Nicholas II. seems much more interested in expansion in the Far East than in any movement towards the south of Asia.

(1) Maximilian Graf Yorck von Wartenburg: *Das Vordringen der Russischen Macht in Asien*, Berlin, 1900.

TENDENCIES IN TRADE UNIONISM

ADNA F. WEBER, *Albany.*



AM sick and tired of listening to the outrageous demands of these wage earners," said the chairman of the committee on labor in one chamber of a state legislature last winter. He was debating a measure proposed and supported by labor organizations. His declamation against the legislative representatives of organized labor did not tire the house; on the contrary, it emboldened several other speakers to follow in a similar strain. And yet the particular measure advocated by the labor leaders was anything but "outrageous" in its demands. Had the contemptuous opponent of labor legislation been a student of comparative politics, he would have realized that the bill in question did not seek to gain for American working men a tithe of the rights and privileges long since conferred upon their confrères in the monarchies of Europe—not even excepting Russia.

Nor can it be maintained that the average middle-class citizen holds the labor union in particularly high esteem. He reads in his daily paper of strikes and violence, invariably attributed to the machinations of an irresponsible "walking delegate," who usurps the powers of conservative members of the union,—if there be any such; of selfish denials, on the part of the unionists, of the right of a non-unionist to work and earn a living; of trade union antagonism to machinery, exclusion of apprentices, and the like.

In fact, the only sympathy the labor union can count upon, outside of the working classes, so-called, is the sympathy of a few humanitarians and the political economists.

The economists have learned from history the possibilities of the institution of Trade Unionism, and they understand that in the early stages of its development it is full of imperfections. The experience of the older organizations teaches that the efficiency of a union rests upon its power, and that appreciation of its power on the part of its own members, no less than on the part of the employing class, must be won by the *demonstration* of power. A trial of strength is, therefore, an early necessity. If successful, the union may thereafter demand consideration from the employers in fixing the remuneration and other conditions of work. Its primary object is to replace individual contracts with collective bargaining, and a few unions in this country have arrived at the stage where conditions of employment are determined by joint boards of employers and employees. In England, however, the classic land of trade unionism, the question was long since fought out in the larger industries.

While trade unionism in America has developed almost entirely since the civil war, in England it dates back about a hundred years; and in 1867, when our organization was just fairly under way, the British parliament instituted a searching inquiry through a royal commission on the organization and rules of trade unions and other associations, which once and for all vindicated the right of associated action on the part of the working people. The commission's report led to the Trade Union Act of 1871, which secured to trade union members freedom from prosecution for conspiracy and virtually recognized trade unionism as one of the valuable institutions of society. War on labor unions, as we know it in this country, is for the English working man a thing of the past. Disputes between employers and employees still take place in Britain, as a matter of course; but the practice of American employers in refusing to

discuss grievances with the duly elected representatives of their employees (the union officials), is something almost unknown in the England of today.

The weakness of American unionism, however, is not wholly a consequence of immaturity. Fundamental differences in the structure of society prevent the formation of that cohesive spirit, that *esprit de corps*, which effective concert in action presupposes. In England an artisan's career is seldom abandoned for a professional or political career; nor has the workman much chance of becoming an employer; in fact, the average working man may almost as easily rise above the class into which he was born, as the average East Indian may break the bonds of caste. Clearly, the settled belief of the permanency of his rank predisposes the English laborer to embrace associated action against the common enemy. But in some trades, the workers may entertain hopes of becoming employers and they are backward in committing themselves and their prospects to a rank of workers above which they aspire to rise. Hence, the universal testimony as to the difficulty, if not actual impossibility, of "organizing" the London clerks.

In the United States the "clerk" type is the prevailing one. The artisan here is ever on the move. He is not tied to one spot and he is not bound to one industrial grade. A bright man, in most American industries, may look for advancement,—although this is much less true today than it was yesterday, for the technically trained engineer is filling an increasing proportion of the superior positions. In fact, American conditions are approaching old world conditions in the machine industries. In politics, however, an inviting field is open to the clever working man in America to a degree quite beyond the conception of an Englishman.

Now, the notable "fluidity" of American social conditions has hindered the development of that iron-bound devotion to the union which has made English trade unionism so strong. Above all, it has prevented the development of skillful leadership,

the lack of which is unquestionably one of the fundamental weaknesses of American unionism. The very man, who, in England, would win the devotion of his fellow workers, the respect of their employers and the good-will of citizens generally, is drawn off from his trade union career at an early stage, in the United States, by the attractions of politics, the professions or a business calling. Many witnesses might be called to the affirmation that the rank and file of American labor unions is in every way superior to that in England; but I have yet to hear of any well-informed person venturing to make a favorable comparison of American leadership, by and large, with British leadership. American society is the stronger for the opportunities it offers, the hopes it holds out to the ambition of the lowliest; but the condition is unfavorable to the development of the highest talent in the *direct* service of the working classes.

So much for the causes of weakness in the American labor movement. They explain, perhaps, why steadiness and good judgment have failed to manifest themselves heretofore as frequently as might be desired; why employers have not always been met in a manly, business-like fashion. But they should in no wise condemn the movement in the minds of fairly disposed men. Universal experience has shown that time and trial will teach unionists moderation and tolerance. Not to mention English organizations, there exist numerous American unions that have outgrown the petty squabbings of their youthful period and learned to conduct themselves in a really statesmanlike way. It is by these that the labor movement should be judged; not by the caricatured agitators of the daily press.

But whether or not we accept the argument from history, we cannot avoid the conclusion of the inevitable necessity of trade union action when once we have analyzed modern industry. To some it may seem singular that the gospel of individualism has, in a country permeated with modern industrialism, maintained itself with so much vigor fifty years after Ruskin and Carlyle

laid bare its falsity. But here again American conditions have been peculiar. Down to the civil war, the United States was a country of farmers and small capitalists, in which every citizen could find employment who sought it. Equality is always the ideal of such a community. Individual prosperity and social prosperity clamor for the right of each citizen to act for himself without subjecting his freedom to the restraint either of government or of private associations. Hence, the worship of freedom of contract and *laissez-faire*, with prejudice against trade unions or other associations that require the sacrifice of individual freedom. The growth of trade unionism and the abandonment of the *doctrinaireism* of freedom of contract are, therefore, two allied phases of social development, and it is worth while to consider briefly the underlying cause.

Equality begins and ends with the power of the individual to accept the terms of employment offered. A domestic servant can bargain with an intending employer concerning wages, hours of work, days "off," "company" days and the like. If the conditions offered do not suit, she can with little difficulty seek and obtain a position elsewhere. Here is practical equality of the kind that lawyers have in view when they discuss freedom of contract versus state interference. Believing thoroughly in the right of property, they uphold the right to acquire property, or in other words, the freedom of contract. A workman possessing his own tools is not dependent upon capitalists for employment; can, therefore, bargain for wages as an equal of the capitalist; and, when the terms offered him do not suit, can open a shop of his own or claim a homestead and force his living out of the soil.

But machinery brought in a new era. Workmen do not own machine shops as they formerly owned their tools. The only capital they now own is their skill, and to employ that skill they are dependent upon the owners of the means of production. Machinery, moreover, is a modern Procrustes who makes his guests adjust their individualities to a hard standard,

lopping off the energies of the zealous and more frequently stretching to a painful length the toil of the weaker individuals. It gives the individual workman no opportunities of bargaining as to the length of the working-day, periods of rest or any other of the physical conditions surrounding the work. Fancy a workman on a street railway bargaining with his employer as to the conditions of his work,—stipulating for such and such a time for his meals, for certain sanitary conditions, protection against the severity of the weather and the like, for so many hours of labor a day, for such and such pattern of motor, for the maintenance of the cars in a safe and manageable condition, for the care of himself and family in case of accident! But, it is retorted, if the conditions of employment do not suit, let the laborer go elsewhere. As if the working man could create his own employment! Where shall he go to earn his living when he owns none of the means of production, when his sole capital is his skill? The question is unanswerable. The freedom of the individual laborer to make his own bargain with the modern corporation is simply and solely the freedom to starve. If he refuses the terms of his employer, he faces starvation; the employer may suffer some inconvenience, possibly a slight reduction of dividends,—but his family feels no pressure.

In the United States the triumph of machinery and capitalism is comparatively recent. Further, one peculiarly favorable circumstance has retarded the effects of such a triumph as they manifested themselves in Britain,—the circumstance, namely, of unoccupied land, which acted in the capacity of an avenue to employment for people who could not make terms with the owners of machinery. That the presence of unoccupied land is the most vital fact in American history, is not an individual opinion; so authoritative a teacher as the late Francis A. Walker, in his later days, emphasized it again and again. It acted as a safety-valve for discontent; it simplified American politics, rid us of the social problems that perplexed Europe and furnished the justifica-

tion of the boast of spread-eagle orators that Americans were not as other peoples. When the close of the civil war left us with an army of a million men, European statesmen predicted a despotism,—for how could places in the ranks of industry be suddenly found for such a host? American politicians proclaimed their confidence in democratic institutions and bade Europe watch how we solve such problems on this side of the water. But neither the politicians nor democracy solved the problem; it was the presence of free land that permitted the absorption of such a population to be accomplished without straining one of our institutions.

Tempora mutantur. Free land in America is now virtually a matter of history. The Fourth-of-July orator has lost his occupation, for he has discovered that democratic America has also its problems,—the same problems that Europe is patiently solving; the problem of the city, of the poor, of taxation, and above all the problems of crises and the unemployed. The first step toward the solution of the industrial problem is now recognized to be the substitution for the principle of equality, of the principle of collective bargaining, and for freedom of contract, governmental regulation. That the trade unionists have first diagnosed the case is to their credit, and that they should be impatient with the slowness of business and professional classes to grasp the situation is not surprising. One may, indeed, feel wonder at the obtuseness of lawyer-legislators, who repulse proposed measures for the protection of working men, with stereotyped objection about violating freedom of contract, now that the United States Supreme Court has affirmed the competency of a legislature to prescribe an eight-hour day for the workmen of Utah.¹ The court explicitly recognized that *proprietors and their*

(1) *Holden vs. Hardy*, sheriff, 18 *Supreme Court Reporter*, p. 383. The Utah statute applies to under-ground mines, smelters and ore-reduction works.

operatives do not stand upon an equality. "The former naturally desire to obtain as much labor as possible from their employees, while the latter are often induced by the fear of discharge to conform to regulations which their judgment, fairly exercised, would pronounce to be detrimental to their health or strength. In other words, the proprietors lay down the rules, and the laborers are practically constrained to obey them."

But, notwithstanding this unqualified endorsement of a patent economic law by a conservative body of men like the justices of the United States Supreme Court,¹ we still see some of our largest employers of labor refusing to tolerate associated action on the part of their employees, while corporation attorneys frighten legislators away from their duty to the laboring classes by conjuring up the ghost of "freedom of contract"! The objection is frequently urged that the liberty and equality banished by capitalism cannot be brought back to human kind by the trade union, because the union itself tramples upon the will of individual members through tyrannous government by the leaders. The aristocratic Tory conscience revolts at the idea of such a suppression of freedom. To sooth their feelings one might quote Mr. Lecky's experience in politics where he soon learned "that if absolute independence of individual judgment were pushed to its extreme, political anarchy would ensue."² As a matter of fact, however, democratic ideals of self-government are more nearly approached in the trade union than in any other important type of organization. Discretion in affairs of weight is seldom vested in officers or councils; on the contrary, the decision is reserved to the entire membership. In the matter of initiating strikes, for example, the officers have no authority and among the older leaders the problem is rather to restrain than stimulate the rank and file. Many a settlement effected by the officials is repudiated by the

(1) Only two justices dissented from the decision.

(2) *Map of Life*, p. 120.

members on the ground of too unfavorable terms. In the national unions, no important action can be taken until the question has been decided by a general referendum.

Close students of trade unionism, no less than persons of practical experience, will probably agree in the statement that the organization may frequently sacrifice the immediate interest of a member in favor of a more solid and remote interest. It is not an uncommon thing for factory operatives to unite in concealing from the factory inspector the fact that the factory is running overtime in violation of law. Although some of the operatives may be members of a union that has aided in the passage of that very law, they cannot resist opportunities for making extra earnings. The union in such cases really represents the broader interests of society, and exercises more foresight than the individual. If unorganized, these persons would be acting in opposition to their own real interests, for an unregulated working-day, as experience shows, will, in time, exercise a tyrannical oppression.

He who has yet to learn to know trade unionism as "a typical and spontaneous manifestation of the methods and results of pure democracy" will enjoy the classic work of Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb on trade unionism, "Industrial Democracy," which has taken its place among the profound contributions to the social history and philosophy of our time. This work treats at length of the aims and methods of trade unions and leaves nothing to be said, so far as English practice is concerned. American practice does not depart much from the traditional English rules. We might say that antagonism to the introduction of machinery and new industrial methods is less pronounced in America than in England, although the Webbs disclaim it for the English unions. Officially, the American unions are entirely opposed to any restriction upon the employer's right of substituting machinery for trained skill. In the local unions, however, the official "platform" is sometimes shoved aside. Thus it is only a few months since the Milwaukee coopers struck against the introduction

of new barrel-making machinery, and it required the presence of the president of the American Federation of Labor and other prominent labor officials to make them withdraw their opposition. The International Association of Iron Molders last year passed a resolution in favor of utilizing a new machine in their trade to its utmost capacity. But many local unions have adopted a scale of wages which utterly prevents a member from turning out any more work with the machine, in a given time, than he formerly did without it.

But the questions of limiting output and restricting the use of machinery are not so simple as they appear to an outsider. When men are working by the piece, some regulation of the output becomes an actual necessity ; for the employer fixes the price paid per piece by comparing the number of pieces made in a day with the average daily wage of artisans of similar rank. Hence, if a few uncommonly strong and ambitious workers should increase the number of pieces done in a day, the employer would reduce the price per piece accordingly ; and in the end the selfish minority would receive the same wages as before, while the other workers would suffer a reduction in their earnings.

Respecting the introduction of machinery, the orthodox political economy teaches that the working people gain more as consumers, in the ultimate reduction of prices, than they lose through the temporary idleness that they may be compelled to endure until new employments are opened up. This is small comfort to the skilled artisan, who wakes up some morning to find his place taken by a new machine tended by a woman or a boy receiving but a tithe of his former wages. To learn a new trade he knows to be impossible at his time of life, and, unless he can control the machine, his standard of life and that of his family must inevitably deteriorate.

In a recent treatise on political economy from the pen of a British professor of the orthodox school,¹ the probable effects

(1) Professor Smart, of Glasgow.

were discussed of a prospective series of inventions whereby skilled labor in the machine and tool making and other metal working industries would be replaced with machinery. Such a revolution has been predicted by experts and may, indeed, come about in the immediate future. One's natural inclination would be to welcome it as affording to the race of men relief from toil, and providing greater wealth and more happiness for all ranks of society. But the new machinery would be so nearly automatic as to require the coöperation of only a very ordinary degree of intelligence and strength, which the proprietors could obtain at wages incomparably inferior to those paid at present to the highly skilled machinists. What would become of the machinists? The economist sees no other solution than their acceptance of the new positions at the reduced wages. And the result would be the sinking of a large portion of the educated, intelligent, and prosperous middle class in the British engineering towns into the ranks of proletarians! ¹

Such being the despairing conclusion of the British political economist respecting the probable outcome of a revolution that ought to benefit every member of society, one can scarcely blame the trade unionists for seeking to control new machines, and, at the least, to make their introduction so gradual as to allow the skilled tradespeople affected to maintain, without serious impairment, their customary standard of life. The community finds the problem of elevating the proletariat too difficult for it to urge upon trade unions a policy that would simply increase the number of proletarians. It is the community which derives the gain

(1) Sweatshop workers furnish a good example of the standard of life that would prevail more generally but for the bulwarks erected by trade unionism against the ceaseless effort of competing capitalists to reduce their wage bills. True, the sweatshop toilers are unskilled; but it would not always be so if they could organize their trade sufficiently to advance wages, for then they might educate their children out of such work. As it is, their lack of skill tends to perpetuate itself in each generation.

from increased production with cheaper methods, and until it can devise machinery,—other than that of the poor law,—to relieve those injured in the process, not to say to give them a share in the new wealth, it must not criticize too sharply the means that the stricken classes take for their own preservation.

From a similar point of view are to be judged trade union methods like the strike, boycott, picketing, and limitation of numbers (apprenticeship and restrictions upon immigration). Selfish they are, sometimes, like other mortals; rarely arrogant; and seldom anti-social. The aim is in almost every case the maintenance of standards of living, that the community for its own protection cannot afford to see deteriorate. The present epidemic of strikes is a perfectly natural phenomenon. Prices are advancing and prosperity is reported by at least one half of the orators and editors of the country to be at hand. To share in the prosperity, not to mention the maintenance of wages at a rate corresponding to the higher cost of living, the working classes find strikes an actual necessity.

The press too often conveys false impressions of trade union rules on apprenticeship, although it may be admitted that they have been so severe in some localities as to place real difficulty in the way of an American boy's learning a trade as readily as may be desired. But when the newspapers make the insinuation that no boy in New York City "can start at the bottom of the ladder in a newspaper office and grow up to be a finished workman," such misrepresentation should be corrected. As a matter of fact, the union rules forbid apprenticeship in the offices of daily newspapers in New York, because there is no opportunity for a boy to learn the trade in the rush and hurry incidental to the publication of a metropolitan daily. In book and job offices, a boy may receive due attention and, in those offices, apprenticeship to the printer's trade takes place with the full approval of trade unionists.

The most generally recognized service of trade unions to

society consists in their benefit funds. Especially do charity workers recognize this service, for they testify to the fact that, during business depressions when the unemployed must be cared for by thousands, scarcely a single member of a trade union has applied for relief,—either to the city or to philanthropic organizations. Typographical Union No. 6 of New York City, popularly designated as “Big Six,” is maintaining in Bound Brook, New Jersey, a farm and home for infirm, superannuated and unemployed members, while it contributes its quota to the expenses of the Childs-Drexel home for invalid printers in Colorado, which is supported by the International Typographical Union. The Cigar-makers’ International Union of America paid benefits in 1899 to the amount of two hundred and eighty-one thousand, three hundred and eighty-two dollars and in the last twenty years, it has paid benefits aggregating over four million dollars, as follows:—

Sick benefit (nineteen years) . . .	\$1,335,594.49
Out of work benefit (ten years) . .	893,215.35
Travelling benefit (twenty years) . .	702,029.02
Strike benefit (twenty years)	700,223.21
Death benefit (nineteen years) . . .	695,783.32

\$4, 326,845.39

Considering the number of years in which these benefits have been paid, the amount spent on account of strikes is least of all.

While the British unions have developed the benefit features in a degree unapproached by the American unions, they have only begun to appreciate the possibilities of the union label, which is a purely American invention. The idea was first put into practice by the cigar-makers, but the hatters and printers have also been fairly successful in its application. The other trades are rapidly following those mentioned and at present the American Federation of Labor has under consideration the plan of issuing a universal label. The purpose of the label, is, of

course, to promote the sale of goods made in "union shops" by a direct appeal to union members of other trades and their sympathizers.¹ While the union label does not furnish a perfect guarantee of honest workmanship, the presumption is much in its favor. The instances in which the factory inspectors have found the occupants of insanitary tenement workshops putting the union label upon garments, cigar-boxes, etc., are not so numerous as the opponents of trade unionism would have people believe.

Aside from the benefit features of labor unions, the social value of which has received general acknowledgement, no activities of the union impress thoughtful observers more favorably than the campaign of organized labor in behalf of protective legislation. An excellent example is the legislative prohibition of child labor in factories by all the principal manufacturing states of the country. No one in New York or Massachusetts is now disposed to deny that if the succeeding generation is to constitute even a capable body of workers, not to say an intelligent citizenship competent to maintain a democratic form of government, it must not prematurely use up its strength by child labor and at the same time grow up without schooling. Yet, less than a score of years have passed since business men were opposing legislative restrictions upon child labor and in the face of their opposition, enlightened and philanthropic social ideas proved powerless until reinforced by the votes of trade unionists.² At the present writing, scores of towns in the Southern states are seeking to attract capitalists by advertising the absence of any legislative restrictions upon child labor in their state. When the

(1) *The Trades Union Label*, by John Graham Brooks, in Bulletin of the United States Department of Labor, No. 15.

(2) The enactment of a child labor law in New York is attributed to the efforts of the labor unions and the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children.

children of southern factory towns are reclaimed from ignorance and premature decay, it will not be through the efforts of the so-called upper classes, but through the strenuous fighting of the working classes organized in trade unions.

To carry on political work, labor unions have developed somewhat different organs from those which they find best adapted to trade action. The unit in either case is the local *trade union*, that is, a body composed of workmen exercising an identical trade in a particular locality. Then all of the local unions in a particular trade, or in several closely allied trades are united in one national organization, as for example, the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers, or the International Union of Steam Engineers. Outside of the national organizations are several trades represented as yet only by local unions and also the local *trades unions*, that is, unions in small cities where the number of workmen pursuing distinct trades is too small to permit the formation of more than one union, which thus becomes a labor union, but not a *trade union*. Such unions are likely to be either federal labor unions, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, or local assemblies of the Knights of Labor. Their number and membership are almost infinitesimal in comparison with the trade unions proper. New York state on January 1, 1900, contained one thousand three hundred and ninety local unions with a total membership of two hundred and twenty-four thousand three hundred and eighty-three persons; but among them were only five unions representing mixed trades with a membership of three hundred and ninety-five.

In addition to this organization along trade lines, an organization according to locality has grown up whose chief aim is political. Within a given city, all the unions elect representatives to a general federation, variously designated as Central Labor Union, Central Federation of Labor, etc., and within each state the local unions unite in the formation of a state federation. Finally, as the crown of the whole edifice, stands the American Federation

of Labor, national in extent. This national federation, however, differs from the state federations in the important fact that the units of which it is composed are the international trade unions rather than the local unions. With the exception of four of the railway organizations (Brotherhoods of Engineers, Firemen, Trainmen, Conductors), and one or two additional trades, all the national unions of the country are now affiliated with the American Federation, which has no real rival for the leadership of the labor movement. The Federation publishes a monthly journal, *The American Federationist*, as its organ, and keeps a salaried president and secretary at Washington, who, with members of the executive council, look after the interests of labor in the national legislature. The chief political demands of the Federation are the following:—

1. Compulsory education.
2. The repeal of all conspiracy and penal laws affecting seamen and other workmen, incorporated in the federal and state law of the United States.
3. A legal workday of not more than eight hours.
4. Sanitary inspection of workshop, mine and home.
5. Liability of employer for injury to health, body and life.
6. The abolition of the contract system, in all public works.
7. The abolition of the sweating system.
8. The municipal ownership of street cars, water-works and gas and electric plants for the public distribution of heat, light and power.
9. The nationalization of telegraphs, telephones, railways and mines.
10. The abolition of the monopoly system of land-holding and the substitution therefor of the title of occupancy only.
11. Direct legislation and the principle of referendum in all legislation.
12. The abolition of the monopoly privilege of issuing money and substituting therefor a system of direct issuance to and by the people.

The foregoing program will give a fair idea of the political beliefs of the conservative working men of this country, with the exception, perhaps, of their attitude toward the judiciary. The feeling in this direction is very strong, and many labor leaders are frank to admit that they hope to secure more substantial benefits through the election of judges favorably disposed toward labor, than through the policy of public ownership of capital, which is now becoming so popular among working men. The hatred of the injunction is particularly ardent and the Federation has for several years had a bill before Congress, that seeks to mitigate the injustice sometimes connected with the enjoining processes of courts. The working man's distrust of the judiciary explains why, in America, he is decidedly opposed to the scheme of compulsory arbitration of labor disputes that he has established in New Zealand.

The truth of the statement that labor organizations perform a valuable social service in securing the enactment of laws indispensable to the welfare of industrial commonwealths may be tested by examining the course of recent labor legislation in New York state. In 1897 the legislature enacted as Chapter XXXII. of the General Laws, a labor law prepared by the Commission on Statutory Revision, largely on the basis of existing statutes dating from the eighties. This labor law embraced a code of factory acts on the whole as liberal as those of the most advanced industrial countries, with provision for a large staff of inspectors; general provisions regarding a legal day's work, hours of labor of public employees, of employees of railroads and street railways in large cities; cash payment of wages, assignment of wages, etc.; a state board of mediation and arbitration, a bureau of labor statistics and a free employment agency in New York City; and concerning the sweating system and the convict labor system.

No new legislation of consequence was added in 1898, but in 1899, as the result of Governor Roosevelt's favorable attitude, a number of amendments to the labor law were made that the

State Workingmen's Federation had been urging for years. By far the most important of these was the Eight-Hour Law, applying to employees of public authorities and, what is of greater consequence, to the employees of contractors of public work.

The eight-hour movement deserves a chapter in itself, for it is the most far-reaching in effect of any of the proposals of labor that have come within the range of practical discussion and action. The working men regard the eight-hour day as the avenue through which they are to acquire their share of the new comforts brought to men by the introduction of machinery. They expect that it will increase wages both through the reduction of enforced idleness and the creation of new wants and consequent advance of the standard of living; although it is difficult to see how wages will be increased if the aggregate production is diminished by the reduction of hours from ten or nine to eight, and unless it is diminished, there will be no increased demand for workers now out of employment. At any rate, the demand for the eight-hour day has long been in the forefront of working men's programs. The American Federation of Labor early made it a rallying cry and planned a general strike for May 1, 1889; the cigar-makers were successful, a few trades compromised on nine hours, while the carpenters secured eight hours in a half dozen cities and nine hours in eighty or ninety other cities. In 1890, the Federation concentrated its strength upon the demands of the carpenters, raised twelve thousand dollars by a strike assessment and made the eight-hour day general for carpenters in all the large cities. Individual trades have succeeded in reducing the length of the working-day by agreement with employers. One of the latest successes is that of the printers; since November 21, 1899, as a result of an agreement between the International Typographical Association and the United Typothetæ of America (the organization of employing printers), all members of printers' unions have enjoyed a nine-hour day.

But while many well organized trades prefer to secure the

shorter working-day through trade action, it is perfectly understood that thousands of workmen lacking strong organizations are outside the possibilities of such arrangements. In fact legislation must in the case of most unskilled labor precede organization. This fact has been abundantly demonstrated by the results of the New York Eight-Hour Law of 1899. The essential change in the law was the prohibition of agreements to work overtime, the freedom of which had heretofore virtually nullified the law. But with a mandatory statute applying to public officials and contractors on public work, the manual laborers were easily induced by the state Federation to organize themselves in order to secure the strict enforcement of the law.¹

The fact is that few laws touching the pockets of employers can be enforced unless the employees have the strength imparted by combination; a complaint made by a single employee would procure his immediate discharge and he, perforce, remains silent. Without organization, an employee will hardly dare testify before a court or an official committee. Indeed, public-spirited citizens of England have found it necessary to establish funds to indemnify women and young persons who have suffered loss of employment as the result of giving evidence in an official prosecution.

A second New York labor law of 1899 was aimed at the sweating system, as operated in the tenement houses of New York City. Work done in the home has been beyond the reach

(1) One of the faults of the law was its failure to take special cognizance of the work of lock-tenders on the canals, who are required to be on duty, or near at hand, throughout the day, although their actual work is of short duration. The labor leaders opposed the insertion of any exceptions in the law, but agreed not to demand its application, when passed, to the class of labor mentioned, on the canals. This understanding was soon broken and the next legislature was, as a result, obliged to make an extra appropriation of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars for the payment of the fortunate lock-tenders. It is another instance of the factional differences and lack of *esprit de corps* that sometimes crops out in the labor movement.

of the factory laws as the courts refuse to permit an invasion of the home. The remedy is to require every family desiring to undertake the manufacture of clothing, cigars, etc., in the home to procure a license from the state, which may be granted only after an inspection of the premises has satisfied the inspector of their suitability. By requiring every manufacturer and contractor to keep a register, which shall be open to inspection, of the names and addresses of persons to whom he gives out work, the state may keep tenement work under control. Such was the law of 1899, passed through the coöperation of organized labor and reform associations of New York. The service that labor organizations rendered to the citizens of the state does not need to be pointed out at this late date; pure selfishness teaches the danger of using articles made in an out-of-the-way tenement where disease may lurk unobserved.

The remaining labor laws of 1899, although of minor importance, were similarly beneficial to the working population and promoted the general welfare. At the session of 1900 no further labor legislation worth extended discussion was enacted, although some fifty-odd bills had been introduced and some of them passed one chamber. Several of these provided that street cars in certain cities should be vestibuled during the winter. That legislation should be necessary to prevent the barbarity of requiring motor-men to face the storms of winter, day after day, when a slight expenditure would furnish them protection, is one of the facts that explains why corporations are not universally beloved. That such legislation should be defeated year after year also explains why some American citizens occasionally talk about the "money power" in politics.

The preferred measure of the State Workingmen's Federation, however, was an employer's liability bill, which led to the denunciation of labor leaders by the chairman of the committee on labor, as noted in the opening paragraph of this paper. As is generally known, an employer is liable to any person not in his

employ, for personal injury resulting from the negligence of the employer himself, or any of his agents, servants, or employees. Under the common law, however, an employer is not held thus liable for injury to an employee unless the negligence giving rise to the injury was the employer's own. Now in modern industry, an employer, whether a person or corporation, acts through his agents or employees; and what is technically their negligence is his. The law has therefore made him responsible for their acts in respect to third persons; but it has not made him thus responsible in respect to any employee. This is the famous—rather infamous—doctrine of common employment, which was carried to its logical conclusion in an Ohio case where the court allowed damages to passengers injured in the wreck of a railway train, and threw out the claims of railway laborers (employees of the company concerned) who were being carried to their work on the same train.

In his annual message to the legislature Governor Roosevelt recommended an employer's liability law, which should abate some of the injustice of the fellow-servant doctrine. The bill introduced at the instance of the State Federation was a very moderate measure, being in fact copied after the English act of 1880, which Parliament abandoned in 1897 as utterly inadequate to secure justice for working men. The Conservative party it was which passed a Workmen's Compensation Act, making employers responsible, not simply for injuries due to negligence, but for *all injuries whatsoever*, save only those caused by "the serious and willful misconduct" of the injured employee. The other European countries have similar laws.

In the light of the failure of American legislatures to enact laws as liberal as those of the monarchical countries of Europe, of which the foregoing is one instance, discontent has naturally appeared among wage-earners, accompanied with plenty of criticism of the existing party system. Heretofore all attempts to break away from the two old parties and organize a working men's

party have failed miserably. The traditions of English trade unionism down to very recent times have been entirely opposed to separate political action. American labor leaders have not only inherited this tradition, but they have had some experiences of their own that taught the same lesson. The first great national organization, the National Labor Union established in 1866, went to pieces on this rock, when in 1872 it nominated David Davis for president of the United States. Other disasters have enforced the wisdom of the doctrine of keeping politics outside the union.

At the present time, however, it looks as if an attempt were to be made to found a working men's party *outside* the unions. The promoters, some of whom are loyal trade unionists, urge the fact that modern developments have furnished an issue of such overwhelming importance as to claim the allegiance of all wage-earners,—the right, namely, of the citizens of the state to control the means of production. The concentration of capital in the hands of a small class of wealthy men gives them the power of withholding employment from whomsoever they please; by the possession of such arbitrary power, it is maintained, a few men can control the destinies of all citizens and establish a despotism. Hence the demand for the democratization of the railways, telegraphs, factories, and other means of production,—in other words, collective ownership and operation.

The policy of collectivism has been sharply debated at several conventions of the American Federation of Labor, notably in 1890 and 1894; but any general endorsement in its favor has been defeated. It partially triumphed, however, in the adoption of a resolution in favor of government ownership of means of communication (the so-called natural monopolies) as noted in a previous paragraph, and the recent extensive development of trusts and monopolies has naturally strengthened the hands of the collectivist party. Working men thrown out of employment by the sudden closing of mills, "on account of overproduction,"

have hardly viewed the trust in the guise of a friend. They did not need to wait for the president and directors of the American Steel and Wire Company to issue the edict that threw the business world into confusion before they could comprehend the evil of monopoly. It appears that this sudden shutting down of steel mills and cutting of prices was the first object lesson the business man had received in this line. The honest dealers in hardware or iron and steel goods carrying in his assets steel worth ten thousand dollars did not relish the sudden cut in prices which reduced these assets to six or seven thousand dollars. One of them remarked that "the trust can impoverish thousands of responsible business men who are helpless to resist such an action as that made apparently for speculative purposes by the steel trust when it shut down its mills."

The writer does not need to point out the possibility of natural causes bringing to the front men who will not abuse the powers that they gain through monopoly. It is sufficient to indicate the despotic powers placed in the hands of private citizens—for a short period, perhaps, but long enough to allow the perpetration of great wrongs upon the working men whom they employ. A premonition of the new attitude which the working man may as a natural consequence assume in politics is given in a resolution adopted at the latest convention of the American Federation of Labor held in Detroit last December. The convention first adopted the following resolution on trusts, reported by its committee on resolutions:—

"The President makes some very timely and truthful observations, and your committee agrees in his opinion that the trust should be considered by the labor movement as a natural outcome of the present keen competition in commercial activity. The evil influence resulting from concentrated capital can only be met by fully realizing that the state cannot successfully legislate against this so-called "growing evil." It is, therefore, manifestly the duty of the state, as well as of the labor movement, to meet this situation and to treat the subject as a natural development. The trust is an industrial disease which can only be alleviated and finally cured by remedies taken from the indus-

trial garden, organizations of labor, free from all anti-combination laws, given full freedom to use its own natural weapons, and the thoughtful and earnest support of all lovers of industrial freedom, will meet this evil and overcome it in the natural evolutionary way. We, therefore, ask from the legislator, not anti-combination laws, but the sweeping away of those now extant, to the end that the trust may not have at its command the judicial, executive, and military machinery of the political state."

From the terms of this resolution it might be concluded that labor unions are planning to unite in political leagues with employers belonging to trusts. But a rather significant amendment to the resolution was offered and "adopted with applause." The amendment reads:—

"And furthermore that this Convention call upon the trade unionists of the United States and working men generally, to carefully study the development of trusts and monopolies, with a view to nationalizing the same."

Of even greater significance is the formation of a socialistic party under the leadership of native working men in full sympathy with trade unionism. Until lately the socialistic movement in this country has been dominated by men of foreign birth or sympathies; men who have scorned and antagonized trade unions. In 1895 the New York leaders of the Socialist Labor party founded an organization, the Socialist Trades and Labor Alliance, for the purpose of undermining the established trade unions and usurping from the American Federation of Labor the leadership of the labor movement, the scheme being to offer lower dues than unions were paying in the American Federation of Labor or the national trade union. When, therefore, Eugene V. Debs, the erstwhile president of the American Railway Union, announced his conversion to socialism, he found himself unable to unite with the enemies of trade unionism and thereupon set about organizing a new socialist party,—the Social Democratic party, which was declared to be "the national union of the laboring class for political action."

Meanwhile the anti-union tactics of the DeLeon, or Alliance

faction, were fought by those adherents of trade unionism who still belonged to the Socialist Labor party and in January, 1900, they held at Rochester a separate convention under the party name, at which they adopted a resolution favoring trade unionism, nominated Job Harriman of California for president and appointed a committee to confer with a similar committee of the Social Democratic party for the purpose of accomplishing a consolidation of the two parties. The Social Democrats held their convention in Indianapolis in March and having voted in favor of uniting with the Socialist Labor party, nominated Debs for president and Harriman for vice-president. Details of the consolidation have been arranged by a joint committee, save that the choice of a name (either United Socialist or Social Democratic party) is to be submitted to a vote of the membership of the two parties.¹ The principles of this new party favor trade union action in economics and collectivism in politics. The platform is a statement of collectivist principles in simple language, which ends with the following "immediate demands:"—

1. Revision of our antiquated federal constitution, in order to remove the obstacles to full and complete control of government by all the people, irrespective of sex.

2. The public ownership of all industries controlled by monopolies, trusts, and combines.

3. The public ownership of all railroads, telegraphs, telephones, all means of transportation, communication, water works, gas and electric plants, and other public utilities.

4. The public ownership of all gold, silver, copper, lead, iron, coal, and all other mines; also all oil and gas wells.

5. Reduction of the hours of labor in proportion to the increasing facilities of production.

6. The inauguration of a system of public works and improve-

(1) The referendum resulted in the adoption of the name "Social Democratic Party."

ments for the employment of a large number of the unemployed; the public credit to be utilized for that purpose.

7. All useful inventions to be free to all, the inventor to be remunerated by the public.

8. Labor legislation to be made national instead of local, and international where possible.

9. National insurance of working people against accidents, lack of employment and want in old age.

10. Equal civil and political rights for men and women and the abolition of all laws discriminating against women.

11. The adoption of the initiative and referendum, and the right to the recall of representatives by the voters.

12. Abolition of war as far as the United States is concerned and the introduction of international arbitration instead.

For the first time in the history of the labor movement in the United States, a working men's political party, dominated by trade union sentiments but independent of trade union organization, is in the field. In all the European countries except England such a party now holds a position in the forefront of the political organizations, and in England collectivism is unquestionably gaining ground. Although the new party has already elected several mayors in Massachusetts towns, as well as representatives to the state legislature, it will find it no easy task to induce working men to abandon life-long party affiliations in the approaching presidential election, especially in view of the fact that one of the great parties now calls itself the New Democracy. The integrity of the new leaders may also be put to the test. Labor men have not heretofore proved more faithful to their principles than other men when elected on the ticket of the Republican or Democratic party; in fact the superior type of labor leader is not the one elected by a general federative body, like those of the city or state, but the head of the national organization of a distinct trade, where faithful service and long acquaintance count more decisively. Organizations generally demand that their

officers keep out of politics. Hence it is the smaller men who parade as leaders in political circles and before committees of state legislatures. Exceptions do but prove the rule.

The general prejudice of the daily press against those contentions of labor that conflict with the interests of capital,—conspicuous in the studied neglect or misrepresentation of working men's progress abroad,—has been the natural cause of the establishment of a distinctly labor press, which has become a power of considerable influence and is organized in an association of over three hundred papers. The best of the labor papers are the organs of the national trade unions, for example, *The Railroad Trainmen's Journal*; but the local weekly papers published or subsidized by city central labor unions are rapidly increasing in number and influence. Both classes of journals contain many out-and-out socialistic papers and it is a striking indication of the coöperation now existing between the trade union leaders and the socialists to find a widely circulated socialistic paper like the *Appeal to Reason* expressing trade union sentiments, and a trade union organ like the *Cleveland Citizen* boldly advocating collectivist principles.

But more voters than all the labor papers can reach are being converted to collectivism by the attitude of some of the corporations, like certain ones in New York that have virtually announced a determination to spend in fighting the new franchise tax law the equivalent of what would be their contribution to the public treasury required under the said law.



THE USE OF BACTERIA IN OUR FOOD PRODUCTS

H. W. CONN, *Wesleyan University.*



THE time has passed when bacteria are looked upon as unmixed evils. These little plants owe their somewhat unsavory reputation in large degree to the fact that they first attracted general interest because of their power of producing disease. That they are the cause of many human diseases has been demonstrated beyond peradventure, and this subject has proved so fascinating that it was for a long time the only side of bacteriological phenomena which received any considerable attention. As a result, bacteria have acquired the popular reputation of being producers of evil to mankind, and have consequently been regarded as wholly undesirable organisms. The studies of recent years, however, have been giving more attention to phases of bacteriological life which are not connected with disease. These studies have disclosed to us a large series of phenomena where these little plants are, in various ways, of direct advantage to mankind. Among other facts we have been slowly learning that in the preparation of the food which comes upon our tables, and in its digestion, the bacilli play no inconsiderable part.

Since they are almost inconceivably minute, bacteria owe their great influence in nature to their wonderful powers of reproduction. A single individual may, in the course of twenty-four

hours produce from ten to twenty million offspring. This extraordinary power of reproduction involves the consumption of a vast amount of food material, and profound alterations are produced in this food as the bacteria feed upon it. The bacteria are so small that they probably do not take the food inside of their bodies, but they live in the midst of their food and digest it outside of themselves. This results in certain chemical changes in the nature of the food. These changes are mostly of that character which the chemist calls destructive. Under the action of bacteria, chemical molecules which are of a high complexity, are constantly being pulled to pieces and reduced to simpler compounds. As a result of this chemical action there appears in the food mass, upon which the bacteria are feeding, a variety of new chemical compounds. These new compounds are, in part, simply bi-products of the chemical destruction of the molecules which they have pulled to pieces; but they are also, in part, to be regarded as excretions from the bacteria. The use of bacteria in connection with food depends partly upon their power of destruction, and partly upon the nature of these new compounds which they produce.

In considering the use of bacteria in food, we may notice first, a possible value they may possess in assisting the processes of digestion. The digestion that takes place in our stomach and intestines consists in a chemical change in the food. Now, the stomach and intestines are crowded with bacteria in inconceivable numbers. As bacteriologists have studied the action of these intestinal bacteria upon such food as we take into our stomachs, they find that the bacteria produce chemical changes in the food in many respects similar to those of ordinary digestion. As these bacteria certainly grow rapidly in the intestines, the question has naturally arisen whether they may not aid the digestive juice in the digestive process, even in a healthy individual. It is not easy to answer this question, since it is impossible to deprive the human intestine of its bacteria, and thus determine whether the

digestive processes could go on readily without them. Such an experiment has been tried, however, with certain animals. For example, a lot of chicks have been hatched from eggs by artificial means, under conditions which have absolutely excluded bacteria from their food and from their alimentary canal. These chicks have been compared with others that have been incubated under similar conditions, except that the bacteria have not been excluded from their system. Upon comparing the two lots of chicks, after a few weeks of life, it has been found that those with the bacteria in the alimentary canal have flourished better, made better use of their food, and grown more rapidly than the lot of chicks from which the bacteria had been excluded. Now, while all experiments in this line have not been absolutely in accord, they have resulted in a strong suspicion that the bacteria which are present in our food and enter the stomach with it are not only of no injury to us but are probably of direct advantage in aiding our digestive organs properly to handle and make use of their nutriment.

Without dwelling longer upon this subject, where there is still so much uncertainty, we may pass to certain uses of bacteria where facts are better known. The value of bacteria in our food products is chiefly from the flavors which they produce. Among the new chemical compounds to which bacteria give rise, there are many which have very strong tastes, much stronger than the taste of the material out of which they are made. When these are produced in food products, they give to them a flavor. Though chemists and physiologists tell us that the flavor of food has nothing to do with its nutritious quality, there is no question that this flavor is a very important factor. For a desirable flavor we will pay high prices, sometimes giving as much as one dollar and fifty cents per pound for lobster meat when we could buy the same amount of food in the form of milk for twenty-five cents, or less; and we pay the high price simply because we enjoy the flavor. The reason that we are willing to pay high prices for a small amount

of nutriment in oysters is because of the flavor. The flavor does more than merely please the palate. Flavor very materially aids in digestion, by stimulating the proper secretion of digestive fluids. This is indicated, not only by the general experience of mankind, but also by experiments upon animals which have shown that digestive derangement may arise in animals fed upon foodstuffs without the benefit of flavor. Our stomachs refuse to handle pure foods without flavor, something that pleases the taste being necessary for proper digestion and assimilation of food. If bacteria, then, supply us with desirable flavors, we must regard them as of no little direct advantage. While many of our food flavors are characteristic of the foods themselves, not a few of those which we regard as the most valuable are the product of bacteria life. Indeed, as we shall see, some of our most valued food products owe their distinctive characteristics to these organisms which we are accustomed to hold in ill repute.

Among the chemical products which may arise from bacterial action, certain acids stand forth somewhat prominently. These acids may be produced in our food material and frequently give it an especial relish. For example; yeasts have the power of producing alcohol from sugar solutions, such as cider or grape juice, and after they have completed their action, certain bacteria often find their way into the alcoholic liquid and begin to grow there vigorously. As the result of this bacterial growth, the chemical nature of the alcohol is changed and the alcohol is converted into acetic acid. The alcoholic solution is thus slowly converted into vinegar, and this vinegar forms a not unimportant factor in the relish of our food. Where the vinegar is allowed to act upon certain vegetable substances it gives us our various pickled foods, whose existence is thus dependent on the action of bacteria upon alcohol. A very similar process occurs in the production of the German relish, sauer kraut. This material is prepared from a mass of cabbage leaf, with which is mixed a considerable quantity of salt. This mass is packed away in vats or barrels, and allowed to undergo a

fermentation. The fermentation that arises is somewhat similar to that which produces vinegar. Sugar is present in the cabbage, and both yeasts and bacteria are concerned in the fermentation. Up to the present time bacteriologists have not studied this process sufficiently to be able to state to what extent it is produced by yeasts, and to what extent the bacteria contribute towards its formation. The acids formed are closely related to those found in souring milk, and there is no question that these acids which are the most distinctive characteristic of the sauer kraut fermentation, are produced in large part if not wholly, by the action of the several species of bacilli which grow in the mass during the fermentation. As the value of sauer kraut is dependent, primarily, upon its flavor, we have here an instance of a food whose usefulness is based upon the products from the growth of bacteria. Without bacterial action there would be no sauer kraut.

We may notice, next, that some of our recently invented food products derived from milk are, in a measure, dependent upon bacteria growth. It is a well known fact that certain species of bacteria produce lactic acid in milk, rendering it sour. It is also a well known fact that milk, in which bacteria have had opportunity for growth, sometimes produces digestive derangements, especially in children. There has been drawn from these facts a general conclusion that the presence of the acid in sour milk is the cause of its occasional injurious qualities. This, however, is not the case, since the digestive troubles arising from old milk are caused by a species of bacteria that do not produce acid. At all events, some of our recent milk foods, which are regarded as especially healthful, are prepared in such a way as to contain a considerable amount of acid. These milk preparations go under various names. We hear of koumyss, kefir, matzoon, and others. These "fermented milks," as they are called, are produced by the growth, in milk, of certain micro-organisms. The micro-organisms concerned in the fermentation include both yeasts and bacteria, each of which seems to be quite necessary for the proper

production of the beverages. Exactly how the two classes of organisms work in the milk, bacteriologists have not yet been able to determine accurately. There is little question, however, that the carbonic acid and the alcohol present in these prepared milks come from the action of the yeast, while the peculiar flavor, especially the acid, is produced by bacilli that have been growing in the milk during the fermentation. The acid is a necessary factor in the fermentation, and without the proper bacteria to aid in the fermentation, the peculiar characteristics of these food products, upon which their palatableness depends, would certainly not be developed.

A much larger class of food flavors is the result of the products of bacteria that are of a very different chemical nature from these simple acids. In illustration of this class we may first notice vanilla extract, one of the most universally used and widely appreciated flavoring extracts, and one that is probably dependent upon the life of bacteria. The vanilla extract comes from the vanilla bean, and is, of course, to be regarded as a product of this vegetable. But when we come to know how the vanilla bean is prepared for commerce, we notice that we are partly dependent upon our friend the microbe for the so-called vanilla flavor. When the bean is gathered from the plant upon which it grows, it does not then possess this flavor. The beans are placed by the gatherers under conditions which produce a fermentation. This is called sweating, and it is a long and tedious process. The beans are wrapped in the folds of blankets, and for a long time carefully watched. This treatment starts a fermentation, during which process the peculiar ingredients, characteristic of the vanilla flavor, are developed. The flavor depends upon this fermentation. It does not appear until after the sweating, and its character is dependent upon the successful carrying out of the fermentative process. Now, no bacteriologist, up to the present time, has made a study of this vanilla fermentation, and it is not certain that it is due to bacteria. It may be due to unorganized

ferments or enzymes. Its general nature, however, is clearly so similar to other types of bacterial fermentation that there can be little question that it must be attributed to the growth of micro-organisms. Whether the micro-organisms are yeasts or bacteria cannot yet be stated from actual observation, but the very general close connection between flavoring products and bacteria growth in other cases makes it almost certain that this vanilla flavor is produced by the growth of bacteria in the bean during the necessary process of fermentation, and that it is the result of certain chemical changes in the ingredients in the bean caused by the bacteria.

Almost exactly the same statements may be made in regard to another food product of much greater value. The cocoa bean is more than a simple flavoring material, for it furnishes mankind with an extremely valuable food. But while cocoa and chocolate are valuable because of the nutriment contained in them, their particular usefulness and popularity depend upon their delicious flavor. Everyone recognizes that the peculiar fondness which mankind has for cocoa and for all the forms of chocolate produced from it, is based on the flavor rather than on the food value of the material. In regard to the production of this flavor we are, from both chemical and bacteriological standpoints, in decided ignorance; but there is very little doubt that the growth of bacteria is a decided factor in the process. The cocoa seeds, after ripening, are removed from the trees and allowed to stand in heaps for a few hours. They are then commonly placed in a "sweating box," but sometimes simply in holes dug in the ground. They are carefully covered, and a fermentation begins at once. This process is attentively watched and generally allowed to continue for about two days. The value of the product depends upon it. The quality of the flavor, as well as the readiness with which the seeds can be preserved, is determined by the nature of this fermentation. An unsuccessful fermentative process produces an inferior flavor and a less valuable

product. While scientists have not yet made a bacteriological study of this process, and know practically nothing about the nature of the fermentation, it is evident enough that here again we have probably an instance of the direct agency of bacteria in producing a flavor in our food products.

We will turn, now, to matters that are more familiar in the foods of every-day life, and are much better understood. We may notice first, that the gourmand is dependent upon bacteria for the production of the "gamy" flavor of which he is so fond. The "gamy" flavor of the meats is, indeed, as most people recognize, nothing more than incipient decay. To acquire a "gamy" flavor, all that is necessary is to allow the meat to stand under the proper conditions for putrefaction; if these conditions are kept up the meat passes, by imperceptible but rapid steps, into a state of complete decay. The putrefaction consists in the chemical destruction of the proteid substance, under the agency of bacteria. As a result of this destruction of the chemical molecules, a variety of new products are formed, partly as bi-products and partly as excretions of the bacteria themselves. These newly developed products, like most products of bacterial growth, have the characteristic of being sometimes highly flavored and sometimes emitting decided odors. If we allow the process to continue until the putrefaction is somewhat advanced, these odors and flavors become so strong as to be unpleasant, as every one recognizes who has ever tasted or smelled a piece of thoroughly decayed meat. It is a fact, however, that in the very first stages of decomposition these products, instead of being unpleasant, are, at least to some people, quite agreeable. During the early stages of this decomposition process, therefore, the meat has a peculiar flavor and odor which it did not possess originally. At this stage the meat is greatly enjoyed by certain people to whose palate the "gamy" taste appeals as delicious. Other people, however, find in this flavor too decided a suggestion of putrefaction to enjoy it. Among

some races of men the more advanced stages of decomposition are especially enjoyed; but with the white race the process must stop short of absolute putrefaction if the food is to be enjoyed by even the strongest palate. This "gamy" flavor, however, of all grades, from its incipient stages to its highly developed condition, is the result of bacterial growth, and bacteriologists already know enough to recognize that several distinct species of bacteria are concerned in its production.

The "gamy" flavor is enjoyed really by only a small number of people, but there is another very similar phenomenon which appeals to the palate of nearly every one. In the two great dairy products, butter and cheese, we have instances where the bacterial products play an extremely prominent part. Butter, as every one knows, is made by churning cream; but before the cream is churned it is carried through a certain process called ripening. The cream, after its separation from the milk, is placed in a vat and retained there, at a moderately warm temperature, for about a day. The cream, even at the time when it was separated from the milk, contained bacteria in quite large numbers, but during the ripening they grow rapidly and at the end of this period their number is inconceivable,—one thousand million to the cubic inch is a small estimate for well ripened cream. Butter-makers have almost universally adopted this process of forcing bacteria growth because they have learned that in this way the butter acquires a flavor which it does not possess when made from fresh cream. The value of butter in the market is dependent, in a large degree, upon its flavor. Butter made from fresh cream is nearly tasteless and not enjoyed by most people. It is true that in this respect there is considerable difference in taste. Some people enjoy a butter with practically no flavor and there is, therefore, especially in Europe, quite a demand for butter made from unripened cream. This butter is not even salted, and consequently, has but very little taste. Others like it best with just an appreciable flavor; others, again, want the flavor quite decid-

ed, while some can hardly get a flavor strong enough to suit them. In general, it may be stated that the American people want a stronger butter than that which suits the European nations. American butter, as now made, would not command a European market on account of its strong flavor. The European connoisseur tells us that it tastes too much of decay. On the other hand, the European butter would not please the taste of an American public. Some races, especially in warmer climates, are accustomed to and demand a butter with a flavor so high that we should call it rancid and unfit to eat.

All of these flavors, whether they be slight or prominent, are the result of bacterial growth in the cream. During the period of ripening bacteria multiply with great rapidity. As they grow in the cream they feed upon certain of its ingredients and begin to produce therein chemical changes which must be regarded as of the nature of decomposition. Numerous new chemical products arise as the result of these changes, and the cream, at the close of the ripening, contains chemical compounds which were not originally present. Among them are some prominent flavors and odors. If the ripening is continued too long, these products may become so abundant and so strong as to give rise to very undesirable flavors in the butter. Thus, over-ripening of the cream always results disastrously to the product. If, however, the churning takes place at just the right period,—a period determined only by experience,—the products developed in the cream give to the butter a slight but very delicious flavor. It is this flavor that the butter-maker endeavors to obtain, since this is what is particularly demanded by lovers of butter. If he can obtain the proper flavor he can sell his butter for a much higher price, even though it is recognized by all that the flavor expresses no food value whatever. In high-priced butter the maker receives more money for these flavoring products than he does for the food materials in the butter, and we willingly pay him for the flavor.

This process of cream ripening has been for several years most carefully studied by bacteriologists, and it has been demonstrated beyond question that the flavors developed during the ripening are produced by the growth of bacteria in the cream. It has also been shown that there are likely to be in the cream a large number of different species of bacteria, for these tiny organisms have different species just as truly as the larger plants and animals have. But we have learned that, while some species produce very desirable flavors, others produce flavors of a decidedly inferior quality, some of them even making the butter bitter. The differences between the grades of different qualities of butter are due, in considerable measure, to the different kinds of bacteria which chance to be present in the cream at the outset, and which continue to grow during the ripening. Hence, the butter-maker has no control over the kind of bacteria in his cream, and cannot, therefore, always depend on getting the proper flavor. Acting upon this knowledge, bacteriologists have been for some time trying to devise means of furnishing to him a proper kind of bacteria to produce the best flavor, and to discover also, some way by which they can be successfully inoculated in the cream. This practice is quite parallel to that now universally adopted, of putting yeasts into bread dough or into beer wort for the purpose of starting fermentation. As a result of experiments in this line, bacteria have now become a commercial article. They are cultivated by bacteriologists, sold on the market, and purchased by butter-makers for the purpose of artificially inoculating their cream. It has not, however, become a universal or even a general habit of butter-makers to purchase bacteria for cream ripening, although there are for this purpose, a dozen different types of bacteria cultures for sale. But even if the sale of such cultures has not become very great, butter-makers all over the civilized world recognize how necessary it is to have the proper kinds of bacteria present in cream at the time of ripening, and are rapidly adopting methods for inoculating them into the cream. In Den-

mark, the greatest butter-making country, over ninety-five per cent of the butter is made by means of these commercial cultures. In other countries the commercial cultures are not very widely used. But whether the butter-maker thus artificially tries to control the process of cream ripening, or whether he allows it to take place naturally, the bacteria are universally his agents for producing the butter flavor. Every bit of agreeably flavored butter owes its flavor to the action of bacteria. The manufacturers of oleo-margarine have learned this, and are now using bacteria to give to their imitation butter the flavor of real butter. Whether the idea appeals to us pleasantly or not, it is certainly a fact that the butter flavor of which civilized man is so fond has been produced by bacteria growth, and in consuming this butter we are enjoying flavors which have come from the growth of micro-organisms in this most universal and most thoroughly appreciated food product.

When we turn to the other great dairy product, cheese, we find the agency of bacteria, in preparing this food even more potent than in butter. Cheese, as is well known, is a highly concentrated food, and is, moreover, one of the very cheapest of our food products. A pound of cheese may contain as much food material as two pounds of beef, and it costs not much more than half as much. But, while we may recognize that cheese is a very valuable and cheap food, we must also recognize that the particular reason why it is so universally eaten and so thoroughly enjoyed is not its food value, which indeed most people know nothing about, but its peculiar and rather strong flavor. When we buy cheese, we do this because we like the taste of the product and not because we think it a cheap food.

People in America have only a slight idea of what is meant by the flavor of cheese. It is true that American cheeses have a prominent taste, and true also that the different cheeses which are found in American markets have widely varying flavors. But to understand really what is meant by cheese flavors, and

what it is for which people so readily spend their money, an American must see the cheese stores in the continental cities of Europe. The shapes, sizes, and character of the different cheeses here sold are a marvel to one accustomed only to the few varieties found in the United States. Some are no larger than a walnut, while others are as large as a cart wheel; and the shapes are too numerous to mention. Some are hard,—much like the ordinary American cheese,—but others are soft. Some are covered with slime a quarter of an inch deep, which not infrequently runs down from the cheese, spreading over the dish which holds it. To attempt to describe the odors and flavors of this endless variety of cheeses is hopeless. They include almost everything conceivable, and may almost all be characterized as having the taste of decomposition, ranging from such slight flavors as are found in the ordinary hard cheeses, to those which have so frequently been alluded to in the Limburger cheese, closely resembling that of decaying flesh.

For these varied flavors many millions of dollars are paid yearly. Incidentally it is true that with the flavors, we also purchase a very valuable food; but this is to be regarded rather as a fortunate coincidence, for nothing is more certain than that the money spent for the cheese is given chiefly for the flavor, and that we eat the cheese because it so greatly enhances the pleasure of our other foods. Even the strong flavors of the Limburger type of cheese, so repulsive to most people from their resemblance to putrefaction, are regarded as extremely delicious by some, and beyond any question they give an enjoyment to many a meal of coarse, plain food which forms the staple diet of the poorer classes. We hardly appreciate the great boon it is to mankind, this having a cheap but valuable food, which has at the same time the power of so greatly increasing the pleasure taken in other foods by the flavors it contributes. The value cheese adds to the food of the poorer classes, and the amount of increased pleasure it gives cannot be estimated.

These flavors are probably all procured for us through the micro-organisms. Freshly made cheeses have hardly any taste. But such cheeses are set away to ripen. The ripening is a slow process requiring several weeks, and during this time the bacteria, which are inevitably present, develop rapidly, and the flavors arise. Other changes occur during the ripening, rendering the cheese more digestible. These may, or may not be, due to bacteria; but that the flavors are in many cases results from the growth of micro-organisms is not questioned. Just what kind of micro-organisms are concerned in the ripening of the various kinds of cheeses can not yet be stated. The types of cheese are too numerous, the difficulty of research too great, and investigation of the subject too recent, to have made it possible for us to reach anything like a complete solution to these questions. In some cases it is known that bacteria are the cause of the flavors, this being certainly true in the cheeses with the especially marked putrefactive character. In other cases, like that of the Roquefort cheese, it is certain that moulds contribute the larger part of the peculiar flavor. In some cheeses, yeasts, and perhaps still other types of micro-organisms, may possibly be concerned. The whole process of cheese ripening has proved a very difficult problem for bacteriologists, and up to the present time they are far from having reached a solution of the real nature of the changes going on in the cheese during its ripening. But enough of them have been studied to show us that the flavors arise during the ripening period, and that this ripening is accompanied, and in considerable measure produced, by the growth of bacteria. That the flavors themselves are, at least in part, the result of bacterial growth, is established beyond any chance of question.

The cheese manufacturer, then, owes even more than the butter-maker to the agency of bacteria. Butter made without the ripening commands a market, since many persons like butter which has no particular flavor. But no one likes unripened cheese. Fresh, unripened cheese is a product which is nowhere

eaten. It is more difficult of digestion than ripened cheese, and absolutely lacking in the flavors so characteristic of the ripened product. The peculiar character of this valuable dairy product, upon which depends its value in giving relish to food, rests upon the growth of micro-organisms; and these are, generally at all events, bacteria, although other micro-organisms do, at times, contribute to the result.

These do not, by any means, comprise all the uses of bacteria in food products. But they may serve to show that bacteria have a decided usefulness in connection with our food. Their use in our food is in two directions. They assist digestion by the chemical changes they produce in our food. But their chief and most important usefulness is in connection with the flavoring materials which they produce. They furnish us with our vinegar and several other acid condiments, they probably develop the flavor of vanilla and chocolate, they furnish the "gamy" flavor of meats. They give us all the delicious flavors of our butters, and they contribute in large measure to the supplying of our cheeses with those flavors which have made them the world over such popular and useful articles of diet.



THE AMERICAN SCHOOL OF HISTORIANS

ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, *Cambridge.*



APPLYING these considerations to the writing of history in America," says Mr. James Ford Rhodes in his recent inaugural address as president of the American Historical Association, "it would seem that all we have to gain in method, in order that when the genius appears he shall rival the great Greek and the great Roman, is thorough assimilation of the materials and rigorous conciseness in relation. Natural ability being pre-supposed, the qualities necessary for a historian are diligence, accuracy, love of truth, impartiality, the thorough digestion of his materials by careful selection and long meditating, and the compression of his narrative into the smallest compass consistent with the life of his story." In these words we have the judgment of an historian of great reputation, whose own works illustrate the qualities which he considers necessary for the historical writer. It is the purpose of this article to consider what has been the progress of Americans toward this standard; how far they have reached the fullness of preparation, roundness of view, and succinctness of statement which make the historian the exponent of his country and his time; to inquire how the canons of historical writing have altered from century to century; and to summarize the characteristics of the most recent and the most renowned historians in America.

At the outset must be made clear the distinction between the recorders of events and the critical analytic writers: the first, men like Columbus, are always a part of the event which they describe; while the second may look backward from a distance of centuries, as did George Bancroft; but at both extremities of our national history we find some writers who combine first-hand and contemporary knowledge with the power to see the spirit animating the body politic; such were Bradford almost three centuries ago, and Ropes and Von Holst today.

Looking over the whole field of American historiography, it is easy to recognize a succession of literary impulses; first come the narratives of such discoverers and explorers as Champlain, written with many different purposes, but much alike in the freshness and life which they put into their story. A few years later, in the first half of the seventeenth century arose a group of writers of whom Winthrop is a type, builders of commonwealths, who have left us a heritage of wisdom on the conditions of colonization. About the beginning of the eighteenth century we find conscious historians piecing together traditions and records, and trying to see the meaning and proportions of previous events; they reach from Cotton Mather to Hutchinson. Just after the Revolution, a new national self-consciousness led to several efforts to tell at some length the history of that great struggle. The beginnings of the literary period of American history, about 1830, included new and ambitious attempts to compress the whole history of the country into one systematic work; in this period George Bancroft is the most significant name. Since the Civil War a new school of historians has arisen, for the most part choosing limited periods and treating them intensively; of these Henry Adams is a type.

The first discoverers and explorers not only laid the foundation on which later generations of writers have built; but they left us narratives which, in directness, simplicity, and elevation of

thought, make them comparable with Herodotus and the Venerable Bede. What may be called the first school of American historians is made up of those who themselves felt the sting of the salt spray; heard the breakers beating upon mysterious shores; saw the painted savages come down to view the great white winged monsters from which came forth a race of white men of incalculable wealth and unearthly powers; smelt the land odors from uncleared forests; and brought home pearls and beavers and savage captives. The letters of Columbus, despite some ignoble boasting and a certain sordidness which ill became so great a man, were memorials of a splendid achievement worthy of handing down to his children's children. So the narratives of Gómara and Pizarro on the conquest of Mexico and Peru give an unfading picture of the harsh, conquering race, and of that heroic spirit through which a handful overcame a multitude. The Gentleman of Elvas somehow appeals to the native American sense of humor when he tells us how De Soto was hemmed in between the Mississippi and his enemies; "and on both sides there were many Indians, and his power was not now so great, but that he had need to help himself rather by flights than by force."

The narratives of the first English explorers have the same quality of virility, intensity, and undaunted spirit. Doubtless Sir Francis Drake was a gentleman who could make a good deal of trouble today on a twenty-knot ship in the midst of an enemy's commerce, and he would hardly understand the niceties of the law of contraband of war; but who can help enjoying his rollicking voyage to the Pacific, with its store of unctuous enumerations of plunder: "a silver chalice, two cruets and one altar cloth"; "thirteen bars of silver, each weighing four hundred ducats, Spanish"; "eight llamas, or sheep of Peru, every one of which sheep had on its back two bags of leather each bag containing fifty pound weight of fine silver"; "a chest full of royales of plate and goodly stores of silks and linen cloth"; "great riches as

jewels and precious stones"; "thirteen chests full of royales of plate, fourscore pound weight of gold, and six and twenty ton of silver." What adventurous boy would not today be proud to share the life of such a pirate, and to revel in the riches of perfidious Spain?

Nor do the voyagers have all the romance of history to themselves. While the English language lives will live honest John Smith, who has been so painfully misunderstood because his historical novel, although carefully studied on the spot and singularly accurate in its setting, came early to be accepted, and has many times been criticized, as though it were sober history. It is fortunate for later generations that so many of the early worthies could either handle the pen themselves, or had a companion or scrivener to set down in order the details of whatever was strange in scenery, in inhabitants, in wild animals, and in products. Nowadays we do not realize the absolute novelty of the new world, for nowadays no part of the world is remote, except perhaps the Antarctic continent. The sense of discovery was very stimulating: men like Champlain could with equal ease explore, fight, found communities, and write the most engaging narrative; heroes like Father Jogues have left us not only a most complete account of the natives of America, but an imperishable record of the superiority of soul over such accidents as tomahawks and bone-breaking gauntlets, and red hot coals.

In real richness, variety, and romance, American history is full, even when we compare it with the contemporary accounts of European countries; and we know actually more of the conditions, the standards and the social life of the American Indians in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries than we know of the life of the English, French, or German peasantry of that time. What wonder if the early writers were a little hampered by the attempt to describe a new barbarism in terms of an old civilization? Why should not the early historian make an "emperor" out of a naked savage who had at least the physical power to

sweep the Europeans off the new continent if he chose? Was it not natural that "kings" and "princesses" and "noblemen" should stalk out of lodges that really held unclean and untrustworthy savages? To Virginia, to New Amsterdam, to New England, the Indians were a mighty military power, often superior in battle, and all but victorious in the great campaign which lasted more than a hundred years. If the red man had had the musket, and the white man the bow and arrow, we should today be writing the history of the United States "as the lion would have painted it." In these contemporary narratives, many of them interfused with fancy, and few recognizing the real squalor, degradation, and sinfulness of savage life, we have a great cycle of historical material told in the simplest historical fashion; and this is the first school of writers of American history.

As soon as English colonization actually begins, we find a second group of writers of whom two, Bradford and Winthrop, stand preëminent; men who recorded the annals of the time in the full faith that we today should carefully read them, and should find disclosed in them the soul of the earliest commonwealths. It is of great significance that throughout the colonies, and especially in New England, there were highly educated men capable of leaving a record, reasonably accurate, and phrased in the big, broad, rugged English of the time. If one of the objects of the historian is to discover motives, what can be more significant than Bradford's long and analytic account of the reasons for the foundation of Plymouth plantation? The opening words of the "Of Plimoth Plantation" seem like the stately gateway to an epic. "And first of the occasion and inducements thereunto, the which that I may truly unfold I must begin at the very root and rise of the same. The which I shall endeavor to manifest in a plain style with sincere regard unto the simple truth in all things, at least as near as my slender judgment can attain the same."

In this manuscript, covering the period 1608-1645, so carefully written, so long preserved, used by Prince, Hubbard, Cotton Mather and Hutchinson, to disappear, and to come to light again in the palace of the Bishop of London at Fulham, almost in our own day,—in this precious memorial, we have the first attempt at a consciously reasoned history of America. Bradford tells only that part which he knew; he depended upon his own memory and the immediate communications of his friends; but the book is a remarkable account of what we now call the constitutional history of the community. Indeed there is much in Bradford to reward the student of mankind, the sociologist, the economist, the lawyer, the ecclesiastical historian, and the lover of picturesque narrative. Here we have the foundations of an English colony and the growth of its polity, the slow building of the walls of a government which was at the same time a municipality; here we read of Indian wars, stratagems, powwows, and peacemakings; here is the record of an important experiment in communism, ending like all such experiments in the final parceling out to individuals of such territory and property as was left. We learn something of what emigrants' food and quarters were on board ship, while crossing the Atlantic; we have an insight into fisheries and agriculture and trade, and interest and profit at "the rate of cento per cento"; and in the midst of affairs we have the splendid story of calm, resolute, unshrinking men, slowly piecing together a political community and preparing the way for the later United States.

The other great historical writer of this period, John Winthrop, is far less systematic and argumentative. An annalist and yet possessed of a keen sense of selection, in the midst of much that is trivial and some things that reveal the intense Puritan curiosity about things better left undisturbed, he still deals in the main with the imposing problems of free government. The staples of his history are the interplay of man against man, of class with class, the rivalries of the grave magistracy with the pushing

General Court; the final compromise by which a legislature of two houses was organized in Massachusetts. In his story of the period from 1630 to 1648, he gives us not simply crude materials, but a description of the farthestmost bases of American political ideas, as worked out on American soil.

Bradford and Winthrop are by no means the only men of that period who deal with events as the warp and woof of a systematic narrative. Captain Edward Johnson, in his "Wonder Working Providence of Sion's Saviour" published in 1654, essays what he calls a "History of New England," from those beginnings "when England began to decline in religion like lukewarm Laodicea," till "these soldiers of Christ first stood on this western end of the world." But Johnson and others had neither the literary skill nor the sense of continuity for which Bradford and Winthrop are remarkable. No others left a well-founded and well-knit narrative extending over so many years. No others felt so clearly that they were both upbuilders and recorders of their own upbuilding.

For the inner life of most of the New England settlements besides Plymouth and Massachusetts, there is a painful dearth of contemporary narrative. The histories of Rhode Island, Connecticut and New Hampshire have to be pieced out of scattered and minute references in journals and public records. It is much the same in the middle and southern colonies; except for the vivacious accounts of the settlers of the Jerseys and Pennsylvania written by Gabriel Thomas and others, there is hardly any contemporary history of the middle colonies, though much material for history. On the foundations of Virginia and Maryland there are interesting contemporary notices by Strachey, John Smith, Wingfield, White and others; but no man writes with the feeling that he is drawing out the real meaning of the events which he describes, for the use of later generations; no man foresees the oak which is to spring from his acorn. The separate history of the Carolinas came much later and must be collated from many scattered narratives. When Georgia was founded in the eighteenth

century, the historical sense was more developed, and of that colony there are several excellent contemporary accounts.

We must leap across more than half a century from the end of Bradford and Winthrop's histories to reach a third school made up of local historians and annalists, most of whom have now become simply material for later writers. Of these the first and the worst is Cotton Mather, whose *magnum opus* is the "Magnalia Christi Americana, or the Ecclesiastical History of New England," first published in 1702. It would be hard to cap this singular production for whimsicality, variety of contents, and treatment; it is everything except history. To Cotton Mather's mind nothing came amiss: tradition, rumor, gossip, memory, experiences, every-day facts, were all equally put to his service. So far as a naturally keen and well practiced memory could go, he sounded and verified these various sources, but it was not in his mind to reject a statement because he could not show it to be probably true. The make-up of the book is a monument to the perverted learning of the time. Anagrams, prefatory poems, attestations, introductory poems, general introductions, epitaphs, old sermons pitchforked in, little biographies, contemporary letters, squibs, polemic pamphlets, dialogues, prophecies, the last dying speeches of criminals, wonderful prodigies, and "remarkables" of Indian wars,—all was fish that came to Mather's net; and it is one of the tasks of the present day historian to delve in the many fonts of type of this ponderous book in order to discover how much is truth, how much prejudice, and how much downright error.

Contemporary with Mather is the first really good local history, Beverley's "History of Virginia," published about 1705; and it is worth noting that Beverley had in his mind the modern conception that history includes a view of the social conditions and standards of the time. He makes it his business not only to describe the founding of the commonwealth of Virginia, for which he had to depend on material made by others, but also to tell us

of the products, the social institutions, the education, and the labor system of his time. Here we have really the first example of an American history, written not from personal experiences, or from the memory of those who had gone through such experiences, but from printed and even written records, or at least from a restatement of such printed narratives as he could find.

Beverley set an example which unfortunately was followed by few writers of his century. To be sure there are some other agreeable books of the same kind: Smith's "History of New Jersey," published in 1765; William Smith's "History of New York," written in the eighteenth century though not published till many years later; Stith's "Virginia" (to 1624), published in 1747; and several ecclesiastical histories of merit, especially Neal's and Backus's. But these writers are independent of each other, are local and had but a limited circle of readers. One man deserves to be specially noticed because he made it his task to accumulate small details, and was the first to establish many of the accepted conventions of American history. Thomas Prince, in the preparation of his "Annals," published from 1736 to 1755, made a collection of documents which served him as the basis for a chronological conspectus of the history of New England, which, unluckily, reached only to 1633. Like his follower, Abiel Holmes, he has long since been forgotten, except by specialists; the work of both Prince and Holmes was that of laying rough stones which are hidden out of sight by the finished structure.

The first general historian of America upon the model of the three great contemporary English writers, Hume, Robertson, and Gibbon, was Thomas Hutchinson in his "History of Massachusetts Bay." An official, a man of property, of high connections, much experienced in town and colonial government, he began to publish in 1764. His second volume was published three years later, when the storm-cloud of the Revolution was already gathering. A third volume, which includes the unhappy history of

the pre-revolutionary controversies, did not appear till long after his death. In Hutchinson as in Prince, we have a study of historical sources, though very limited in kind; he seems scarcely to have known that there were manuscript records of the lower house of the Massachusetts legislature, and his history is directly founded on private papers and the records of the governor and council. What is really important in Hutchinson is his attempt to write a history in a narrative form, covering a century and a half, which should deal with events in their right proportions, and in which he should also apply the same methods of judgment and segregation to a period within which he had himself lived. Nobody now reads Hutchinson for his style, and his account of early Massachusetts is long since surpassed, but the experience of the trained public man gives a permanent value to his conclusions, and his is distinctly a genuine historian's work.

Among the evidences of a quickened national consciousness, was the growth of a new school of historians immediately after the Revolution. Among them were several notable historians of a single commonwealth,—Proud's "Pennsylvania," Trumbull's "Connecticut," Burk's "Virginia," and,—far the best of them all,—Belknap's "New Hampshire." At the same time arose several conscientious and hard-working writers, who wrought upon the history of their country, taking into view not a colony nor a section but the whole nation; and they also conceived the modern idea of choosing a limited field and treating it with thoroughness and in detail. Of these the most notable are Gordon, Ramsay, Mercy Warren, and Timothy Pitkin. Gordon was, during the Revolution, a New England minister, who was struck with the importance of the movement and infused with the desire to make a permanent memorial of the events of which he was witness or contemporary. He met the not uncommon fate of those who attempt to publish a history of their own times in the midst of intense passion. In vain did he rewrite his book in the hope of

finding a British public ; it was too impartial to please either side, and much of it relates to affairs about which there was then but little accurate knowledge possible. On the whole Gordon seems inferior to his rival, Dr. Ramsay, whose book, published in 1811, describes much of the military side of the Revolution, and includes an invaluable discussion of the effects of that great struggle on the political and social life of Americans. Mercy Warren was the first woman to publish a narrative history, which, however one-sided, was written by an eye-witness, and that eye-witness a woman of high education and great spirit. It was this able person, called by her friends the Marcia of the American Revolution, who ventured to attack the great John Adams and accused him of leaning toward monarchism. Better than all the others is honest Pitkin, whose history published in 1828, covers with clearness and insight the history of the foundation of the American republic from 1763 to 1797, with a few foot-notes referring to the scanty sources available at that time. Pitkin had a strong liking for statistics, and his books remained until up to a few years ago almost the only well thought discussion of the political and economic conditions of the colonies, as a background for a discussion of the causes of the Revolution.

Besides these important studies of material at first-hand, the great libraries contain many so-called histories of the United States, published in the first third of the nineteenth century. It seems to have been a habit of the New England country clergy to combine with the country newspapers to produce a history ; the parson furnished scissors, paste, and circumambient rhetoric, and produced a manuscript chiefly out of extracts from his predecessors ; the printer set it up on the off days when the week's paper was printed and copy for the next had not yet appeared. This process, not unknown in later and wiser generations, adds nothing to American historiography and needs no further description.

Although up to 1830 there had appeared no account of the development of America which is now read as a classic, and still less any first-hand American history of a foreign country,—the foundations were laying upon which historians might safely build. During the whole time from the beginning of the Revolution down, materials were being collected and made available, without which the work of Hildreth and Bancroft would have been impossible. It is the happy fortune of America that the great men of the revolutionary period either kept copies of their letters or wrote such important documents that they were preserved by those who received them. In the letters of Washington and Franklin, of John Jay, of Jefferson, of Madison, of Monroe, and a score of other revolutionary worthies, we find the true spirit of their times, and in 1791, Dr. Jeremy Belknap, himself the author of the excellent history of New Hampshire, founded in Boston the Massachusetts Historical Society, the first in time of a long series of public spirited organizations whose aim it has been to collect memorials which would otherwise perish, and to put them in permanent form for later generations.

Our ancestors have always been rather tenacious of public records, partly because of the importance of such evidence in settling questions of property, and partly from an instinctive feeling that what they were doing was worth remembrancing. It is this sense of doing something worth while which finds expression in the famous resolutions of the Cambridge town meeting in 1765: "that this vote be recorded in the town book that the children yet unborn might see the desire their ancestors had for their freedom and happiness." Accident, neglect, the Revolutionary War, caused the loss of many precious records, especially in the South, but enough remained to make an almost inexhaustible mine for the antiquary and investigator. Three different influences were brought to bear side by side with each other to effect the publication of historical material: the historical societies; the state governments, in many cases animated by the societies;

and the strong historical spirit of a few investigators. Of these latter, the chief is Jared Sparks, who published his edition of the "Writings of Washington" in 1836, followed by his "Franklin's Works," and by his "Correspondence of the American Revolution," and accompanied by a series of brief biographies, all of them edited and several written by Mr. Sparks. It is hard to overestimate the influence of this man, endued as he was with an immense capacity to take advantage of his great opportunities. According to the historical canons of his time he was a most intelligent editor; he thought it his duty to correct the mistakes of grammar or expression in the originals before him, so that he might more clearly bring out the sense; and it wounded him that the Father of his Country should misspell. Sparks's editions, therefore, overlay the originals with a literary shellac and varnish, but he does not conceal the original grain. Himself a conscientious investigator, a careful historical writer, he combines within his own achievements three historical triumphs: he opened up great evidences of truth; he was the first exemplar of the coöperative method of writing history; and he was himself no mean author.

Upon the foundations thus laid, and infused with that lively national spirit which began to be distinctly felt after the War of 1812, there now appears a writer who had a combination, almost unexampled in America up to that time, of an historian's qualities: ambition, training, wealth, social connections, political experience, and an intense desire to write a history of his country from its earliest beginnings down to the end of his own time. That man was George Bancroft, who, beginning his self-imposed task about 1830, in 1883 was still systematically engaged on it. A whole cycle of national history had passed by between the beginning and end of his work, and his fifty years of labor was enough only to bring him from the discovery of America down to the adoption of the federal constitution in 1788.

Here at least was a different conception of history, so different

from those who preceded him that he became the founder of a new school. Besides a capacity for vast labor, Bancroft created a machinery for the assembling of material up to that time unknown in America: he sent all over the world for transcripts of documents; he collected a valuable library; as Secretary of the Navy under Polk, he had opportunities for intimate acquaintance with the archives of the federal government; he wrote patiently and repeatedly rewrote his own work, which in its most elaborated form includes twelve good sized volumes. That Bancroft is today rather the companion of the scholar than of the patriot reader is not strange; he began and carried on his work in the midst of an atmosphere of what may be called professional history; his intellectual predecessor was Robertson; his intellectual compeers were Macaulay and Prescott. He wrote to be read and chose the style which most attracted readers half a century ago; he wrote to justify his fathers for the Revolution, and his mind was quicker to grasp the grievances of the colonies than the difficulties of the English administration. A sincere and honest man whose public service has been enormous, Bancroft is now neglected by readers, and his example is avoided by writers. It is unfortunate for Bancroft's permanent fame that a considerable part of his work has no foot-notes; his reason was that other people followed him on his authorities, without giving him credit; he thus cut off not only a means of checking his conclusions, but also a useful aid to inquirers. Bancroft has often been charged with rearranging and docking his quotations. His habit of referring to many materials available only in his own collection of transcripts, makes it difficult to examine this charge, but where he refers to printed materials he does not seem consciously to have altered the sense of a quotation by omission or transposition.

Side by side with Bancroft is a writer much less known and much less appreciated, who nevertheless has deserved well of his countrymen,—Richard Hildreth, who attempted the same task as

Bancroft, and in six volumes, the last of them published in 1856, brought down his history from the earliest colonial times to 1820. In many respects Hildreth more nearly approaches to the modern standard of the historian than any one who preceded or accompanied him. He has such a grasp of facts and so well knows how to assemble them, and to discriminate among them, that almost any event of large importance that has happened in our history is mentioned in his volumes. He, too, had his thesis to prove; strongly federalist in sympathy, his later volumes are to a considerable degree a justification of the Hamiltonian theory of government; and like Bancroft, he does not see fit to append those foot-notes which are a restraint upon a writer, an opportunity to examine his ground, and a useful equipment for later investigators.

Only one other general history of the United States in the period from 1830 to 1860 need be mentioned here. Tucker's "History of the United States" published in 1857 and covering the period from 1774 to 1841, is the only work of the kind written by a southern man. Just why most of the history writing down to the Civil War was done by New England men, is not easy to discover; traditional interest in history, good libraries, the influence of a live state historical society, the nearness of a book-buying public, the close connection between literary and public life—these are some of the reasons. Tucker aimed to look at our history from a different angle, but he has little of the method or style of the trained historian, he does not attract the reader, and is less quoted than his careful work deserves.

So far, most of the interest of American writers had been given to their own country; it was a mark of a growth in cosmopolitanism when two writers chose for their themes fields of European history, though in both cases there was a connection with American history in its wider aspects. Prescott chose first the Spaniards in America, and then the Spanish monarchy in the sixteenth century. In his time he was considered one of the

safest as well as one of the most brilliant historical writers. Brilliant he is, and he chose for his theme the romantic period which connected European civilization with the earliest phases of American history. His "Ferdinand and Isabella," his "Conquest of Peru," his "Conquest of Mexico," his "Charles V.," his "Philip II.," published during the two decades from 1837 to 1858, were read with interest and enthusiasm by scholars, business men, and schoolboys, just as Macaulay was read at the same time both in England and America. In every way he is a notable figure, this man, almost blind, working patiently year after year in his Boston library and slowly committing to the press his beautifully written volumes, which are still among our best historical works, although the methods of the author and his judgment of his sources are no longer accepted as final.

Motley came a little later, chose a similar theme, but without a direct connection with American history. His "Dutch Republic," his "United Netherlands," his "John of Barneveld," have been sources of inspiration to thousands of readers; and if the maturer student now searches them in vain for any insight into the organization of the marvelous military people whom he described; if he finds little about their colonies and nothing about their government; if he learns not the source of their wealth, nor the secret of their national persistence, he does get a striking picture of the heroism of the later day Athenians contending against the Persians of the sixteenth century. Motley was really not an historian, but a describer of mighty historic deeds.

Motley began to publish in 1856, and continued long after the Civil War, but he belongs to the ante-bellum school, and that school notwithstanding its great services, had as yet treated history only in partial fashion. Materials were collected and much learning was expended in explaining and annotating them and in brief articles and papers founded upon them. Upon the other side, several ambitious attempts had been made to give in one conspectus an account of what was most noteworthy in the

whole history of the nation. A school of biographers had also arisen, some of whom had published elaborate works like the painfully minute Rives' "Madison"; or history was grouped about the life of one individual as in Marshall's "Washington," or Irving's "Columbus." As yet, however, there was little grouping of great masses of related facts in monographs, and few examples of historians who took a brief period as their whole field.

For some years after the Civil War, Motley and Bancroft were still the noted American historians, and the development of a new spirit in history is due first of all to the achievements of another writer, whose work, though begun long before, was ended only in 1885. Francis Parkman is the greatest of all the writers who have ever made America their theme or have written as American scholars, and his greatness depends upon three qualities rarely brought together in one man; he was a matchless investigator, a man of the most unflinching tenacity, and somehow he knew how to write so that men loved to read him. His method was that of the special field, long enough in his case, but narrow in geographical dimensions. He wrote upon what he himself called "the history of the woods," upon the century and a half of hostile contact between the French colonists and the English colonists, accentuated by the fierce savages who were between them.

Back of the romance of history was the romance of Parkman's own life. One of the most unassuming and modest men who ever lived, he went on his way without seeming to know that he was a hero; but in an autobiographical fragment drawn up in 1868, he has revealed the inner man. At the age of eighteen he had formed the splendid plan of his history, all of which he lived to complete, and while still a young man he made that adventurous overland trip to Oregon, which is faithfully commemorated in his "Oregon Trail," published in 1851, an account of a journey intended to give him an "inside view of Indian life."

He returned with a physique naturally feeble, further weakened by the hardships of the prairie, and resulting in a state which he describes as follows: "The conditions were threefold: an extreme weakness of sight, disabling him even from writing his name except with eyes closed; a condition of the brain prohibiting fixed attention except at occasional and brief intervals; and an exhaustion and total derangement of the nervous system, producing of necessity a condition of mind most unfavorable to effort." After 1851, he says that there had not been "any waking hour when he has not been in some degree conscious of the presence of the malady;" although later "the condition of the sight has so far improved as to permit reading, not exceeding, on an average, five minutes at a time. * * * By reading that amount and then resting for an equal time, this alternative process could generally be continued for about half an hour, then, after a sufficient interval, it would be repeated, even three or four times in the course of the day." It was thus that large parts of his literary monument were prepared; and the difficulties but enhanced the result, for they make it evident that it is not the fascination of the subject, nor the pleasure of breaking new ground, nor the careful preparation of material that fix Parkman as the greatest of all American historians, but the soaring spirit, which had its message to tell and could not be fettered.

Parkman is a kind of bridge between the older and the newer school of historians, for he began with the same traditions as Bancroft and Hildreth, and he furnished a model and an impetus for Henry Adams, McMaster, Winsor, Rhodes, and Roosevelt. Before describing the more recent group of writers, most of them still living, it is necessary to show what an awakening came over the country in historical matters, during and after the Civil War. If it be true that interest in athletic sports and open air life is to be traced from the Virginia and Georgia campaigns, it is equally true that, just as in the post-revolutionary period, the country

awoke after 1865, to a new sense of the dignity and importance of its own history and institutions. This consciousness took form in various directions: first, in the systematic training of young men to be writers and teachers of history; second, in the appearance of a new literature of carefully wrought monographs, resembling though usually superior to the German doctors' dissertations; and third, in the devotion of their lives to historical writing by a new series of historians.

Most of the elder historical schools in America from the days of Bradford and Winthrop down to Hildreth and Palfrey were made up of college bred men; and most of the writers are grouped about one little New England college. Winthrop was a founder of Harvard; Hutchinson, a graduate; Bancroft, Hildreth, Parkman, Belknap, Prescott, Motley, were its sons; Jared Sparks, its president. And yet that college made no effort, and no other college made effort, to train young men in historical methods, and very little was done to instruct them in historical data. Each successful writer was his own teacher, and handed down few traditions. In several of the colleges were intelligent and highly educated men, who taught history by hearing formal recitations from a dull text-book; but the creative and inspiring side of teaching commonly went into mental and moral philosophy.

Early in the seventies arose two fishers of men, Charles Kendall Adams in the University of Michigan, and Henry Adams in Harvard University, and about the same time began a new system of graduate instruction in Johns Hopkins University, where for twenty-five years Herbert B. Adams has been the incitor of historical teachers and writers. All these men, and others who speedily followed them, made it their task, not only to inform their students, but also to make them searchers for truth. Henry Adams had the habit on the first day of the term of deliberately frightening out of his course all but the most eager and undaunted students; and from the residuum he built up an enthusiastic company of able young men. He edited and published a volume

of essays on Anglo-Saxon Law, prepared under his guidance by students whose names have since been attached to many more formal works; but he grew tired of enforcing historical truths through other people, and he withdrew to the ten years' labor of preparation of his masterpiece. Charles Kendall Adams at the University of Michigan, introduced with some useful modifications the German seminary method, and he also sent out students imbued with his methods, to be college professors and presidents. This was also the method steadily and effectively applied at Johns Hopkins, and the young men trained there have been widely distributed throughout the country.

In 1877, Justin Winsor came to Harvard, and so long as he lived he was the greatest force for historical learning in his university. This remarkable man in many ways resembled Sparks; he was a great organizer, and as librarian of the Boston Public Library and of the Harvard College Library furnished models to the world of libraries in which the main purpose was to have books used. As an editor and historical writer he has left three series and various independent volumes; but one of his greatest services to learning was his untiring interest in the young men and young women, students of history, who came under his influence. Himself a man of method and accustomed to deal with great masses of material and to draw from them his conclusions, he infused into all those who came into contact with him the spirit of scientific historical work. Perhaps Mr. Winsor's chief claim to eminence in his craft was his profound acquaintance with practical bibliography, not only a knowledge of books, but a consciousness of what books are important, a power of discrimination; and upon the period of American history from discovery to the War of 1812, his "Narrative and Critical History" is an example of broad scholarship applied with high intelligence to the service of science. Although he gave but few college courses, Mr. Winsor was in effect a teacher and a

trainer, as well as a librarian and an author, and he drew into his coöperative labors the most ardent young men.

Mr. Winsor's labors were to a large degree monographic. He secured from various other people short studies of episodes and movements, all founded upon a minute study of sources and each annotated by the author and supplemented by Mr. Winsor's own unfathomable learning, with precise references to the original material. Similar monographic work has for twenty years been going on all over the country and particularly in the universities. Following the example of Johns Hopkins other universities after 1880 founded special graduate schools and developed systematic instruction and preparation looking toward the degree of Ph. D. The fledgling doctors were expected to write theses, and their results, in most cases printed, constituted a new stratum in the historical materials of America. In many instances they were published in separate volumes, like Woodrow Wilson's "Congressional Government;" others were grouped in various series, of which the oldest is the "Johns Hopkins Studies," comprising a volume every year since 1883, and thus has been furnished an opportunity of reaching the world on a subject which did not stimulate the ordinary publisher, or commend itself to the magazine editor.

Later, other institutions took up the system: Columbia University, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Michigan, the University of Wisconsin, the University of Nebraska, Cornell University, Brown University, Harvard University, and other institutions have taken the responsibility for the publication of single or grouped studies, often representing the well-directed labor of several years. Here many historical writers who have later blossomed out into more general literary work have tried their prentice hands; here young men and young women have the opportunity to put upon record evidence of their power to deal with historical subjects, an evidence

often of much service to them through the effect which it may have upon the mind of the college presidents and other grantees who have the power to hold out the golden sceptre. In such monographs the residuary results, drawn from the distilling of great masses of otherwise undigested material, are made available for other writers. The stream of such publications goes on unceasingly, and their character tends to improve as the opportunities for study and for direction from older men increase. The better writers outgrow their doctor's theses, and sometimes wonder that their judgments were ever so crude; but the result is an opening up of fields of great importance which had long remained untilled.

For example, until a few years ago there was nowhere to be found any account, based upon the sources, of presidential elections, or of the speakership of the House of Representatives, or of the Senate, or of the veto power, or of congressional committees, or of the actual system for nomination for office; the student of American institutions has now the benefit of careful studies in all these subjects; and it is worth noting that within this field of practical politics some of the best work of collecting and generalizing from the scattered materials has been done by women. Twenty years ago there was almost nothing in the way of careful, first-hand studies of the slavery question; now we have able monographs on various individual commonwealths, on fugitive slaves, on slavery in the District of Columbia, on the slave-trade, and on the underground railroad,—nearly every one a result of scientific study under the direction or impetus of college teachers.

The system of monographs has done much to make the conditions and the merits of historical writing widely known. Where half a century ago one man knew how to write an acceptable historical narrative, forty persons have now had some experience. One of the influences which has done much to stimulate investigation in limited topics has been the American

Historical Association, founded in 1884. In its two functions of holding meetings at which younger men are brought into association with older writers, and of printing an annual report in which shorter or longer papers may be printed and distributed to an impatient world, the Association has made the path of young writers easier; and its list of presidents has included most of the foremost historical writers of the time.

The most widely known and most useful series of monographs, a revival of Sparks' idea of brief biographies by experts, is the widely read, "American Statesman Series," which is edited, and of which several volumes have been written by John T. Morse, Jr. Similar to it in scope are the "American Men of Letters," "Makers of America," "Beacon Biographies" and other like combinations, all in principle an attempt to tell the story of a brief period through the lives of public men who stood for a dominant idea.

Under modern conditions one of the measures of the interest in a science is the kind of journals which are created to represent it. In many respects the publications of the various state and local historical societies have for more than a century been sober periodicals; besides the more special issues of "Collections" such societies annually print "Transactions," or "Records" which contain briefer and less imposing matter, and in several cases, as for example the Pennsylvania Historical Society, this publication has not only the character but the form of a magazine. From the founding of Carey's "American Museum," in 1787, and especially after the establishment of the "North American Review," in 1815, there has always been a medium for historical articles, often elaborate enough to be monographs. Not till 1857 was there a periodical devoted entirely to history; Dawson's "Historical Magazine," which kept up a respectable existence till 1875. Then followed the "Magazine of American History" from 1877 to 1896.

These were both private enterprises, which were able to get

very little aid and comfort from the established historical writers of the time, and they received little that was significant from the new race of monographists. In 1895, a journal was founded under the title of the "American Historical Review," with the express purpose of uniting scattered historical forces, of dealing with all fields and phases of history, and of offering an opportunity for the publication of the result of the latest scholarships. Through a relation established with the American Historical Association in 1898, the circulation and influence of this review were much increased, and history remains one of the few great fields of learning in America on which rival universities have not established rival and struggling journals.

The illustrated magazines of the time, and the political reviews also give scope for historical articles, often of great excellence, by able hands, and in many cases drawn out into a series which eventually becomes a book. No historical writer young or old, need suffer for a medium through which to make his conclusions known, provided he really has conclusions worth drawing; and in the pages of the special and general periodicals future writers of history will find a fund of valuable materials.

The connection of history with universities has had some admirable effects; among them has been an intimate relation between the profession of teaching history and the profession of writing history. The American historians of half a century ago were, with few exceptions, literateurs, men of private station and of private means, who gave up a large part of their lives to historical writing for the love of scholarly occupation and the hope of fame. The collection of materials was a tedious and expensive task; they were the men who had the time and money to travel afar, in order to get the proper horizon, and to make some acquaintance with other countries and languages. In the Sparks manuscripts, in the Parkman manuscripts and the Bancroft manuscripts, are many extracts copied from records not available in print. A man sat down to write a history as he now

sits down to found a review, with ambition as a frontlet and with money in his pocket. Sometimes good Uncle Sam gave them a diplomatic position in which they might pursue their investigations; thus Prescott was made Minister to Spain, Motley to the Netherlands, Bancroft to Germany.

The growth of scientific instruction in history has developed a new race of historical writers who have gone forth to supersede the older type; among the present best known American writers upon history, McMaster is a professor in a university, Schouler is a lecturer in a university, Charles Francis Adams is a most ardent overseer of a college, John Fiske was once an instructor in history in a college and a college librarian, Von Holst is a professor, Moses Coit Tyler is a professor and Winsor was a college librarian. This academic connection is the more striking when we remember that in pure literature the most noted writers today have mostly come up outside university precincts and are little associated with college life.

Some reasons for the taking up of formal history by college men are obvious; since the scientific basis of history has become recognized, history is more likely to be undertaken by those who have had a scientific training and a scientific opportunity. From the other direction, the publication of an excellent history often leads to a call which for the rest of a man's days connects him with some college; thus McMaster's first volume led to his transference from an instructorship in mathematics to a professorship in American history. It has become a tradition that the university professor of history ought to have part of his time for literary duties, and he often has the use of superior libraries. Perhaps the best explanation is simply that preparation for classes and preparation for publication run on all fours with each other; and the enthusiasms of both pursuits are alike.

All explanations, however, fail to account for the fact that among the many American teachers of ancient, mediæval, continental, and English history, hardly a single one is at work on a

magnum opus in his own field; so far, text-books, brief histories, or an account of an episode, are all that have been exhibited. While Doyle and Lecky and Trevelyan place themselves among the best writers on American affairs, what American professor has undertaken a history of England, or of any part of it, as a life-long task? The few considerable pieces of such work do not come from the universities at all: Henry C. Lea is a publisher; Hannis Taylor's "England," James Breck Perkins' "France," Tom Watson's bizarre "France," a kind of etherialized Georgia, are written by hard-working lawyers or politicians; William R. Thayer has made Italian history his theme, and Charles M. Andrews, is author of a history of modern Europe; they alone of American historians of Europe are in close touch with universities.

Two remarkable exceptions must be noted to the general rule that the more noted living writers of history are given up to American history. Captain Mahan has so far chosen to write chiefly on the naval history of Great Britain; but aside from the interest of the trained naval officer in that country which has taught the world most about fighting at sea, he has really in mind a principle of national polity which he thinks his countrymen ought to keep in mind; he is an American writing for the instruction, first of all, of America, and then of all mankind. Henry C. Lea in his studies of ecclesiasticism and especially in his "History of the Inquisition," has shown a rare cosmopolitan spirit. In interest of subject, in insight of investigation, in the power to reach and state conclusions, and in style, he stands among the best of American historical writers, and exemplifies the value of the study of other peoples and their civilization.

In general it is safe to say that the chief interest of American historical writers is in the affairs of their own country, and all the living writers give themselves up to a distinct and limited area. No longer does anyone try to write a complete history of America from the sources; the last attempt was Winsor's, and he

was unable, even by his skillful use of the coöperative method, to get much beyond the beginning of the nineteenth century. Each man now assumes that he may begin on the foundations laid by somebody else. John Fiske has, in his own method, traversed the ground of Bancroft and Hildreth, to the adoption of the Constitution. Edward Eggleston has chosen the era of commonwealth building. James Schouler has written a history in six volumes extending from the end of the Revolution to the end of the Civil War. Professor McMaster has chosen the same beginning, and appears to look forward to about the same date for his end. Rhodes has chosen to begin at 1850, long enough before the Civil War so that he may make plain the reason for that titanic struggle, and he expects to bring the work down to a point near the present day. Henry Adams chose the sixteen years, 1801-1817, from the inauguration of Jefferson to the end of Madison's administration, and having finished that period has apparently abandoned further historical writing.

No attempt has been made in this paper to enumerate all the good writers in or on America, for the aim is to describe tendencies and not men; and prophesies as to what is to be accomplished by the fledglings would only cause distrust in the prophet's judgment. It is, however, safe to say that, through a long process of development, in which the recorders of history and the critics of historical events have united to bring together a vast body of materials, we have now reached a point where there is a permanent body of active, highly trained, ambitious writers of history who, with the aid of the monographers, the patient earth-worms who prepare soil to bear fruit, constitute what may not unreasonably be called the American School of Historical Writing.

Perhaps illustration may be clearer than statement on this point; four living writers of American history stand out plainly as the present heads of their craft: Hermann Von Holst, Henry Adams,

John Fiske, and James Ford Rhodes ; what they do is the best that is now being done.

Von Holst has finished his labor of thirty years, on what is substantially a history of the slavery contest from 1828 to 1860. He fights the battle over again, for he loves intensity. His chief service has been to bring home to Americans the inevitableness of a contest, after the traditional principles of free government were so violently contradicted by slavery. A good hater, a powerful hitter, Von Holst has done much to break in pieces the conventional apotheosis of our public men, and to lead us to see the real elements of the Civil War.

Henry Adams seems to have given up historical writing ; a man of independent fortune, he likes to diverge around the world and to give sage advice to young politicians. He need never put pen to paper again in order to assure his reputation as one of the world's great historical narrators. It is his forte to be at the same time scientific, careful, and imaginative, to penetrate the intricacies of complex characters, to seize the spirit of bygone times ; his is the study of motive, the discerning of guiding principles of national character. He has almost a lordly disregard of his own footnotes ; he gives a reference, not because he feels the need of a backer, but because he has so many reserves that he may give them or withhold them as he pleases. His style, less absorbing than Parkman's, is equally limpid, almost equally effective.

John Fiske delights in the mastery of events. Gibbon has been compared to the march of an army ; legion after legion, cohort after cohort, trumpets fanfaring at regular intervals, horses cavalcading, all glowing in shining armor ; perhaps Fiske might be compared to a holiday procession, men singers and women singers, both young men and maidens, flutes, harps, and psalteries, and children dancing in the rear. There is a wholesome, sunny serenity about his volumes ; he does not go very deeply into the "Weltschmerz," but he tells the story so that he who runs may read. His books are the books of the prosperous man, who likes to see the evidence of healthy growth in his country.

Rhodes is the latest knight to besiege the enchanted castle of literary fame, and he is the only one of the four who reveals the intellectual forces that lie outside the colleges; only a short time a college student, never a college teacher, brought up to business in a bustling western city, he has wooed both Lady Fortune and the muse of history, and both have smiled upon him. His most characteristic merits are his care, his impartiality, his clear and readable style, and above all, his ability to discover the ruling motives of a people in a time of passionate stress.

The impression made upon the observer of historical writing is hopeful. Our greatest historian, Parkman, lives only in his imperishable books; but leaving him out, there has never been an American historian equal to the best living writers in training, in conception of what historical research means, in discrimination, in insight, or in genuine historical style. Where are the poets to replace Lowell and Longfellow and Whittier? Where are the essayists to equal Emerson? Where the novelists to measure height with Hawthorne? Yet in historical writing the authors of the golden age give way to the present American School in popularity among readers, and in usefulness to scholars; and perhaps some day a new generation of authors may arise to whom the historians of this quarter century will give God-speed.



THE CONFLICT IN CHINA

EDMUND BUCKLEY, *University of Chicago.*



HE Powers are at war with China!

That means, in the first place, a struggle between civilizations; for the Powers, with the exception in some degree of Russia, stand well into the vestibule of enlightenment, while China stands only at the threshold of civilization.

Civilization is distinguished from the barbarism which is the stage of culture next below it chiefly through practice of writing, while some such term as enlightenment seems necessary to mark that stage of culture that has begun to depend on an all-around application of science. The Powers are certainly at war on a culture ground, namely, to prevent, if possible, and otherwise to punish, an utterly barbarous breach of that phase of a friendly international intercourse which finds its expression in resident representatives. Whether, and how far, the struggle is also one between races, can be determined with certainty only from the conduct of the Chinese during the coming centuries,—that is to say, the question is whether the Chinese will show themselves capable of adopting and adapting Occidental culture. As we believe that “blood (that is, race) will tell” in some degree or other, we shall proceed to rapidly sketch the physical and mental traits of this Chinese race. We write Chinese race rather than Mongolian; for here the Japanese must be dissociated from the Chinese by reason of

their Malay blood, which shows its influence in both their physical and mental traits, so that the Japanese differ from the Chinese far more than the French do from the Germans, who are only different peoples from the same Indo-Keltic race (popularly known as Caucasian, and otherwise as Aryan), while the Malays differ in race from the Mongolians. These traits of the Chinese are more than interesting; they are surprising, and even alarming in these days of open and keen competition. They may well give us pause; and they lend strong support to the oft repeated declaration of the late Dr. Gulick of Canton, that by the time the American had worn himself out, the Chinese would be ready to inherit the earth, as well as to the recent assertion of General Wolseley, that a properly trained Chinese army would prove invincible. As to physical traits, we find that the heredity of the Chinese is as mixed as that of the European. The Northern Chinese is "tall, stout, solid, and slow," as Ross says, while the Southerner is "short, small, 'cute.'" The same difference and kinds of difference prevail in Europe and India, and have the same origin, namely, the incursions of larger and stronger races from the North, which gradually spend their force as they progress southwards. Europe, India, and China are parallel again in the variety of languages, of which there are eight in China. The commonalities of Peking, Canton, Shanghai, Foochow, and Amoy cannot understand each other's language.

Here is the ethnologist's description of the Chinese: Yellowish skin, lank, coarse, black hair, rudimentary beard, prominent cheek bones, eyes black, lack-lustrous, and obliquely sloping towards the nose, which has little or no bridge and broad nostrils. That picture is nothing short of repulsive; seems even to suggest the satyr to our Greek-haunted eyes; and, in fact, while Japan is the "globe-trotter's paradise," China is little visited, and gladly left. Keene's "Asia" contrasts the Mongolian expression as heavy, inanimate, monotonously uniform with the Caucasian as

bright, intelligent infinitely varied; and the Mongolian temperament as dull, taciturn, morose, lethargic, but fitfully vehement, with the Caucasian as energetic restless, fiery, and poetic. One can see at a glance from this comparison of traits that for routine work as "hands" the Chinese would be superior to the Caucasian. Far more important is the immunity of the Chinese from consumption, syphilis, and alcoholism, those scourges of the Occident and of Japan, where Malay blood has destroyed this immunity. The Chinese is, moreover, free from inflammatory diseases, and partly so from cholera and beriberi, twin scourges of humanity. And when we consider that the Chinese recuperates on four hours sleep, for which he needs neither quiet nor darkness, and, in general, has no nerves; that as a schoolmaster he can teach twelve hours a day; that only officials wear hats, even in tropical weather; and that he has a digestion like an ostrich,—we must admit that he has splendid equipment for the modern industrial struggle. That children and aged alike can swarm in spite of general ignorance of hygiene, and of poor and insufficient food, is unaccountable, except on the assumption of the exceeding vitality of the people. His temperament has precluded the practice of competitive sports; and he cannot be brought to comprehend why Westerners should wish to work so hard without pay. He prefers to fly kites; and if he practices archery or lifting weights, that is only in preparation for military examinations. Only one danger besets such a physique and such a temperament; but this is a momentous danger; it works like rat-bane. That is opium, which appeals, with its Fool's Paradise of dreamy bliss, to the sedate Chinese as powerfully as does alcohol to the active Caucasian. Introduced from Java in the eighteenth century, opium-eating spread slowly until the nineteenth; but is now practiced by some forty millions of Chinese. In Foochow alone are one thousand registered opium dens; more numerous than rice or tea shops. The taste for opium is plainly a hereditary predilection of the Chinese, and not an accident of

environment, as is the Japanese distaste for butter and kissing,—both of which are readily overcome !

Out of a score of attempts at characterizing the “mental” Chinese the following description by Archdeacon Gray is easily the best ; and, moreover, so groups its traits as to meet the problem suggested by Mr. H. Norman, that “the Chinaman and the mosquito are the two great mysteries of creation.” “Meekness,” says the Archdeacon, “gentleness, docility, industry, contentment, cheerfulness, obedience to superiors, dutifulness to parents, and reverence for the aged are, in one and the same person, the companions of insincerity, lying, flattery, treachery, cruelty, jealousy, ingratitude, avarice, and distrust of others. The Chinese are a weak and timid people, and, in consequence, like all similarly constituted races, they seek a natural refuge in deceit and fraud.” The significance of this portrait will be entirely missed, unless one understand that its features are true in a preëminent degree. One who estimates the industry and contentment needed to survive in a population of five hundred to the square mile, will readily confirm General Grant’s choice, when he declared that the most extraordinary sight he beheld on his world tour was a petty Chinese dealer by his keen competition driving out a Jew ! If we add to the above those sudden accessions of “Chi,” or “wrath matter,” whenever the usually ox-like patient celestial has been taxed beyond even his forbearance,—a vast specimen of which is now witnessed in China,—we have a full length mental portrait of the Chinese.

So much for the hereditary traits of these men whom we must increasingly meet either in war or peace, henceforth forever, and whom we need, therefore, to understand. We must now see just what culture (civilization) such heredity has developed ; for it is just these two, culture and heredity, that form the fundamental cause, as distinguished from the mere occasion, of the current conflict in China.

If we marshal a crowd of facts under the various cultural, in

their order; namely, industry, knowledge, art, conduct, and religion, it will both conduce to clearness and make the evidence plainly cumulative, instead of confining it wholly to the much disputed spheres of conduct and religion. To Chinese industry Europe owes silk, tea, china, and perhaps printing, which the Chinese invented in the eighth century. They have also made pape since the second century before the Christian era. But the printing was by blocks, and the Chinese never developed the movable type which has ousted the block with us. They invented also the mariner's compass, and gunpowder; but used the latter only for fireworks. The Grand Canal and the Great Wall are works of gigantic labor, but not of great skill. During the millenniums since these inventions were made, the Chinese mind has devised nothing new. The ox drawing a plow which only scratches the surface; the hoe and the sickle,—are used now as in primitive times, whereas the Occidental uses the horse with a deep plow, the spade, and the reaper.

The state of knowledge in China shows the same low stage. Their histories are mere annals with moral reflections attached; their vast encyclopædias are full of detail, which is dear to the Chinese mind, but are wanting in accurate generalization. The Chinese can draw the plan of a city, but not the map of a country; they make a good itinerary but a poor campaign. They are great in small things; but small in great ones. Most characteristic of all, the Mongolian never devised either grammar, logic, or mathematics,—a failure that of course tells disastrously upon all his science and philosophy, if such these can be named. Astrology, geomancy (*Fangshui*), magic, and divination abound in the land, while physiology, hygiene, surgery, and scientific diagnosis are impossible, because the mutilation involved in anatomy would persist with the ghost! There are no medical schools and no better safeguard for medicine than that prescribed in the “*Li Chi*” (twelfth to first century B. C.): “The physic of a doctor in whose family medicine has not been practiced for three genera-

tions at least, should not be taken." Although the Chinese began astronomy as pupils of the Chaldeans, and have made it a favorite study ever since, their knowledge of it is merely considerable, and not profound. They can calculate eclipses, but still suppose the earth flat, immovable and square. They still use the Ptolemaic system they learned from the Jesuit missionaries centuries ago; nor can they take nautical observations, and, thus, they find little use for their mariner's compass. So, again, the factual connection of the tides with the moon has been observed from early times, but no nearer approach made to its theory than this: "The vital essence of the moon governs water; and hence when the moon is at its brightest, the tides are high." Similarly we read: "It is the nature of water to run downward; the nature of fire to flame upward, etc." The dramatist and novelist make no analysis of motives, but move their figures about at pleasure. The same lack of thorough going research, of profound inquiry, which continues until it reaches the self evident, appears in a sphere which the Chinese have cultivated for millenniums with great assiduity. "While they expatiate on the virtues, they make but little inquiry into the nature of virtue; while insisting on various duties, they never discuss the ground of obligation; and while duties are copiously expounded, not a word is said upon the subject of rights." According to Balfour, this weak intellect is obvious in ordinary intercourse. "There are few things more amusing, and at the same time more exasperating, to a European than the utter confusion of thought which characterizes the Chinese as a race. * * * There seems a looseness of reasoning, a want of consecutiveness in the mental process of the Chinese which argues an inherent defect in their constitutions."

Let us accumulate evidence for the bare civilization of the Chinese in the realm of fine art. Chinese architecture never progressed any further than to repeat in wood and tile the primitive, nomadic skin tent. The sag in the roof, the absence of

upper stories, and the support by wooden columns instead of by walls, all recall the original tent. Here has been no development of styles, as in Greece and subsequently in Western Europe. Perspective and chiaroscuro are still almost unknown to painting; distant objects being placed at the top of a picture, and nearer ones below them, with little difference in size. Clothing as a mark of status is emphasized, while mental expression is neglected. The same ignorance of anatomy which precluded medical skill leads to caricature, when men or animals are depicted. When one learns that Chinese music has only five sounds, doesn't distinguish major and minor, and combines instruments only in unison, he wonders what is left. Like every other branch of Chinese culture, their music is the product of sedulous cultivation for millenniums; and it remains nevertheless an infinite deal of nothing! It is the same with their literature; so that Douglas may well write: "It is difficult to imagine a nation of busy writers pursuing the course of literature for more than three thousand years, and yet failing to display greater progress in thought and style than Chinese authors have done." Think of the incomparably oldest people on earth without a Raphael, a Mozart, or a Shakespeare!

We now reach a sphere that is not simply a clear case of inferior culture, but a powerful cause of that inferiority in all other spheres. We mean conduct, in which we include both individual morality and public politics. In China one concept covers both, and that concept is patriarchalism. In abstract ethics the Chinese attained the human climax six centuries B. C. though the insight of Kongtze and Laotze; and the same achievement by nearly contemporary Hindoos, Hebrews, and Greeks shows how near human nature such altruism lies. The silver rule, golden rule, and diamond rule of overcoming evil with good were all declared comparatively early in human progress. But the application of such principles to specific duties is a far later product. The Chinese society, for example, still lags in the

partriarchal stage, which requires filial piety as the prime and model virtue, just as it does ancestorism as a religion. The moral code here takes shape in the duties of the "five relations"; namely, those of father to son, older brother to younger brother, husband to wife, ruler to subject, and friend to friend. Only the last one is "between equals," the others are all modeled on the first, which plainly calls for subordination. The conception of the matter given in the Chinese Classics is first to prescribe the duties of the "superior man" as such, and then to prescribe the duties of all others with reference to him as their lord and master. The only text known to me where their mutual duties are mentioned together is the following from "Li Chi," Vol. II, pp. 379-80: "What are the things which men consider to be right? Kindness on the part of the father, and filial duty on that of the son; gentleness on the part of the elder brother, and obedience on that of the younger; righteousness on the part of the husband, and submission on that of the wife; kindness on the part of the elders, and deference on that of the juniors; with benevolence on the part of the ruler, and loyalty on that of the minister; these ten are the things which men consider to be right." These generalities would pass muster here; but let us interpret them as the Chinese do. So dominant a virtue is filialism that sons, even when full grown men, will meekly submit to be flogged, and would be readily committed to prison on the father's charge. The son's property is as much under parental control as is his liberty. "While his parents are alive, a filial son will not have wealth that he calls his own." Since "the ceremony of marriage was intended to be a bond of love between two families," the parents choose the son's bride; and "If he very much approve of his wife and his parents do not like her, he should divorce her"; and, "A filial son will be good even after his parents' death mainly to reflect honor upon them." A Chinese marries by twenty years of age in order to secure such substantial benefits as sons are in this life, and to guarantee the

sacrifices necessary to his salvation after death. "Trees are for shade, and children for old age." Indeed filial piety positively incites the prosaic Chinese to enthusiastic eloquence.

Though the husband may divorce his wife, for any of the five reasons, among which is talkativeness, she may never divorce him on any ground, but may remonstrate with him, although not so as to irritate or annoy him! She does not eat with him, or appear in public with him, and must travel in a closed sedan, if she would visit other women. To friends visiting the home, she is an invisible, nameless thing; and, conversely, gentlemen seek female society in the shape of courtesans who are trained in accomplishments like the *hetærae* of Greece. Girls are secluded in the women's apartment after ten years of age; and after early betrothal are sedulously watched; being bad by nature, and therefore as "dangerous as smuggled salt." Since a woman is not taught to read, nor allowed to attend theatres, novels, jest books, and dramas alike have remained without purifying influence and are therefore impure. Other malign effects of patriarchalism upon woman are, first, the frequent infanticide which falls mostly upon girls,—an inscription beside a pool near Foo-chow runs, "Girls may not be drowned here,"—and slavery which serves mostly to secure housemaids and concubines, of which a comely one fetches about thirty-five dollars. A like mischief, that chiefly concerns sons, is the vendetta—"with the enemy who has slain his father, one should not live under the same heaven."

While the family is the social unit in China, the individual is the unit in Western societies; and these individuals are possible only in the freedom guaranteed by a nation. Individual, family, and nation complement and incite each other to finer issues than would be possible did any one of these exist alone. From the lack of these modern units, Chinese government, moreover, falls under the bane of a patriarchalism extending from family through clan, village, province, to the whole people. "The Son of

Heaven (Emperor) and the Queen are to the people what father and mother are." Thus saith the ancient "Li Chi," from which there can be no appeal. As such a father the authority of the Emperor is absolute. When, in 1859, the American minister to China, Hon. John E. Ward, refused to prostrate himself (*koto*), or even kneel before the "dragon countenance" of the Emperor, with the words, "I kneel only to God and woman," he was answered, "The Emperor is the same as God."

This autocratic Emperor appoints every officer,—mandarin,—high or low; and each exercises, according to his degree, the patriarchal function. The governor of a city sits under a canopy inscribed with the words, "Ye are all my children." His duties correspond with this conception. Dr. W. A. P. Martin tells us in his "A Cycle of Cathay," that "His duties are multifarious as those of the head of a household. He directs the police, collects the taxes, inspects the schools, superintends the public charities, holds inquests; and his spare time, if he have any, is given to functions of the judge in a court of first instance." When we learn, furthermore, that his salary is miserably small, and that there is neither a free press, platform, nor ballot box to expose him, can we wonder that corruption is the rule, and integrity the exception among such autocrats. Such are the terrors of the law before a mandarin that numberless suits are privately settled by a go-between. Many cases are settled by the elders of the village, who will sometimes inflict even the death penalty on a local prodigal. This patriarchalism is guarded so far as possible from the caprice and tyranny of the sovereign by an iron-clad education, including religion, and by six administrative boards; namely, of civil office, of military office, of rites (education and religion), of justice, of finance, and of public works. The Emperor generally sanctions the advice of the board. In critical matters all six of the boards may be called into consultation; and to the advice of this august assembly the Emperor always conforms.

There are neither priests nor lawyers in this queer State. The State worship is conducted by the Emperor or officials as his representatives, and the mandarin's secretary declares the law as cases arise. Staunton is authority for the general statement, that Chinese law is no further advanced than was the Roman 300 B. C. In what is called "the severe question," torture by means of instruments for compressing wrists or ankles, resembling mediæval thumb-screws, is legal as a means of extricating evidence, and especially confession from the defendant, since no punishment can be administered without it. Doubtless such torture and the subsequent corporal punishments offer less terrors to a people that can ride in carts without springs, and bear surgical operations that would blanch the more sensitive Westerner. In the light of such facts can anyone wonder that the Powers required "concessions" of land at the Treaty Ports, on which they might set up their own judicial courts? Assuming that intercourse of nation with nation is mutually beneficial, one must grant that extra-territoriality as a provisional arrangement followed of necessity. The same plan was instituted in Japan under similar conditions, and was relinquished this year of grace when the Western legal code had been not only adopted, but tested.

A fact of prime importance at the present juncture is the total lack of patriotism in China. Mr. H. Norman said bluntly, "There is no such thing as China"; and all observers agree in substance. Politics is considered the business of the officials,—mandarins,—who are paid for attending to it. Then, how could politics flourish without a press! Loyalty to the throne is just as rare, except in the officials whose interest always lies that way. Hence the ease with which the Chinese change dynasties, which has happened no less than thirty times since the era of Confucius, 6th century B. C. On the other hand, local attachments to family, clan, district, and province are intense.

Mr. John Fiske has observed how generally ancestor cult accompanies the patriarchal social system. Neither could cause the

other ; but both belong to the same low culture. Ancestorism is the worship of the ghost of an ancestor, because on the one hand it continues to need food, clothing, etc., and, on the other hand, can deal good or evil to mortals. Dread of such ancestral and other spirits is the nightmare and the daymare of the Chinese mind. All the unexplained fortunes of life are referred to their influence ; and their cult is enforced under severe penalties alike upon Confucian, Taoist, Buddhist, and even Mohammedan, of whom there are thirty millions in the North West of the Empire. Professor Martin recommended, at a missionary conference, control rather than abolition of this ancestorism ; but the missionaries were unanimously in favor of the abolition, and were correct. Ancestorism, too, must go along with the other patriarchal lumber.

The dire need for a son to worship one after death makes marriage and posterity a ruling motive with the Chinese,—a motive equaled only by his love of money. “ The ceremony of marriage was intended to be a bond of love between two families of different surnames ; with a view in its retrospective character the securing the services in the ancestral temple, and, in its prospective character, to securing the continuance of the family line. It thus powerfully fosters what can well care for itself, the reproductive impulse in man, and, consequently, people marry in China as no where else but in India, where the same ancestorism prevails. China simply swarms with people, young, adult, and aged, with a consequent competition for all sorts of goods, which only those who have seen can appreciate. It has come near placing a prohibitive amount of self-sacrifice upon the virtue of benevolence, and, as Mr. Smith says, “ most rigid economy of the truth has become a fixed habit ” with them.

Several phases of the Chinese belief in survival after death presents special interest just now. One appeared in 1854, when a rebel stronghold was captured by Sengkolinsin, a Mongol prince, and the prisoners were offered in sacrifice to the

manes of his fallen soldiers, while their hearts were eaten by the victors to increase their courage! Another is the practice of slaying persons in order that their spirits may secure the foundation of a bridge, or other difficult structure. The natives of Shanghai supposed twenty children buried under the walls of the English Cathedral there; and now fear a like practice to secure the railway ties. Finally, the timidity of the Chinese in war is augmented by their belief that mutilations persist with the ghost. Hence Chinese suicide is always done by drowning, poison, or strangling, never by mutilation; while the Government reserves decapitation for paricides, and further mutilates the bodies of pirates or rebels, while it scatters the bones of their ancestors to the winds. Both are horrors of the first rank to the Chinese mind. The naturistic side of the Chinese religion consists in the worship of Tien, "Heaven," with whom has been identified Ti, "Ruler," or Shangti, "Supreme Ruler," and of Haitu, "Earth," besides a host of minor nature deities. Only the Emperor may offer the great sacrifices to Hwangtien Shangti, "August Heaven, Supreme Ruler," and to Haitu at the winter and summer solstices, the vernal equinox, and great civil occasions. At such seasons the sacrifice in point of ceremonial, and of value of the material, vegetal, and animal sacrifices, is easily the grandest on earth. Commoners may at any time offer incense and address prayers to Tien, and usually do so at the time of the new and full moon.

Such, then, is the miserable condition of Chinese culture in each and all its forms. The superiority of our own culture is demonstrated by the ability to perceive and even measure the inferiority of the Chinese, and especially in tracing its cause,—to the end let us hope that it may be remedied. Now, the Chinese could not possess even such culture as they do without having attained to it, that is, without progress or development. More intimate acquaintance with Chinese culture-history has shown that such development, or at least innovation, has continued in vary-

ing rate down to the present. But it has been so astonishingly slow and trivial that one suspects Chinese capacity for it to be at fault.

Certainly all human races have not the same attitude for mental development. "The law of heredity is one of those from which man cannot escape, and it is this law which, under the influence of the conditions of life, fashions races, and makes them what they are." But we must not, therefore, pass to the opposite extreme, and admit that some races are incapable of progress. The indigenes of America, Oceanica, and Africa would have progressed under favorable conditions. So far Quatrefages. That is, as ever, the difference is quantitative. All human races are capable of progress under improved conditions; but, alas, some are so slow that conditions sufficiently favorable would be impracticable. Of such commanding importance is this capacity for progress that modern ethnologists like Vierkunt and Deniker make this the criterion of classification for stages of culture. The latter distinguishes savages, who progress very slowly, semi-civilized, who progress slowly, and civilized, who progress rapidly; and places the Chinese in the semi-civilized, along with Abyssinians, Malays, etc. Ratzel holds the same view, when he states that in semi-civilization the forces that retain are most active, while in civilization those that extend are so. He continues his discussion of human progress by such specific reference to the Chinese that no apology for quoting this is needed.

Semi-civilization Ratzel claims lacks in intellectual progress, while material progress is easier. Two hundred years ago China and Japan astonished Europeans by their achievements in agriculture, manufacture, and trade. But now Europeans are far ahead. What but the light in free intellectual creation has made the West so far outrun the East? Voltaire hits the point when he says that Nature has given the Chinese the organs for discovering all that is useful to them, but not for going any further.

They have become great in the useful, in the arts of practical life; while we are indebted to them for no one deeper insight into the connections and causes of phenomena, for no single theory.

“Does this lack arise,” he asks, “from a deficiency in their endowments or does it lie in the rigidity of their social and political organization, which favors mediocrity and suppresses genius? Since it is maintained through all changes of their organization, we must decide for the defect in their endowments, which also is the sole cause of the rigidity of their social system. No doubt the future alone can give a decisive answer, for it will in the first place have to be shown whether and how far this race will progress on the ways of civilization which Europe and North America vie in pointing out to them; for there has long been no doubt that they will or must set foot on them. * * * Should they possess in themselves only the capacities for semi-civilization, the need for progress through immigration from Europe and North America will bring stronger organs to the front, and slowly transform the mass of the people.”¹

I fully agree with these views of the distinguished ethnologist, and will seek only to confirm them. The Chinese have obviously progressed as far as is possible to their unaided capacity. Help must come from without, from that external, indirect cause of development, intercourse. It was through such intercourse that Westerners gained from the Greeks those elements of culture that, operating afresh at the Renaissance, have led to our present enlightenment. It has been the distinction of the Indo-keltic race to develop those germs; and it thus offers the best guarantee that it could have originated them. Can any one doubt that the German Leibniz, the English Newton, or the

(1) H. Ratzel, “*Völkerkunde*,” vol. i. pp. 25-26. I quoted from the English translation, *A History of Mankind* except for the last sentence which quite missed the author's meaning in his *Sollten in ihnen selbst, etc.*

French Pascal could have invented geometry, if he had not inherited it from the gifted Euclids? Pascal actually regretted that he had not been allowed that delight of invention. Does not the quantification of the predicate by Sir William Hamilton, and the symbolic logic of Boole show that either would have invented formal logic, had not Aristotle preëmpted the same? What the Mongolian can do to promote the progress of humanity remains to be seen; but certain it is, that he will do nothing until stimulated from without. To apply that stimulation peaceably, if possible, but otherwise by war is the plain duty of those possessing the precious boon of higher culture, which means more of specifically human life. When, in 1853, our Commodore Perry steamed into Yeda harbor, and demanded friendship with the Japanese, we did the best single service ever rendered a people. Concessions were a provisional necessity; but no Power ever had "spheres of influence," or talked of partitioning Japan. If the case differs in China, the fault lies with the Chinese, and the reasons are not far to seek. His arrest of development arises from his hereditary incapacity, and from certain special traits which he has acquired. Here is his pride, and not without reason; for has not he been the source and centre of culture to all the peoples known to him for millenniums? As late as 1854, he styled the American President "vassal Prince," and not until 1860 did a special clause in the treaties compel him to cease use of the term barbarian for foreigner! Then his education inculcates extreme reverence for the ancient order. "They listened, but they did not ask questions; and they could not transgress the order of study!" Again, filialism and the allied ancestorism promote conservatism. Finally, the suspicion of the Chinese, bred of their own insincerity and corruption, is directed against everything new, whether a census, a coinage, a railway, or a machine.


We now occupy a standpoint from which we can perceive the folly of mutual incrimination by merchant and missionary for

incitement of past and present uprisings in China. Only one of the grounds of conservatism relates to religion; and, as a matter of fact, Chinese are not troubled about the truth of a religion as we are, but only about its value in government or life. Thus he tolerates Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and Mohammedanism, all for some real good they do; and would tolerate Christianity on condition that it submitted, as do the other religions, to the State requirement of filial piety, funeral sacrifice, and mourning rites. This, to its honor, it will not do, any more than it will prostrate itself before the Emperor, who is "the same as God." It is equally natural, and certain, that the Chinese oppose *every* foreign cultural by reason of the great disparity between it and the corresponding Chinese cultural, as we have shown at length above. They dislike our costumes, our frankness, our logic, and admire our machines only as something curious, inexplicable, but—to them—useless! English law with its care for the defendant is simply incomprehensible to them. It is easy to believe, therefore, that Chinese riots have generally been incited, not by Buddhists or Taoists, but by mandarins or students, who accuse foreigners of horrible crimes. Their quite natural purpose therein is to preserve that *status quo*, which is the condition of using their education as officials. Especially the foreigners are accused of kidnapping children to use for magic, and of depriving the native of the labor necessary for his living. Three out of four riots on the banks of the Yangtse were caused by the diversion of the carrying trade from native junks to foreign steamers. Similar reasons have doubtless contributed to the current uprising. For the last twelve months the Tientsin-Pekin Railway has been in operation, and has permanently thrown out of employment thousands of carriers, donkeys, mules, and camel drivers, boatmen, and hotel keepers, and especially Boxers, who often served as body guards to the wealthy and helpless travelers, or to treasure in transportation.

The recent transformation of Japan in *every* cultural, forms

one of the marvels of the nineteenth century, but the difficulty involved here was but a tithe of what must be encountered in China. Modernization there will be the greatest change since the abolition of feudalism in the third century, B. C.; will far surpass that in depth and breadth, and must, indeed, form the greatest change ever witnessed in human history, because affecting the largest number of people, in the largest possible number of ways—nothing short of all the cultural—and in the shortest time; for, now that the breach is made by the introduction of railways, those arteries of culture-life, the modern flood will rush in, especially under competition by the Powers.





THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIA:

PROBLEMS OF THE EAST AND PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST.

(Continued from the September number.)

ALFRED RAMBAUD, *Paris.*

THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST.¹



HE eastward expansion of Russia through the solitudes of Siberia and among its barbarous tribes began about the close of the sixteenth century, immediately after the conquest of the Tartar czarates of Kazan and Astrakhan. It was between the years 1579 and 1584 that the Cossack, Irmak Timofévitch, fleeing

from the punishment of the law and the wrath of the Czar Ivan the Terrible, with a handful of brigands like himself, Russians, Cossacks, Tartars, German and Polish prisoners of war, to the number of six-hundred and fifty men, crossed the Ural, traversed the immense untrodden forests of the Tobol, defeated the Tartar Khan, Kutchum, took Sibir, his capital, and subjected to tribute the tribes of the Irtysh and the Obi. When Irmak Timofévitch was drowned in the Irtysh, dragged to the bottom of the river by the weight of the cuirass given him by the Czar, Russia made a hero, and the Orthodox Church a saint, of the old outlaw. Along the pathways that he had marked out, there soon followed

¹ Krahmer, *Russland in Asien*; vol. iii. *Sibirien und die grosse sibirische Eisenbahn*; vol. iv. *Russland in Ost-Asien*, Leipzig, 1897, 1898. Legros, *La Sibérie*, Paris, 1899.

a stream of "good fellows" of every description: gold-seekers, fur-hunters, and peasants fleeing the estates of their feudal lords in search of government lands that they might cultivate as freemen. Hither also flocked religious dissenters, persecuted by the Orthodox Church, who found a shelter in the immensity of the Siberian forest, retreats concealed from all mankind. Into this same wilderness escaped the German, Polish, and Swedish prisoners of war of Peter I. and of Catharine II. Then, in long, wretched troops came in chains or in fetters the unhappy serfs deported by their masters, often bearing the marks of cruel beating and mutilation; their sides scarred by the knout, and nostrils or tongue cut by the executioner; strewing the highways with their corpses. This barbarous feature of the old Russian penal code came to an end at the close of the last century, and it is known that the present Czar, Nicholas II., has suppressed deportation into Siberia for common law crimes in order to purify that colony of a reproach like to that against which the English colonies of Australia long protested. The rapidity with which colonization of every kind was spread over the millions of kilometres which the immensity of Siberia measures, is shown by the dates of the founding of the principal towns: Tobolsk on the Tobol in 1587; Tomsk on the Toms, a branch of the Obi, in 1604; Yeniseisk on the Yenisei in 1619; Yakoutsik in 1632; Atchinsk in 1642; Nertchinsk on the Shilka, a branch of the Amur, in 1654; Okhotsk on the sea of the same name in 1638.

Siberia, even to our own times, has been valuable mainly on account of its immense extent and the liberty that free immigrants have found there. It may be divided into three divisions: in the north, the *tundra*, marshy in summer, a mass of ice in winter; in the centre, the *taïga*, or forest, dear to the hunter; in the south, the cultivated region, of an area thrice that of all France. Even this last division, except in the districts where the "black earth" is found, is not characterized by a fertility that redeems the severity of a climate, extreme

in its summer heat as in its winter cold. In the seventeenth century a belief was current that the region about the Amur was, on the contrary, of great fertility, a belief which experience has shown to be ill-founded. It was, therefore, in this direction that the most venturesome Cossacks and the most energetic settlers hastened. They were not disturbed by the fact that the country belonged to the Chinese Emperor. In 1649, a young officer named Khabarof, undertook to descend the still unexplored river, building forts at the junction of the tributaries, conquering rebellious tribes of natives, and fighting troops of Manchurian horsemen (1649-1652). In 1658, Pachkof, governor of Yeniseisk, founded Nertchinsk on the Shilka, a branch of the Amur. Five years later Albasin was founded. This was a fortress with ramparts of wood, and in its vicinity there arose many Russian villages. Finally, the Chinese, irritated at seeing these adventurers assume rulership over them, several times attacked Albasin with armies of from fifteen to twenty thousand men; but were invariably repulsed. Upon receiving tidings of these events, the court at Moscow sent envoys to that of Peking with a letter written in Latin and in Russian. After long deliberation at Nertchinsk a treaty was signed in that city, in 1689, in accordance with the terms of which the heroic fort of Albasin was to be razed; and the frontier between the two Empires was definitely fixed as it continued to be observed by both countries down to the treaties of 1858.

On their side, the Russians renounced further forcible encroachment and settlement on Chinese territory; but they did not renounce their efforts to gain a foothold by commerce, religious mission work, and diplomacy in the Middle Kingdom, and even in Peking itself. The Russians that had been made prisoners at Albasin, or in battles at other places, had been taken to the capital of the Empire. Some of them had established themselves there as artisans or merchants; others formed the Russian guard of the "Son of Heaven." At Moscow it was known that these men

were well treated at Pekin, but that they had neither church nor priest of their religion. Peter the Great resolved to send an embassy to Pekin to secure satisfactory concessions on this point. This, indeed, was the object of a mission entrusted to Eberhard Ysbrand, who reached Pekin in 1693, and there obtained what the Czar wished. In 1721, Tsmailof was despatched to the Chinese capital to secure from the Emperor Kanghi the privilege of establishing there a permanent Russian legation. He gave the Bogdy-Khan a letter from the Czar and left M. de Lange as *chargé d'affaires*; but the latter almost immediately after Tsmailof's departure was dismissed by the Chinese court. In 1727, a treaty that secured greater commercial privileges for the Russians was signed at Kiakhta. In 1806, Golovine, another envoy, was sent to Pekin with a view to obtaining the free navigation of the Amur River. This mission failed; nevertheless the position of Russia in the Asiatic East was continually growing stronger. In 1707, they had annexed the peninsula of Kamtchatka. In 1847, Count Nicholas Muravief, who was to win the surname of Amourski, became governor of Eastern Siberia, and set himself to develop and strengthen the colony. He perceived that it would have no future if possession was not secured of the chief river and the richest province of the region, that is, of the Amur and of Manchuria. The river was still so incompletely known that the Grand Chancellor Nesselrode declared to the Emperor Nicholas that its outlet was inaccessible. In 1848, a Cossack expedition, under Vaganof, perished without the escape of a single person to tell the tale. Two years afterwards Captain Nevelskoi discovered that Saghalin is really an island, separated from the mainland by the channel or strait of Tartary, and, in the course of his exploration, came upon the mouth of the Amur, entered it in a small boat, and planted the Russian flag on its banks; proclaiming to the natives that the country belonged to the "White Czar" at St. Petersburg. The Grand Chancellor was terrified at Nevelskoi's

audacity ; he already saw himself at war with China ; he insisted that the daring captain's action be discountenanced, but the Emperor replied : " When Russia's flag has been raised anywhere it should not be taken down." On his part, Governor Muravief endeavored to persuade the local mandarins that the best thing to do was to leave the Russians alone. The Chinese demanded that negotiations be entered upon with their Emperor ; Muravief thought that Pekin was too far away for that and that Chinese diplomacy was too slow. He continued to act, therefore, as if the country were already a Russian province, and strengthened his position by building along the river the forts Alexandrovsk, Mikhaïlovsk, and Nicolaïevsk,—all of these baptismal names of the royal family. Pétropavlosk, on the southeast coast of Kamtchatka, had been established in 1740. Other fortresses arose at the junction of the several principal tributaries of the Amur River. " The Amur will be the death of you," said the Emperor Nicholas jestingly to Muravief.

During the Crimean war the Anglo-French fleet blockaded the Russian Pacific coast, and destroyed a part of the military establishments and of the infant marine. This blockade, by threatening to starve out the colony, only hastened a decision upon the part of Muravief, who had need of Manchuria to furnish food for his colonists. Its annexation was already an accomplished fact, when, in 1857, Admiral Putiatin dropped anchor in the Gulf of Pechili and proposed to the Chinese Emperor, in consideration of Russia's armed intervention in the Taiping rebellion, the cession of Manchuria. China's only reply was a vigorous protest against Russian encroachment. War seemed imminent between the two Empires. Fortunately for Russia, just at that time came the Anglo-French expedition and the march of the allies upon Pekin. The Russians profited by this event to complete the annexation of the coveted territory. The Czar sent a fleet into the Chinese waters, and the Celestials did not relish having a third European Power to deal with. By the

Treaties of Aigun and Tientsin in 1858, they granted to Russia the entire left bank of the Amur, the entire territory between that river and the ocean as well as its tributary stream, the Ossuri, the bay on which there was, in time, to rise the fortress of Vladivostock, with its prophetic name (Dominator of the East). These newly acquired lands formed two provinces, the Amur Province and the Maritime Province. By the Treaty of Peking, in 1860, China ceded to Russia the region adjacent to the lakes Balkash and Issik-kul; the boundary line between Manchuria and Siberia was re-adjusted, and the Russians were granted the right to trade in all parts of the Empire. Fifteen years more, and Russia obtained from Japan the abandonment of the latter's rights over Saghalin in exchange for the North Kurile Isles.

For nearly thirty years the boundary between China and Russia remained as agreed upon in the treaties of 1858 and 1860. But already the commercial and political activity of the Russians was overstepping it. They had established themselves in large numbers in the cities of Chinese Manchuria,—in Kiakhta, Mukden, Kirin, and Tsitsihar, the residence of the mandarin-governor. The navigation of the Ossuri and the Sungari rivers fell wholly into their hands. The steamships of the Amur Company put Russia in rapid communication with Japan and San Francisco. "Scientific Missions" traversed China in all directions. At Peking the Russian colony acquired a continually greater importance and the ambassador of the Czar wielded more influence at court than the representatives of any other European power. His open handed liberality won him the favor of the courtiers, the mandarins, and the generals. In all the sea and river ports, the colonies of Russian merchants multiplied, and these seemed to live on better terms with the native population than the traders of other foreign nations. On the arrival of the Czarovitch, in 1891, he was honored with a series of royal entertainments.

For a long time, China and Japan, "The Middle Kingdom," and "The Land of the Rising Sun," the *Bodgy-Khan* and the

Mikado, had disputed with each other the protectorate of the kingdom of Corea. War broke out between the two Empires in the July of 1894. The Japanese troops, drilled and equipped in the European manner, were everywhere victorious. Their war-ships, built in the best shipyards of Europe, sank the Chinese vessels. The Japanese occupied all Corea, stormed and captured Port Arthur, conquered a part of Chinese Manchuria, captured Wei-hai-Wei, threatened Peking, and finally imposed upon China the Treaty of Shimonosaki, April 17, 1895. China was compelled to renounce all her claims with respect to Corea; to give to her conquerors the Island of Formosa, the Pescadores, the peninsula of Liao-tung, with Port Arthur and Talien-Wan, to open five new ports, including Peking, to their commerce; to grant them the right to open manufacturing establishments in the Empire; and to pay a war indemnity of seven hundred and fifty millions.¹

The success of the Japanese had been so rapid that all the European Powers were surprised at this sudden revelation of such a military and naval strength in the hands of the Mikado. England, at first hostile and malevolent, hastened to show more friendly feelings for the conqueror; the United States concluded a commercial treaty with the Japanese government; and all the plans that Russia had formed for supremacy in the Far East were threatened with failure. She could not allow either Wei-hai-Wei or the peninsula of Liao-tung, with the harbors that she had so long coveted, to remain in the hands of the Japanese. Should she do so, she would see herself relegated to the ports of Siberia and Northern Manchuria, closed by ice for a part of the year, and her hope of unfolding her colors in the seas of the Far East taken from her. She could not permit that the influence of triumphant Japan should be substituted at Peking for her own influence, already dating back a century or more. It was necessary, at

¹ Vladimir, *The China-Japan War, compiled from Japanese, Chinese, and Foreign Sources*, London, Sampson Low, 1896.

any cost, even should it mean war, to prevent the provisions of the Shimonosaki Treaty being carried out. She was successful in enlisting the coöperation of two states which, although antagonistic to each other, had reasons for keeping the good-will of Russia. These three Powers:—Russia, France, and Germany,—formed what might be called “A Triple Alliance of the Far East.” They forwarded to the court at Tokyo some “friendly advice” regarding the giving up of claims that might bring about a general conflagration. It was hard for Japan to renounce the Liao-tung peninsula, with its harbors of Port Arthur, Talien-Wan, and Wei-hai-Wei, that had been conquered at the price of its blood, and by such brilliant victories; but the Japanese armies were on the Chinese mainland; the three Powers were masters of the sea; and thus the island Empire was left almost without defence. The three protesting Powers had the advantage. Russia, in the deliberations over the revision of the treaty, showed such passionate insistence that twice, May 5, and May 8, Admiral Tyrtof made all preparations to meet the Japanese fleet, which probably would have gone to the bottom. By the Treaty of Tokyo, May 8, 1895, Japan agreed to give up the Liao-tung and Wei-hai-Wei; to be satisfied with Formosa and the Pescadores, positions of the utmost importance in the Pacific; and to receive the war indemnity and certain commercial privileges.

As a matter of fact, Russia had just inflicted upon Japan the treatment that she herself had received from the European Powers, after so many splendid victories over the Turks. It was under the pressure of a “European concert” that Japan lost the most precious fruits of her success against the Chinese, just as the Russian conquerors of the Ottomans had lost theirs. Russia set up against Japan the principle of the integrity of the Chinese Empire in exactly the same way that the Powers had imposed upon her the principle of the preservation of the Turkish Empire. The Treaty of Tokyo, in 1895, modified the Treaty of Shimonosaki as completely as had the Treaty of Berlin modified that of San

Stefano in 1878. Just as Russia, in 1878, had had the mortification of seeing her political foes, Austria and England, enrich themselves with the spoils of that very Turkish Empire that they pretended to protect against her covetousness, laying their hands, the one on Bosnia and Herzegovina and the other upon the island of Cyprus; so Japan had soon the mortification of seeing Russia violate, for her own profit, that very principle of the continental integrity of the Chinese Empire that she had set up against Japanese ambition.

France and England, the latter in particular, obtained from China numerous important concessions; but of more value were those that Russia secured. By the convention of June, 1895, China contracted with her, through the intermediary of the Russo-Chinese bank, recently established at St. Petersburg, and under the direction of Count Oukhtomski, whose oriental policy we know, a loan of four hundred million francs at four per cent, payable in thirty-six years. On October 25, 1896, this same bank made another agreement with the Peking government. This agreement, ratified by the Czar, became, on December 26, the Treaty of St. Petersburg. It gives the Eastern Chinese Railroad Company the right to build a road through Chinese Manchuria, making it a branch line of the Russian Trans-Siberian Railroad; to develop coal and other mines in the territory traversed by the road, and to devote itself to all other industrial and commercial enterprises. The stock of the company can be held by Chinese and Russians only, which means that it will fall almost exclusively into the hands of the Russians. A special clause authorized the Czar to station in Manchuria both infantry and cavalry for the protection of the railroad. This was the disguised annexation of all the part of the vast province that had not

¹ R. I. Pinon et J. de Marcillac, *La Chine qui s'ouvre*, Paris, 1900. Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, *La rénovation de l'Asie: Sibérie, Chine, Japon*, Paris, 1900. Chas. Beresford, *The Break-up of China*, London and New York, 1899.

already been ceded to Russia in 1858 and 1860. Furthermore, China leased to Russia for fifteen years a harbor in the province of Shantung, and finally, Russian war-ships were given the privileges of the two harbors of Liao-tung peninsula, Port Arthur and Talien-Wan.

March 27, 1898, there was formulated a new agreement between the two countries. Port Arthur and Talien-Wan and all their dependencies were leased to Russia for a term of twenty-five years. With this was granted the privilege of building through the Liao-tung peninsula a railroad from Vladivostock to Port Arthur, which is to be merely another branch of the Trans-Siberian road.

Nor is this all. According to a still more recent agreement, a Russian railroad is to be built from Mukden in Manchuria to Peking. Another Russian company is to construct a system of Chinese railroads, the three principal lines of which, setting out from Peking, are to traverse, the first two, the provinces of Shansi and Ho-nan, the third, the province of Hupé and to terminate at Hankow on the Yang-tse-kiang. Against this third railroad, England made a vigorous protest. In her treaties with China, she had secured for herself the building of railroads and the commerce of the valley of the Yang-tse, and here the Russians were coming to cut off her railroads, and in the very heart of China to draw off the merchandise that she was counting upon to export by sea, and which was now likely to be carried by the Trans-Siberian line. After having secured the defeat at Peking of the propositions of a Franco-Russian syndicate, she encouraged two Chinese of high rank to apply for a contract to build the debated railroad. They found themselves unable to raise the necessary funds, and it was then that Russia, thanks to the energy of Count Oukhtomski, had the franchise transferred to a Franco-Belgian company.

Nevertheless, in November, 1897, Russia had either not the ability or the wish to prevent the Germans from landing in the bay

of Kiao-chow, which she seemed to have reserved for herself, or from securing a lease of it for ninety-nine years. Neither could she hinder the English, incensed at the action of the Germans, from obtaining, in April, 1898, a lease of the harbor and bay of Wei-hai-Wei, evacuated by the Japanese. It thus happens that in the Pechili Gulf, from which Peking receives the greater part of its supplies, three European Powers occupy places very near one another; the Russians at Port Arthur and Talien-Wan, the Germans at Kiao-chow, and the English at Wei-hai-Wei. The Pechili Gulf has become another Mediterranean, on whose shores rival Asiatic interests continue the rivalries of Europe. The position of Russia is much the strongest. She commands Peking, not merely by sea, but by all the overland highways. She alone of the three rival powers in the Pechili Gulf possesses a vast continental base of operations. She fronts China along a boundary line several thousand miles in length; she embraces and penetrates China; and she alone by her railroads, the Trans-Siberian, the Trans-Manchurian, and the Trans-Chinese, will be able to pour into the very centre of China and into its capital a great European army. Recently in the revolution of the palace, which took place in Peking in September, 1898, it was manifest to what degree the influence of the Russian legation there was preponderant. The young Emperor, Kwang-Su, supported by Japan, and perhaps also by England, endeavored to shake off the tutelage of the Empress-Dowager, Tsu-Hsi, and of the viceroy, Li-Hung-Chang, the friend of the Russians, in order that he might inaugurate an era of reforms. The plot was discovered, the accomplices of the Emperor were executed or banished, and the Empress-Dowager reassumed full power.

In Corea, Russia has taken the place of China in the long-standing rivalry that the latter has carried on with Japan. At Seoul, in the palace of King Li-hui, it is the Russian faction which, as a conservative party, has taken the place of the old Chinese faction in opposition to the Japanese faction, which con-

stitutes the progressive party of Corea. Japan and Russia dispute with each other not only political influences, but commercial exploitation. Russia might employ force, but she fears lest Japan, the Great Britain of the Far East, may throw herself into an alliance with the Great Britain of Europe. Therefore, Russia now openly opposes Japan, and now again craftily manipulates her. In spite of the keenness of the contention, she has had the shrewdness never to push matters to a rupture. In a series of agreements, dated May 14, 1896, February 24, 1897, April 25, 1898, respectively, the two rivals have attempted to define the conditions of this sort of *condominium* and to establish an equitable division of commercial advantages, of mail and telegraph monopoly, and of police force. In this division, however, Russia seems to have secured the lion's share. She possesses in Corea a system of telegraph lines which is annexed to her Siberian lines; she has managed to have the financial administration of the kingdom entrusted to Russians, and has succeeded in having King Li-hui issue an edict that the future railways of Corea shall be of the same gauge as those of Siberia.

With France in Tonquin and the region round about; Germany in Kiao-chow; England at Wei-hai-Wei, on the Blue River, and in the peninsula of Kelung before Hong-Kong; with Russia throughout all north China; the Japanese in Corea, in Formosa, and the Pescadores, and the United States in the Philippines,—it can be seen that the political problems of the Far East have become as complicated as the like problems have ever been in Europe or America.

THE MEANS AND METHODS OF RUSSIAN EXPANSION.

We have followed Russia in all the directions that her policy of expansion has carried her. It now remains for us to study the means that she has employed, especially in what concerns her expansion in the East.

The essential characteristic that distinguishes her Oriental

from her Western policy is, that, while nearly all the progress she has made in Europe has been either the cause or the result of bloody wars like those of the Czars of Moscow against Poland, of Peter the Great against Charles XII., of Catharine II. and Alexander II. against the Ottomans, of Paul I. against the French Republic, of Alexander I. against Napoleon, and of Nicholas I. against the Allies in the Crimea, her oriental expansions have never brought her into war with a power of the first magnitude, not even with China. However bellicose Russia may have shown herself in Europe, in Asia she has exhibited a prudence wholly oriental. A score of times it has seemed that she was on the brink of a mighty war with Great Britain over the frontiers of India; with China over Albasin, Kuldja, or Manchuria; and with Japan over Liao-tung and Corea. Some sort of an agreement has always come in time to ward off an open rupture, as in 1872, 1885, 1887, and 1895, with Great Britain; and as at Nertchinsk, at Aïgun, at Tientsin, and at Peking with China. In 1871, war with the latter seemed imminent with respect to the Kuldja question, but, rather than proceed to extreme measures, Russia preferred to abandon a part of her conquest. In these agreements Russia, it is found, has generally the better part of the bargain. She understands how to utilize the *amour-propre* of her adversaries. Thus, she helped the Chinese "to save their face," for example, by inducing them to lease for twenty-five or ninety-nine years what they would obstinately have refused to cede definitely. Thanks to this expedient, it appeared to the Chinese that the dignity and integrity of their Empire would remain inviolate. England also has grown accustomed to allowing herself "to save her face," and to be put to sleep by the mesmeric passes, energetic and, at the same time, caressing of Russian diplomacy. She allows herself to see in the "explanations" brought to London, the proof that some bold Cossack raid, some thorough lesson administered to her Afghan clients, is the result of an "error," a "misunderstanding." A company of six hundred soldiers is

almost always a "scientific expedition." The English minister, in order not to stir up strife, allows himself to yield, and hands over to his successor the task of disentangling the knot. This successor is careful not to meddle with what he himself was not mixed up in, and what the jingoes and London cockneys have already forgotten; and so what the Russians have skillfully acquired remains permanently in their possession. If the occasion demands it, they will declare that they did not intend to conquer Bokhara; but have they proved that they have not made a vassal state of it, something that will be more useful to them than an annexed province? They never intended to advance to Merv; but if the people of Merv of their own accord came to them, would it be a wise policy to reject a "voluntary" submission? And thus, slowly, silently, without excessive cracking of her whip, Russian supremacy, in her well-oiled car of progress, has been moving on through all Central Asia.

Russia is the only European power which has an absolute government. Its autocratic feature, so fiercely assailed upon the accession of Nicholas I. by the "Constitutionals," or "Republicans," of 1825, and under Alexander II. by the Nihilist conspiracies, seems to have taken on a new life in the estimation of the Russian people, because, according to the expression of Prince Oukhtomski, it is the necessary condition of the greatness of their nation and of her "supernatural" and providential mission in Asia. If the foundation of the government remains autocratic, this autocracy is at least more sincerely an "enlightened despotism" than was the absolutism of the eighteenth century, a despotism thoughtful of the economic interests and the well-being of the people, blending its ambitions with the legitimate aspirations of the nation. It has borrowed from the West municipal or provincial self-government, but not the parliamentary, not even the representative regimen. In Russia there is no minister responsible to legislative bodies, where changeable majorities successively displace one another; but ministers having the confidence of the sovereign

continue in office for a long time, in such manner that from 1815 to 1882 Russia had only two ministers of foreign affairs, Nesselrode and Gortchakof, and since the latter date there have been only three, De Giers, Lobanof, and Muravief. How many have been those that have followed one another during these past eighty-five years in France, England, and even the United States! This permanency in office allows continuity of the same political views and constancy in realizing them. No parliament, therefore, no questionings, no blue or yellow books. A restricted liberty of the press closes with respect the indiscreet lips of reporters and interviewers. Hence secrecy in both planning and executing is possible. There is no need of throwing dust in the eyes of parliaments, of the newspapers, and of the people; nor is there any need of brag, of optimistic proclamations, and of oratorical heroics. Great conquests can be accomplished silently.

This form of government, though it may appear as archaic as the despotism of Nebuchadnezzar or of the Grand Turk, does not exclude the use of the most modern appliances and scientific methods over which free peoples pride themselves: railroads, telegraphs, telephones, improved cannons and rifles, battleships and cruisers of the latest pattern, a thorough knowledge of history, of ethnography, and of all forms of human speech, from those of Finland to those of Kamtchatka. It does not exclude the system of military organization in vigorous operation by the powerful and enlightened nations of France and Germany, nor yet the art of securing from the people the maximum of military power.

Russia has a regular army like France and Germany, national militia like Switzerland, and irregular troops like those of the Shah of Persia and the Emperor of China. These irregulars date back to the beginning of Russian expansion. The Czars of Moscow had their Cossacks of the Dnieper, of the Don, of the Volga, and of the Ural. In proportion as conquest succeeded conquest, the

soldier class of the subdued peoples were amalgamated with the Russians in the "Cossack armies" of the Terek, of the Kuban, of the Caucasus, and of Turkestan. There are to-day Cossacks of the Trans-Baikal, of the Pamirs, and of the Amur. For hundreds and thousands of kilometres, they constitute the grand guard of the regular army, the mobile curtain of light cavalry that will screen its movements, "free lances," for whose too audacious encroachment and too bold raids, it will be possible to disavow all responsibility.

Behind these, like another advance guard, come the merchants, adventurers also, *merchant adventurers*, as the English of the fifteenth century said. Behind these, again, sally forth the colonists in search of cheap land, and who, following the course of the rivers and streams, at times venturing into the jungles, found villages over which will soon rise the humble bell-tower of a church. All these people, Cossacks, officers, and soldiers of the regular army, merchants, colonists, and even the *tschinovniks*, or officials, possess to a degree not met with in any other European nation, the gift of adaptation to a new climate and environment, and the gift of assimilating native races or of becoming assimilated with them. The peasant of European Russia, very much mixed, especially in the East, with Finnish or Turkish blood and characteristics, does not differ essentially from the Ostiak and the Vogul of Western Siberia. These, in turn, show no marked difference from the Turkish population of Eastern Siberia, such as the Yakuts. From these to the Mongolian races, such as the Tunguses, the Buriats, and Manchus, and from these to the Chinese population, there is scarcely any noticeable transition. There was a time when from the Dnieper to the Pacific, all obeyed the same master, the Grand Khan, "the son of Heaven," whose heir to-day is the "White Czar." From the Dnieper to the Pacific extends the same plain, are found the same climate and the same soil, barren steppes alternating with fertile mould; the same manner of life, of dwelling, and of dress;

the same endurance of extreme cold, excessive heat, privations, fatigue, long journeys, and a half-nomadic existence; and the same tendency to oriental fatalism, which the orthodox term Christian resignation. And thus, as *Elisée Reclus* remarks, the Yakuts easily become Russians and the Russians as easily become Yakuts, and both Russians and natives possess the same readiness in acquiring the language of the foreigner.

Does not the difference in religion constitute a barrier between them? The Russian peasant with his rudimentary faith, to which, nevertheless, he holds with all his heart, and even the *pope*, or parish priest, with his vaguely uncertain theology and his ignorance, are free from all intolerance. Any form of the Christian religion, whatever value it may have, although it clashes with the still less highly developed beliefs of the Mohammedan peoples, makes its way among tribes that are pagan, Shamanist, Fetichist, or vaguely Buddhist. Between the Russians and the pagans there is established a oneness of faith or superstition. There is no question of complicated dogmas devised by the subtle brains of Alexandria or of Byzantium. The untutored Siberians do not fall into controversies over the mystery of the Trinity, the twofold nature of the Redeemer, or transubstantiation. The idea of God is too lofty for these coarse minds, but they all agree in placing on the summit of their Pantheon Saint Nicholas, the Thaumaturgist, and above him, beneath him, or equal with him, Christ and the Virgin. Beneath these come Saints, Christian or with a physiognomy that may be pagan, Buddhistic, and at times Mohammedan. And all this multiform worship is in full harmony with the primitive cult of springs and of certain venerable trees, with the belief in demons of the forests and river sprites, and with the custom of wearing certain amulets that the orthodox priest, the Shamanist sorcerer, or the Hadji returned from Mecca, may furnish. What more is necessary in order to be, in this life, successful on the farm, or in fishing, or in hunting, or in war, and, in the next, to

be certain of salvation? The Tunguse, the Buriat, the Vogul, and the Ostiak, who firmly believe in Saint Nicholas, have already become, or are in the process of becoming, Russian. Are not the Tchuvashi, the Mordva, and the Meshtcheraks all children of the same father, that is, subjects of the same Czar? Though they may be Mohammedans, do they not still believe in the virtue of certain magical words uttered by the orthodox priest, the efficacy of the holy waters in driving away Cheitan (Satan) and evil Djinns, in the protection that Saint Blaise, the old-time god, Valoss, of the Russians, extends over their flocks, and in the cures wrought in the name of Saint Cosme or in that of Saint Damian, those heavenly physicians, who cure their adherents without requiring remuneration?

Those two scourges, journalism and theology, being almost unknown in the Asiatic Empire of the Czar, one can live there in a happy confusion of things. Politics does not create any differences among men, and religion scarcely any. There is no time to reflect and subtilize upon the more or less brown or yellow color of the face, the more or less turned-up shape of the nose, the more or less slant of the eyes, or the more or less prominence of the cheeks. In no degree of the social scale is there known the prejudice "of the skin," so pronounced among the English and Americans, and noticeable, but to much less extent, among the French, Portuguese, and Spanish colonists. Russian colonization is not destructive of aboriginal races; it does not exterminate them, it absorbs them. Marriages, legal or otherwise, are frequent between the conquerors and the conquered. Already, in the days of Ivan the Terrible, Tartar Khans became Russian princes. To her subjects of brown or of saffron complexion, of Buddhist or of Mohammedan religion, Russia has always shown more liberality than France has to her Algerian subjects. In Algeria it has become difficult for an Arab or a Berber to rise above the grade of captain, but majors, colonels, and even generals of Turkish or Circassian race, and even of the

Mohammedan religion, are numerous in the Asiatic armies of the "White Czar."

The Russians of Europe are fully able of themselves to people their Asiatic colonies without having to assimilate the natives, and without the assistance of foreign immigration. Russia is fortunate in that her colonies are only a prolongation of her own territories. To become a colonist, there is no ocean to cross, no steamboat fare to pay. The poorest peasant, a staff in his hand, an axe at his belt, his boots slung from a cord over his shoulder, can pass from one halting-place to another, until he reaches the ends of the Empire. Moreover, the population of Russia, by its own birth rate, increases, in spite of insufficient medical care at child-birth, with a rapidity unknown to any other nation of European blood, excepting, perhaps, the Canadian French. In 1878-79, the subjects of the Czar numbered ninety-six millions, in 1899 they reached one hundred and twenty-nine millions, an increase in twenty years of thirty-three millions, a number almost equal to the population of the kingdom of Italy, or an annual increase of about one million six hundred thousand souls, a number that about equals the present population of North Carolina or Alabama. With such a treasury of men to draw from, neither military power nor colonial strength will be lacking. In Siberia, before 1895, the increase of population by immigration alone was only about ninety-two thousand per year. Since the suppression of penal transportation, especially since the construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad, immigration has brought in two hundred thousand annually. The population of Siberia must by this time have reached the figure of seven millions. Of this number at least six millions are Russians. This, however, is one person for each square kilometre of territory, so that neither is there any lack of land.

For a long time the Russian sovereign needed two things to enable him to boldly plunge into the depths of Asia. First,

he lacked the assurance that England or the German Powers would not be able to foment on his European frontiers one of those coalitions like those that resulted in the Crimean war or in the revision of the Treaty of San Stefano; secondly, he lacked "the sinews of war," or, as the English phraseology is, "the Cavalry of Saint George." The alliance with France, outlined at Kronstadt in 1891, proclaimed at Paris in 1896, and at Saint Petersburg in 1897, has given the Czar the two things that were wanting. It assures the safety of the European frontiers against any effort of the Triple Alliance. In the Far East, in 1895, we have seen how, at the same time, France and Germany took in hand the interests of Russia against Japanese ambition and British hostility. The Germany of Bismarck attempted to ruin Russia's credit in the Berlin exchange and in the European market. France threw open her market and her credit to Russia, and either in France, or thanks to her, the Czar, within a few years, has been able to borrow several milliards. This has enabled him to strengthen his army, put a powerful navy afloat, consent to large loans to China and Persia, complete his European railroad system, and push forward the work upon the Trans-Caucasus, the Trans-Siberian, the Trans-Manchurian, and the Trans-Chinese railroads.

The results of the daring raids through Turkestan, in the direction of the Persian Gulf and of Afghanistan, and towards the Amur and the Japan Sea, are now consolidated by a wholly modern outfit of war and travel. In Turkestan, the ancient capitals of Tamerlane, the fortresses conquered by the heroism of the Pérovskis, the Tchernaiëfs and of the Skobelevs, or which called for so much skill and careful manipulation on the part of Russian diplomacy, are to-day railroad stations. There are dining room stations at Merv, Bokhara, Samarkand, Kokhand, Andijan, Tashkend, etc., and the Russian station of Kushk is only one hundred and twenty kilometres from Herat. The Trans-Siberian railroad with its numerous stations, its branch lines to Khabarovsk,

Port Arthur, and Peking, and the annexed systems that penetrate the Chinese Empire, has consolidated all that was accomplished by the venturesome explorers of former times, from Irmak or Khabarof to Lieutenant Nevelskoï of our day. The principal line, six thousand two hundred kilometres long, with its bridges of eight hundred metres over the Obi and the Irtysh, of one thousand metres over the Yenisei and the Selenga, with its ferry-boat, one hundred metres long, that ferries the trains across the southern bay of Lake Baikal, permits the transportation of colonists, merchants, regiments, and brings to bear upon the further side of Asia all the power of the Czar who reigns at St. Petersburg. In 1889, the merchants of Nizhni Novgorod, in an address to the Emperor Alexander III., predicted in these terms the brilliant future of the Trans-Siberian: "It will unite to Europe, through the Russian Empire, four hundred millions of Chinese, and forty-two millions of Japanese. One will be able to go from Europe to Shanghai by Vladivostock in twenty days instead of the thirty-five which the Canadian route requires, or the forty-five of the Suez route." The distance between Europe and the Far East will still be further shortened by the extension of the Russian railroad to Port Arthur. In the commerce of the world, the Trans-Siberian will work as important a revolution as did the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope in the fifteenth century, or the construction of the Suez Canal in the nineteenth. The future policy of Russia will be to secure the full attainment of what she has been striving after for centuries in her onward march through the Siberian wilds, that is, access to seas free from ice, where her fleets of war and commerce may have unhindered course. Russia is attaining this freedom of the sea four hundred years later than Spain, Portugal, France, England, and Holland. She has lost nothing in having waited so long. Thus far, she has passed through the Baltic and the Mediterranean periods, with a power for expansion unknown to her predecessors. She is about to inaugurate a new era in her history; the oceanic, the world-wide era, is merely beginning for the Slav.

THE PRIMITIVE OBJECTS OF WORSHIP¹

L. MARILLIER, *Paris.*



It is almost self-evident that we know nothing, and can scarcely be in a position through direct evidences, to know anything about the first manifestations of religious feeling among our remote ancestors. The only knowledge we are able to acquire is an indirect knowledge, one by analogy and inference.

The epoch which is revealed to us by the oldest figured monuments and inscriptions of Chaldæa and of Egypt is a relatively recent one in human evolution, and these ancient remnants of bygone ages bring us face to face with a complex civilization, conceptions already modified and transformed in countless ways, and institutions with a lengthy past. The distance is certainly less between actual societies and the great Empires of the valleys of the Euphrates and the Nile, than it was between these Empires and the restricted communities in which were grouped men contemporary with the cave-dwelling bears and the *Elephas primigenius*. To attempt to imagine the mind of primitive man by means of the liturgical and already scholarly poetry of the Vedic hymns or the wonderful narratives of the Iliad and the Odyssey would certainly be a fruitless undertaking. These priests, warriors, husbandmen, bards, or shepherds are, in spite

(1) Translated by Mr. C. H. C. Wright of Harvard University.

of various differences which separate them from us, in many respects men of our time, with modes of thought and feeling somewhat like our own; with conceptions, at all events, long defined, clearly and sharply outlined; with customs which they continue to follow, even when they have lost the true value and meaning of these customs. They are far distant from the men of the Neanderthal, or even from the Troglodytes of the Vézère, —much more so perhaps than those first specimens of mankind were from the most highly developed of the anthropoids, those quasi-human primates.

And what traces remain to us of those remote epochs, of that life of shapeless and almost inorganic societies without fixed rules or established customs? Sepulchres, pierced shells, rondles of bone, particles of hard stone, drawings on ivory tablets, fragments of implements in bone or horn, cut flints. What relates to material civilization can be immediately interpreted and understood, as well as those attempts, strangely skillful in their awkwardness, of a fine-flavored and vigorous art, which is but little thwarted by the poverty of the means of execution. But the totality of social, religious, and moral life, all the psychological life in short, can be known only by inference, reconstructed only by analogy. The tiny articles which we find in tombs or caverns appear to us to be amulets, simply because we assimilate the customs and beliefs of these ancestors of humanity with the customs and beliefs of modern savages. It is through the present that we have to see the past; it is the observation of the present which alone may by some favorable chance enable us to decipher the obscure enigma of that past.

But if neither the history of the most ancient periods to which we can ascend, nor prehistoric archæology can give us direct information as to the primitive feelings, thoughts, and beliefs of mankind, how do we succeed in evolving an idea of them? The answer which occurs naturally to all those who are familiar with recent researches in comparative religion, is that this picture of

primitive societies has been preserved almost unchanged in the uncivilized societies which exist today, and that, in order to imagine the beliefs produced in minds centuries since by the sight of the universe and the obscure consciousness of the dreaded Powers by which man feels that he is surrounded and dominated, it is only necessary to listen to the narratives told about camp fire or at the cabin threshold by the American Indian, the Zulu, or the Australian native concerning the origin and governing of the world and the destiny of the departed.

Here, again, we must be on our guard against an illusion; uncivilized societies are as old in the world as civilized races. They have advanced by slower stages; they have often paused by the way, and possibly they have not in them the power of going so far on this way. Nevertheless, they have progressed, and it may be possible that some of the most degraded among them have even experienced a sort of retrogression. No modern society reproduces exactly the features of those which have long since disappeared, and however much is to be ascribed to the traditionalism and the conservatism of the non-civilized, especially their religious conservatism, still we cannot deny that manifold variations have probably taken place in the modes of thought, feeling, and action, in the myths, rites, and pious emotions of the humblest savages, of those who seem to have remained in the closest proximity to their origins, since the days of the age of cut stone. Individual inventions have arisen here and there, an influence has been exerted, strong or weak, direct or remote, by ethnic groups which have reached a more advanced condition of civilization upon others not yet free from their primitive coarseness; institutions have become at once much more complex and better defined; and they have served as models and types for new conceptions of the divine administration of the world and of the men who dwell in it; the knowledge itself of natural phenomena has increased, and has become more precise. Meanwhile, the facility became greater, however rudi-

mentary it may seem to have remained, in the reproduction in distinct and clear images of the impressions which encumbered the consciousness by a confused mass that was almost indistinguishable as to its elements.

It is consequently vain to expect to find unmodified among the savages of to-day the characteristic traits of primitive thought and feeling. For as a society grows in civilization, it becomes at the same time more stable and more plastic; it undergoes in a shorter time deeper alterations in structure, and, if I may say it, in soul, in the mass of conceptions and sentiments which are the principle of its existence and its movement; and, on the other hand, it offers a stronger resistance to all the causes of destruction. But though uncivilized societies vary more slowly, though their weak organization makes all progress still more precarious, though they experience setbacks unknown to civilized peoples, still they all do vary, without exception; they all tend, save those which are on the road to decay and death, towards a better equilibrium and a more complete development; and there is variation also in the thought of their members and its forms of expression. To imagine that it is enough to project into an obscure and distant past the image of Australian, Bushman, or Andamanian society in order to bring before the mind's eye the whole life of primitive humanity is to be duped by a naïve illusion, which may become a dangerous illusion.

We must, however, exaggerate nothing. The material civilization of some modern savages is strangely analogous to those civilizations of which ours is the offspring, and which prehistoric archæology enables us to understand in their essential features. We notice practically the same weapons, the same tools, the same ornaments, the same modes of burial, the same fashions of abode and ways of nourishment. From this similarity, at times even complete identity, between the industrial products of non-civilized men of today and those of people who cut flints in geological ages before our own, we can infer that neither conceptions nor

thoughts have undergone very profound transformations. The religion of savages of to-day is a point of arrival, but one which is not very remote from the point of departure; and from the extremity at which we stand, we seem able to descry the faint outlines at the other end. Moreover, the distance which separates a New Zealand Maori, a Zulu, or an Iroquois from an Andamaner or a Bushman seems in every way greater than that which separates a Bushman or an Andamaner from the man of the polished stone age. And yet we find the same fundamental beliefs in the little hunter of the great southern desert, or the Negrito of the Indian Ocean, and those Polynesians, who, in spite of their barbarous customs, belonged at the time of the arrival of the whites to a comparatively advanced civilization, or those North American Indians, whose religious conceptions are already mingled with clearly distinguishable ethical features, or those Zulus, whose critical spirit and sagacity have disturbed and perplexed Christian missionaries. We can even go still further. In all nature religions we see the same essential data, the same ideas of superhuman Powers and of their relations to men, the same rites, the same conceptions of sacrifice, with infinitely diversified forms. And yet what a difference between a negro of Guinea and a Hellene, or an Australian native and an Irish Celt!

There is a sort of common religion in humanity. In spite of differences of climate, of environment, of modes of life, of race, which sever the various ethnic groups still on an inferior plane of civilization, there yet exists between the various religious conceptions of all this still half childlike humanity, a remarkable likeness and uniformity, which the hypothesis of multiple borrowings from each savage race by all the others is unable fully to explain. And this similarity existing between the beliefs and even the myths in which they acquire a more distinct and better defined outline, is found among the rites which translate them into practical acts,—rites which a people or a tribe are

much less likely to borrow from another people or tribe than myths or wonderful narratives. The human mind seems to move a long while in a very narrow circle, and there where there is no intervention of a powerful individual initiative, and no manifestation of that fecundity of religious and moral invention, that energy of conscience which has given birth to the great ethical religions,—all of which as Professor Tiele truly says, are the work of one man or of a few men bound together by the ardor of one personal faith,—the human mind seems condemned to an indefinite repetition of its anonymous and monotonous creations, which beneath their apparent variety are for ever unconsciously copying each other. There is, then, a human mind, a spirit subject in its evolution to uniform laws, which under infinitely diversified conditions give rise to conceptions reproducing each other so exactly that they seem to be copies, scarcely modified by the touch of the craftsman, of a common original. And not only are they analogous at the same stage of evolution, in spite of differences of race, of social organization, of material environment, of historical traditions, but also at very different periods of development, when all the other forms of human activity have become diversified to such a degree that as between one country and another they seem to have very few common elements, until far on to the moment of evolution in myth and cult which is not very remote from our own time, on to the period indeed, to be more precise, of Buddhism, of Hebrew monotheism, and, to a degree, of Mazdeism, the fundamental religious beliefs are strangely alike, in spite of modifications consequent upon the intrusion of morals into the domain of faith. The difference extends even to the opposition between an Australian tale and a narrative of Herodotus, between the political life of the Athenian city-state and that of a negro tribe. But the myth of the separation of Heaven and Earth is related in terms not very dissimilar by Hesiod and by the Maori poets whose works have been preserved by Sir George Grey; and a rite described by Pausanias may remind us vividly of some

barbarous and brutal custom still in vogue in the Australian bush. This close kinship of practices, of legends, and of religious beliefs through time and space, authorizes us, in a way, to use for the reconstruction of the religion of primitive man the materials furnished by comparative ethnography, and especially by the study of the races which appear to have remained in the lowest stage of civilization. And prehistoric archæology, moreover, which by itself was unable to give us any precise indication as to the religious life and cosmic conceptions of our ancestors, becomes a precious means of verification as soon as it becomes possible for us to interpret by analogy with present facts the numerous remains which it puts into our hands.

But it is not only through the mind of the savage that we must consider the remaining traces of the religious and social life of this distant infancy of humanity. We shall also see it through the mind of the child. The distance is certainly far from the child of our cities, or even from a little peasant, however rough and uncouth you may imagine him, to the little negro or the young Indian, and the distance is still greater between this offspring of a race grown old with civilization, and the tiny being who, long ages ago, played naked with the bones of animals in the obscurity of a dream-haunted cave. But we must not forget that these differences which, in the course of their development, have arisen between the men of different races and of different degrees of civilization, are more clearly shown the nearer the individual approaches to the adult age. The modes of reaction of two babies a month old are remarkably similar, and it matters little whether they are both white, or one of them English or French, and the other a negro. And what is true of racial differences applies with all the more force to differences of class and of hereditary culture. We must remember that if they appear only at a fairly advanced stage of the evolution of the individual, it is not merely because we must await this stage in order that the effect of education and environment may be

fully felt, it is because of organic laws, of psycho-physiological laws, which allow individualization and particularization in a way only as the being develops and becomes complicated. The mental life of the child has a uniformity unknown to the adult; and originality is infinitely more rare in a youth of eighteen than in a man of forty. We can, therefore, without running the risk of going too far astray, apply to the mental life of children who lived many thousands of years ago, conclusions drawn from the observation of children of to-day, at least in their most general aspects, or those least dependent upon contingent conditions of education and environment. If we were obliged to stop here, the similarity which we feel authorized to postulate between the mental constitution of a little French boy or an American of one year or eighteen months of age and that of a child of the period of the reindeer or mammoth who might have lived the same number of weeks, would not carry us very far. But we must note that there is much less difference between a negro of forty and a negro boy of four or five than between a white man of the same age and his son of twelve or fourteen, and that the mental condition of the white child is much like that of the adult savage. If we eliminate the modifications brought about in the feeling and intelligence of the savage by the development of the sentiments, of sexual desires, and of the images caused by them, we can almost say that the structure of their minds, and, in a large measure, their contents are similar. Let us add a formula drawn from the vocabulary of embryology, namely, that the "ontogenic development reproduces the phylogenic development." The successive phases of the life of the individual correspond to the different stages of the long evolution of the species; the life of every man is like a summary of the whole life gone through up to that time by humanity; and, if we wish to acquire an accurate idea of the ways of thought and feeling of our ancestors in those remote ages, it will be sufficient for us to bend over the minds of our children and observe the awakening in their hearts of the

varied emotions and naïve beliefs caused in them by the sight of the vast world which surrounds them on every hand, as well as by their relations with other beings, with animals, men, and plants, by the observation of their own selves, of their active volition,—an observation which is of course still without reflection and quite spontaneous, but which informs them, just as the savage learns, that all is living in the universe.

We are not merely, however, in a position to study in this indirect way the religious conceptions of the man of former ages and the rites to which they must have led, as we consider the life and thought of children of to-day. We can determine with some precision the advance made by humanity in its evolution, inasmuch as we know the point of arrival, and are not unfamiliar with the initial state, which is the point of departure. This initial state will be reconstituted in its essential elements by materials drawn from the careful study of the mental life of higher animals. We cannot say, if we wish to keep the usual meaning of words, that animals have sentiments to be truly assimilated to the religious sentiment, but it is clearly proved by the investigations and analyses of Van Ende¹ that there are already apparent in the obscure consciousness of those of our inferior brothers who are most closely connected with us, a majority of the emotions which, united together and moulded into a single complex sentiment with varied aspects, represent in man, at the first stages of his development, the most lowly forms of religious emotion with the concepts which they necessarily imply, and the elementary acts of worship and of propitiation, the meagre outlines of sacrifices and prayers towards which they tend. Fear of the unknown stands first among these sentiments which in a being higher in the zoölogical scale acquire a religious coloring; and there is already in the attitude of the animal face to face with the great carnivora and the celestial bodies something of the attitude

(1) *Histoire naturelle de la Créance*, Paris, F. Alcan, 1887.

of the savage ; already there is visible in him a tendency to attribute to certain inanimate objects which he fears a spontaneity of action like his own. Death always frightens him, and attracts his attention.

In spite of our lack of documents, a penury which is not accidental, but inherent in the nature of things, concerning the first periods of religious evolution, we can thus by inference form some idea of the thoughts and feelings of the men of those distant ages ; and, in spite of the absence of any positive chronology of the initial phases of the psychological and social development of humanity, we can, without excessive rashness, attempt to indicate their succession. But it is self-evident that such a reconstruction is in its nature hypothetical and provisional : in historical questions the only affirmations which cannot be disputed are those justified by documents contemporary with the events which they relate and sufficiently explicit to afford no scope in the interpretation of them for what is fanciful or arbitrary. Here we have only incomplete indications, traces in the events which to-day are offered to our observation of a past long since wiped away, analogies which, complete as they may seem, are after all only partial analogies. Moreover, however ample our knowledge may be even now of uncivilized peoples, our comprehension of the facts is far from coinciding with the gross material which we possess. There are many rites and practices of which we can only register the existence, incapable as we are of explaining them satisfactorily ; there are many myths and legends for which we have devised interpretations proved by subsequent investigations to be arbitrary and false, though we cannot always be sure, in spite of our affirmations, that the new explanations which we have placed in their stead are much more solid. Concerning the child we have much to learn ; it is but yesterday that a methodical inquiry into its mental life was initiated ; prehistoric archæology may have many a surprise in store for us, and the animal consciousness is to us a dark and almost unexplored

country, in which we can as yet scarcely even take our bearings. Perhaps within a few months or a few years some of the conclusions which now seem most certain will become null and void, and we shall have to modify our interpretation in more than one point which now seems certain. It is with these saving considerations in mind, that I venture to offer this sketch of the first religious conceptions that one can with some probability attribute to primitive humanity.

If there is a time in religious growth to which we can fully apply the conception which Schleiermacher had of religion, it is the initial phase. When there first entered into the minds of primitive men a vague consciousness of the presence in the universe of fearful and nameless powers, of irresistible and indistinct forces which govern things and men, the feeling which came over these men must have been one of absolute dependence upon these Strong Ones, these Terrible Ones, whom they knew not, but whose dreadful power they felt at every hour of the day, and especially of the night. It is not reflection which has created the gods, and the terror, mingled with respect and adoration, which prostrates the savage before the lord of his fate is not the conclusion of a syllogism. However close the relationship between form and content in any religion, the obscure feeling of the divine, and the conceptions, acts, symbols, in which this feeling takes shape, and acquires a definite outline, it is undeniable that the representation of the Beings who inhabit and constitute the universe, and crush men by their collective might is not what has produced religious emotion. On the contrary, it is this very emotion which has aroused in minds those images, doubtless still vague and confused, but in which for the first time the divine has been thought.

If we admit with the poet that it was terror which first peopled the universe with gods, at least we must acknowledge that it was a terror which carried with it its own remedy. Man, in fact, has partly freed himself from the yoke of his

gods, as soon as he becomes able to think them, as soon as they appeared, imposing and fearful, in the depths of his mind. As soon as he becomes able to conceive them with any clearness, the image which he produced enables him to explain his own fear, the vague terror by which his life was incessantly tormented by night and day; and for the very reason that he sees them face to face, the terror which emanated from them becomes less fearful,—the heavens send him back his own reflection. Religion appeared in the world as a liberator; it freed this timid and cruel child, I mean the man of those remote days, from the mysterious fear which filled him, at a time when, powerless to attribute a definite cause to the phenomena of which he, or those who lived with him, were not the immediate agents; unable to perceive any plan in things, to lay hold upon any regular succession in the order of nature, incapable of distinguishing the living from other beings, or of evolving any conception of life itself, however obscure and confused one may assume this life to be; tracked by forest beasts, uncertain of the morrow's food or abode, living without a permanent dwelling, suffering from hunger and the inclemency of the weather, surrounded by countless dangers, trembling at the howling of the wind in the branches, at the roaring of the waters, at the sinister howls of wild animals and birds of prey, at the countless vague and disquieting noises of the night,—he felt in the presence of all these dangers, disarmed, helpless, and forsaken.

He could not have recourse to a superhuman protector, inasmuch as he was in no position to represent with definite outlines those powers whose terrible energy he experienced at every moment; he did not know how to employ the magic rites which in the following age enabled him to struggle against the gods with the help of the supernatural weapons which they themselves used; and he did not find in his horde, so lacking in cohesion and unity, the firm and comforting support which the savage finds in his close alliance with the men

of his clan, or the barbarian in the ancient institutions which link him to his tribe or band, and make him one with it.

Cruel himself, he could only confusedly imagine the indistinct beings, the *numina* with which he peopled the world, to be cruel, too, even if he did not humanize them sufficiently to conceive of them as irritable, or to attribute to them hostile feelings towards himself.

And though as yet unskilled in evolving thoughts, clear and well defined, in linking together concepts, however rude and coarse, in explaining, for better or worse, all that was about him, he still had a capacity for imagination and recollection already infinitely more developed in him than in the animal. And so he was more unhappy, more troubled, more agitated a hundred times than the most timid among animals. Under the influence, indeed, of this vague terror to which he was easily a prey, images would appear and grow of such a character as would increase this terror still more. Everything, moreover, favors in the savage an exuberant growth of images; his food in turn insufficient and excessive; his long fasts alternating with copious repasts; the anxious expectation in which he constantly stands of a danger which, infinitely more than animals, he is capable of foreseeing, and, if I may so express it, of anticipating; the extreme fatigue to which he is exposed in his exhausting pursuit of game or flight from the foe; the long periods of idleness and inactivity which succeed at intervals these laborious tasks; solitude and silence haunted by countless indistinct noises; life in the open air; sleep near a fire that casts its fitful glare upon all objects in turn, and makes them leap from the darkness like so many supernatural apparitions.

And it is probable that these conditions were much more completely realized for the men of the earliest ages than for the non-civilized man of to-day, who is comparatively sedentary, supplied with more perfect weapons, in possession of customs and institutions which ensure the solidity and permanence of the

social bond, upon whom the disappearance of some of the most fearful animals that waged war against our ancestors confers a comparative security, and who, finally, in the protecting aid of the superhuman beings with whom he has made an alliance, whom he bends to desires by magic rites, or whose good-will he tries to conciliate by gifts, finds a constant support against the manifold dangers from without.

The savage is of an extreme suggestibility; all that is suggested to him by others or by himself, he immediately projects outwards in the shape of objects which appear as real as those which he sees and touches. In fact, a clear distinction between what is perceived and what is imagined calls for a critical capacity, a capacity for reflection of which he is completely bereft. This distinction he is capable of achieving, without, however, having a precise consciousness that he is making it, at the moment when he experiences a sensation, and when this is opposed to images which the very intensity of this sensation causes to seem internal; but he is not capable of distinguishing the memories of his perceptions from the memories of the creations of his imagination. For him these stand on the same plane, and have the same reality. If with time a selection does come about between them, it is only because by acting in conformity with certain recollections, he attains more surely to the objects of his desire; it is merely the practical utility of certain images which assures them a greater permanence and stability, which thus makes them more real, and, to be accurate, the measure of the reality of others. But all are externalized or, at least, half objectified.

These newly formed images, some of them merely simplified and attenuated sensations, which abide in him, though driven into the background by the constant influx of new sensations; others the results of the processes of association and of synthesis, which, under the influence of certain states of affection and of distinct motive tendencies, construct new totals with the

scattered fragments of former representations,—these images are mingled and confused with dream-images. The savage, as was doubtless also the case with man of former ages, dreams very often; the sleep of animals even is interrupted by visions which disturb them, and at times make them utter cries, or twitch their limbs. His hours of slumber are most irregular, and as he possesses a memory as confused and unable to localize as it is tenacious, a memory peopled by intense and highly-colored images but with ill-defined outlines, and as he passes his life in a sort of vague reverie which is neither slumber nor wakefulness, he is not in a position to distinguish clearly between his life as a waking man and the life of his sleeping hours, to divide by an impenetrable barrier his real perceptions from the figments of his dreams. His two lives are mutually entangled; his wakefulness is haunted by the dreams of the night; and it is the day's hunt or combat which persists in the mind of the warrior or hunter as he lies stretched under the shelter of a rock, or beneath a hut made of branches.

He is, moreover, much more subject than even the civilized man to real hallucinations, which often strike him with terror, and are to him quite indistinguishable from perceptions. Strange animals and men appear before his eyes; trees like the familiar trees of the forest,—and however different from them, bend their branches towards him, and the sky is traversed during the bursts of storm by gigantic forms which vanish in the midst of the flashing lightning. His mind, thronged by numerous fitful images, projects them upon objects, which are transformed by them. And however great the part played in his inner life by hallucination, that of illusion is greater. The peasants in our country districts take for washerwomen of the night, who are washing in the black swamp-waters the shrouds of the dead, the strips of white vapor floating in the peaceful air of evening, and clinging in the moonlight to the branches of drooping willows; and most stories of apparitions have a perfectly natural origin in the close

fusion of a real perception and the images which at the same time crowded the field of consciousness. But these illusions, rectified in the civilized man by a familiarity, however elementary, with some of the most important laws guiding phenomena, have in the case of the savage free scope for growth and development. A touch, the accidental contact of a blade of grass or of a piece of wood, becomes the touch of an animal's paw or of a human hand; and in the wind, which tears off branches or rolls up eddies of dust, he sees manifested the evident force of a being whose roughness and brutality he experiences when it strikes him in the face. The nipping cold produces the impression of genuine bites, and the slow rhythmic motion of the sea becomes its mighty breathing. But the greatest informers are voices; he hears in his ear words which no one has uttered; in the sound of murmuring waters, in the melancholy howling of the winds and the sighing of the branches, in the shrieks of wild beasts, the cries of birds, the crackling of the fire, the grumbling of the storm,—voices speak of which he thinks that he understands the speech. He hears these voices, too, in the depths of his being, whence they seem to rise from his very vitals as though somebody else dwelt in his own body. Inspirations come to him which are foreign to his usual conceptions and thoughts, which are unfamiliar; orders are given to him which he knows he has never given to himself, but which are known to him alone. Continually there rise from the obscure realm of the subliminal consciousness to the luminous and distinct consciousness, confused and imperative calls, suggestions of thoughts and acts; he is troubled, agitated, worried by these incitements which rise from the inner depths of his mind as well as by the countless external suggestions.

And he is incapable, because of his ignorance, of appreciating the meaning and value of the images which assail him at every hand; all that they suggest as real he accepts as real. He is all the more unable to escape from their tyran-

nical sway over him, because like the child, and almost like the animal, he is incapable of thinking in concepts and of formulating judgments; his whole mind is, according to Taine's expression, a mere "polypidom of images." He cannot rectify, as a child can by contact with an adult thought, the instinctive conclusions to which he is led; he has to submit to them passively. They are amended or modified only with extreme slowness by accumulated experiences; many generations of men are needed at these early stages of evolution to bring about the slightest progress. Primitive man, incapable of reflection, is scarcely inquisitive—I mean that his curiosity is neither tenacious, nor patient, nor persevering; he cannot long concentrate his attention on anything but a material object which interests him directly and practically. Abstract thoughts are inaccessible to him, and all that is not linked in his consciousness with some strong emotion, or the satisfaction of some need passes without leaving any impression before the mirror of his mind. Food, impending dangers, sexual desire, such are the preoccupations about which the content of his consciousness is crystallized. There is, then, no counter-weight to the perpetual stimuli of his feeling; passively he obeys all their suggestions; he does not reason or argue; he does not meditate or observe, he merely imagines, and beholds the images which must spontaneously arise in his mind under such conditions. They will impose themselves all the more readily on him as realities in the degree that they are the more vague and undetermined, and cannot consequently come into contact with any real perception, at any rate with the perception of any one of the familiar objects among which he lives, and of which he has often only a very imperfect knowledge, that becomes definite and precise only under the compulsion of practical exigencies.

Savages to-day coincide but very imperfectly with this description, the main features of which, however, are borrowed from the rich collection of documents about non-civilized

peoples, which are supplied by missionaries, religious and scientific travellers, merchants, and explorers. We cannot affirm that our remote ancestors are to be considered as their prototypes, as similar in all respects; but it is nevertheless very probable that such is the case, and that the man of former ages did not possess that nervous equilibrium which, after the bounds of animal life have been crossed, and a being has arisen to the dignity of waking dreamer, can be established only by regular habits, by a certain stability of life, implying an outline of civilization, however slight, and which alone enable reflection to begin its work, and the chaos of images to acquire some order.

It is, therefore, highly probable that religion in the primitive forms which analogical inferences alone enable us to attain, consisted not of ceremonies or myth-conceptions, but only of strong and vague emotions, united, but by very weak bonds, with confused and unstable images, which for a moment lent them an objective form; they were the very fears which troubled the human mind,—its anxieties, its anxious forebodings, its desires and joys,—which became external, and assumed the form of representations having the same mobility, the same wavering and fleeting outlines. The mental structure, which apparently legitimate inductions lead us to attribute to primitive man, implies the existence of this imaginative and emotional religion, not yet crystallized in definite shapes. Moreover, things would take precisely the same course among the savages of to-day, if traditional beliefs and rites collectively celebrated did not impress on his capricious thought a relative permanence and check fitful deviations. When, for example, on the occasion of initiatory rites to be undergone by a young man or a young woman before becoming a weapon-bearing warrior or a prospective bride, a savage finds himself in a condition analogous in certain respects to those in which men probably lived in the first stages of their civilization, an emotional condition arises in him very like the one I have endeavored to out-

line ; he experiences the same vague unrest ; he is harried by the same emotions, oppressed by the same anguish ; the same procession of wavering images flits through his mind ; the same phenomena of division appear in his consciousness. We must add, too, that the young Indian warrior, or the maiden who in Guinea awaits the visit of the snake-god, that the young Australian native who desires the functions of Biraark, or the future Shaman, has some confidence in certain of those supernatural beings with whom he is going to measure himself face to face ; that though some may be dangerous foes, others are protectors, allies, members of his clan ; that he has at his disposal magic means for his own preservation against the supernatural risks to which he exposes himself ; above all, he believes that these fearful Powers have definite features, which he can figure to himself, which he can conceive in his thought, and that he knows just how to deal with them, what attitude to adopt in order to gain their good-will ; finally, that he foresees the direction from which the danger will come, and what its nature will be. Such was not the case in those distant ages, before myths and beliefs, which later coalesce into coarse and childlike dogmas, had assumed a definite form, before ritual practices and sacerdotal institutions had built about man a double barrier to protect him against dangers begotten of the hostility of, or even the mere contact with, unknown beings near him ; hence his confusion in the midst of these many mysterious perils must have been infinitely greater.

The notion of mystery is not essential to the notion of religion ; it increases and becomes more precise along with the knowledge which man has of himself and of the world ; it is correlative with the conception itself of science, and acquires a sharp outline and a definite meaning only when a rudimentary criticism of our means of knowledge has found a home in the thought, at first naïve and unconscious of its limits, of the child or the savage. It makes religion more religious when it has permeated it, but it is not an integral part of religion.

The world about him appears mighty and fearful to the helpless savage who trembles before the rude hand of the Strong Ones; it does not appear to him impenetrable and mysterious. His conception of it is always rather mean, and when he grovels in the dust before the terror which issues from the gods, it is because he realizes his weakness and his ignorance; it is not because he considers them incomprehensible or irresistible. The wizard, the magician, the priest, the man, in short, who has knowledge and power, treats the superhuman beings on a footing of equality, and by the force of magic practices and sacred rites constrains them to obey him, and bends them to his will. Robertson Smith, among other scholars, has clearly shown that when an alliance has been made between a clan and a protecting deity, the members of the clan treat him with a joyous and confidential familiarity. But this is the case only when a dogma, however rudimentary, has been set up, when ceremonies are celebrated, when men have learned the preservative value of rites, and that one can by gifts win the good-will of the gods, and soften their hearts by prayers. So long as it was impossible to imagine them with definite forms or to imagine anything fixed or stable behind the moving shadow cast over their minds by the endless flux of the world; so long as they were a prey to a vague and anxious terror, the sacred terror aroused in childish souls by solitude, night, ignorance of everything, and the keen consciousness of self-weakness, of inability to resist the thousand unknown foes which, scarce suspected, hover about unseen; just so long the universe appeared to them full of mystery, of horrible and fearful mystery. This is why the birth of a religion which brought with it rites of preservation and of defence, myths and beliefs with outlines already more clearly marked, became for our ancestors, oppressed by the fear of the unknown, a sort of liberation. It already exorcised some of the phantoms which science later was to drive away entirely; it gave man a little of the serene confidence which was to find a more

ample and better justification in faith in a God of love and justice. It was powerless to enslave beings kept in servitude by their very liberty; who became free from the inner yoke which they bore in them only when they gradually acquired consciousness of their double dependence upon the society of which they are members, and upon the gods who are members of it like themselves, who protect it, because they belong to it.

It is, moreover, very probable that these vague Powers, these living and moving Forces by which man felt himself surrounded, were not sufficiently personal for him to attribute to them either good-will or anger on his score. They seemed to him awful, but not, it would appear, hostile; and, on the other hand, he had no idea that he could avoid their action or struggle against them; he did not distinguish them with sufficient clearness to imagine what weapons he could use against them. Thus, the fear which he felt before them was not the abject fear which casts whole tribes of savages at the feet of their bloody gods, but undoubtedly the anguish, the troubled expectation, the vague terror, which, united with the sense of an unlimited and omnipresent force, and of the close dependence of the individual upon the superhuman beings whom he does not know, but sees ever varying and changeable, ever fleeting, ever different from themselves,—must produce in minds a truly religious emotion. This emotion furnishes to the conception which man succeeds in building of the world and of himself the material on which it will impose a form as soon as he has been able to go through a sufficient apprenticeship in reflection to enable him to think his images in coherent totalities, and to give them sufficient attention to make them persist identical in his memory, instead of scattering and dispersing like the ephemeral castles which the mind builds out of clouds.

A theory which has gained footing in the study of comparative religions is that all objects of nature appeared at first to man as animated by spirits, and all phenomena of which it is the stage, as caused by spirits. Behind all bodies were hidden souls,

like that of man, which gave them movement and life, which survived them when they were destroyed, and determined, by abandoning them, their dissolution and destruction. These souls were found not only in animals and in plants, but in rocks, rivers, seas, trees, as well as in the earth and the sky; even wrought articles were an abiding-place for spirits. To the most powerful of these beings, who duplicate, so to speak, the material beings, were directed the worship and homage of men who looked upon them as the agents of all the great cosmic events, as the masters of their fates, and transformed them into deities. This animist conception has certainly not been manufactured by the mythologists and historians of religion. It exists indeed; it is a true conception which constitutes the substance, even at the present day, of the science, of the philosophy, and of the theology of most non-civilized peoples. But the mistake, to my mind, consists in projecting it into a far too remote past; it is not recent, neither is it primitive. To endow objects with a soul, it was already essential to have a notion, however confused, of the soul. And it is impossible to conceive how this notion could have existed from the first in the mind, incapable of analysis and abstraction, of our early ancestors.

It is a keen realization of this difficulty which has given rise to all the *euhemerist* theories of the origin of religions, which for some years have had a singular vogue, and which aim at reducing all cults to merely differentiated forms of funeral and ancestral worship, and at deriving the whole doctrine of the animism of nature from a primitive spiritism. The only deities are at first the souls of the mighty dead, free and stripped in a way, or incarnated in manifold objects. Then, by a process of extension by analogy, was reached the assimilation with men of those natural objects whose manifestations have most power and energy, and the attribution also to them of souls. In truth, and to this point I shall return later, nothing proves the priority of the worship of the dead over other

religious forms, and it would even seem that in some cases the ancestral cult is the most recent of the various forms coexisting in one social group. But we must add that even were funeral religion proved to be, in its actual condition, correlative with the lowest stage of civilization, and to present itself with characteristics which would make us consider it as the most archaic of all known types of religion, still this would not solve the problem. It is, in fact, as hard to understand how, at a time when man was still almost steeped in animal qualities, he could reach such a complex and subtle conception of human two-foldness, as to imagine how he could at once rise to the idea of the animism of all nature, of a universe peopled with souls, which seems to us not the beginning, but the conclusion of a long philosophical evolution. The theory of animism, childish as it appears to us in many of its applications, presupposes a serious effort of reflection, a marked aptitude for system and generalization. It is, therefore, a remarkable neglect of the best established laws of general psychology to make it the product of the mind of men of ancient ages, still incapable of attention, of abstraction, and of generalization. But the notion also of the two-fold, the worship not of the dead, but of the spirits of the dead, presupposes also a marked ability to analyze, to decompose a total given in perception into its elements, to think details apart from the whole,—an ability which we are hardly ready to admit. Herbert Spencer and his disciples argue as though the notion of soul were an experimental datum, and he links it with the phenomena of shadow, reflection, fainting, ecstasy, sleep, dreaming, and death. But it is a constructed notion: all these phenomena can only have furnished the understanding with the materials necessary for constructing this notion, and even then we must grant this capacity to the intellect, and the ability of detaching from the complex whole which makes up a human being, this or that coherent group of phenomena which can be represented later under the material form of reflection, or of a double. It is precisely this effort, of which in

the initial period of psychic evolution it seems to us quite incapable.

And yet at this very phase of the developments of the first human societies, and after the stage had been outgrown, when religious life had been almost exclusively affective, a definite religion must have arisen, a religion which gave shelter to practices and rites addressed to superhuman beings representable in thought, and about whom more could be known than the mere existence manifested by a force experienced but not understood. This religion, of which psychological analysis has led us to postulate the existence, is known to us. It exists, interwoven with spiritist and animist elements in many of the ethnic groups least advanced in development. At this point of the evolution nature appears to man, not as peopled with spirits, but merely as living, or rather made up of Living Ones, which he cannot conceive as different from himself, and whose arbitrary and capricious will regulates the course of events, which is in reality but their acts. The forest will be alive; living, too, the fertilizing and devastating waters; living the plants, nutritious or poisonous; living the raging ocean; living the hard, resisting rocks, the nimble fire, the wind that overturns trees, the bright heavens, the mists laden with rain, the lightning that cleaves the clouds, the sun that destroys and creates anew. And he does not attribute life alone to these beings, and to these various things, but also a will like his own, and an intellect of the same order, as well as the same sentiments, the same desires, the same affections, the same hatreds. These human attributes he has, moreover, in the very earliest periods bestowed upon animals, whom he does not conceive as separated from him by any impassable barrier, and whom he often assumes to be more intelligent and more powerful than himself. This conception has received from Guyau a name which deserves to pass into common use, that of *panthelism*. He describes this as "the state of human intelligence which first places in nature, not

spirits more or less distinct from the bodies, but simply intentions, desires, wills inherent in the things themselves." But at this stage of its development it represents not only the objects and beings of nature as wills, but also the acts. This is because they appear to it as objects. The expression of any physical or moral energy is accompanied by variations of the affective state, which result, in turn, in images of one kind or another. These images symbolize the act, represent it, embody it, in a way; and, just as the acts, so the passions which drag men to these acts, and the desires which excite them, become personified and clothed in sensible forms,—all this spontaneously and without the intervention of any reflecting or conscious tendency towards the creation of allegories. Language completes the work begun by the emotions and the images, and confers on these entities of thought a fuller and more complete reality. Thenceforth, Man himself, like the world about him, is in his own eyes a republic of Powers, more or less confusedly represented in consciousness, identical in appearance with the multiple objects revealed in external perception. And these externalized images are felt by him as forces, as energies acting at the same time upon things and upon himself. Hence becomes completer still the identification between surrounding nature, and man who lives from it and in it.

Moreover, in the development of this notion of the life of things an essential part appears to be played by the familiarity of primitive man with animals, whose life is so closely connected with his, and by the conception which he has of the inner workings of their nature. They are in all their doings, in all their modes of action towards each other and towards him, too like himself for him to think of placing them in a category apart from himself. Yet they are so different, or some of them at least, in all external appearances, as not to seem more closely connected than the plants, the waters, which also move and speak, or the rocks, which seem occasionally to have kept something of his appear-

ance or the outlines of his body. This is one reason more why plants, rivers, and rocks should be conceived by him as living beings and volitional beings. Simultaneously he appears to himself in the image of the objects of nature and all nature; nature he represents in the image of his will. Men and things are of the same essence, endowed with the same attributes and powers, with a difference of extent alone, not of quality.

These attributes and powers are, moreover, very different from human attributes and powers, as we conceive them; they are more varied, more numerous, of a higher value perhaps. According to non-civilized peoples, and we have no reason to surmise that in this they deviate at all from primitive tradition, the action of man is carried into a thousand realms now known to be inaccessible to him; he can make rain fall, or the sun shine, the wind blow or die away, the clouds collect or disperse, the plants grow or the leaves dry up; he can give whom he wishes to the demon of disease, or cure whomsoever he likes; assume the form which pleases him most, or impose it upon others. And what man can do, is equally possible to the other wills like his own which make up the world. All beings, then, to be plain, are magicians, but magicians of unequal power and knowledge; the natural gift, or *mana*, which cannot be acquired, and the familiarity with good rules and useful receipts, such are the two elements of this magic which enables some men, but some only, to lord it over the ocean, the thunder, or the powerful and wise beasts of the forest. Those who lack this power, and they are in the majority, do not differ in essence from these skillful and mighty wizards; they can accomplish less, that is all. A prey to the countless dangers which threaten the weak, their only hope is to earn the good-will of some human or superhuman magician who, through kindness or self-interest, will place at their disposal his science and the effective energy which is in him.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

THE NEW ITALY

SALVATORE CORTESI, *Rome.*



MASSIMO D'AZEGLIO, patriot, novelist, painter, and politician, who was Premier under Victor Emanuel, exclaimed shortly before his death: "Now that Italy is made, we must make the Italians!" He meant that, although the struggle for unity and independence had lasted for half a century, such a period was totally inadequate to make the people morally, intellectually, and politically, equal to the new conditions of their country. How right he was, is proved by the present state of the Italians, who, notwithstanding that half a century more has passed since D'Azeglio uttered his prophecy, are still far from having accomplished the evolution which will, in a relatively near future, bring them to the level of the most advanced nations. The situation, however, is not generally realized, and the consequence is a most erroneous judgment of Italian affairs not only abroad but at home.

General Ponza di San Martino, who is now a Senator and Minister of War, was two years ago unknown to his fellow-countrymen except as a soldier, but he has shown that he had the intuition to rightly judge their true position. He was sent by King Humbert to render homage to M. Faure, President of the French Republic, who was at the frontier, and answering some compliments of the Head of the Republic on the progress made by the Peninsula, he said, "We Italians are not yet what

we will become; it will take one hundred years more for us to show of what we are capable." The exclamation of Massimo D'Azeglio and the answer of General Ponza di San Martino complete each other, and should remind all those who study Italy that they must take into consideration the Law of Time. They must consider that it is only a little over fifty years since Constitutional liberty was granted, and then only to a small part of the country; scarcely thirty-four years have passed since the war of Independence ended, and exactly thirty since the whole Peninsula has been a united nation, so that it would be manifestly unfair to make a parallel between Italy and the other European countries who have had centuries of unity and freedom.

Italy's advance in recent progress comes immediately after that of Germany,—who was in all respects better prepared and ripe for the turn which her destiny took,—but with this exception, she has in her short life as a kingdom, made proportionately immensely greater advance than any other country. This advance has, in fact, been accomplished with such rapidity and feverishness that the law of time, which should have taught that the solidity of things is in indirect proportion to the quickness with which they are made, has not been taken into account. The consequence is that much of the work done is mediocre, and much must be changed, thus leading to a waste of money, which, if employed with more parsimony and more discretion would have produced lasting and useful results. For this reason those who watch the evolution of Italy usually fall into two extremes: either overlooking the praiseworthy effort, they see merely the mistakes, and so predict failure; or they see the effort and consider it as successful accomplishment.

A very gloomy idea of the Peninsula would certainly be had if only one side of the picture was regarded. For instance, there are still places where the peasants eat only chestnuts, and in the Marches provinces the poorest support life on acorns, while in the regions of the north they eat corn-meal year in and year out,

resulting in the majority being affected with goitre. Many of the working men are in no better condition. For example, there are in Milan (which is, perhaps, the most prosperous Italian city), tenement houses where one thousand and eighteen souls are crowded together under conditions too heartrending for description. Among these there are some whose work-day is from fourteen to sixteen hours long. Some of the men receive only twelve cents a day, while the women are given four cents; and in certain provinces of Sicily, Calabria, and Puglie, no wages are given at all but the workmen are paid in kind, often of unsound quality and meagre quantity. The overwork and insufficient nourishment, without taking into consideration the increase in the death-rate, have so stunted the growth of the population that the minimum height for military service has had to be reduced. Nor would the impression change if one looked at Italy only from the financial point of view. The Italian people pay, in fact, higher taxes than any other country, amounting altogether to \$437,000,000 per annum, which makes an average of about \$15 for each inhabitant, while there is a public debt of \$2,587,125 averaging \$95 for each citizen, not to speak of the city debts which, to quote only the principal, are roughly: Rome \$42,198,075; Naples \$26,125,900; Milan \$18,820,785; Genoa \$9,985,230, and the mortgages on private land amount to over \$1,400,000,000. The bad impression will be deepened on learning that the forced sales by the Government on property for unpaid taxes amounted to 9,114 in 1891; to 9,471 in 1892, and to 13,375 in 1893, that being the last year in which statistics have been issued, which is without doubt serious, especially as the majority of the sales were made for taxes not surpassing \$10. The private property of the Peninsula is estimated at \$10,800,000,000, so that Italian citizens pay about four per cent. of their incomes in taxes, while Frenchmen pay only 1.87, and Englishmen 1.74. The pessimists, not by any means justly, attribute to this situation

the ever increasing exodus of workmen, who have lately emigrated to the extent of 300,000 a year, although there are 13,958,622 acres of uncultivated land, and the Peninsula is obliged to import every year \$80,000,000 worth of cereals. A sad comparison is made between the \$800,000 a year which the Government allots to assist agriculture and to redeem the immense uncultivated region (which sum is, of course, quite inadequate) and the \$71,200,000 which are expended annually on the army and navy, not counting the \$105,000,000 which the ill-fated Erythrea colony has cost in sixteen years. What different results, people say, would we not have obtained if, at least this last money, had been used for the construction of the much talked-of irrigating canal through the Emilia region, from Piacenza to the Adriatic Sea, which would transport from the River Po 157,000 litres of water every second, give wages and work to some of the most populous provinces, and have cost \$61,200,000. Or it might have been employed in redeeming one fourth of the uncultivated land, thus proving an untold blessing for the starving peasants. To these conditions is put down the alarming growth of crime, as, in the sweet and smiling country where St. Francis of Assisi preached the religion of love and pardon, 4,000 murders and attempted murders according to statistics, take place every year, that is to say, an average of over ten a day. The augmentation of crime is shown by the fact that in 1862 the gaols contained 15,037 prisoners, while in 1894 the number had reached 28,336, and, more distressing still, the increase was particularly noticeable among minors, who represent one fifth of the whole.

Now for the other side of the picture. To have a true idea of what Italy really is now, all these eminently terrible figures and facts should be counterposed with what the country has done, attempted to do, and is doing on the road of progress, and it will be found that perhaps no other nation in Europe even among the most learned, rich, and civilized, has obtained, in so short a

period of time more satisfactory results. There is, in fact, no instance in history of a people which, after so many centuries of decadence, political slavery, and moral degradation, has succeeded in bringing about so quickly a resurrection and transformation. Spain and Greece also conquered their liberty, but they have shown themselves, up to the present, wanting in the other co-efficients necessary to make them rise to a new life morally and materially. Those who compare Italy with the most progressive countries in Europe, establishing parallels between what in late years has been done in Germany, England, and France, and the corresponding results in the Peninsula, do not take note of the difference which existed at the starting point. Italy was so behind the others, that, of course, even running, she cannot yet claim to have reached those who have continued their way simply walking. Forty years ago she did not exist, and out of worse than nothing, through revolutions and wars, she has with sudden ambition made herself a great power, uniting together peoples which, although belonging to the same race, had become through centuries of separation, almost heterogeneous. The army and navy alone have represented an expense of \$3,000,000,000.

The railway lines are three times what they were, now covering about 10,000 miles, when a quarter of a century ago more than two thirds of the young kingdom was cut off from any traffic and enlightenment for want of communication, and the travellers who were 25,000,000, are at present about 75,000,000.

Especially in the ex-Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, where for many years the country had been governed according to the famous formula of Ferdinand IV., known as the three "F's," *i. e.*, "Forca, Farina, Feste," (Gallows, Flour, Festivals) there were no roads, no bridges, a defective postal service, and the telegraph was almost unknown. They had not even a diligence service, and journeys were made by ox-carts which forded the rivers as best they could. With the exception of

northern Italy and Tuscany, public instruction did not exist, the people being purposely left by the Government in the most appalling ignorance, so much so that there were provinces in the south and in Sicily where the illiterates reached the amazing average of ninety-nine per cent., while taking the Peninsula as a whole, the average was seventy-five. Public primary schools, which in 1870 were 32,384 with about 1,000,000 pupils, costing \$6,116,359, now exceed 60,000 with over 3,000,000 pupils and cost \$15,000,000 annually, while the average of illiterates has fallen to about forty per cent. The post-offices have increased from 2,637 to 7,883, the number of letters mailed having augmented from 99,000,000 a year to 217,500,000, while the telegraph offices formerly only 1,351 are now 3,823.

Even twenty years ago Italy had no industries to speak of, but the tariff war made against her, which at first appeared a disaster, was in reality a blessing in disguise, as it gave to Lombardy, Piedmont, and Liguria, new life and impetus. Several industries have grown in these regions with such vitality and perfection that Italy not only no more needs from abroad the goods which she manufactures but exports them herself, having already become a dreaded competitor, especially to France. Senator Jules Siegfried, in his recent report to the French Senate on the Budget of Industry and Commerce, said that general Italian commerce had risen ninety-nine per cent., and the exportation one hundred and twenty per cent.

The greatest exportation, however, which Italy makes is that of her strong working men, which is not as I said above, due exclusively to their poverty, but also to the increase in the population, which, according to the same report of Senator Siegfried,—I quote him as he cannot be suspected of partiality,—has increased forty-four per cent. since 1860. The average number of inhabitants in Italy is one hundred to each square mile, reaching a maximum of one hundred and fifty in the pro-

vince of Genoa, that is to say, higher than any other country in Europe except Belgium, and the increase, arising from the difference between the death and birth-rate, amounts to about 407,000 yearly, or thirteen to every thousand. From the results of calculations it will be seen that, continuing at this rate, in one century the present 32,000,000 inhabitants would more than triple itself, reaching 100,000,000, and even admitting that all over the Peninsula a population as dense as that of the province of Genoa could live, Italy would not be able to contain more than 55,000,000. The remainder would necessarily be absorbed by emigration, which is exactly what is already taking place. In the last twenty years those who have emigrated are nearly 5,000,000 exceeding the exodus in the same period of France, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Spain, and Portugal, taken together. Four times more than that of Russia, which has 180,000,000 inhabitants, three times that of Germany, and a few thousands more than that of Great Britain who has colonies all over the world. Without capital, without organization, abandoned to themselves, rather impeded than otherwise, the emigrants have made a new Italy on the shores of the Platte River, where they find affinity of race and tongue and a sky which recalls their own. Numbering about one third of the entire population, they efficaciously contribute to the development of the Argentine Republic, Uruguay, and Paraguay, forming a new market which is already a source of income to the mother country, so much so that England no longer fears there the competition of goods "made in Germany," but that of those made in Italy. The exportation from the Peninsula to the Argentine Republic alone, which did not exist about thirty years ago, and which amounted to \$2,600,000 in 1885, now reaches almost \$30,000,000. The United States offers a great attraction to spontaneous emigration from Italy, although the Italians once there find themselves confronted by races such as the Anglo-Saxon, the German, and the Scandinavian, who are intellectually

and financially superior to them, and with linguistic and climatic difficulties from which they are free in South America. In 1899, 76,489 landed in the United States, a figure which had never before been reached and which cannot be compared with that of any other country, as it exceeds that of Great Britain, Germany, and Russia, of the same year taken together.

With regard to the progress made in commerce it will be sufficient to look at the harbor of Genoa, which rivals that of Marseilles for the supremacy of the Mediterranean, and which dreams of leaving her behind when, in a few years, the Mont Genis and St. Gothard roads will be added to that of the Simplon tunnel, now in course of construction, and which will be the shortest way of communication between the Mediterranean and Central Europe. A clear idea of the increased traffic in the harbor of Genoa may be obtained by glancing at the increase in the returns of customs and port duties, which were \$2,500,000 in 1870; \$4,600,000 in 1876; \$10,200,000 in 1881; \$16,000,000 in 1890; and over \$20,000,000 in 1899.

Together with the intellectual development of the people has grown their self-respect, the traditional army of beggars being now practically limited to the south, while a really striking step forward has been taken in the field of hygiene. This last was obtained almost entirely by rebuilding Florence, Rome, and Naples, which had become centres of infection,—respecting where possible all that had an ancient or artistic value,—and by rendering compulsory on each Commune, no matter how small, the support of a doctor whose services must be free to all. To have an idea of the gain, let us look at Rome, which was one of the less salubrious towns. While her death-rate in 1872 was 41.8 per thousand, it had fallen in 1899 to 15.1, in which year that of New York was 18.4. This, indeed, was not one of Rome's best years, it having been only 14.3 per thousand in 1897. Taking the last ten years, the average death-rate has been 17.8 against 18.9 in London; 19.8 in Paris; 20.00 in Vienna; 22.1 in

Budapest; and 25.5 in St. Petersburg. It is most important to note that malaria has become almost a legend in the city itself, as only 1.89 per cent. of the deaths are traceable to this cause.

The position of the Peninsula, her past history, and the struggle by which almost miraculously she succeeded in joining her dismembered parts, prevented her from following in her foreign relations a policy of neutrality which would, perhaps, have facilitated her internal development. To have her territorial integrity guaranteed and to protect her interest in the Mediterranean, she had to join the Central Powers, forming, in 1892, that Triple Alliance of which both good and bad has been said in much abundance, and which has no doubt contributed to make heavier the burdens the people have had to bear.

Last, but not least, those who will not be led astray about Italy, must take into consideration the struggle always going on between the Papacy and the new kingdom, causing a situation which, now-a-days, does not exist in any other country, and which is of too much importance to be treated incidentally in this rapid survey of Italian life and of which I shall write on another occasion.

In other countries the Church, and especially the Roman Catholic, is the best ally of the Conservative elements, both having as a mutual object the preservation and protection of the State. Italy, on the contrary, has in the Clericals her bitterest and most irreconcilable foe, who on her hearth-stone and in her very midst are ready to give support to any enemy attacking her, both abroad and at home, should it be Republic or Empire, followers of deposed rulers, or subversive parties. The attacks are continuous, the Clericals having at their disposal the strongest organization which has ever existed, employing diplomatists and the press, the pulpit and all active propaganda, with such liberty and protection as can hardly be found even in countries where the relations between Church and State are cordial. The conflict between the Papacy and Italy continues ever unabated, there

being no hope of reconciliation, either through agreement between the two, or an international convention, as in either case the condition put forward by the Vatican would be the abandonment of Rome by United Italy, which is a proposition which will not even bear discussion. If the Papacy thinks that temporal rule is necessary to her future well-being, the new State holds that the Eternal City is necessary to its unity, and certainly the feeling is universal that the latter is a much more imperative necessity than the former. Its ecclesiastical policy has, however, always been the weak point of each Cabinet in Italy since 1870, no Government ever having succeeded in taking a clearly defined and determined attitude, but has always oscillated between two extremes, severity and laxity, each neutralizing the effect of the other, both leaving those in power exposed to grave censure at home and abroad. A most noteworthy feature of the controversy is, that, having its seat at Rome, the struggle takes place with mutual respect, without interfering in the least with public tranquillity, which seems to be the result of centuries of such violent changes that it now takes exceptional events to rouse them, forming at the same time a striking proof of the tolerance of the Romans. The year has remained memorable in which Pious IX. was at the Vatican, King Victor Emanuel at the Quirinal, and General Garibaldi at the Villa Casalini, these three great men who had fiercely fought each other for about thirty years, living in the same town, surrounded by their ardent supporters, without coming into direct conflict. Giovanni Bovio, the well known philosopher, arriving that year in Rome, exclaimed: "This is not a town, it is the world!"

In such an atmosphere Italian politics have their centre, and their most important manifestations. To understand them clearly it is necessary to recall briefly the short Parliamentary history of the Peninsula, based on the Constitution which was given in 1848 by Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, to his subjects. Then in all the States of Italy revolution brought about similar consti-

tutions, but as soon as the respective sovereigns were strong enough, aided by foreign bayonets, to trample upon the "Liberals," as the Nationalists were then called irrespective of party, the reforms were abolished and ancient tyrannies reëstablished; the most intolerant being that of the Papacy, and the most ignorantly brutal, that of the Bourbons. Only the ruler of the Sardinian Kingdom risked his crown to maintain the liberties granted, his country becoming the centre of the progressive movement. Under these auspices came into existence the Subalpine, afterwards Italian Parliament, which, for the fourth of a century until the fall of the Temporal Power, gathered together the most luminous minds of Liberalism in Italy and wrote the most glorious pages of its history. Then Victor Emanuel, the King, and Cavour, Conservative Minister, worked together with Mazzini, apostle of Democracy, and Garibaldi, hero of Republicanism, for the great object of unity and independence, though in conflict as to forms. Parliament was divided into two great parties, Right and Left, nominally Conservative and Liberal, but, in fact they were all sons of the revolution, and it was said that the most conservative member of the Italian Chamber was more radical than the most advanced Radical in other countries.

This explains why only Conservatives had been in power until 1876, when the Minghetti Cabinet fell, and the Left came into power with Depretis. *Finis Destrae* was predicted, but it was in reality the beginning of the end of all parties, as the two great sections which had divided Parliament, both aspiring to be the makers of Italy but differing in methods, had melted away at the foot of the Capitol. The truth is that almost as soon as the sublime ideal of the fatherland was realized, the unpreparedness of the country for representative government was evident, the larger part being only then freed from a long period of political slavery.

The generous and audacious struggles, the heroism and martyrdom, were succeeded by ambitious thirst for honor and power,

and by corruption and immorality in all the manifestations of public life

Signor Depretis remained in power, with a short interruption, until his death in 1885, and, cynic and sceptic as he was, inaugurated what he called "transformism," *viz.*, having no party, taking colleagues from all sections of the Chamber being anxious only for a majority no matter how composed, a policy which was followed by his successors. The most important event of this period, particularly because of its consequences, was the "Railway Convention" for ceding the railways to private companies, which was denounced as an interested speculation. In 1885, to divert public attention, Massowah was occupied, which Signor Mancini, Minister of Foreign Affairs, called, "the key of the Mediterranean," a phrase now ridiculous, but which pleased the paradoxical tendency of his countrymen. So Italian colonial ventures were inaugurated and were continued down to the disaster of Adowa, always being used to disguise internal misgovernment. This policy was, however, a great expense to the country. The African enterprise having by official confession cost \$100,000,000, and the lives of 8,000 soldiers, which does not include the 2,000 men held captive for ten months and their ransom of \$1,800,000.

The fractional division of parties has brought into existence groups and semi-groups, which do not gather around a programme but about individuals by whose names the Deputies are called and who regulate their votes, generally having as their object only personal or local interests. So each deputy, like a sunflower, follows his sun, hoping that it will sometime reach supreme power, and that it will reflect on him some of its rays. This is the real gangrene of Parliament, which renders its action inorganic and incoherent, and paralyses all Cabinets which cannot rest on a homogeneous majority, but have to depend upon hybrid coalitions. The most flagrant example of this was given by the Rudini Cabinet, which came into power in 1896 when Signor Crispi was

overthrown by the reverses in Africa. The Marquis di Rudini, the old Conservative, who in 1866 pointed the guns of Palermo at his fellow-townsmen, assumed power through the support of the Radicals and with the personal, although unofficial, coöperation of the late Signor Cavallotti, the fiery leader of the Extreme Left, a man ready to help any government take the reins of power from the hands of Crispi, who, though a Republican in his youth, led the most violent of campaigns against the subversive parties. The result of such degeneration in the Parliamentary system is that large numbers of Deputies call themselves for electoral purposes in their respective constituencies, Conservatives or Liberals, Moderates or Progressists, but who are in reality nothing in the Chamber, and who are always ready to support the Cabinet which seems strongest and from which they can get the most for themselves and their friends. In many cases the elections are the result of corruption and local influences quite apart from, if not injurious to, the welfare of the country, and to call such Deputies "representatives of the nation" is an irony. The same Chamber, for instance, which supported Signor Crispi in an implacable attitude against Abyssinia, was ready to applaud the Marquis di Rudini when he declared he would not accept, even as a present, the whole Tigré, over which Italy and Ethiopia had been fighting, and repudiated any protectorate over Emperor Menelik's dominions. So the great majority of the people live apart from politics, and one may say that the indisputable progress which the country has made, and which I have already pointed out, is quite independent, and, at times, in spite of the action of Government and Parliament.

Some advance has been made in electoral laws, which from granting the right to vote only to citizens having a certain income, has lately been extended to all who are of age and can read and write, so if there were no illiterates and all qualified went to inscribe themselves on the electoral lists the electors would be over 7,000,000. As at present about forty per cent.

of the population are totally uneducated, the electors should be 4,000,000, whereas, only 2,000,000 citizens have done their duty by signing the lists, and only 1,360,910 went to the polls at the last general elections. Thus here is a country of over 32,000,000 inhabitants, governed by the will of a minority, which is in most cases induced to vote for a certain candidate through corruption. No better ground than this could be found for the growth of those subversive parties, as they call them here, which are represented in the Chamber by the Extreme Left. They gathered together in the general elections of June 3d, 1900, 445,594 votes, which is over one third of the number collected by the Constitutional candidates. The Radicals had 110,208 votes, the Republicans 119,645, and the Socialists 215,841. The greatest progress was made by the Socialists, who from 76,357 votes in the general elections of 1895, rose to 134,502 in 1897, and have in the last three years almost doubled. The Extreme Left has returned to the House from the recent battle augmented by one third, numbering almost one hundred Deputies, that is to say one fifth of the whole Chamber, so that they may hope to be almost always masters of the situation by throwing their weight on one side or the other. This state of things which at first sight may seem dangerous for present institutions, will on the contrary, according to the opinion of the most enlightened men, in time bring back Parliament to its normal workings by the resurrection of the two great parties. The disappearance of the traditional Right and Left, after the taking of Rome, was due also to the fact of having accomplished the work of the unity, to the famous papal *non expedit* by which Clericals were forbidden to participate in political life. Thus the Conservatives found themselves deprived of the element which in other Catholic countries represents the backbone of the party, and the Right ceasing to exist had the natural effect of splitting up the Left into the present many groups. What would have been obtained by the entering of the Clericals into the political arena will be

produced by the Extreme Left, enlarged as it is, and with the certainty of still more expanding. Around this party will gather all Democrats and progressive groups, forming a homogeneous party which will be counterposed by another uniting together all the moderate and conservative tendencies. It will then be found that the dreaded Extreme Left is not so entirely composed of "subversive" elements as is believed, but that it especially represents the new generation, which, instead of living in the past, wishes to push forward into the future. This new generation, the party of the Young, as it may be called, is the opposite to those who dream, without the nation being duly prepared, of the formation of a new Roman Empire, or to those who are in love with the splendor of mediæval art and idolize everything connected with that period, growling at the destruction of the Ghetto or the introduction of electricity, and who are even ready to admire the Papacy out of gratitude for the many artists which she employed in the days of her greatness.

The young generation faces all this with a strong spirit of progress, liberty, and science, ambitions which, as the last general elections proved, have many adherents among the masses, thus showing that there is every chance that the country will have a fresh impulse and new life.

Historic traditions, climate, education, and heredity, are conducive to the lack, in the Italians, of certain qualities which the Anglo-Saxons and Germans possess, such as patience, calm tenacity, and a spirit of association or combination, but they have instead vivacity, adaptability, intellectual acuteness, and less inclination to alcoholism. Such natural gifts should be sufficient for their complete *renaissance*.

RECENT PROGRESS IN GEOLOGY

ANDREW C. LAWSON, *University of California.*



AMONG the remarkable phenomena connected with volcanic activity that which to the geologist is the most mysterious, is the extravasation from the same vent of totally different kinds of molten rock. The surprise which this discovery occasions implies an expectancy of homogeneity at the sources from which the

lavas are drawn. This expectancy of course arises in the common law controlling the evolution of scientific knowledge, viz., that we advance from simple hypotheses to more complex. Nearly all the important scientific hypotheses and theories which pass current to-day are the product of a process of evolution from an original conception which proved too simple to adequately express the complex relationships involved. The early geologists seem to have experienced a shock, as our own students of to-day certainly do, on discovering that the same volcano may vomit forth quite different kinds of lavas. The tacit assumption of a homogeneous source for all the lavas emanating from the same vent seemed to be an error. Geology demanded a more advanced hypothesis to embrace the recognized degree of complication. This demand stimulated inquiry and speculation. Prior to the middle of the present century various incidental attempts had been made to explain the facts observed. Scrope, Darwin, and Dana had discussed the question, but the chemical characters of rocks were not then sufficiently known to permit of such

discussions leading to any satisfactory results; and it was not until 1851 that Bunsen, the great Heidelberg chemist, after a visit to the volcanoes of Iceland and a review of the then known rocks of the world, announced a working hypotheses which gave due consideration to the chemical factor in the problem, and which, in an important degree, has influenced all later thought on the question of the origin of rocks. Bunsen's studies led him to the conviction that in volcanic regions there existed beneath the crust in distinct reservoirs two primary magmas, the one the chemical antithesis of the other. One magma was supposed to be acid, having an excess of silica and an abundance of the alkalis, particularly potash, while the other was basic, i. e., poor in silica, and rich in lime, magnesia, and iron. The consolidation of one of these magmas gave rise to the extreme acid type of rocks such as rhyolite, while the consolidation of the other gave rise to the very basic rocks such as basalt. All other rocks were regarded as due to mixtures in various proportions of these two primary magmas.

Bunsen's ideas were combated by his contemporaries and they have found no acceptance in geology since. Their great value lies in the fact that they were the first recognition of the important chemical relationship which certainly obtains between rocks apparently widely dissimilar. To find a more correct expression for that relationship and so formulate an hypothesis to explain the genesis of the numerous types and varieties of rocks, is a problem to which geology has addressed itself for more than half a century and at no time more energetically and successfully than during the past decade. For the first half of this period progress was slow. Methods of research were crude and undeveloped. In the seventies the application of the polarizing microscope to the study of these sections of rocks came into general use. The new method, one of the most clear and precise in modern science, attracted a host of investigators and the study of rocks became a science in itself. In the twenty-five years of this activity the literature on rocks has grown enormously. Our

concrete knowledge of rocks from all parts of the earth's surface, from the heavens above, and from the mines beneath, has piled up so rapidly that it, for the most part, as yet awaits philosophical discussion. As a result of this activity much has been accomplished not only for petrography, but for the broader science of geology. Notably has the old German classification of rocks into the geologically *old* and the geologically *new* been swept away, and it is now recognized freely in the German text-books that the essential conditions controlling the formation of igneous rocks in the crust of the earth has not changed since the first rocks known to us solidified. But perhaps no other fact has come out more strongly than the repeated observation that in the same plutonic centre we frequently find, closely associated, rocks of widely divergent mineralogical and chemical characters. Here we have a fact of the same order as the extravasation of totally different lavas from the same volcanic vent; and here, again, Bunsen's hypothesis fails ignominiously in any attempt to explain the origin of these different plutonic types. To explain the genesis of these different types of rocks whether they be volcanic or plutonic is the great task which petrology has before it to-day. The science is, indeed, concerned with other things, notably an attempt to formulate some consistent scheme of classification of rocks for every-day use, pending the solution of the greater question of rock genesis, which, of course, lies at the bottom of rational classification. The modern hypotheses of petrogenesis are two in number, and may be called the hypothesis of magma differentiation and the hypothesis of endomorphism. The first has by far the most numerous body of advocates and adherents. It reverses the idea of Bunsen, and states that different types of rocks arise not from the mixture of magmas but by the splitting up or differentiation of simple magmas into chemically diverse parts which on consolidation yield diverse rocks. Rosenbusch, for instance, maintains that the dykes of light colored acid aplite and the dykes of dark basic lamprophyres which are commonly associated

with granite masses, and which are chemically complementary, are due to the differentiation of the granite magma. The Swedish geologists hold that many of their great iron ore deposits are the result of the differentiation of basic magmas. The unquestioned leader of the differentiation school of thought is Brögger of Christiania, whose brilliant researches upon the origin of the rocks of Southern Norway, "*Die Eruptivgesteine des Kristianiagebietes*," 1895-97, constitute an epoch in themselves. Teall in England, Washington, Pirsson, and Iddings in the United States, and Rosenbusch in Germany are notable advocates of the same general theory of petrogenesis.

While the majority of petrologists, following these leaders, are thus in agreement as to the fact of differentiation, there is as yet but little settled knowledge of the laws which govern the process of magma differentiation. Many different hypotheses have been advanced and the chief controversies of the day deal with this question. Several of these hypotheses are not necessarily in conflict and there is little doubt but that the process is a complex one, resulting from the operation of different physical and chemical laws, and that the process is variable in its results because of the dominance of certain of these laws, due to local conditions, in any given magma basin.

The endomorphie theory of the genesis of rock types is stoutly maintained by some very eminent geologists of the French school, notably Michel-Levy and Lacroix. It claims that a magma rising through the crust of the earth frequently fuses and resorbs the rocks which it invades, thus chemically changing the character of the magma. The recent work of Lacroix on the Pyrenees, "*Le Granite des Pyrénées et ses Phenomenes de Contact*," 1898, seems to prove incontrovertably that this process does take place to an important extent, and many other facts particularly in the igneous rocks of the Archaean are in harmony with Lacroix's results. The theories of endomorphism and differentiation are not, however, mutually exclusive.

In physiographic geology great advances have been made in recent years. The conception of the geomorphic cycle, as developed chiefly by Professor W. M. Davis of Harvard, has proved a splendid and powerful tool, the use of which has become general among American geologists concerned with the interpretation of geomorphic forms, whether they be those of the present or of past geologic time. Any portion of the earth's crust above sea level will be reduced, in time, under the attack of erosive forces, to a nearly featureless plain, which Davis has called a peneplain. The uplift of this peneplain will immediately subject it to dissection and degradation till the region of which it was the surface is again reduced to a peneplain. The geomorphic evolution inaugurated by the uplift and ended with the establishment of the second peneplain is the *cycle*. It is an ideal or abstract conception of great practical use. The cycle has, of course, only rarely in geological time been fully realized. But various stages of the evolution of the cycle may be distinctly recognized. It is easy to discriminate between a geomorphic block which has been but recently uplifted and one whose degradation is well advanced. Hence we speak of infancy, youth, maturity, old age, and so forth, as indicative of the stages of geomorphic development, or their position in the cycle. We thus have a rude but expressive classification of land forms due to erosion of uplifted masses, and what is perhaps more important a basis of comparison of the relative ages of such forms. The cycle is, of course, subject to interruptions at any stage, the region may be depressed or reëlevated, and the consequent modification of the geomorphy complicates the scheme and adds interest to the study. Accidents such as glacial incursions or volcanic extravasation may also interfere with its progress. The vigorous application of the cycle as a working hypothesis in North America is in strange contrast to the slight headway that it has made in Europe, where the illustrations of the cycle are much finer and more abundant than they are in the land of its birth. The only notable European

geologists who have given the idea of the cycle a cordial reception and attempted to apply it are Penck of Vienna, De Margerie and De Lapparent of Paris. Philippon of Bonn, is approaching its acceptance as a result of his recent travels in Russia, but as yet in a very conservative spirit. In this country, indeed, the fear has arisen that we are using it too recklessly ; and a warning note has been sounded by Professor Tarr of Cornell, and by Dr. W. S. T. Smith of California, on the danger of mistaking for uplifted and dissected peneplains, features that may arise from the intersection of slopes at approximately the same altitude. This process has been discussed by Penck and by Shaler, but there seems little real danger of expert geomorphologists confounding the two things.

A close study of glacial phenomena has been one of the characteristic features of geological research of the past decade, and important results of a general kind have been reached. The explorations of the officers of the Canadian Geological Survey in the far North, notably the work of Dawson, Tyrrell, McConnell, and Low, have given us very valuable information for regions where field observations are of prime importance for any general theory of the distribution and movement of the ice of the glacial epoch. As a result of these explorations it seems now well settled that the old idea of a polar ice cap and even its successor, the single continental ice sheet, must give way to the conception of several centres of dispersion, of which the Greenland ice sheet of the present time is a type and living illustration. The absence of glacial phenomena in northern Alaska, the occurrence of glacial drift from the south at the mouth of the Mackenzie River, of drift from the west on the west side of Hudson Bay, and from the east on the east side, the non-glaciation of a long belt to the east of the Canadian Rockies, these and other facts of a similar order have led the Canadian geologists to a recognition of at least three distinct centres of dispersion of the ice of glacial time. They are named the Cordilleran, the Keewatin, and the Labra-

dorian glaciers, the names indicating the regions from which the ice flowed in all directions. Not only were these three great glaciers distinct from one another geographically, but, according to Tyrrell, they were not strictly synchronous. This energetic explorer and writer cites evidence to show that the more westerly or Cordilleran glacier had greatly shrunk and perhaps had almost disappeared before the Keewatin glacier had attained its maximum development, and that the latter was, in turn, on its decline at the time of the maximum extension of the Labradorian glacier. It cannot as yet, however, be claimed that the succession of these great glaciers in time is sufficiently well established to merit unqualified acceptance, and it will require an extended and severely critical study of the regions of confluence of these great ice sheets to properly test Tyrrell's hypothesis.

While the Canadian geologists have been pushing their researches on glacial phenomena into the far North, their fellow workers in the United States, concerned chiefly with the southern border of the great glaciated region, have improved the methods of studying the drift and from this study have fairly revolutionized the science of glaciology. Chamberlin, Salisbury, and Leverett have applied what may be called the stratigraphic method to the study of the glacial drift. They have found that there are several glacial drifts and that by a careful scrutiny of their physical characters these may in general be discriminated one from another. These different glacial drifts, together with certain other formations which could only have accumulated in periods of deglaciation, are found to occur in a definite sequence of superposition, and are thus related to one another in the same way as are the formations of any of the geological periods. These different drifts are, therefore, now known among glacialists by formational names, and are discussed from a stratigraphic point of view. This has led to a great advance in our ideas of the character of the glacial period. We no longer think of it as a simple, or even as a duplex event, but as a complex series

of rhythmically oscillating conditions. The latest important work in this field is Leverett's monograph on the Illinois glacial lobe, "U. S. G. S., Monograph XXXVIII," 1899, in which no less than fifteen glacial and interglacial stages are recognized, with various substages in some of the major divisions. The more important drift sheets in the order of age are: the Albertan, the oldest, referred to the Cordilleran glacier; the Kansan, referred to the Keewatin glacier; the Illinoian, referred to the Labradorian glacier, partly overlapping the territory formerly occupied by the Keewatin glacier and so superimposed upon the Kansan drift; the Iowan, with the main loess sheet; and the Wisconsin drift sheets.

With the successive advances of the ice lobes across the region of the great lakes, the northern drainage was successively dammed. In this way there arose along the front of the ice a series of lakes held up to the north by a wall of ice. The largest of these lakes were Agassiz and Warren, both greater than any lake now extant. The former occupied the valley of the Red River, and has been made known chiefly through the labors of Upham, whose results are monographed in his "Glacial Lake Agassiz." The most notable recent work on Lake Warren and the numerous other glacial-dam lakes which fringed the various stages of Keewatin and Labradorian glaciers, is that of Taylor, who in a series of papers has worked out a remarkably rhythmic chapter in Pleistocene history by extended studies in the correlation of the beaches of these lakes with the moraines of the ice lobes which held them up.

In the field of speculative theory as to the causes of glacial conditions the most noteworthy recent contribution is from the pen of Professor Chamberlin, in a series of articles entitled, "An attempt to frame a working hypothesis of the cause of glacial periods on an atmospheric basis," in which he exhaustively discusses and accepts the hypothesis that the climatic changes necessary to bring about glaciation arise from an impoverishment of the

quantity of carbonic acid in the atmosphere. The possible ways in which this impoverishment may be brought about are shown to be numerous but too complicated for brief statement in this place. He further claims that, glaciation having attained a wide extent, the process of impoverishment would in consequence chiefly of the lower temperature and the large surface land protected by ice from the atmosphere be reversed and conditions of deglaciation set in.

In tectonic geology perhaps the most noteworthy advance that has been made in recent years is the recognition of the importance of thrusts as elements of the structure in geologically disturbed regions. The movement was begun by the English geologist Lapworth, who in an important communication on "The Secret of the Highlands" showed that the structure of the north-western highlands of Scotland had been entirely misunderstood. The apparent sequence of the strata, which had been accepted as the true sequence, he found to be in reality reversed in consequence of a great thrust, whereby the older or underlying formations were pushed over, along a thrust plane making low angles with the horizon, so as to lie upon rocks of later age. The extent of this thrust was in places not less than ten miles in extent, the movement being from east to west. Lapworth's discovery was immediately followed by active research on the part of the officers of the Geological Survey of Scotland, and a great belt of the north-west of Scotland was found to be traversed by a series of such thrust planes, each piling older formations on top of newer. The interest which was excited by this work has had an astonishingly stimulating effect upon field geologists the world over, and in many mountainous regions thrusts which had not before been suspected were found to afford the key to the unravelling of the more complicated structures. In the Canadian Rocky Mountains McConnell showed that in the section along the Canadian Pacific Railway the Cambrian had been thrust far over Cretaceous. In the Alps an extended series of studies by Rothpletz has shown

that important thrusts are common features of the structure of these mountains, and that the failure to recognize them has given rise to erroneous interpretations, particularly by Heim the famous Swiss geologist, in the Glarner Alps.¹ In the United States the studies of Willis, Hayes, and others in the Southern Appalachians have brought out the prevalent occurrence of thrusts as structural features of that region. These thrusts have, of course, long been known to geology as reversed faults, but it is only by the researches above referred to that they have received the attention and study which they merit as tectonic features of the earth's crust.

Pre-Cambrian geology, or the study of those rocks which antedate the earliest known fossiliferous strata, is a field of its own. In the greater duration of time which they represent, in the greater complexity of the problems which they offer, and in their comparative nearness to the beginnings of geological history, these pre-Cambrian rocks transcend in interest all the formations from the Cambrian to the present. They lack, however, the charm and fascination which is attached to the fossil remains of the Paleozoic, Mesozoic and Kainozoic rocks. Most geologists approach geology by the way of fossil studies partly by reason of their strong inherent interest, and partly from the fact that they thus escape the severer training in chemistry, physics, mineralogy and petrography which is pre-requisite to the study of the older non-fossiliferous and usually crystalline rocks. It thus happens that the great problems of the Archean, being rather formidable in their aspect, and the methods of attacking them being but partially developed, have attracted to their solution but a small proportion of the entire number of active geologists. The record of achievement is, therefore, less imposing than in the case of post-Archean geology. Work is being pushed, however, in a few fields. In Finland, the Geological Survey under the able and energetic direction of Sederholm is yearly adding to our stock of

(1) *Das geotektonische Problem der Glarner Alpen*, 1898.

knowledge, and has been particularly successful in establishing criteria whereby highly crystalline schists may be discriminated into those which were originally clastic and those which were originally igneous. Rosenbusch in his last work, "*Elemente der Gesteinslehre*," discusses this question and holds, in general, that however rocks may be metamorphosed, their ultimate or bulk composition remains constant, and that, as there are radical differences of a general kind in the chemical composition of sedimentary and igneous rocks, their metamorphic derivatives may be safely distinguished by chemical analysis. Adams of McGill University had, a little earlier, applied this principle to the study of certain Laurentian gneisses and found that they fell into two sets, those which had the chemical composition of granites and those which differed from these by the defect of those very ingredients which are commonly removed in the processes which give rise to sedimentary rocks. It thus seemed probable that certain gneisses were squeezed and foliated granites, while others were metamorphosed sediments.

The most important advance, however, which has been made in pre-Cambrian geology is the gradual recognition of the fact, first announced by the Geological Survey of Canada some fifteen years ago, that the great bulk of the Laurentian gneisses, which up to that time had been universally regarded as metamorphic sediments because of their foliated or laminated character, are in reality igneous intrusives. Of the old threefold subdivision of the Laurentian system into upper, middle, and lower series of metamorphic sediments, only the middle or Grenville series proves to have been correctly interpreted. The fundamental or Ottawa gneiss (Lower Laurentian) and the Norian (Upper Laurentian) are now recognized as more or less deformed batholithic masses of plutonic irruptives. Adams' work in the Archean region north of the St. Lawrence River, pursued with great ability and persistence for many years, has been particularly contributive to the establishment of these new ideas of the Archean.

Not less remarkable is the widespread recognition which has been given in recent years to the Algonkian group of rocks. This term has been applied and extensively used, particularly in the publications of the United States Geological Survey, to a set of rocks which are older than the oldest Cambrian but which rest unconformably upon the Archean. The Algonkian comprises at least two series of rocks separated by an unconformity. These are best exposed and have been most carefully studied in the Lake Superior region, where they are known as the "Copper-bearing Rocks" and the "Iron-bearing Rocks" respectively, or the "Keweenawan" and "Animikie." These rocks without doubt represent a long time interval between the Archean and the earliest Cambrian, and the rapid extension of the term in literature testifies to the readiness of geologists the world over to recognize this interval as an important division of the geological scale. Unfortunately for the interests of exact definition and usage the more enthusiastic advocates of the Algonkian have been carried away by their perhaps unconscious desire to magnify its importance; and, in seeking to swell the volume of strata which should be named Algonkian have dipped down into the Archean, fished up the time honored Huronian and labeled it Algonkian. The Canadian Geological Survey, however, which must ever be a powerful factor in questions of pre-Cambrian geology does not assent to this procedure. The law of priority is on the Canadian side, and the new label does not stick. There results from the attempt, however, considerable confusion as to the lower limit of the Algonkian among the geologists of the rising generation who have not familiarized themselves with the details of Lake Superior geology. There is little doubt but that the term will eventually be used in its original intention as covering the Animikie and Keweenawan and their correlatives.

Economic geology has received a larger share of attention during the past few years, particularly in the United States, than has been devoted to it in any other single decade in the history of the

science of geology. The mere mention of valuable monographs and papers would fill pages. This activity is manifest chiefly in the publications of the United States Geological Survey, and in the reports of the various State surveys, and is ascribable to two causes, the first being the general advance in geological methods and in the knowledge of the geological processes and the second, the necessity of such institutions justifying themselves in the public esteem, by turning out publications bearing on practical matters, so that they may have the support and continued existence desired for the pursuit of researches in pure geology. Among the most notable of these investigations in economic geology may be mentioned that of Van Hise and his associates, Bayley, Smyth, and Clements, on the iron ores of the south shore of Lake Superior. The results of his work, published in a series of monographs extending from 1892 to 1899, are not only of appreciated value to the iron miners of the region, but also contain important contributions to our knowledge of the conditions controlling the deposition of ore bodies. A large part of the iron ores are found to lie in approximately rectangular troughs formed by the intersection of the sedimentary strata by dykes of igneous rock. These dykes were originally vertical and cut the strata when the latter lay in horizontal attitudes. When, by the general disturbance of the region, the strata were inclined to the horizon, the dykes were tipped from the vertical to the same degree, so that it now happens that on one side of the dyke the beds are dipping down toward it and abutting squarely upon it, forming for any given stratum a trough. Now some of these beds contain carbonate of iron, and the meteoric waters entering at the surface and flowing down the beds have leached out the iron, oxidized it to hematite, and deposited the latter in the trough against the side of the dyke, where the descending currents were intercepted. Spurr, in his studies of the remarkable iron ore deposits of the Mesabi range in Minnesota, has advanced the theory that the iron of that region was originally accumulated in the form of green-

sand. The iron of the green-sand was present in the form of glauconite contained in the tests of foraminifera, just as it is in the green sand accumulating off parts of the Atlantic coast to-day. The iron from this silicate was leached out, oxidized, and concentrated in the vast bodies where it is now found, by the chemical action of underground waters. The same investigator has since given us two other important monographs, one on the Mercur District of Utah, and another on the Aspen Mining District of Colorado. The famous quartz mining districts of Nevada City and Grass Valley, in the Sierra Nevada of California, have been carefully studied and monographed by Lindgren, and much new light has been thrown upon the genesis of these rich gold deposits. Here the gold-quartz veins are confined to the metamorphic rocks, while the granites are barren. The contact zone of the granite and older rocks is not characterized by frequent or rich deposits. The most interesting feature is that while the gangue is quartz with a small amount of calcite, the walls of country rock have usually been replaced by carbonates and potassium micas. There has thus been a radical difference between the chemical action going on in the vein fissure and in the immediately adjoining country rock; and although the currents passing along the fissure filled it with quartz, there was no silicification of the adjoining walls. The hot ascending mineral waters seem first to have attacked the walls and changed them to a "mixture of carbonates, potassium micas, and pyrite, adding calcium carbonate and sulphur, probably also potassium to them, and abstracting sodium. Finally, this process being completed, and the walls usually coated with crystals of carbonate, the formation of the latter ceased, and in this surrounding of carbonates, the silica now began to be deposited, and with it the gold and the rest of the metallic sulphides."

Similar monographic papers have been written by Cross and Penrose on the Cripple Creek district, Colorado, by Cross on the Silver Cliff and Rosita Hills, Colorado, and by Tower and Smith

on the Tintic district, Utah, all of which show that ore deposits, when studied by trained geologists, may be made to tell the story of their genesis with a satisfactory measure of clearness and certainty.

In European literature the most important contributions to economic geology have been from the pen of Professor J. H. L. Vogt of the University of Christiania, who, in the papers thus far published, has shown a masterly grasp of the problems he seeks to solve. His "*Beiträge zur genetischen Classification der durch magmatische Differentiationsprocesse und der durch Pneumatolyse entstandenen Erzvorkommen*" is an able discussion of the general principles of ore genesis from igneous magmas.



PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
THE IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNMENT BY THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY.

GEORGE FRISBIE HOAR, *Worcester.*



SOME people seem never to learn that the task of governing a great people is a serious and difficult task, and that the task of governing itself, by a great people, is more serious and difficult still. Many good men seem to think that every problem of domestic or political policy is to be solved by some simple general maxim of morals or public liberty, and that men who hesitate or do not agree with them as to its application, are recreant to righteousness and liberty. This state of mind never continues long in men, after they are themselves clothed with public responsibility, although in my opinion the purpose to submit their own public conduct to the test of righteousness and liberty, exists quite as strongly, in general, in men clothed with public responsibility as in their critics. Still, let us not be impatient of those who undertake to speak for the conscience of a free people, even in their narrowness and intolerance. Their function is healthy for the State. If the policy of the politician be of God, these men can neither hurt it nor him. If it be not of God, the sharp and clear challenge of the most impracticable dreamer will help arouse public attention and prevent evil.

In setting forth the necessity of party government to a people,

into whose government anything of freedom enters, and insisting that in proportion as the government is free, so the necessity of party government becomes greater, I shall seem to many good men to put the government of the republic upon a low plane. But I mean to state the result to which a long and anxious consideration of the question, with largest opportunity for observation, has brought me, and not to flinch from saying it for fear of incurring the angry condemnation of critics, for whom in their angriest and most unreasonable moments, I still retain much personal respect.

I had occasion to consider this question for myself at the beginning of my public life. I have acted upon the view I now state ever since. I have to the best of my ability endeavored to resist the tendencies in my own party that I thought evil, and to secure the choice of the best candidates. I am satisfied, as I look back now, that I have done right, and that I have been able to accomplish more good for the Republic and for the Commonwealth by remaining in the Republican party than by abandoning it. That party has something to show for its many years of party government. The Democratic party, and the Mugwumps or Independents, who have frequently abandoned the Republican party for its Democratic rival, have nothing to show of which they ought not to be, and in general are not, thoroughly ashamed.

No careful student of history, it seems to me, can doubt that in proportion as party government has prevailed in any nation, or in any generation, in that proportion the nation or generation has achieved most for Righteousness, Justice, and Liberty, has made most rapid progress, and has been most prosperously and wisely administered. It will be conceded that of all the great nations England and the United States are alike the freest and the best governed. England has been wholly under party government since the coming of William of Orange. Until the latter part of the reign of George III., the sovereign exercised a

large personal influence. This influence is now wholly at an end. Until a time still later all administrations, even if nominally Whig or Tory, were formed largely by arrangements made by leading characters, who had a following of their own and made their alliances with one side or the other according to their conception of personal advantage, or their opinion as to particular measures.

The United States has been under party government in every State since the adoption of the National Constitution, and in national matters since Washington's first term. This appears clearly from Washington's letter to Pickering written in September, 1795: "I shall not," he said, "whilst I have the honor to administer the government, bring a man into any office of consequence, knowingly, whose political tenets are adverse to the measures which the general government are pursuing; for this, in my opinion, would be a sort of political suicide."

That party lines were drawn absolutely in our Government before General Washington's death appears from his letter to Governor Trumbull, dated August 30, 1799, where Washington declares that if he were to be nominated again for the Presidency, not a single vote would thereby be drawn from the anti-Federalist candidate. That he had himself become a zealous partisan appears from his letter to the same friend, of July 21, 1799. He says:

"Let that party set up a broomstick and call it a true son of liberty,—a Democrat,—or give it any other epithet that will suit their purpose, and it will command their votes in toto." Mrs. Washington was accustomed, even while her husband was President, to apply to her Democratic fellow citizens an opprobrious phrase we will not quote.

There is one great difference between the English Constitution and ours which makes party Government more strongly a necessity here. That is,—to use Mr. Evarts' phrase—our "adjusted and accommodated periodicity."

The Queen has no politics. She is removed from the strife of party. She has no opinion of her own. She represents the whole people. She thinks only of what England wants. If she thinks the Administration does not represent a majority of the people, either because there is a hostile vote in the House of Commons, or because the majority in the House of Commons no longer represents a majority of the people, she picks out a new Prime Minister, or dissolves Parliament and has an election. A new Minister and a new Government come in. The question which has caused the change is settled in accordance with the public opinion. Another is then taken up, and if the Government be not in a majority, on that, it may go out again in three months.

But we choose our Prime Minister for four years. If he can get a Congress to act with him, chosen by the same people who chose him, he will have his way for four years. Now there may be twenty questions to be dealt with in that period, on each of which there are great and conscientious differences of opinion.

There may be several questions, on the decision of each of which the prosperity, honor, and safety of the country will depend.

We are apt to say in every Presidential election that we are in a great crisis, and that the fate of the country is at stake. This is not so foolish an exaggeration as may seem. Every stump orator compares the Republic to a ship. No ship makes a voyage in which a single blunder of the captain might not wreck it. The voyage of our ship of state, thus far, with its precious freight of Humanity and Freedom, has been over a stormy sea, through channels full of rocks, and sometimes with rash and inexperienced masters. Now you cannot determine your duty by considering one question only. If the candidate, or if the party that will come into power with him, be right in one thing, he or it may be wrong in nineteen others. In that case you have not only to consider, whether the one matter be of importance so paramount, that the determination of the other nineteen is of less importance

than it is to have that decided rightly. You are to consider also, whether the chance that will be decided rightly, and brought to a righteous and wise decision by the man whom you are asked to support, is worth the cost of deciding all the others wrongly. You are also to consider, to which candidate, and to which party, you are willing to entrust the decision of all future public questions, now unforeseen, which may arise during his term of office. You are also to consider, that the evil effects of the overthrow and destruction of one party, and the establishing in power of another, may be likely to continue far beyond a single term of the Presidency. The building up of a new party, or the destruction of an old one is a slow and difficult process. Of course you must determine whether the professions of one man, or one party, are to be trusted. You must consider not only what are the avowed doctrines of one party, or the other, but also what the party seems to have thoroughly at heart, and what it has avowed only for the purpose of catching votes. So in deciding, as you are bound to decide, what is best for the Republic, and giving your vote with a single eye to that consideration alone, there are many things to be thought of beside the professions of a candidate on one particular, even on one paramount question.

I think the history of our own country and of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for the past thirty years gives a most instructive and persuasive lesson to men who seek to do their best for the country and Commonwealth, and who would know whether they can do better by party instrumentality or by action independent of party. The Civil War ended in 1866. The States in rebellion were held in the grasp of war until the coming to power of President Grant in 1869. For thirty years the masses of the people have been divided between the Republican and the Democratic parties. The strength of the Democratic party has been in the solid South and in the foreign population of the great cities. The strength of the other has been in the North, except the foreign populations in the great cities. For

twenty-two years of the thirty the president has been a Republican. The division of power has not, however, been so unequal as that fact might at first seem to imply. Nearly half the time the House of Representatives has been Democratic, and for six years of the time there has been a majority against the Republicans in the Senate. During the whole of the time there has been a small but zealous body of men calling themselves Independents, sometimes called "Mugwumps," a name which they seem not to dislike, who have acted on the principle of going from one party to the other, according as they liked or disliked the candidates of one party or the other for an important office, or in obedience to their convictions on some political measure, which they thought of paramount importance.

Now let us see in which way most has been accomplished for the good of the Republic. We concede that this is the true test of the action of these gentlemen and the action of the persons who are called partisans. "By their fruits ye shall know them." What has the Republican party to show that it has accomplished, or tried to accomplish, for the public good? What has the man who adhered to the Republican party to show that he has done, or that he has helped to do for the public good? What has either done of public mischief? What, on the other hand, has the Independent accomplished, or helped to accomplish, or even tried to accomplish during these thirty years? What mischief has he done, or had a part in doing? I think the Republican partisan can feel a great and honest satisfaction in looking back on the record. I think the Independent or Mugwump must feel a sense of regret, if not of shame. What has each got to show for his thirty years' work? There has been no presidential election since 1868, when these gentlemen have not in considerable numbers, broken off from the Republican party and undertaken to help its antagonist, unless we except the election of 1896, when they could not accept Mr. Bryan or the Democracy, although they are asking us to accept the same Mr. Bryan and the same Democracy today.

They could not vote for Grant, in 1872, because of the corruption in politics which followed the great war. So they went to the polls side by side with Tammany Hall, and the KuKlux Klan, and the men who were fresh from helping the Tweed government in New York City. They could not give their confidence to Blaine in 1884, and so they aided the men who had suppressed by criminal processes the votes of great states to elect, by those processes, a President under whose administration they would be safe and undisturbed. They complained of the McKinley bill, and so aided in the overthrow of Harrison in 1892. I am not questioning their honesty of purpose, although they are clamorous in imputing low, personal motives to everybody who differs from them.

Now they have just two things to show as the things they have done, or have helped to do.

First. They have a right to claim their share of the credit for the two administrations of President Cleveland. If they look back with satisfaction on the achievements of those administrations, one of which had a majority of both Houses of Congress its supporters, they are welcome. The majority of the American people have no desire to go through that terrible political nightmare again. The comfort is, that it is over, and that it has taught its lesson, and that it does not seem likely the people will wish to repeat it.

Second. But they have accomplished another thing more serious, more permanent, and, in my judgment, inflicting a more deadly injury upon the Republic than even the eight years of Cleveland times. They have undoubtedly been able to baffle the attempt of the Republican party to secure the rights of citizenship for the negro, and to secure free, fair, and honest national elections. So far as the reconstruction policy has been a failure, their weight turned the scale in making it a failure.

The plan of the Republican leaders, in which Grant and his immediate counselors on the one hand, and Mr. Sumner and the

radicals, as they were called, who followed him, on the other, were in full accord, was a very simple one. It was to confer upon every man, born or naturalized in the United States, equality before the Constitution and laws; to secure to him the elective franchise, equality in such social rights as are the proper subjects of legal protection, provide for him a good education at the public charge, and to secure all these rights, especially the right of a free and fair ballot, by national authority and power. I am not now discussing the wisdom of this plan. It is the theory on which the Constitution of Massachusetts was established, in 1780, and under which Massachusetts has been ever since, the model Commonwealth of the world. If it has been a failure, in my opinion, the fault has been the fault of the white race. If the white men in this country had welcomed the black man to citizenship as they have welcomed men of all other races from abroad; had taken him by the hand; had dealt honestly with him; had educated him and respected him,—things would have gone as smoothly throughout the whole country, as they have gone in Massachusetts or Vermont. I do not argue that question now. It is manifest either that that policy must be adhered to and be permanent, or that the alternative is to trust the whole matter to the States and to let them completely alone, to be governed by a majority of their people, under the Constitution, or by such process, criminal or otherwise, as each community may elect, whether the Government be that of the people, or of an Oligarchy usurping the Government by violence. You cannot get along with a national election law one year, and no national election law the next, according as one or the other party be in control at Washington. You cannot undertake to convict the violator of a civil rights law, or men who lynch negroes, under national laws which are to be enforced under a Republican administration and disregarded under a Democratic administration, if such administrations are to follow each other in succession. Under General Grant the criminals who were attacking negroes in the South,

who were overthrowing state governments and driving lawful majorities from their power, were convicted and sent to the Albany Penitentiary. When the political revolution came in 1874 a House was elected which refused to make appropriations to enforce those laws, and the attempt to control the wrongdoers had to cease. In the same House the same majority, elected by Mugwump help, refused to pass any army appropriation bill, and the lawful governments went down in several Southern States. In Mr. Cleveland's time, the last vestige of an election law calculated to secure a fair ballot, or even to detect fraud, was removed from the statute book under the lead of Senator Hill of New York. Shortly before that I had said in a report to the Senate, alluding to the bill, falsely called the "Force Bill," a bill which merely provided for a system of watching and reporting what took place at Southern elections, without the application of any force, other than the judgment as to the facts by the court in the first instance, and the final judgment of the House itself,—

"It is not likely that this particular measure will ever be revived. The control of national legislation in this country will be for sometime beyond the reach of the Republican party, and we believe that it is the desire of a majority of the people that the experiment should be fully tried whether existing laws and an improving public sentiment will not cure the evils complained of; so that it is not probable that any legislation having the same object will be proposed again for many years to come, or that it will ever be proposed, unless experience shall satisfy the people of the country, without political or sectional division and with substantial unanimity, that the existing instrumentalities for securing fair elections have failed."

This I repeated in my place in the Senate when the last national safe-guard for honest elections was struck from the statute book. It is quite obvious that measures of this class, whether for the security of elections or of private citizenship, must be permanent if they are to be effective. They are worth nothing if

they are to be enacted one year and stricken from the statute book the next. Now in my judgment, this policy on which equal citizenship to ten million Americans is dependent, was more important than tariff or income-tax. It may be that we are wrong; that the old Massachusetts doctrine, the old doctrine of the Declaration of Independence, the old doctrine of the Republican party,—is a delusion and a sham. I will not debate that question at this moment. All I have to say is that the one sole permanent result of the action of the so-called Independents in the North is the destruction of the Constitutional rights of the negro at the South, the wiping out, so far as it has been possible, of the fruits of the war and the great Republican uprising which preceded the war, and of the life-work of men like Abraham Lincoln, Charles Sumner, and John G. Whittier, and the life-work also of William Lloyd Garrison and Samuel May. You did it, my Independent friend, who voted twice for Cleveland. You did it, my Independent friend, who voted for Tilden, and who helped to turn the scale in the House of Representatives in 1874 and 1876. These two things, Mr. Cleveland's two administrations did. The baffling of an attempt by national authority to secure political equality in the South is what you have got to show as the result of your non-partisanship; and you are proposing to repeat it this year. You will secure, if you are successful,—mark this prediction,—the only thing you will accomplish of any practical value, will be that you will make it impossible that the four Southern States that have disfranchised the negro already by cunning devices in their State constitutions, and the others that are preparing to follow their example, shall even be subjected to the result of such proceedings expressly provided by the Constitutions, viz: that the representation of the offending states shall be proportionally diminished. You will help your Democratic allies to load their dice in all future contests for power with forty or fifty Representatives and forty or fifty electoral votes representing nothing but usurpation. You will have helped disfranchise

ten million negroes, and you will have helped disfranchise, in large part, the people of thirty free States.

Now what has the Republican, the partisan, the man who you say acts on a low plane, to show for his thirty years of adherence to the Republican party? I do not speak of what happened before that time. I do not speak of the Union preserved, of the rebellion put down; or the three Constitutional amendments which give glory and splendor to our history, as the three blazing stars in the belt of Orion give glory and splendor to the sky. I will begin with the coming in of President Grant. We have to show in the nation the public faith kept; the debt paid; the manufacturing independence of the United States achieved; the country placed at the head of all the nations of the earth in wealth, in manufacture, and in strength; we have to show a public credit unequalled; national resources developed, not only in amplest measure for all our own exigencies in war and in peace, but England, the commercial mistress of mankind, coming to us to borrow money for her public necessities; we have to show the homestead law; the right of expatriation secured by treaty; we have to show apology and reparation exacted from Great Britain; we have to show Cuba liberated; we have to show the Americans imperilled in China liberated by the army of the swiftest, surest, and strongest power on the face of the earth. We have to show in my own State, instead of a government of Butlerism and Bryanism, a government like that of Frederick T. Greenhalge and Roger Wolcott and Murray Crane; we have to show laws uplifting labor; we have to show the public schools kept open to all the children, free from partisan or sectarian control, on one hand, the rights of American citizens, with no distinction of birth or religious creed on the other, each rescued from a dangerous attack from opposite quarters. "By their fruits ye shall know them." "Men do not gather grapes of thorns nor figs of thistles." The Republican tree, which in my humble fashion, I helped to plant, has spread out its branches over the nation. For thirty years the

American people have gathered its fruit, the fairest, the sweetest that ever grew on mortal soil. If my Independent and Mugwump friend prefers his own puckery and fast-rotting product, he is a freeman, and he is welcome to his choice.

The old conflict of ideas—between governing races, and subject races; between aristocracy and equality; governments resting on the consent of the governed, and governments by military power; government checked and government unchecked; a republic, or an absolute democracy will go on.

The stronghold of one of these ideas has been from the beginning of its history in the Republican party and in the free States of the North. The stronghold of the other has been the Democratic party and the Solid South. I am opposed to Imperialism. When the treaty with Spain was before the Senate, I did my best by speech, and by vote, to amend it in accordance with the doctrine I have stated. I was faithful to the cause of freedom and justice, as I understood it. That cause was stabbed in the back by Mr. Bryan in the moment of its victory. I do not trust him now. I am not prepared to purchase the chance of what he will do hereafter, at the price he demands:—a Supreme Court of his choosing; the Solid South in the saddle; ten million American citizens at home disfranchised; national dishonor; the free coinage of silver at sixteen to one. He told his Populist audience, the other day, that if he were elected they might be sure that this monetary reform would be accomplished before the next Presidential election. If you are ready to make this purchase at this price, my Independent friends, go your way, do your duty as you see it. I shall do mine as I see it. I think the future of justice and liberty in the Eastern hemisphere safest in the hands in which it is safest in the Western hemisphere. I think it is safest abroad where it is safest at home.

We have had one great object lesson in this country within the memory of men now living. The disunion Abolitionists took one view of this matter. The founders of the Free Soil, or

Republican party, took the other. I should seem extravagant if I were to state my admiration for the character of William Lloyd Garrison, or for the eloquence of Wendell Phillips. I have lately had gathered, mostly from newspapers, every reported speech of Phillips, consisting of several thousand manuscript pages, besides what is published in pamphlets and in the volumes of his collected speeches. He had very grave faults indeed. He lacked Mr. Garrison's absolute veracity. He was fond of rhetorical effects, and careless—if not worse than careless,—as to what he stated as fact. But this reading has satisfied me that he was not a mere dreamer or rhetorician. He was a profound political philosopher. He went down to the very roots of political philosophy, and he acted with great fidelity, and made great sacrifices for his convictions. These gentlemen planted themselves on abstract righteousness, refused to coöperate with anybody that did not go with them to the extremest length of their belief, and demanded the destruction of the country itself, which they believed by its Constitution pledged to the great injustice of sustaining slavery. So these gentlemen declared the Constitution "a covenant with Death, and a league with Hell." I will not now revive that old debate. I am only looking to see in what way most was accomplished for righteousness, justice and liberty. The leaders of the Republican party, on the other hand, said we must accomplish this thing in a practical way. We will use the powers of the Constitution to correct the mistakes of the Constitution. That done, we will take a new step in the same direction. Now what was the result? Mr. Phillips' attacks upon the Republicans were as severe and bitter as his attacks upon the slave-holders. After nearly thirty years Mr. Phillips and his followers had made no progress whatever. The thirty years of their activity witnessed a series of victories for Slavery. His public speeches at the end of that time are full of despair. In 1858 he describes England, whose conduct in 1834 in abolishing slavery in the West Indies had inspired him with so much enthusiasm, as having

a pro-slavery Government, and as ready to re-establish the slave trade. He declares that we are about to admit Kansas as a slave State, to seize Cuba and what remains of Mexico ; that the slave-master may travel through the North with his slave, without setting him free, and he denounces the Judges and the States alike as given over to the domination of slavery. He says that when he dies he hopes some one will give him a piece of marble large enough to write on it—"Infidel" at the top and "Traitor" at the bottom. This was the result of nearly thirty years of the non-partisan.

Now what was done by the politician? Some of us met at Worcester, Massachusetts, on the 28th of June, 1848, to found a new party, devoted to arresting the future encroachments of the slave power, and to secure the freedom of the vast territory between the Mississippi and the Pacific. At Buffalo, in the same year, that party nominated its candidate for President. In that year, it did not command a single vote in the electoral college, and chose but three members of Congress. But it increased rapidly in numbers and political power. In eight years it carried a majority of the free States. In twelve years it elected its President and had a majority in both Houses of Congress. In sixteen years it had abolished slavery and had put down the rebellion; and in twenty years it had adopted the three great amendments to the Constitution, which made every slave a free-man, every freeman a citizen, and every citizen a voter.

The old conflict of ideas has been going on since the Pilgrim Fathers landed at Plymouth, and the Puritans at Salem. The idea of governing races,—aristocracy on one side, political equality on the other; government resting on the consent of the governed, and government resting on power; government checked, government unchecked; government under Constitutional restraint; absolute power, whether a monarch, or a majority; a republic, or an absolute democracy; liberty protected by law; unchecked license leading surely in the end to absolute power.

No man will question that for fifty years the stronghold of the first of these ideas, not only in this country but in the world, has been the Republican party of this country, having its chief seat of power in the Northern States of the Republic. The stronghold of the other, in this country at least, has been the Democratic party, having its chief strength and leadership in the White Democracy of the South, and the men who control the great mixed population of our great Northern cities. Everything that has been accomplished in this country, for fifty years, everything that has been achieved by this country for the world, has been accomplished by the Republican party, having almost always to encounter the bitter and steadfast opposition of the Democracy.

Now I, for one, do not believe that the spirit and temper of these two parties has been changed in a day, in an hour, in the twinkling of an eye. One party has abolished slavery; the other stood by slavery till the last gasp. One party saved the Union; the other tried to destroy the Union. One party put down the rebellion; the other party supported the rebellion. One party preserved the national faith and paid the debt; the other sought every scheme and expedient to evade the honest payment of the debt. One party preserved the standard of value unchanged; the other sought to tamper with it and to destroy it. One party made the Constitutional amendments making every slave a free-man, and every freeman an equal citizen before the law; the other party has sought by every device to overthrow that freedom, that citizenship, and that equality, and is seeking to-day, either by the use of force or by ingenious devices, to take from ten million American citizens at home the Constitutional rights which the other party conferred on them.

Certainly no man will deny that down to the time of the liberation of Cuba, and in all its dealings with Cuba, the Republican party has been true and faithful to its ancient principles. One subject of difference has arisen. It is a subject of difference, the gravity and importance of which cannot be overstated. That

difference relates to the Philippine Islands. It seems to me that in dealing with that subject a grave mistake was made,—the only grave mistake the Republican party has made for fifty years. It should have dealt with the Philippine Islands as it dealt with Cuba. When anybody says that the Philippine Islands are ours, I answer, the Philippine Islands belong to the Philippine people. When anybody says we will establish for them such good government as we think they are fit for, I answer that in my judgment they have the right to establish for themselves such government as they think fit for themselves. I am not alone among Republicans in this belief. I stand in that respect on the platform declared by the Massachusetts State Convention in 1899, and upon the platform declared by the Wisconsin Republican State Convention of 1900. I think no man will question the genuineness of the Republicanism of the Massachusetts State Convention that nominated Governor Crane in 1899, or of the Wisconsin State Convention in this year. And I think the future of Liberty in the Philippine Islands safer in the character of the Republican Party than in the hands of Mr. Bryan.

Literature is full of the impatience of men of loftiest ideals with the men who alone bring those ideals to practical accomplishment. The Government of a country will be what the governing power decides. If the ruler be a despot, the character of the despot will determine the character of the Government. If the powers of Government be limited by a Constitution, the Constitution will measure the height and the depth to which it may rise or fall. What can be done within the Constitutional limits will depend upon the character of the majority, and what the majority can be persuaded to do. The man who refuses to join in accomplishing the best thing the majority can be persuaded to do, and puts the Government into the hands of men of worse character and with worse purposes, because he aims at higher ideals still, does just as much mischief as the man who aims to govern by bad ends for bad purposes. His teaching

may be of the loftiest, and as a public teacher he may be a valuable and lofty influence. But his conduct, his vote, his political influence, the present fact of what he does and says, are just as mischievous as the act of the bad man, and indeed the more mischievous, because he is more influential, and because of his lofty ideal of morality. When the Independents in New York voted for Seth Low instead of for Mr. Tracy, and the result was the election of Richard Croker's Mayor, their votes did just as much mischief as the vote of the most corrupt Tammany Sachem. The political history of the United States is full of the political mischief which has been accomplished by these gentlemen, acting I concede from the purest motives, in playing into the hands of the vilest political instrumentalities.

The stock quotation of these excellent and worthy gentlemen is Robert Browning's "Lost Leader." That is as good an illustration of my point as I could make. Those famous lines were applied by Robert Browning to William Wordsworth. Wordsworth determined after a time in his youth, of sympathy with revolutionists, if not anarchists, that the most could be accomplished for righteousness and liberty through the existing order of things in the English State. He refused to adopt Shelley's theories for the destruction of the family tie, or to adopt the remedies for all social evils of the French clubs. Shelley in his "Ode on Immortality" grieves that Wordsworth—

"having been should cease to be—."

Browning drew his portraiture in the "Lost Leader." He says he did not mean an exact portraiture—but he had Wordsworth in his mind,—

"Just for a handful of silver he left us ;
Just for a ribbon to stick in his coat ;
We that had loved him so, followed him, honored him,
Lived in his mild and magnificent eye,
Learned his great language, caught his clear accents,

Made him our pattern to live and to die !
 Shakespeare was of us, Milton was for us,
 Burns, Shelley were with us,—they watch from their graves,
 He alone breaks from the van and the freeman ;
 He alone sinks to the rear and the slaves.

We shall march prospering,—not through his presence ;
 Songs may inspirit us,—not from his lyre ;
 Deeds will be done—while he boasts his quiescence,
 Still bidding crouch whom the rest bade aspire,
 Blot out his name, then,—record one lost soul more,
 One task more declined, one more footpath untrod,
 One more triumph for devils, and sorrow for angels,
 One wrong more to man, one more insult to God !
 Life's night begins; let him never come back to us !
 There would be doubt, hesitation and pain,
 Forced praise on our part,—the glimmer of twilight,
 Never glad confident morning again ! ”

I would not speak without reverence of the great genius of Browning, or of the gentle Shelley without a pitying love. But what became of them ? I am not speaking of their place in literature. I am speaking of their relation to righteousness and liberty as wrought out in the conduct of states. I am speaking of the history of England for a hundred years. What did they do for it ? What did either of them do for it ? What became of Robert Browning and what became of Percy Bysshe Shelley ? Who were their companions ? What accomplishment for humanity have they to show outside of their place in literature ? Who were the “ us ” that the great poet left “ for a handful of silver ” and “ for a ribbon to stick in his coat ” ? Who are the “ we ” that are to “ march prospering ” ? Where did these gentlemen march to ? What great moral battle-field, what great victory, did they win ? What are the deeds these great men did while Wordsworth—“ boasts his quiescence ” ? I am speaking solely of political achievements. What great leader in the battle of freedom points for inspiration to Robert Browning or Shel-

ley? Think of William Wordsworth's soul lost! Think of the devil triumphing and angels sorrowing over Wordsworth, and of "the glad, confident morning" shining upon the face of Shelley, and not casting its rays upon him! The name that Browning would blot out shines like a constellation in the sky. The "lost soul" of Wordsworth, as he said of Milton's, was

———"like a star and dwelt apart,
Pure as the naked Heavens, majestic, free."

The influence of William Wordsworth,—it is the greatest power for justice, and righteousness, and liberty, that has been on this planet since Milton. It is the greatest power for justice, and righteousness, and liberty, save Milton, that has been on this planet since Luther. The Knights, the great and brave champions of freedom, as they take upon their lips their vows of consecration, bathe themselves in Wordsworth as in a pure and clear fountain. The love of liberty under law, the loftiest political philosophy, snowy purity of life, sympathy with every human sorrow, breathe from every line Wordsworth ever wrote until at the age of eighty the mighty power passed from the earth, and

"The man from God sent forth,
Did yet again to God return."



THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN AMERICAN POLITICS

A. D. MORSE, *Amherst College.*



THE national democratic party came into being during the first administration of Washington, and is, therefore, more than a century old. What were the circumstances of its birth? The answer carries us back to the long period between the first settlements in British America and the Revolution. In each colony there showed itself very early a tendency on the part of the common people to demand for themselves a share in the government; and this demand grew stronger, and the degree of participation called for grew larger as time went on. The result was that in most of the colonies the basis of government, both civil and ecclesiastical, was broadened by the inclusion of a large popular element. In the course of this movement, each colony developed a democratic party, organized, it is true, less perfectly than the parties of to-day, but still sufficiently to accomplish its proper ends. John Adams, who knew the facts and understood the meaning of earlier American history better than any other statesman of his time, wrote in 1812: "You say our divisions began with federalism and anti-federalism? Alas! they began with human nature; they have existed in America from its first plantation. In every colony, divisions always prevailed. In New

York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Massachusetts, and all the rest, a court and country party has always contended.”¹

The significance of these local democratic parties in colonial politics is that they aided in the political development of the people by impressing upon them democratic ideas, and by giving them an invaluable training in practical politics,—an education which more than anything else explains their success in the greater struggles that were to follow. Taking the record as a whole, it is surprising that there was so little error in political theory and so little political misconduct on the part of the masses during the five or more generations which cover the colonial period. In explanation, it should be said that, owing to the strong and in general wisely exercised influence of the colonial aristocracy, and to the prudence of the English government these young democracies were entrusted with public responsibilities quite gradually, and never completely. The popular leadership, as a rule, was wise and strong. The early development of democracy in the colonies was affected but little by philosophical speculations, home or foreign; the persecutions of the Stuart period, political and ecclesiastical, sifted out those Englishmen who were most democratically inclined, and sent them to the new world; here they came under influences which stimulated in every man the impulse to make the most of himself; this impulse thus strengthened acting upon the colonial masses is the source of American democracy. Looked at from another standpoint, the significance of the colonial democratic parties is that, owing to their work, the political ideas and character of Americans had become at the close of the Seven Years' War very unlike those of their kindred in the mother country,—so unlike in fact that the aristocratic and monarchical system of England was no longer adapted to their wants and was soon to be regarded as intolerable.

The Revolution made a deep and lasting impression upon

(1) *Life and Works of John Adams*, x. 23.

American democracy and American democratic parties. The revolutionary period is generally supposed to terminate with the close of the war, but a broader view would extend it to the adoption of the Constitution, that is, to 1789; for the full significance of the Revolution is not seen if we regard it merely or mainly as a military struggle; it was a movement which abolished or modified every part of the system under which Americans were living at the time of the Stamp Act, and created every part of the new system which was to take its place. In this creative work the most difficult and, in some respects, the most admirable portion was that government of the Union which more than replaced the rejected British government; but this was not devised until 1787, and was not established until 1789. The Revolution should, therefore, be considered as extending from the Stamp Act to the inauguration of Washington, a period that covers nearly a quarter of a century.

How and to what extent did the Revolution affect American democracy and democratic parties? In the first place, the Revolution was a democratic movement; its controlling motive was attachment to democratic ideas; the centre of resistance in each colony was not in governor, council, or senate,—they, as a rule, were for submission,—but in the democratic assemblies. All of the typical revolutionary utterances, the gravest and weightiest, as well as the most passionate and vapid, breathe throughout the spirit of democracy. With this, the declarations and resolves of the different revolutionary bodies, from the Continental to those of the New England towns, are filled to overflowing; it is the essential and living element in the Declaration of Independence, in Paine's "Common Sense," in popular song and caricature. Moreover, in the early stages of the Revolution the work of governing fell into the hands of the people and was performed by them until the new constitutions established state governments in place of the colonial. During much of the period the New England town-meeting assumed the higher functions of a politi-

cally sovereign body. Not elsewhere, unless we except Athens and Switzerland, has the ordinary citizen ever exercised an influence so decisive on the determination of great matters. The undemocratic elements, namely, the official classes, and that large section of the colonial aristocracy which was unfriendly to the Revolution, speedily lost their influence and became the object of a fierce persecution, every act of which gave impetus to the democratic movement. This embittered struggle with the Loyalists or Tories during the war and their expulsion at its close deepened measurably the democratic impress upon American society and politics, for the Tories were the strongest upholders of conservatism, and of that regard for birth and culture which distinguishes the colonial from the post-revolutionary aristocracy. Further evidence of advance of democracy during and in consequence of the Revolution can be found in the character of the new state constitutions, in the working of the Articles of Confederation, in the legislation of the several states, and, it must be added, in the general decline of good government. In fact, the Revolution through weakening the forces that hitherto had exercised a wholesomely restraining influence, gave to democracy a stronger impetus than it could bear. In large measure the misgovernment of the closing years of the period were due, as democrats like Gerry conceded in the Philadelphia Convention, to an "excess of democracy."

In brief the lesson of the American Revolution, like that of the greater revolution which followed soon in France, is that at the close of the eighteenth century the democracy, without the aid and coöperation of the conservative classes, was not yet fit to be entrusted with the full control of government.

The first truly national or federalist period began in 1787 with the framing of the Constitution and extended to the party revolution of 1800. Its political characteristic was conservative reaction; the democratic masses had few representatives in the convention of 1787; and the Constitution itself, particularly in

its first unamended form, in some of its most distinctive features, is undemocratic. This was recognized in the debates of the convention, and was the ground on which some of the members refused their signatures. It was the chief ground also of the strong and nearly successful opposition to ratification. This opposition which, had it been well organized, would have defeated the Constitution, must be recorded as an error, grave indeed, but more significant of political immaturity than of incapacity. Hitherto the democratic masses had concerned themselves with public interests either narrowly local or at most provincial; they had not yet learned to "think continentally."

At the beginning of Washington's first administration the conservative and wealthy classes were again in control; Hamilton was the chief motive power of the new government, Washington its balance wheel. Democratic dissatisfaction with the Constitution was in part appeased by the incorporation of the first amendments,—a substantial bill of rights,—and by successful opposition to the undemocratic official etiquette which the high federalists wished to introduce.

It was early in this period that the reaction against the policy of the new government began, which, through consolidating the democratic parties already existing in the several states, led to the formation of the national democratic party of the Union. One cause of this reaction was the series of famous measures by which Hamilton undertook to restore public credit and, at the same time, to strengthen the moral foundation of the new general government while weakening that of the states. A second cause was the administration's policy of peace with England,—a policy that involved large concessions to a hated enemy,—and a strict neutrality towards France, our generous ally in the war of Independence, now laboring in the throes of a revolution which gave her the ardent sympathy of every American democrat. Of the two, the scheme of Hamilton for the restoration of public credit had the greater influence; most of the measures which it embraced were

well calculated to arouse democratic opposition ; they tended to strengthen the federal government over which the people had comparatively little influence, and to weaken correspondingly that of the states where they had full control ; moreover, their manifest tendency was to foster the growth of a moneyed aristocracy and to make it the permanent ally of the government ; and lastly, one feature of the scheme, namely, that of a national bank, prepared the way for that doctrine of "implied powers" which threatened to destroy those limitations upon the general government that democrats regarded as the crowning merit of the Constitution.

The leader of this reaction and the founder of the national democratic party,—called at first the republican party,—was Thomas Jefferson.

How were these two statemen Hamilton and Jefferson related ? Hamilton, whose unequalled talents and splendid services should not blind us to the grave defects of his statesmanship, wished to destroy the states and to build up a highly centralized national government in which the aristocratic division of the people was to have forever not merely the leading, but the controlling voice. His model was the British system. His distinction as a statesman rests in part on what he did as the restorer of order in times when the Union was perishing through disorder, and in part on what he did,—more doubtless than any contemporary or successor,—“to reëstablish the processes that connected the development of the United States with that of England.” The value of this, his second great service, becomes apparent when we reflect that owing to hatred towards England, kindled by the Revolution and fanned by the galling nature of her subsequent policy, and, to gratitude towards democratic France whose aid had made it possible to throw off the British yoke, we were under strong temptation to disregard our English inheritance and to develop American civilization on a basis too largely French. But Hamilton, by birth and early training a British West Indian, “did not

inherit an American character * * * to him America,—the America of the British mainland,—was neither a birthplace nor a nursery ; and only in a qualified sense can it be called a school. It was rather a field into which he entered after his character was formed and his equipment for work nearly complete.”¹

In the character of the American people there were two fundamental traits which Hamilton persistently antagonized : these were hostility to privilege, and attachment to local self-government. This is why he seemed and was the arch-enemy of American democracy. Hamilton’s character and policy go far to explain the enduring qualities of Jefferson’s work in organizing the democratic party. What Hamilton struck at were the principles of democracy ; and it was these that Jefferson defended. In reading to-day the writings of these profound thinkers, one notes in each and everywhere proofs of solicitude as to the deeper results of public policy ; each concerns himself with the question, how will the measure under consideration influence civic character and institutions ? In such inquiries, however, Hamilton emphasizes most what makes for national strength and reputation, while Jefferson cares first for the welfare of the individual ; Hamilton would make the Union great and glorious ; Jefferson would make every citizen strong and free.

Hamilton had little of that tact whose source is considerateness towards others, and none of that which springs from dislike of struggle ; he was opinionated, overbearing in manner, and pugnacious. Jefferson, on the contrary, was tactful in a high degree towards the feelings and rights of his associates ; he was delicately considerate ; his letters to Madison are,—if we overlook the passages relating to enemies,—a fine revelation of a gentle, manly party chieftain ; his dislike of war was constitutional ; he always chose the means that promised to accomplish with least

(1) Quoted from the writer’s estimate of Hamilton, published in the *Political Science Quarterly* for March, 1890.

friction the ends he had in view ; he was not always magnanimous and sometimes imagined evil when none existed. In dealing with others Jefferson was adroit, Hamilton masterful ; Jefferson used strategy, where Hamilton gave resounding blows.

These differences helped to explain the failure of Hamilton as a party leader and Jefferson's almost unexampled success. Unlike Hamilton, Jefferson, was by birth and training wholly American. He felt the Virginian's pride in his own state. In him the taste and culture of the best representatives of American aristocracy were united with trust in and respect for the people. Unlike Hamilton to whom strong government seemed the chief support of the public welfare, Jefferson felt a profound distrust of government, and would narrow its functions as much as possible while broadening correspondingly the sphere of the individual's initiative and rights. Jefferson, despite his attachment as a Virginian to state rights, was as little provincial as Hamilton ; but his emancipation had come in a different way, namely, through the working on his mind and character of the ideas which are the foundation of universal democracy. He was a lover of nature, agriculture and science, of music, literature, and philosophy. In fact, he surpassed Hamilton in range of liberalizing interests and pursuits, almost as much as in human sympathy. He appropriated in short a large share of the good things of life, and he would have the less favored possess and enjoy as much as he, and is not this, namely, to secure to all full participation in the good things of life, the real aim and justification of the democratic movement ?

Under the wise guidance of its founder and its able lieutenants, Madison and Gallatin, the newly organized party sustained creditably the rôle of opposition. At first it was beaten in nearly every contest ; each measure of Hamilton's financial scheme became law ; the disputes with England were settled in a way which the democrats condemned ; our relations with France grew colder as their country grew more democratic ; but this experi-

ence of failure did not in the least dishearten; in each struggle the new party gained a clearer consciousness of its tasks, a fuller confidence in its leaders, and a better discipline. But while its numerical strength grew constantly, the political revolution that placed the democratic party for the first time in control of the national government did not take place until the year 1800. In the history of party the events which led to that revolution are of deep significance. The misconduct of France under the ignoble government of the Directory culminating in the shameful ill-treatment of our envoys in the years 1797 and '98, caused the democratic party (which had always been friendly towards the French) a temporary loss of popular favor. The federalists under the influence of the war fever very imprudently passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, to which Jefferson and Madison made reply in the famous Kentucky and Virginia resolution. In the earliest discussions which these resolutions have called forth, undue emphasis has been placed on their relationship to later sectionalism. What most concerns us here is their relationship to the democratic party. "In the principles of that party the rights of the individual and the rights of the states then held the first place. Every true republican believed that the federalist legislation of 1798 was unconstitutional, and therefore, to quote the words of Jefferson, 'as null and void as if Congress had commanded the people to bow down and worship a graven image;' and many republicans, among them Jefferson himself, believed that this legislation was part of a conspiracy to transform our government into a monarchy. Protection through the federal judiciary they did not consider a possibility. That body was regarded as thoroughly partisan; and one of its members at least, Judge Chase, had given good ground for that opinion. * * *

"In fact, during the years under consideration, the distrust of the early republicans [democrats] towards the federal judiciary was not less strong than that of the later republicans during the first five years which followed the publication of the Dred Scott

decision. It seemed, therefore, an imperative necessity that a protest as solemn, as earnest, and as influential as possible should be uttered, and this was what the resolutions accomplished. Silence under such circumstances would have appeared cowardly, and must have proved demoralizing. * * * Perhaps the greatest party advantage which the resolutions secured was this: they drew the attention of the republicans to domestic affairs and to their own political principles, and in this way weakened and broke that spell of France which had done more than all things else to hurt their usefulness as citizens and to bring them into discredit as a party."¹

In the year 1800 came the political revolution which placed the control of the national government for the first time in the hands of the democratic party, and opened a new chapter in its history and that of the country. What at that date had the party accomplished? Although the record looked at in detail is marred by serious errors in policy, it had done much for the education of the people; it had helped to emancipate them from the political provincialism of the earlier periods, and to develop in them an interest in the questions that concerned the Union as a whole; in fact it had brought the masses again into full participation in the political life of the country; moreover,—and this was the highest service,—it had restored to their proper influence over the minds of the people those democratic principles that had fallen into discredit at the close of the Revolution.

THE JEFFERSONIAN-DEMOCRATIC PERIOD, 1800-1825.

The propriety of giving this title to the first quarter of the nineteenth century can scarcely be questioned. During his administration of eight years the rule of Jefferson over his party was

(1) From the author's paper on *Causes and Consequences of the Party Revolution of 1800*; Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1894.

more complete than any other American party leader has ever enjoyed, and this ascendancy over party carried with it an influence over Congress greater than that exercised by Washington or Jackson or Lincoln. Madison and Monroe, the succeeding presidents, were disciples of Jefferson, and the same may be said of the foremost party leaders of the period. Throughout these twenty-five years Jefferson was either the all-powerful active leader of the party or the revered guide and counselor of those who undertook to fill his place. The inaugural of Jefferson in 1801, is often quoted as the most adequate statement of democratic principles and policy to be found in the entire range of political literature, a distinction which it richly deserves. The man whom Hamilton had denounced as "an atheist in religion and a fanatic in politics," and whom not a few New England divines regarded as a modern anti-Christ, gave in this address sincere utterance to sentiments and views which advancing civilization can never leave behind, for they express its inner unchanging spirit.

In no portion of his varied career did Jefferson show greater political wisdom than in his course towards the defeated federalists. He refused to persecute; he did everything to conciliate; and in the inaugural of 1801 he appropriated and took under his protection and that of his party the useful work that they had done. This policy made a revival of federalism impossible. Had the democrats attacked the Constitution or sought to weaken the national government, the federalists, in defending their own creations, would have had a future. But Jefferson's policy deprived them of the most honorable and useful activity which is open to a party in opposition, and left to them little more than a choice of ways to die. A second result of Jefferson's policy was that it helped to federalize the democrats. Desertion from the defeated to the victorious party soon grew into a stampede, and the new element in the democratic camp became quickly and greatly influential. Looked at from the standpoint of party, the

destruction of the federalists and the federalization of the democrats are the most striking consequences of the revolution of 1800. From the higher standpoint of national progress the most important consequences are these: first, the resumption of that progress toward democracy which had been the marked characteristic of the colonial and revolutionary periods, but had been checked during the conservative aristocratic reaction of the years 1786 to 1800;—a progress on whose resumption and healthful unfolding was to depend what is most distinctive and beneficent in the contribution of America to the civilization of the world; and second, a powerful impulse to the forces which were slowly establishing in our people a national and American character. The explanations of our troubles in the "critical period" from 1781-1789 is that through breaking our relationship to Great Britain we had come to occupy the position of a nation before possessing either a national organization or a national character. In 1800 the national organization, thanks to the federalists, had been supplied, but we still lacked a national character. This, then, was the urgent, the overshadowing want of the new period. The attitude of the mass of the people toward the beneficial changes made by the federalists had been either reluctant acquiescence or passionate opposition; only in a slight degree had they unlearned the provincialism and the unbalanced democracy that had produced the calamities of 1786; only in a slight degree had they concerned themselves hitherto for national interests or national honor; but now, through their elevation to power, the welfare and the good name of the nation were placed in their keeping and the new responsibility tended to develop within them those larger political conceptions which, when added to the traits that had distinguished them from the beginning, namely, love of freedom and devotion to self-government, were to make the character of our people national and American.¹

(1) Ibid.

THE JACKSONIAN-DEMOCRATIC PERIOD, 1825-1840.

The third period in the history of the democratic party extending from 1825 to 1840, is rightly called the Jacksonian ; for with the one exception of Jefferson, Jackson has impressed himself upon the party more deeply and durably than any other of its leaders. How does this period differ from the preceding ? Chiefly in this : Jefferson, as has been noted, tried to make all classes democratic, and his success was such that at the close of the second war with England the democratic party included the conservative classes, and supported a conservative policy. Jackson on the contrary made himself the champion of the masses, and in this way became the leader of a movement more radically democratic than that which Jefferson had led. Instead of seeking to reconcile the two divisions of society as Jefferson had done, he stood forth as the champion of the poor, and made war in their behalf against the rich. This is the significance of the crusade against the bank and the looting of the Civil Service. The great development of executive power under Jackson, signified a notable retreat from the earlier position of the party, namely, that of distrust towards the president and confidence in the House of Representatives. Jackson was a strong executive, because behind him was the strength of the people. His course towards the nullifiers of South Carolina signifies an advance of the democratic party in national sentiment. As a rule those who have given most study to this period censure the course of Jackson. Professor Sumner says : " We must say of Jackson that he stumbled along through a magnificent career now and then taking up a chance without really appreciating it ; leaving behind him disturbed and discordant elements of good and ill just fit to produce turmoil and disaster in the future." Later he adds, " Representative institutions are degraded on the Jacksonian theory just as they are on the divine-right theory, or on the theory of the democratic empire. There is not a worse perversion of the American system of government

conceivable than to regard the President as the tribune of the people." The view of Von Holst may be inferred from the following passages: "In spite of the frightful influence, in the real sense of the expression, which he exercised during the eight years of his presidency, he neither pointed out nor opened new ways to his people by the superiority of his mind, but only dragged them more rapidly onward on the road they had long been traveling, by the demoniacal power of his will." The meaning of the bank struggle is thus defined: "Its significance lay in the elements which made Jackson able actually and successfully to assert his claims, in conflict both with the Constitution and with the idea of republicanism, to a position between Congress and the people as patriarchal ruler of the republic." Elsewhere he tells us that the "curse of Jackson's administration" is that it weakened respect for law; that "the first clear symptom" of "the decline of a healthy political spirit" was the election and reelection of Jackson to the presidency; that his administration paved a "broad path for the demoralizing transformation of the American democracy."

In reply to this arraignment it may be observed that Jackson worked for and with that portion of the people whose political development was least advanced; that the personal methods he employed were suited to their needs; that the net results of his influence was to lift them to a higher political plane than they had occupied before; that since they regarded him (as he regarded himself) not as the violator of the Constitution but as its staunchest supporter, his example tended to build up rather than to break down respect for law; that no president of the United States has been more distinctly national in his spirit or has done more to awaken that spirit in his supporters. On the other hand, it is fair to concede that under Jackson politics were vulgarized and American society was deprived of its rightful influence over government; still in a fair summary of the period it seems safe to say that it lifted the lower political strata more than it depressed the higher.

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN CONFLICT WITH SECTIONALISM,
1840-1860.

The twenty years from the defeat of Van Buren in 1840 to the defeat of Douglas in 1860 brought disaster to the old parties. The characteristic of this period was the rapid growth of sectionalism, the North with its institutions based on free labor, and the South resting on slave labor, had each become conscious that the public policy best adapted to the interests of the other threatened its own welfare. Favored by a rapid increase of population and by legislation that had excluded slavery from the region north of the Ohio, and from most of the territory west of the Mississippi, the North in 1840 had made itself master of the House of Representatives and seemed destined to win in the near future control of the Senate and the presidency. The South in alarm resolved upon a policy of territorial expansion in order to increase the number of slave states and thus preserve the sectional balance in the Senate. The first step was to annex Texas, the second, to wrest a vast territory from Mexico. Earlier the great parties had tried, not without success, to keep slavery out of politics. In 1844 the acceptance by the democratic party of the policy of territorial "expansion" made slavery the leading political issue, and such it remained to the end of the period. During these years so memorable for territorial acquisitions, for the struggle over the Wilmot Proviso, for the Compromise of 1850, for the growing agitation over the new Fugitive Slave Law, for the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, ostensibly to make room for Squatter Sovereignty, for the long agony in Kansas, for the sensational Dred Scott decision, for the reconstruction of the party system on the sectional basis,—during all these eventful years the democratic party was the accomplice of the southern slaveholder in the effort to extend slave labor at the expense of free labor. The sacrifice of principles necessitated by this relationship led to

rapid moral decay; in the way of beneficial legislation little or nothing was accomplished. The party ceased to produce great leaders; among the names now held in honor by the democratic party not one belongs to this period. Men of conscience and courage like Thomas H. Benton were driven out of the party; of the new leaders none were better than third rate; the real democrats of those times are to be looked for in other parties, the greatest of them all, Abraham Lincoln,—whom next to Jefferson the democrats of our day quote oftenest, was first a whig and then a republican. The leader who had most influence over the party was Stephen A. Douglas, a man of boundless audacity and not destitute of courage, but blind to the moral aspect of public questions. In declaring, at a time when the disposition of slavery was the highest concern of the country, that he did not care whether slavery “was voted up or voted down” Douglas forfeited all right to the name of statesman; nevertheless it was he who in 1860 led the party out of its bondage to the South. The significance of this period in the history of the democratic party is the illustration it gives of the disastrous results of a betrayal of principles to the morals, honor, and usefulness of a party.

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY DURING THE CIVIL WAR.

Even if it had remained in power, the greatly demoralized democratic party could not have met the emergency created by secession. During the interval between the election of 1860 and the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln it made no preparation moral or material for the impending struggle; the reluctant support which it gave to the war for the Union was inconstant, and at times ceased altogether; its opposition to the policy of destroying slavery was bitter and continued to the end. If it is true that the Union was saved by the aid of democrats, it is also true that it was saved in spite of, rather than by the aid of, the democratic party; and there were times in the course of the doubtful

struggle when President Lincoln and his supporters felt that the "fire in the rear" was not less deadly than the "fire in the front." Nevertheless the record is not wholly of mischief. Under stress of public danger the republicans often disregarded the limitations of the Constitution. In resisting such illegal acts the democratic party vindicated democratic principles, and at the same time met an urgent public need. But this service, considerable as it was, did not atone for the lukewarmness of the party in support of the war, for its colossal blunder of 1864 in declaring the war a failure and demanding a cessation of hostilities, for its steady and at times embittered opposition to those measures which looked to the destruction of slavery, and for its compromising entanglements with the disloyal elements of the North.

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION.

Lincoln's plan of reconstruction was not followed by the republican party; instead of seeking as he had purposed to restore everything except slavery to the ante-bellum status, to reconcile North and South, and to maintain the friendly relations existing at the close of the war between the whites and the colored people of the South, the republican party, under great provocation it must be confessed, took the control of government in the South out of the hands of the whites and placed it in the incapable hands of the ex-slaves. On its face the policy was monstrous and monstrous were its fruits. The old alienation between North and South was deepened, embittered, and given a long lease in which to work evil; an alienation unknown before was established between the southern white man and the negro; and this is the source of that race issue, which more than all things else retards southern progress.

In resisting the republican reconstruction policy the democratic party began to recover its moral tone and the confidence of the public, in advocating reform during the second administration of

General Grant it made a further advance; in 1876 the rehabilitation had progressed so far that it seemed for a time to have won the election.

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY SINCE THE CLOSE OF RECONSTRUCTION.

Since the close of reconstruction the democratic party has passed through two phases of experience, the first lasting into the second Cleveland administration, the other from then until now. The former phase which covers some eighteen years is marked by a return of the party to earlier ideas and policy; its greatest leaders, Tilden and Cleveland, may be characterized as conservative democrats of the Jeffersonian school. In firmness and courage, as well as in his conception of the presidential office, Mr. Cleveland reminds us of Jackson. But before the close of his second administration, many signs began to appear of a party change of considerable magnitude; its nature and extent were made evident at the Chicago convention of 1896, which declared for free silver, censured the judiciary and refused the complimentary vote of approval that is usually given by a party to a retiring president of its own political faith. The course of the party in the campaign of '96, the speeches of Mr. Bryan, the re-issue in 1900 of the platform of '96, the alliance with the populists and with some of the labor organizations make it clear that the conservative party of Mr. Cleveland has become a radical one. To-day quite as in the days of Jackson the democratic party is the party of the masses.

Turning now from the historical sketch let us ask how the democratic party stands related to American politics in their entirety. The American people constitute one of the great democracies of the world. The democratic party is the political champion of those elements of the democracy which are most democratic. It stands nearest to the people; through its agency the people have entered politics. The functions of every great party are three; teaching, giving shape to public policy, and

administration. In the discharge of the first the party has rendered inestimable service; it has gone out into the hedges and byways, and given instructions to multitudes that otherwise would have remained untaught; it is safe to say that the democratic party has done more to Americanize the foreigner, to transform the alien into a citizen than all other parties. Corresponding with the importance of this function of the party, is the excellence of the teachers it has produced. The democratic party has taught its pupils self-respect and love of freedom; it has kindled their ambition and introduced them to the opportunities and responsibilities of political life. The errors it has taught,—and they are many,—are of small account when compared with the lifting influence it has exerted.

In giving shape to public policy, the democratic party has had only a qualified success; in political construction the greatest builders have not been democrats. As a rule democrats have succeeded better in tearing down than in building up. During the early period they were too afraid of government; they held that the only good government was a weak one; hence in framing constitutions they were more intent to guard against the possible encroachments of government than to make it efficient. The Articles of Confederation illustrate well the early democratic idea of a general government. The chief contribution of the party to the fundamental law, state and national, are the provisions collectively described as bills of rights, which are restraints upon governments rather than sources of power. In that second field of public policy where the task is to deal wisely with the issues of the hour, what is the record of the democratic party? Here, too, we find only a qualified success, and in periods of greatest peril and difficulty almost unqualified failure.

In the administrative function, the democratic party has shown the characteristic merits and defects of its changing constituency. In periods when the party has included a large conservative element, it has succeeded well, but in the one period when its

radical elements were in control, namely, that of Jackson, there was, to say the least, a degree of failure.

On the whole it seems fair to conclude that the greater services of the democratic party have been in the line of political education; for the framework of our political institutions and for the wise conduct of government, especially in critical times, we owe more to other parties. But this does not justify the conclusion that the democratic party should never be intrusted with office. To exclude the party of the people permanently from office is to destroy its usefulness as their teacher and to bring to an untimely end American democracy.



THE PRIMITIVE OBJECTS OF WORSHIP¹

L. MARILLIER, *Paris.*



HE infinitely multiple powers with which the non-civilized man invests animals, stars, plants, and men, have to him nothing marvelous about them; the notion of "supernatural" implies that of a nature, a cosmos, a customary and normal order of phenomena, and this idea is quite foreign to him. In phenomena there is for him no rule, no uniform and necessary succession; the idea of law is absent from his mind, and the causality which he manages to conceive is a capricious and uncertain one. The universe is not to his mind a vast organism of which all parts are linked together, but a collection of beings in perpetual conflict, of which now one, now another, is victorious,—a conflict which is not associated in his mind with any question as to which side must ultimately prevail: these beings are, like himself, the plaything of their unbridled and varying passions.

Not one of them, moreover, is subject to an invariable function, not one of them is constrained to the performance of one part for which alone it might seem suited; everyone can do all things, and with a success exactly in proportion to the degree of the virtue behind it, and the intensity of its energy. Departmental spirits are, like departmental gods, of a relatively recent creation;

(1) Continued from the October number.

each "will," each "power" is manifested in a thousand different ways, and no peculiar dominion is assigned to one of them to the exclusion of all others: the *life* which is at the heart of the cedar or oak, and makes the branches bear leaves, predicts the future, heals diseases, makes the rain fall, and animals die, and not because it has taken to its own use functions once distinct, but merely because a living being can radiate its life in every direction according to the very measure of the power which is in it. These powers which he has granted to all beings of nature conceived in his own image, he has not denied to himself; he knows that he possesses them, and he makes use of them; all magic being only an illustration of this conception of savages and of primitive peoples. But he knows also that they are not equally imparted to all, and this is to him a satisfactory explanation of his numerous failures. If in the actions of modern magic-men, there is found an element of imposture and trickery, it is because doubt begins to creep into them; they still have faith, but a wavering and vacillating faith made less self-confident by contact with white men. In tribes which have remained quite free from the contagion of modern civilization, the sorcerer does not hesitate to attempt in good faith the most hazardous undertakings; he thinks he can exert upon the course of the planets or the progress of the seasons a real influence, and if he does not succeed in reaching the goal which he has desired, he concludes, not that it was by its nature inaccessible, but merely that his own effort was thwarted by the will of one more powerful, more skillful, wiser than himself.

It is easy to see what the gods are like, at this period of religious evolution, to whom man directs his worship, the superhuman beings to whom he will give magic rites and offerings in order to bend them to his will, or to win their coöperation and help, or at least their neutrality, and whom by means of sacrifices he will usually turn into allies, protectors, members of his clan, united with him by the sacred ties of a common blood. They merely

seem the most powerful, the most useful, or the most dangerous to man of the Living Ones who constitute the immense body of nature; they are of the same essence as the other objects, events, and energies of which the universe is built; they differ, not in quality, but in strength from what is not divine, and all degrees of force and power can be noticed in their ranks, although at this period of the evolution they do not form a hierarchy. From the tree or the spring which enriches the wild animals upon which man feeds, or heals the sick, to the thunder which rends the heavens, from the crystal or the shining stone which reveals the future, to the mighty ocean or the sun, giver of life, everything is divine by the same right, since everything receives, or can, at need, become the object of a similar worship, made essentially from the same ceremonies, and having as organs the same rites. But certainly there is a greater distance between the most powerful and the weakest among them than between the least powerful and the objects or beings of a nature really the same, but which are not a goal of worship because of the weakness of the *mana* which is in them. It is by their acts that the gods at this period are defined; one asks not what they are, but what they can do, what they do achieve, and what hold one has upon their will.

They cannot be said to be conceived as spirits, nor can one say, on the other hand, that they are not conceived as spirits, but as beings like the Greek gods, immortals with proud incorruptible bodies. The truth is that the notion of spirit is still wanting, and is wanting because the question of the nature of god and man has not been brought before the human mind. Speculative curiosity is not yet aroused, and man seeks to find out only what he needs for practical purposes to know. Instinctively our remote ancestors represented in their own likeness the super-human and vague beings with whom they peopled the world; and their notion has become more precise along with a more precise notion of themselves. At that distant age consciousness, as yet unaccustomed to such analyses, does not distinguish in man

a body and a soul ; and so it does not place a soul in any of the objects of nature which it endows with life, intelligence, and will ; and the superhuman beings which it produces spontaneously, the protecting divinities with confused and vague attributes to which Mr. Lang justly calls attention in a recent work,¹ are not, any more than the real nature gods, spirits. Although, in most cases, we very probably ought not to see in them mortals deified after death, they usually assume a human form because no definite one is imposed upon them by external perception ; and of all the images which people the brain of primitive man none is more familiar than that of the face and body of individuals of his own kind ; none is more closely connected with the workings of a voluntary and intelligent activity. But though this be the usual rule, it is not exclusive, and they often assume the appearance of animals, or they even have no precise and definite form ; they remain powers, forces, *numina*, whose effects alone are described because they alone are of importance. Nor have we any more right to speak, at this period, of conscious and systematic anthropomorphism than of animism.

It is not at the first phases of religious development that we can expect to meet conceptions already organized and with definitely marked outlines ; and it is strange that the followers of the theory of evolution are the very ones who have tried to connect, as with a single origin, all religion with a group of elements as clearly differentiated as the ancestral cults : the exclusive cult of the ancestor, the Greek anthropomorphism, totemism, in the narrow and rigorous meaning of the word, are, each in its kind, adult religious forms, already so definite that they cannot undergo further evolution and transformation without a considerable modification and dissolution. They seem to us relatively primitive only because of the distance at which we see them, and because we oppose them in our thought to the ethical religions belonging to a more

(1) *The Making of Religion*. London, 1898.

advanced stage of thought and of civilization. But they have no embryonic quality; they are types presupposing a long evolution and forming the conclusion of a partial development, so that it is, in a way, an historical and psychological absurdity to treat them as a *terminus a quo*. The confusion has been increased by the application of the names of animism and anthropomorphism to this primitive conception of the world, represented in consciousness as a collection of living things; but this is a real abuse of language, since these living things usually do not have human forms, since life is inherent in the objects themselves, although it may radiate afar, and act where they are not, and since the idea of a spirit, which is the essential part of any animist conception, is still lacking.

Our remote ancestors, as I have said, did not have, at least so far as analogy allows us to determine, the idea of a double, dwelling in man and forming the source of his activity and of his life. When this notion of a double, sometimes identified with the shadows, sometimes with the reflection, was once established, it doubtless was soon extended, and very naturally through analogy, to animals first, and very probably to plants, then to all the objects of nature, and, at the period when non-civilized people for the first time submitted to regular observations, to objects even of human manufacture. Thenceforth, every being, every object, has a soul; the world is a vast society of spirits who act and re-act, who, as J. G. Frazer has shown in his excellent investigations of the External Soul, do not necessarily dwell in the bodies which they animate. The gods are from now on the souls of these Living Ones, who were already worshiped because of the power manifested in them; at times they are conceived as inherent in the beings or objects and closely united with their material and tangible bodies, at times as external, independent, and governing from without the events or beings in which they are revealed. This idea of the external position of the soul has led to the supposition of spirits without corresponding bodies,

existing in themselves and for themselves, and this conception was, moreover, corroborated by the fact that the double of the man or animal survived the destruction of the corpse. Dreams, which among non-civilized people have a remarkable frequency and acuteness, hallucinations, customary among them and impossible to distinguish from true perceptions ; trances, syncopes, which their food and ways of living make much more frequent than among people of more advanced culture ; shadows, reflections upon the glassy waters or any polished surface ; doubtless, also, the facts of telepathy, true or supposed, to which Mr. Lang assigns a preponderating part, in a recent work,—such are a few of the phenomena which have produced the conception of the spirit, that is to say, first, of a sort of silhouette of the body, as material as itself, endowed with the same energies, and obeying the same needs, but formed from a material more subtile and more fine, and, in some cases, even of an impalpable and intangible matter. This soul, which has often appeared in his dreams to the one whom it animates, seems to him to leave him lying motionless upon the ground while it departs on long journeys, since it is present at scenes far removed from the hut, the forest or nook of the beach where he fell asleep. It leaves the body, which remains motionless and helpless, hence it must be the origin and cause of his motion and life, the active energy which gives him a hold upon beings and things. And it is to a soul like his own, a double, that he will attribute through a reasoning by analogy which is quite natural, the life of other living beings, the power and strength which are manifested in other objects, even made things, as a hatchet, a lance, a canoe, or a house, which he conceives as the visible form, as he is himself, of intelligent wills.

Among the men and animals which he sees in his hallucinations and his dreams, some are dead, and among the things some have been shattered or destroyed ; accordingly, the double must survive the being itself which it animated. Until this notion of the soul was definitely established, there was attributed to the dead a sort of

obscure and attenuated life which lived beyond the grave, and disappeared only with the dissolution of the body, which, at times, even lasted as long as the bones. The worship of the dead was of the same order as that of the living ; it was directed scarcely to any but to those who were endowed at the time of their existence upon earth with special magic powers, or whose social rank, success, and wealth implied the possession of a higher *mana*, of an effective energy much above the ordinary. But inasmuch as the dead had the same needs as when they lived in their villages, feelings of filial piety, of affection, of kindness led their kin to bring them food and all that might be of use in their new life, that shadowy and half-extinguished life to which they were henceforth reduced. They excited, moreover, fear as well as pity ; they carried with them the contagion of death, and gifts were made them to avert vengeance for possible forgetfulness or neglect. At this stage the worship of the dead is closely and indissolubly linked with that of the grave. But, little by little, the soul of the deceased acquires a more precise and more distinct individuality, and then it is not the body, but the spirit, the double, which receives the offerings, homage, and prayers, over which the wizards try to prevail by means of their incantations. There are performed, too, rites of a funeral character in the narrow sense of the word ; but the dead receive also a worship of another kind ; libations are poured on the hearth in their honor ; they sit in person at the ritual banquets with the living, and, quite as much as in their actual remains, they dwell in the carved or painted effigies of their former faces.

Like this human soul, whose independent existence with regard to the body it animated is affirmed by these new practices, similar souls are attributed to all beings and all things ; they, too, are free from any necessary connection with a tangible and palpable body ; by analogy other spirits are imagined to explain the phenomena, whose production cannot be linked with any determined thing. The souls become the universal causes.

This body of ideas could not fail to react upon the conception of the gods held by the men of former ages. Under their influence the savage, risen almost to the dignity of barbarian, and the barbarian himself, succeed in imagining the gods as spirits. At first, these appeared to them as spirits closely linked with the objects, but they could not very well long maintain the aspect of doubles in the case of the planets, the earth, the waters, the ocean, etc. It is even open to serious doubt whether they ever possessed it; they never assume it in the period of religious evolution directly open to our observation. But on these divine souls of things the intelligence had to impose a form which should enable it to represent them to itself; the only image which it could devise was that of living and moving, energetic and active beings. The natural consequence is that the soul of the spring, the soul of the sea, the soul of the tree, or of the sun,—all these souls, reservoirs of superhuman energy and of superhuman power, appeared with the features of an animal or of a man.

At a more advanced stage of evolution, these souls inherent in the multiple objects of nature have parted company from them; they have conquered, in turn, independence and individuality, and they are conceived as distinct beings, governing and producing phenomena from without. This is the universal polydæmonism which many historians and mythologists have considered the initial phase of the whole religious development. The most powerful of these spirits, the most dreaded, those, too, with whom a clan, tribe, or nation made a more intimate alliance, became gods, as were already those who had been more especially united with one or another of the great objects of nature which already received religious worship.

Moreover, the idea finally became obscured of the true meaning of these spirits; the form under which they were represented misled people with regard to their primitive nature, and they came to be considered as divine men and animals, having, like the men of the earth and the animals of the forest, a body and a soul: the

Greek gods are supernatural men, they are not spirits. And yet these gods, independent of the objects, did not cease to be identified with the objects and the beings of whose life and motion they were at first the source; for they were very powerful magicians, and, as such, could appear under the most varied forms. Without losing their nature-character, the superhuman beings to whom were directed offerings and prayers, thus acquired a more and more definite anthropomorphic aspect. Henceforth, not only the needs of men and their desires, their sentiments and their passions were attributed to them, but divine society grew to be a copy of human society; its members seemed subject to the same habits and the same customs, limited in their power by the same ritual interdictions, celebrating the same ceremonies, performing the same sacrifices. Everything is similar, institutions, social organization, family structure, and material setting, too, in the sensible world and in the supernatural world, which is its double, and constitutes its collective soul and vital principle. This is a way of conceiving the universe and the divine which is at the root of the whole mythological development, and persists, with a modification of form, in Islamitic and Christian tradition. Though religion in its totality has not its origin in the worship of the dead, and the animist conception of nature, yet it is undeniable that these have exerted a decisive influence upon its development by accustoming men, on the one hand, to represent as spirits separate from the bodies the supernatural beings on whom depended their prosperity and the whole life of things, and, on the other hand, to direct to spirits often invisible, and yet omnipresent, their homage and prayers; to consider sacrifice and libation as bearers of their requests to these intangible Powers, as a means of communication with the gods, who, instead of mingling with the world, and constituting, so to speak, the very substance out of which it is made, govern it from afar. The notion of the divine is not rooted in the worship of those who are gone, but it is one of the essential factors of the idea of the

transcendency of the gods which characterizes at a certain phase of their evolution all polytheisms and all monotheisms.

This double character of the gods explains the double character of the myths in which are related the multiple incidents of the superhuman existence; they are natural phenomena, and they are men. All the events of nature with which they have to do are transformed into human adventures, and, on the other hand, men, magnified and supernatural, in contrast with the men of earth, they have an existence like that of powerful kings and the most skillful of wizards. It would be idle to attempt to explain all episodes by a definite allusion to a meteorological or cosmical phenomenon, all the more so since the special assignment to one department of the universe of even those divinities whose natural character is most marked, took place fairly late; but in the course even of all the strange, tragic, or burlesque intrigues in which the fertile imagination of our ancestors placed them, the gods never entirely lose their primitive character; they still remain, however anthropomorphic in their appearance, the sun, the moon, the west wind, the storm-cloud, the morning star, night or dawn, and if not the incidents, at least the coloring, of the wonderful tales of which they are the heroes, result in a large degree from the original stamp of which they have kept the impress.

I have, in this brief sketch, foreshadowed, without definitely establishing it, the most natural solution of some of the chief questions which occupy the attention of the historian of religion, and, in the first place, that of the universality of religious phenomena. This seems long since actually settled, and the patient investigations of Roskoff¹ have refuted the affirmations of some hasty anthropologists, among whom I regret to include Sir John Lubbock, E. B. Tylor, A. Réville, Girard de Rialle, and De Quatrefages, who reach conclusions of the same character; and it is evident that the mistake results both from superficial observation

(1) *Das Religionswesen der rohesten Naturvölker*, 1880.

and from an actual misconception of the nature and of the true bearing of religion. But if we grant the accuracy of the reconstitution of primitive religious forms which I have attempted, it will be necessarily and *a priori* certain that every ethnic group, without exception, has, at least at the initial phase of its evolution, gone through a period of greater or shorter duration, during which the prosperity of the tribe and of its members and the whole life of nature have been conceived as being in close correlation with certain superhuman beings, whose will might be either magically compelled or at any rate influenced, by offerings or prayers. And whenever this conception appears, by this very fact there is a religion. Some people exist who have no religious faith, no feeling of the divine; a people can be conceived from whom all faith has disappeared. But the absence of religion rests on negative and critical conceptions, which never appear except at a fairly advanced period of evolution, inasmuch as they are always the result of reflection, abstraction, and analysis. Religion might be lacking in some particular group, if the existence of the gods were reached by means of the syllogism, and if it were the presence in the intelligence of the representation of the gods which would produce in the mind the humblest forms of religious emotion. But the latter preëxist precisely in these representations which are indeed excited by it in the mind: the divine is experienced and felt before the gods are thought. The emotion itself results directly from the mental structure of man at his lowest level of development, and from the conditions in which he has universally been placed at this moment of his evolution; it is the necessary product of these conditions and of this structure. The existence, moreover, of this emotion produces, on the other hand, without any effort, at first, of reflection, a combination of conceptions in which it may assume definite forms, and determines in the subject in which it appears, acts, which consciously applied, will lead him to formulate a theory of his conduct which contains the germ of a whole rudimentary dogma.

Thus fall at once the theories which make of religion an artificial or semi-artificial creation, the conscious work of a priesthood, or a collection of symbols intentionally selected to be the brilliant and mysterious garb of a system of high metaphysical or moral truths. In the religions of non-civilized peoples, in the ancient and primitive forms of the great nature religions, there is no place for allegory or symbol; we need not seek in the rites a hidden or mysterious meaning; all is to be taken literally, and we must avoid interpretations which pervert the clear and evident meaning of ceremonies and legends. It is only at a much more recent period that reflection brought to bear on the myths expressive of the ways of thought and belief of previous ages has tended to transform these into symbols, because their literal meaning no longer satisfied the religious needs, or the scientific exigencies of a new civilization.

The barriers which separate the various superior and inferior forms of nature religions are in turn shattered, and give way. From the negro polydæmonism to the Hellenic polytheism, from the Australian totemism to the primitive worship of Yahwe and of the Canaanite Baalim, everywhere we find the same conceptions, the same essential rites, and, in their most general features, the same myths; and everywhere, the living and fruitful essence, the essence productive of all these varied forms, is the same religious emotion, at times rude, at times more refined, linked with the greatest diversity of secondary feelings, but at bottom ever one and self-identical. The very principle of a distinct division of religions into monotheistic, polytheistic, and animist will seem outworn. Animism (or, to be more accurate and exact, polydæmonism), polytheism, and monotheism are, in fact, moments of the religious development, different stages of a single evolution, rather than distinct types, branches springing from a single trunk. All religions at first consist essentially in the worship of vague and fearful Powers of partly undetermined number and attributes, but who are scattered throughout all nature; they all tend

towards the worship of a single God, who unites and absorbs all the many manifestations of the divinity ; they all pass through a long or short period of organized polytheism, when the government of the universe belongs to an oligarchy of superhuman beings. And, on the other hand, when the world is alive with the murmur of the countless spirits that dwell in the trees, the streams, the rocks, animals, and in the air and the stars, when all is divine, active, and living, when the magician contends on an equal footing with gods and demons, and bends them to his will by incantations and the efficacy of sacrifice, in the full swing of polydæmonism, there already appears a first outline, so to speak, of monotheism in the worship, preponderating and at times exclusive, of the supernatural protector with whom the clan or tribe is united by an alliance, sealed by ritual sacrifice and the sacred banquet. In the period of polytheism, the way is opened wide to monotheism by "*henotheism*," the neglect of all other gods for the worship of one of them in prayers or in hymns, or the endeavor by means of sacrifice to earn his good-will or exact his coöperation ; the predominating part assigned to one of the immortals, as the sky or the sun ; the frequent identification of the various cosmic Powers with each other, so that they often seem to be only various names and varied functions of a single being. In fact, monotheism already exists potentially at this moment, and only an effort of philosophic reflection is needed to make the faithful realize the unity of God, a unity which, moreover, in nature religions will more often assume a pantheistic than a personal form. On the other hand, in the most vigorously monotheistic religions, how many traces of polytheism remain, such as the worship of the saints, which has its counterpart in those of the *imams* and *maraboots*, where survive also the beliefs and rites of ancient burial animism. To Islam the Christian dogma of the Trinity seems a sort of tri-theism, and in Judaism itself the angels, messengers of God, and his ministers have preserved something of their former divine character. It is only the intro-

duction into the domain of religion of ethical elements at first foreign to it which has determined a deep fissure between the ancient religion of nature and the new religions,—religions of moral redemption, which have their foundation in the consciousness itself of sin. Up to the advent of ethical and universalizing religions, until the appearance of the great founders, individual or collective, the great religious initiators who have marked them with the stamp of their powerful originality, there has always been a real homogeneity in the conceptions of the divine on the part of all the peoples of the earth. Even after this homogeneity had disappeared through a fusion among so many of piety and moral feeling, a striking likeness has persisted between the myths, legends, ritual practices, and sacerdotal institutions, which, however, stood for the most varied emotions and thoughts. Thus the same elements are everywhere and always met with in various combinations, ever similar implements for different tasks, eternal vehicles for changeable and varying feelings, whose function, however, and whose place in the human soul, remain the same. In the rationalistic religions of our day they still survive under the form of allegories and verbal or plastic symbols; in the vague outlines of God-worship practiced by the Troglodytes of the quaternary age doubtless they could be found; they are the very material of the religion of magic of Australia, or of negro animism, as well as the polytheism of India or of Greece.

It is thus easy to understand the difficulties in the way of treating as scientific the attempts, periodically renewed, to link by derivation all religious forms in their infinite diversity (a diversity which conceals, it is true, a real unity) to the worship of a determined number of beings or of objects, animals, deceased human beings, or celestial bodies. A writer of great ability in discussion, and of a keen and fascinating talent, whose recent death was a loss to letters, Mr. Grant Allen, endeavored in his book on "The Evolution of the Idea of God" to show that all worships were in reality only transformed funeral worships. But the difficulty is

that we do not know any non-civilized people whose only religious practices are beliefs relating to the other life, and where the only religious practices in use are funeral ones, no matter how far down we descend in the scale of civilization. We cannot discern any close parallelism between the culture of a given social group, and the place occupied in its religion by funeral rites, the adoration and propitiation of the dead, and conceptions relating to the part played by the souls of the dead in the government of the world, and their influence on the destiny of the living. Worship of animals and worship of plants, worship of stars and worship of waters, worship of rocks and worship of kings, masters of the elements or men divine, all this is coëxistent, and at every stage of evolution, with the worship of the dead. These various elements of a single religion stand on the same plane; and we find them, doubtless with a greater or lesser development, in one place, embryonic, in another, with indications that they formerly were mere traces of a vanished past; but we do find all, or nearly all, of these elements in every society, no matter what may be the point reached in the long course travelled by humanity. There is no chronology to be distinguished among them, no evidence of dates; if they be placed at periods of time, some earlier and others later, it is by pure hypothesis, the value of which cannot be verified by any external means. An annoying thing, too, is that even to the consciousness of the non-civilized, the spirits of plants, stones, or waters, and the souls of the dead form two mutually irreducible classes of beings of different kinds; this is the case with the Melanesians, the negroes of Guinea, the Esquimaux, the American Indians, the non-Aryan peoples of India. These same distinctions, moreover, are always found among the ancestors of modern civilized races, in Greece, at Rome, in India, among the Germanic and Slavic tribes, and they have survived in folk-lore. The *jinni* are not to the modern Arab the souls of the departed, nor were they to the pre-Islamic Arabs; and throughout Assyrio-Chaldæan antiquity the demons and the gods belonged to another

race and class than men. If, at times, it becomes possible in this mixture of various worships to assign, in a given society, an even probable priority to any one of them, it frequently happens that the most recent are precisely ancestral worships. This seems to have been the case in Polynesia, perhaps also in Micronesia and Melanesia, and doubtless among the Bantu tribes of South Africa. It would be a serious mistake, besides, to imagine that funeral and ancestral worships are characteristic of civilizations that are still coarse and unformed, and nature worships of civilizations more complex, more polished, and more stable. The Amazulus, whose religion is reducible almost to the worship of the dead, are among the most civilized peoples of Africa; and the Polynesians had attained to a real development of metaphysical and religious thought, when the worship of deified chiefs acquired all its importance among them. On the other hand, there are populations apparently almost in the lowest ranks of humanity among whom appears undeniably a sort of tentative outline of a species of theism, a worship directed to a kindly deity, who by every characteristic is as much as possible differentiated from the soul of a dead person, and is honored by rites different from those used to propitiate the dead.

We must not wonder at the juxtaposition in one society or worships directed to very different objects; they are based on the same conceptions of causality, on the same unconcious reasonings; they imply the same emotions, the same hopes and fears, the same desires. The psychological process which has led to the practice of funeral rites destined to conciliate the good-will of the powerful dead, led also to the adoration of animals whose help might be expected, to the propitiatory worship of dreaded animals, or of those whose flesh was eaten, to the worship of the divinities of vegetation and of the waters. But these various religious forms are mutually independent; not one presupposes the existence of any other; they appear not subordinate, but coördinate in one society.

What we have attempted to establish here briefly, in so far as the worship of the dead is concerned, might be proved in the same way and by arguments of a similar kind for all the worships directed to other objects. The adoration of trees or theriomorphic cults, cannot, any more than funeral religion, lay claim to a primordial character. All arguments valid in the one case are valid in the other, and the documents relating to the non-civilized supply us with abundant facts in support of our negative thesis. But I may add that this result is precisely the one anticipated, in a way, by the sketch which I have attempted of the genesis of religion. If, indeed, the structure of the human mind is such as to oblige the men of former times to conceive the universe as composed of the very bodies of the gods, and if they are obliged to conceive these gods in their own image as acting wills, then, it is certain that their worship will not be directed to a particular and limited category of beings or objects, but to all, and it is certain, too, that they will be pious, and that religious observances will occupy a preponderating part of their life, since the only control which they seem to have over phenomena is the magic or religious action which they think they can exert over the energies which constitute the essence of those phenomena, and are clearly manifested in them. When the power of analysis develops in the human mind, and the ability also to form a synthesis, one gradually becomes able to distinguish more active causes, and to subordinate the others to them. Worship, then, becomes specialized at the same time as a hierarchy is established by degrees among the superhuman beings, who at once govern and make up the world; but this is the conclusion, and not the beginning, of an evolution which must have been very long.

This dispersion of divine causation, which the very structure of the primitive mind obliged it to conceive, seems to constitute one of the strongest arguments against the hypothesis of a primitive monotheism, obliterated in the consciousness of the savages of to-day and of the ancestors of modern civilized peoples by the

advent of spiritualist beliefs. Mr. F. B. Jevons, one of the most brilliant and best equipped of the recent historians of religion, did not venture, in spite of his evident desire, to postulate firmly the existence of this primitive monotheism; the conscientiousness of the careful and acute scholar prevented him from taking the final step. A writer, who is never disconcerted by a paradox and whose supple and ready intellect ventures upon many audacious conclusions, often with the happiest results, Mr. Andrew Lang, did not flinch at the heavy task of rehabilitating the discarded theory of religious degeneration. His incomparable erudition, his wonderful skill in argument, the marvelous clearness of vision which enables him at once to detect his adversary's weak point, and direct thither the whole onslaught of discussion, the attractiveness of the art with which he constructs a new synthesis, and, also, the combination of humor and piety in his works of religious criticism, all appeared, for a second, to justify him. And, yet, if we can for a moment escape the magic of his style, we perceive that what he has succeeded in establishing, is, as we on our side have tried to do, that nothing authorizes us to assign to funeral rites and beliefs priority over all others; also that the spirit notion is not a primitive one; that gods exist even among races in the lowest stage of civilization who are neither deified dead persons, nor natural objects; finally, but in this conclusion we must be cautious, that a predominating position often belongs to these gods. For all this, it seems indeed far to the hypothesis of primitive monotheism. We must acknowledge, however, that if one were forced to choose between this hypothesis and that of the funeral origin of the gods, it would undoubtedly be wise, in presence of the facts brought together by Mr. Lang, to take our stand with him. But we are not obliged to make the choice. And if we consider the probable structure of the thought of our remote ancestors, we shall interpret the existence of these gods who are not linked with any definite material object as the survival in a society of one of the vague and dreaded Powers haunt-

ing the consciousness of primitive man. Then we shall understand both the appearance of this Power as the oldest of the gods, and the veneration in which it is held, and the cult directed to supernatural beings of more recent formation, and whose functions are more precise and better defined; we shall understand, finally, the mission assigned to this oldest Power of guardian of the traditions of the tribe, both by right of seniority, and because its indeterminate character cuts it off in a way from physical nature, and makes it the natural organ of social and moral functions, which, too, are less easily represented. But if the conception which we have expressed of religion in its initial phases be exact, these Powers existed at first in indefinite numbers, and the fact that they were not duly counted, if it establishes the non-existence of an organized polytheism, does not indeed suffice to found belief in a primitive monotheism.

In the same way, it appears certain that if men at first got a representation of nature, and of the divine energies animating nature, as seems most likely, they must have tried in every way to gain a hold upon these energies. And to reduce all religious forms to the sacrifice of alliance as a common origin, is to proceed arbitrarily to an elimination of elements which are integral and essential parts of religion, which is a private as well as a public effort to propitiate the gods so as to constrain them, or to make them enter into the desired relationship. This conception of totem alliance, or of sacramentary union, presupposes, in fact, a comparatively advanced mental development, and if, almost with the first stammerings of the intelligence, as I have tried to show, and when man as yet could scarcely speak, the religious emotion arose in him, because of the very conditions in which he had to live, and with it the images which it naturally causes, we cannot really admit that for such a long period he made no attempt to bring these dreaded and mighty gods to help him in life, or to preserve himself at any rate from the perils which their anger or their contact alone could create. And yet that a rudi-

mentary and confused idea of an alliance with the gods should have existed at the very first is possible, even at a period of evolution, when, according to every probability, worship was almost exclusively magical. For in this domain, as in many others, all the essential elements of beliefs and customs which will be developed later and differentiated seem to have existed from the beginning, still intermingled, hard to distinguish, without clear or marked characteristics.

The great difficulty in such matters is precisely to make our thought, accurate and analytical as it is, conceive these confused ideas; to represent these states of consciousness, half feelings, half thoughts, these semi-instinctive tendencies towards acts whose end was felt rather than known; to realize the condition of man at that moment of his history, when, unable as yet to think God, to serve him, love him, fear him consciously, he merely *felt* him, full of a respectful terror; when, unable to aspire to even the coarsest ideal, he nevertheless revelled in contact with divine force, when he did not feel it hostile. But a constant effort must be made to surmount this obstacle; and to enter into this limbo of human history. And where we are deprived of the clear light of documentary evidence, we must recreate the mind of primitive man, naïve and complicated at the same time, multiple and confused, a child-like mind unable to speak the clear language of men, but which, haunted by the dangers and exigencies of daily life, heeding only what is of direct advantage, lets pass before it the wavering dreams projected by the ceaseless and unchanging flux of things.

“EUROPE IS NO MORE”

MARC DEBRIT, *Geneva.*



IN the September of what is still known as the “*année terrible*,” when M. Thiers made his famous journey to the European capitals in search of some one whom he might interest in the disasters of a France conquered in a war which she had been foolish enough to provoke, it is related that at Vienna he heard from “his friend M. de Beust”—every one was a friend of M. Thiers, even M. de Bismarck himself—this melancholy but resigned confession. “Europe is no more.” That would mean, the world has no longer a permanent Areopagus sufficiently disinterested to uphold in the quarrels of others the rôle of an impartial judge, who pronounces a decree without further appeal, and who is, at the same time, strong enough to have it carried out.

The old politician and historian who was the advocate of France at the time, was, it appeared, so struck with the expression that he repeated it. “Europe is no more,” he would say, sighing and lifting his arms toward Heaven with a gesture at once despairing and submissive. If there really were no longer a Europe, this was an excuse for his having been unable to find it, was almost a consolation for having failed in a mission, which at the time it was undertaken, was truly desperate. For—we need not disguise the fact—what he went to ask of England and of Russia in

behalf of their interest; of Austria in the name of her justifiable bitterness; of Italy in the name of a gratitude that was due for services rendered,—was to take part, uncompelled, in a quarrel which did not concern them; to stop a victorious army in its march, and to make of themselves knight-errants of the right as seen from a French standpoint, which is to make conquests and not to submit to them. Was it reasonable? Was it possible? And could the experienced man who undertook this desperate mission deceive himself as to the answers he would receive? But, good or bad, the excuse pleased him, and the world, who loves a simple explanation, with one voice repeated after him: “It is true! ‘Europe is no more.’”

All the great political writers of the time, those who wrote the leading articles in the daily papers of Paris and Vienna, and those who wrote long articles in the reviews, embroidered emulously upon this fruitful theme. And their numerous readers, accustomed to believing their least word, repeated after them, “Europe is no more.” And every one looked upon it as a great misfortune which had recently happened, as a grievous change that had come unexpectedly upon the world, and was the precursor of terrible calamities. No one entertained the idea, either at that time or later, of asking if there ever really had been a “Europe” in the sense that this had been meant by M. de Beust with the assent of his illustrious visitor, the historian of the campaigns of the First Empire, the apologist for the justifiableness of the war and the passionate defender of the conquests of Napoleon.

It is true that at this time, that is, at the time of the imperial epic, the great Captain who filled the world with his glory, Europe with kings in his style and of his family, and his palaces and his museums with objects taken from foreign lands, had before him a coalition of peoples and monarchs armed to defend from his insatiable ambition their countries, their independence, and their lands menaced with confiscation;—for the Napoleonic kings settled themselves without ceremony in the belongings of

those whose place they took. They thought nothing of exercising a judicial or sacerdotal function. They simply obeyed the instinct of self-preservation. They did not pose as champions of an eternal right; they contented themselves with protecting their interests to the utmost from those who knew only the right of genius and might. They rendered no judgments; they fought battle after battle. They did not strive for justice, but for personal defence.

And when the Empire was overturned, its enemies, that is, all Europe, met together at the Congress of Vienna, not to redress wrongs,—they did not dream of that,—but to restore the old edifice that was battered and broken by the tempests of twenty years. And what did they do in this royal symposium, which lives forever famous in the work it did not achieve? Lands and peoples were bought there and adjudged to those who had enough ability and power to make themselves heard. It was not a tribunal, but a market-place.

It was not a tribunal, for justice was not rendered. Consequently, this was not that Europe that M. de Beust regretted. Each one wanted his own lands again but without restoring in exchange for them lands that were wrongly acquired. The most chivalric of all was Emperor Alexander I. He felt some pity for France, and returned to her a part of her frontiers that the majority of his colleagues wished to take from her, and not without reason, since she had taken them from others, who wanted them again. Yet, even he did not carry his rôle as lover of justice to the end. He did not give up Poland, which he had received from his ancestress Catherine the Great; neither did he give up Finland, which he had taken from Sweden. And he, let us repeat, was the most disinterested of all.

We must, however, make one exception to this common rule of indifference, and we should indeed be ungrateful to forget it. The Swiss Confederation not only recovered her independence and was confirmed in her lasting neutrality, which was known and guar

anteed by all Europe and became one of the bases of the European equilibrium ; but she obtained further some rectifications of the frontiers necessary for her security and for her own profit, even the neutralization of a part of the old duchy of Savoy.

She owed it all, this especially, to the good-will of several powers, of which England, despite some hesitation, was with Russia the firmest in upholding her just demands.

Above all, she owes it to the skillful perseverance of certain of her delegates, who knew how to kindle in her favor sympathies that were prone to grow weary even before anything was done. It is for this great service that he rendered to his country that the name of Pictet de Rochemont has remained great and honored among those of all the citizens of Geneva.

* * *

You will permit me to dwell a little upon this Congress of Vienna, which was the first of the century, and which still remains to-day—and will remain for some time—the historical type of a great congress of men, assembled together to rectify frontiers and to restore the public good. All the European monarchies were represented there, not only by ministers of great renown, by Metternich, Talleyrand, Castlereagh and Hardenberg, but by a victorious general like Wellington, by emperors and by kings.

Never has there been so august an assembly, and never one which lasted so long a time ; which might perhaps explain why there was so little useful work accomplished. And we must acknowledge that the work was not easy, for it consisted in restoring Europe to order after the frightful confusion, of which, for twenty-six years, she had been the prey by reason of the Revolution, closely followed by the military empire of Napoleon, that marched from conquest to conquest ; juggling with crowns and looking upon the masses merely as vile cattle, over whom he might put kings of his own family to govern and lead at will to

the slaughter-house; treating these kings, moreover, as servants whom one scolds and dismisses when they are not intelligent or docile enough. No, the work that consisted in undoing all this in order to repair it after a better plan, was not exactly easy.

Many of the old traditions were lost, among others the respect of the nations for their rightful leaders, whom they had now seen in unfavorable positions. They had fallen into the habit of respecting nothing but strength, of believing in nothing but strength, and of confusing this with the justice whose place it had taken for so long a time that they had ceased to distinguish the one from the other. And these sovereigns themselves, when seated again upon their thrones, did not feel at ease there. They came back after having been conquered for a long time; they knew that people remembered this, and, in spite of themselves, they remembered it also. They had lost their confidence in that hereditary respect of the people which made the greatness and majesty of kings. After having seen so many fabrics fashioned by history crumble around them and beneath them, they hardly dared to build for the posterity of to-morrow.

The impression with all was one of surprise to find themselves back there, mingled with a great relief, but not without some disquietude for the future. Their terrible enemy was not dead, and they kept asking themselves all the time, if he was not going to reappear and begin his work of destruction again. And, indeed, they were still far from completing their tasks; these were hardly sketched out, before they had to flee from this newcomer, who made armies grow beneath his footsteps, and who, having hardly arrived in Paris with great strides from the island of Elba, reassumed his air of arrogance and his profession as conqueror. It was a vivid warning and a tragical interlude.

Up to that time, the men of Vienna, wholly given up to the joy of living, had somewhat neglected their useful work for the pleasures and fêtes from which, it must be admitted, they had been for a long time debarred; thus they were all the more

tempted to extravagance. "What did the Congress do then?" they asked. And the answer was, "It danced!" And it danced indeed. There was nothing but balls and festivities. When one reads the letters of that time, especially those of the beautiful ladies who were the ornaments of this grave European gathering it is merely a question of the polonaise and of "monfer-rines." And those who had had the honor of opening one of these fêtes with the Emperor Alexander, who was the handsomest man of his time, thought that it was impossible to have more joy or glory under the sun. Many of these ghosts of the old régime had some progress to make to accustom themselves to the liberal and brilliant existence with which they had lost touch. The English, especially, shut up so long on their island as in a fortress, assumed in their isolation, ways of living and of amusing themselves different from those of the continent, where, even in exile, they had continued to preserve the ways and customs of former times. They tell of a fête at Lord Castlereagh's where the seats were lacking, the refreshments also, and some poor violins were all the entertainment. But at the Hofburg of Vienna they kept up the custom of the court fêtes which had never ceased, even after Wagram, and every one, archdukes and archduchesses, feeling again the joy of living, were happy and proud to receive Europe and make her dance.

The Hundred Days put the violins to flight and the dancers also, but not for long. They came back after Waterloo, when the everlasting "Killjoy" was duly embarked upon the "Bellerophon" for a place of exile from which he was not to return.

This interlude of war had the advantage of sobering the Congress and of setting it at its duty. It was not a very easy duty, for it was a question of liquidating the Napoleonic empire, of rendering to each his due, and even a little more if it were a question of very great people, leaving, however, to the king of France whom they intended, although with little enthusiasm, to put upon his throne for the second time, sufficient means for making a

good appearance in the world, especially in the eyes of his own subjects. The French historians are, almost without exception, ungrateful in reproaching this Congress, which was almost exclusively composed of the victims of the empire, for its severity towards the nation who had so long divested them of their heritage.

In fact, all that was taken away from France was the countries she had conquered, nothing but what was very right. They even went so far, in a moment of almost unreasonable generosity, as to allow her to keep the works of art taken from the conquered nations, from Italy in particular, and which in mercenary value represented hundreds of millions, and a hundred fold more in artistic value. There can be seen in these trophies, statues from the Vatican, pictures from all the museums, the horses of St. Mark's, and thousands of the masterpieces of the highest art.

This restitution, more than was legitimate at the time, is still to-day considered in France as a terrible abuse of the power of might. It will, however, be difficult to admit that the right of conquest is a sacred right when it is exercised under the form of pillage among legitimate owners; and when it is practiced under the name of restitution it becomes injustice. But people have willingly two systems of right and two codes of morals: one for their profit, the other for the use of the stranger. And it does no good to argue, for you can never convince them.

To sum up, the Congress of Vienna has sanctioned many acts of injustice, some of which have disappeared more recently, while others still remain to be repaired; but it has also redressed some legitimate grievances and corrected some acts of violence that took place in the course of the recent wars; and for this we owe it our thanks, for the deed is rare, and we are allowed to state, that of all the people to whom it has shown the most indulgence, under circumstances that would warrant excess of rigor, the only one who has felt no gratitude and even cherished a bitter grudge against it, is the one, whom, everything considered and all com-

pensation made, it has spared the most. If it had extended its good-will towards Poland; if it had saved Venice; if it had freed Greece from Turkey; if, lastly, it had desired to busy itself about this eternally mutilated country that to-day is called Italy and which was then called Piedmont, Tuscany, Austria, Legations, States of the Church, and Kingdom of the Two Sicilies,—it would better have merited the indulgence and even the gratitude of history.

It is only fair to take into consideration what it has done and under what circumstances this was done. It had to rebuild Europe; it has rebuilt it. They might have remodeled it better, on a less antiquated plan, thus sparing the future several wars and some revolutions. But, after all, part of its work still remains, and its protocols are to-day, after eighty-five years have elapsed, the basis of European public right. Of all those assemblies whose deeds history has enrolled, for what one can you say so much?

This Congress, of which we have just been speaking rather at length, is the type of every congress, the European assembly par excellence. And, moreover, when one considers all that it did and all that it did not do, one finds nothing which recalls that justice-loving Europe, whose memory the minister of Francis Joseph recalled, and which, it is our humble opinion, has never existed, but in the imagination of the shrewd diplomat who found it expedient at the time to shelter his powerlessness or his resolution to do nothing behind the ghost of a recently dead or at least swooning Europe.

Is it, then, in her more recent assemblies where Europe is seated about her council board, or even under the form of a conversation by letters that she has practiced the duties of a judge, the righter of wrongs? At all events, it was not so at the Congress of Verona, convoked seven years after that of Vienna,—assembled on the 20th of November, 1822,—to complete the work of its predecessor in establishing the European order which was seri-

ously disturbed by the malignity of the people of the two Mediterranean peninsulas.

In Italy the people of Naples had rebelled against the dynasty that had been given them, that of the Bourbons of the Two Sicilies. Just as might be expected, she had immediately revived that system of government to which she was accustomed, a fine little system of absolute despotism, depending, on the one side, upon the army, the clergy, and the lazaroni, on the other, with an inquisition refined by civilization, for nipping in the bud the faintest show not merely of revolution nor even of rebellion, but simply for opposition to the will of the God-elected king. Never has there been seen a people more completely relieved than these of the burden of their own affairs. But, in spite of it all, the minds of these men were so poorly formed that they were neither grateful nor content, and it was often noticed that they showed little respect for their masters and were ungrateful to their benefactors who desired to relieve them from the trouble of living.

The pious king Charles-Felix, had not learned the art at Turin, either, of winning the hearts of his good people, recovered on his return from Sardinia, from whence he came back a trifle more despotic than he had been before he went there ; and that is saying much. He was one of those who never forgot anything, nor ever learnt anything.

Encouraged by their example, the Greeks took the great liberty of rebelling against the yoke of the Turks, who extorted money from them, pillaged them, and made them march sometimes to the blow of the knout, sometimes to the shots of a gun.

Finally in Spain, although the Catholic king on mounting the throne of his fathers had brought back with him all the tools of that olden monarchy, from the régime of the sabre to the holy inquisition, the Spaniards did not understand their good fortune in living under such just laws ; and, organizing themselves into a constitutional council, they disrespectfully seized upon the person

of the king, whom they handled rather as a puppet, to the great disparagement of the majesty of the throne, the public order, and the cause of good manners.

It was to remedy this deplorable state of affairs that the Powers, answering the appeal from France, who was happy to thus reassume her place in the European Areopagus, while giving pledges to the cause of universal peace, met at Verona on the 20th of November, 1822, with a most serious and pressing programme for the day. It was nothing less than a sort of royal and collective crusade against the liberalism that pops its head up everywhere, and under its every form, from insurrection to free thought.

And since for so great a task workers of the highest rank are necessary, all the élite of Europe were given a rendezvous in the old-time capitol of the valiant and terrible della Scala. It was the élite, in truth, at least from the social point of view, for two emperors figured in this august assembly, Alexander I. of Russia and Francis II. of Austria, the father-in-law, and, in spite of himself, the enemy of Napoleon; a king, Frederick William III. of Prussia, the conquered of Jena and one of the conquerors of Waterloo; and, a trifle inferior in their degree of dignity if not in glory, the élite of the diplomatists of Europe at that time. France was represented there by Montmorency, minister of foreign affairs, and by the most illustrious of her writers, Chateaubriand, anxious to leave his name written in the beautiful pages of French history as he had already written it, in the most illustrious way, on those of her literature.

He it was,—at least if you can believe the stories that he told of this Congress and the letters that he wrote from Verona to the ministers and to his friends,—he it was who led all this brilliant assembly. He was the inspiration of it, its father confessor, its magnificent orator, and he was the one who was always heard. This Spanish war, which he had come to preach to all assembled Europe, was not a common war; it was a holy war, destined to give back to France her rôle as moral directress of the world, to

prove to those who dared to suspect her that she had forever broken with the Revolution; but, above all, that it was his war. He had invented it, he had made it his business, his work. It was to immortalize his passage to the direction of the affairs of the world and to preserve from oblivion the name of Chateaubriand. Who would have dreamed that, after having written “Atala” and the “Génie du Christianisme,” one could still feel the need of searching for glory? But human pride has no limits, and that of Chateaubriand was insatiable. Alas! who remembers the Spanish war to-day and the part he took in it? It is well for the renown of this great mind that he had held another pen besides the pen of gold which signed the protocol of the Congress of Verona.

This war saved the Spanish monarchy for a time; but it did not give back to Spain her equilibrium, for that is lost forever; it did not reconcile the nation with royalty; it did not give what Charles V. looked for in vain, the harmony of liberty and internal peace, almost as compromised to-day as it was eighty years ago. She has not yet found what she needs and she seeks it all the time with that feverish and unrestrained ardor that she brings to everything she does.

To the restoration, pure and simple, of a politically deplorable régime, without either restraint or warranty of any sort, without a single germ of progress, without a thought of betterment for the future, was reduced the work of a Congress as impotent as memorable. They have curbed for a time the effects of a too legitimate discontent, they have not abolished its causes; and so they have left the door open for revolutions. Such is the work of the Congress of Verona.

That is what Europe did, the Europe of that time, the time when they still firmly believed the dogma of 1815, that there was a Europe, when there was simply one great conquered Empire, the victorious military Empire, the usurper of the patrimonies of others, and a great house divided against itself, all of whose

tenants, with gracious compliments and stately bows, sought to deceive each other and keep up the game to the end. As for considering lawful aspirations at Vienna any more than at Verona, Europe never dreamed of any such thing. It was because she was incapable of such things. And truly there is not much to regret because Europe no longer exists. And to finish with the assembly of Verona, let me add that in this Congress of magistrates, whom one might suppose to be disinterested, several small transactions were carried on, under the table, as it were, which have left their traces in history.

Russia had her recent annexations in Poland confirmed, and Austria obtained the same satisfaction for Venice, that poor widow in mourning upon the Lido, for whom so many poets have wept from Byron to Alfred de Musset. And we are not told that Chateaubriand objected. He was in too much haste to carry on war in Spain. Lastly, Prussia made known her rights to the recently annexed province of Posen.

This honest traffic of mutual concessions at the cost of the good of others was the most important and most lasting work of the Congress of Verona.

* * *

Where, then, shall we seek for this ideal Europe of which they tell us and which we have not yet been able to find? Is it at the Congress of Paris, in 1856, where on the morrow of the Crimean war they heard, without saying a word, the Count de Cavour proclaim the rights of Italy to that political unity that she was later to win, first by the sword of France, whose assistance she had to purchase by the cession of Nice and Savoy, the cradle of the kings of Italy, and finally to achieve alone, despite the hesitations and even the resistance of this vacillating ally?

There, at least, was a word of emancipation uttered, and Europe, astonished, hardly able to believe her ears, heard the right of a people proclaimed to go forth from bondage and live,

that is, unite its scattered members into one nation. But if Europe heard this assertion of a new right, it was in spite of herself, and it certainly was not with any idea of consenting to it.

That happened in France, with a sovereign whose power and political skill was then exaggerated; and if one did not protest too loudly it was in order not to become embroiled oneself with the master of the house. But it can be affirmed, without fear of mistake, that at that time Europe showed herself unruly and discontented.

* * *

We must pass over several years before we find Europe again assembled in a Congress busying herself about her affairs, otherwise called regulating the great questions of universal politics. It was at Berlin, in 1878, soon after the Turko-Russian war, which came so near having a great historical event for its finish, the end of the Turkish dominion in Europe. But it was not to authorize this act needful for good policy; on the contrary, it was to succor the accused, that the Congress, under the influence of a newcomer, who was called Prince Bismarck, spent its time and strength.

For the rest, it was one long mystification from beginning to end, and every notion of right was set at variance there.

The official programme of the Congress was the revision of the treaty of San Stephano imposed upon Turkey, whom it expelled from Europe, leaving her no more than the foothold of Constantinople; but the Congress had no sooner opened than it was discovered that secret steps had been taken between some of the judges and the accused party. Bismarck, filling the rôle which he enjoyed especially, that of the honest courtier, had arranged everything in a way to show himself as disagreeable as he could possibly hope to be towards his great colleague and predecessor, Prince Gortschakoff, who was later to avenge himself by doing him an ill turn with the Czar.

Suddenly they learned that England, who had then her Bismarck in Lord Beaconsfield, had treated in the dark with the Sultan for the cession of the island of Cyprus. And it can be understood how this unforeseen discovery would displease Russia, whose overrunning enthusiasm had been curbed by calling upon all Europe to place its signature below a second carefully criticized and corrected edition of the treaty of San Stephano. There remains very little, if anything, of this panic treaty; for Austria, whom the German minister pushed by the shoulders in the matter of the Turkish East in order to keep her away as far as Germany, obtained for her part the honorable and lucrative privilege of undertaking the education of Bosnia and Herzegovina. She proved, moreover, that on this occasion, Europe had not misplaced her confidence, and that she understands better how to direct the affairs of others than to push on her own.

In return, others were very ill treated and could estimate on this occasion the height of ingratitude that the conscience of a sovereign, frustrated in his designs, can rise to. As a price for the loyal aid that she had given Russia on the battle-fields of Roumelia, and especially before Plevna, where her troops had conducted themselves admirably, it was first proposed to, and later forced upon, Roumania, to exchange the rich and fertile Bessarabia for the unhealthy desert of Dobrujda, inhabited at the time by Crimean Tartars, encamped with their troops in huts of mud, and by web-footed birds peopling in immense multitudes the ponds where fever lurks. This was the price of the blood poured out by the Roumanians in the service of the most generous and liberal of czars, since it was he who accomplished the great work of the emancipation of the serfs.

But emperors hold themselves no more bound than Europe to do justice to their rivals. The "*raison d'état*" exempts them from this, and even forbids it, when, to recompense a service rendered it is necessary to make a sacrifice which would diminish the strength of the nation or the prestige of its sovereign. Thus,

Roumania payed double to Russia the price of her campaign against Turkey, first by the blood of her soldiers, then by the exchange of her most beautiful province for a valueless territory. Yes, it was indeed a Congress of dupes.

The only good deed that was done there, the obligation imposed upon the Sultan to treat his Armenian subjects better, was the near cause of the greatest scandal of which our generation has been the astonished and indignant witness, and one of the greatest crimes that history has ever known.

Was it not yesterday, after the Armenian massacre, on the eve of the Turko-Grecian war, followed by the apparition of the Cretan question that we saw no longer a Congress of diplomatists, but a Congress of ships, flying the flags of the six greatest military powers of the world, displaying their chronic impotence for months, by their passive, immovable presence, apparently indifferent to the continuation of what might well be called an insult to right, a defiance to the civilized world and a crime of *lèse-humanité*?

A cannon ball shot upon the Yildiz-Kiosk, which sheltered the trembling and ferocious author of this tragedy, would have sufficed to end it all. But, being as clever and well-instructed as fanatical, he knew well enough that he had nothing to fear and that this cannon shot would never be fired, because the masters of this navy were not judges, but rivals who watched one another with defiant eyes, and who would see every crime in the catalogue committed rather than fire a shot which would set on fire the four corners of Europe.

All that one could do after the Turko-Grecian war which burst forth in the meantime, showing the most incredulous what Europe really was, and that he who braved her thus knew her the best, was to give a nearly independent government to Crete, destined to lead, sooner or later, to her annexation to the kingdom of Greece. And when she had done that, thinking she had done enough for her glory and wearying a little also of playing a rôle

as ridiculous as it was odious, Europe, satisfied at having escaped a danger which she feared above everything, that of having a will employed in the service of a righteous indignation, went away as she had come, leaving with the Turks, astonished and proud of their success, the memory of a demonstration as imposing as it was ridiculous.

* * *

The declaration of war between the United States and Spain for the conquest—they called it the deliverance—of Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines was the logical consequence of this publicly demonstrated impotence. And one could add that the war which rages to-day in South Africa between England and the Dutch Republics is also a consequence of this too certain fact, that no longer does anything protect the rights of the feeble from the lusts of the strong, because Europe, the protectress, exists no longer; because Europe, the lover of justice, is a myth.

He who possesses strength and dares to make use of it has a free field,—he can do whatever he chooses. No one dreams of hindering him from going to all the extremes of his covetousness and his will. They will content themselves,—and it is one insult the more done to this political morality which they persist in invoking without ever practicing it,—they will be content to profit by the troubles of others to further their own affairs. And that is all the morality of the history of our times.

Let us say, if you so will, that it is the morality of all times, of those times that are called barbarous as well as of those that we call civilized; and do not let us regret that there has never been any other, for the best warranty that the feeble possess to-day is that there does not exist a code of international laws, nor a bench of sword-bearing judges, and above all that there is not a cosmopolitan police charged with applying them. For there would be a thousand chances to one that this code of the nations would be made by the strong for their own profit, that is, against

the weak. And there would no longer remain for them even the poor resource of cursing the indifference of those who left them to be slaughtered without saying a word, and above all without interfering. For all this would then take place as a perfectly legitimate penalty inflicted upon those who stood in need of correction, and who had been brought by their conquerors themselves to that deplorable condition in which they were helpless before outrage, humiliation, and spoliation.

It is because of this that many of the wiser minds who are a hundred times more liberal and more the friends of peace than those who assume to be its knights and pontiffs, see, not without some disquietude, the generous initiative taken last year by one of the greatest sovereigns of our time to codify the rules of the rights of the people and to assure the maintenance of peace by placing it under the safeguard of Europe; of Europe,—and let us be clear on this point,—that is, the five or six Powers, who, possessing an army and a navy, wield such power in the world that there is no other rule of justice on this earth than their will. The very little latitude left to the liberty of others exists only when these directing Powers are divided among themselves. Should they be in accord, their will is law. That represents in our century the fatality of the ancient and blind destiny.

Then, there would be no air left to breathe in the world, then, would they speak to us in the name of Europe, of that Europe over which the two augurs wept together, M. Thiers and his friend the Count de Beust, whom we mentioned in the beginning of this article, dupes perhaps—who knows?—of their own comedy.

It has certainly been noticed with what prudence the plenipotentiaries of the Hague eluded all engagements which might limit the means of action of those whom they represented. The conference terminated without producing anything but Platonic sentimentalities and theoretic declarations which bind no one. They even forgot that they had been assembled for the special end of considering methods for proceeding to the disarmament of

Europe. For it may certainly be taken for granted that those who refused to sign the protocol will not sacrifice a cannon nor a man-of-war nor a soldier.

They made beautiful theoretical declarations, that is, declarations without any useful outcome. As to practicing what was preached, she will remain as she is, that is, as she always has been. And to-day as to-morrow, to-morrow as to-day, the artists, when they want to represent on canvas or in marble this august allegory that is called "Europe," they will continue to place in her hand the sword, emblematic of strength and violence, and not the scales, which might confuse her with the Eternal Justice whom she does not resemble. The scales, besides, would be still more menacing than the sword, for the rights of the feeble would run the risk of being weighed with false weights. The justice of the masters of the world has always borne a close resemblance to the scales of Brennus.

If Europe exists no longer, it is because there never was a Europe,—at least in the sense understood by the Austrian minister and his French friend. And if one judges by the experiments which have taken place under our eyes and in our time, it is preferable that it should be thus, and that no one, not even an Areopagus of five or six heads, should wield in their hands the right of judging and the right of punishing. For it would be then truly that the law of strength and number would overcome everything, and there would be no more security for any one.

Better the Europe of to-day with her faults corrected only by the salutary fear that these all-powerful nations have of each other than that Europe, perfected and fashioned into a tribunal without appeal, that they propose for our administration, the Europe which does not exist, which never has existed and which, if unhappily she should ever chance to issue forth, armed in full panoply, from some congress assembled under the ensign of peace,—would prove the most insupportable tyranny that the world has ever known.

Yes, better that history should continue to be made as it has been so far, from the free rivalry of the passions and interests of the entire human race, and no pretence about it, than to be delivered over to the direction and perhaps to the lusts of self-styled impartial judges who would themselves be only actors disguised and actors in no way without a personal interest in the drama that they played.

The greater powers would win much there, but the small and the feeble would be left without defence against the gross appetites hidden under the terribly dangerous form of an international police that is both judge and suitor in its own cause. And all that is well summed up in the old proverb of ancient wisdom ! *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes ?* Who then will guard the guardians, themselves ?

The small nations, whose desire is to remain free, would do well, if they are wise, to distrust these great scenic shows of philanthropy, which presage nothing good for them.



THE PREDOMINANT ISSUE

W. G. SUMNER, *Yale University.*



EACH of the two great parties in the present campaign is trying to force on the other a "predominant issue" to which the other will not agree. The predominant issue, not for a campaign or a year, is expansion and all that goes with it. It will not be settled by speeches or votes. It will have to work itself out in history. The political history of the United States for the next fifty years will date from the Spanish war of 1898. The attempt to absorb into the body politic of the United States communities of entirely foreign antecedents, nationality, religion, language, *mores*, political education, institutions,—in short, of a different culture and social education from ours, must be regarded as a far more serious venture than it is now popularly supposed to be. Out of it will arise one question after another, and they will be of a kind to produce political convulsions amongst us. The predominant issue, in a far wider sense than the wranglings of a presidential campaign, is how to let go of what we seized. No discussion such as occurs in a campaign ever clears up an issue; for one reason, because the discussion is carried on, not to get at the truth or wisdom of the case, but to win a party victory. It is an interesting study to notice how such a discussion results in set phrases and stereotyped assertions which bar the way to any real understanding of the issue. Let it be our object now to try

to define the issue under expansion, imperialism, and militarism, which stands before the American people as the chief political interest of the immediate future.

There are few of us who have not heard it said, after the failure of a mercantile or manufacturing firm, that the cause of failure was that they had "spread out too much." The story is generally one of success within a field of effort, then of enthusiasm and ambition overmastering prudence and moderation, then of excessive burdens and failure. On the other hand, we are familiar enough with cases in which business enterprise and courage sustain enormous growth and expansion. It appears, therefore, that expansion, as such, is neither good nor bad. The question is one of conditions, circumstances, powers. It is a question of policy which must be decided by wisdom and prudence. It follows that it is never a question which can be settled by precedent. Every new case of expansion has its own circumstances. Enthusiasm would have no place in the plan, if it was to win the confidence of bankers and investors. Impatience of prudent foresight, and irritation at demands to see the grounds for expecting success, would not recommend the project to wise business men. Mere megalomania,—a desire to get a big thing to brag about,—would not be regarded as a good basis for the enterprise.

At least two of our large cities have recently expanded their boundaries. A leading newspaper of Chicago has explained the financial distress of that city by the extent to which it has included unimproved suburbs.¹ The people of greater New York seem to have many doubts whether their expansion was wise and prudent.² No doubt both cities were chiefly influenced by megalomania, although it may very probably appear, after twenty-five years, in the case of New York, that it was well to secure

(1) *Chicago Tribune* in the *New York Times*, Sept. 4, 1900.

(2) Comptroller's statements and newspaper comments thereon about Sept. 22, 1900.

the consolidation before greater difficulties accumulated in the way of it, and that the ultimate interest of all concerned was really served by it.

If it is proposed to a railroad company to buy or lease another line, shall they not look to see whether it will be a burden or an advantage? To buy a lawsuit is not always an act of folly. John Jacob Astor did it with great profit, but he took care to get the best information and legal advice which could be obtained before he did it.

Expansion, therefore, is not a disease, of which it can be said that it is always a calamity; nor is it a growth of which it can be said that it is always an advantage. How can it be doubted that territorial expansion for a state presents the same kind of a problem, with similar danger of delusions, fallacies, and pitfalls of vanity? Expansion may lower national vitality and hasten decay.

Any state or nation has life-necessities to meet as time goes on. It was a life-necessity of the German nation fifty years ago to form a unified state. The same was true of Italy. The cost was great, but it had to be met. The alternative was stagnation and decay. The Russians say that it is a life-necessity for them to get better access to the sea, but the case is by no means so clear. Probably the real philosophy of the American Revolution is that it was a life-necessity of the Anglo-American colonies to become independent. It mattered little, therefore, that the alleged reasons for the revolt, in history, law, and political philosophy, will not bear examination.

This doctrine of life-necessity is dangerous. Unless it be handled with great caution and conscientiousness, and be checked by a close and positive adherence to facts, it may easily degenerate into the old "reason of state," and furnish an excuse for any political crime. It is a grand thing to soar over epochs and periods of history, deducing political generalizations and sweeping "laws of history," but it is futile and to be condemned, unless

it is done upon a basis of mature scholarship and with great reserve and care. Such deductions deserve no attention unless they are restricted to simple phenomena and are above all suspicion of party interest.

The acquisition of Louisiana by the United States was a clear and simple case of life-necessity. If Spain claimed that, as possessor of New Orleans, she might of right close the Mississippi River, it was a life-necessity of the people of the United States to take New Orleans from her by purchase or war. Her views of public law and international rights and colonies then brought her into collision with us. The purchase of the whole western half of the valley was never contemplated by anybody here. It was proposed by France. If the purchase was wise, it was because the city could not be obtained otherwise, and we have a case which establishes the doctrine of "meeting the consequences" at the same time that it limits and defines it. The arguments of the Federalists against the purchase were all good (so far as they were not partisan), at that time, but the railroad and the telegraph took away all their force afterwards. Neither party could foresee the railroads or telegraphs. The purchase of Louisiana entailed the question of extending slavery, but the statesmen of 1803, doing what our interests then required, could properly leave the consequences to be met when they arose, and they are not to be blamed if those consequences were unwisely met when they came.

The acquisition of Florida was not in obedience to a state-necessity so clear and great as the acquisition of New Orleans, but Florida was geographically a part of our territory and Spain discharged her international duties with respect to it so badly that our relations with her were always bad. There was a great interest to acquire Florida, if it could be done by peaceful purchase.

The acquisition of Texas and California was a very different matter. The two cases are generally conjoined, but they were

very different and the whole story is one of those which a nation ignores in its own annals while vigorously denouncing similar episodes in the history of other States. The current argument now to justify what was then done is to point to Texas and the other states, to the harbor of San Francisco, the gold mines, and the Pacific Railroad, and to say that we should have had none of these but for what was done in 1848. This is as if a man who had stolen a fortune fifty years ago should justify himself by saying that he would not otherwise have had the land, houses, ships, stocks, etc., which he has had and enjoyed. Public and private property are not to be put on the same plane, and this comparison is only good for the particular point for which it is adduced, namely, that the pleasure and profit obtained from spoliation never can justify it. Nevertheless, there is some force in the doctrine of "manifest destiny." Manifest destiny is far more sound than the empty and silly talk of the last two years about "Destiny." Manifest destiny includes a rational judgment about the relations which now exist compared with those which will probably arise in the future. "Destiny" has nothing rational in it. To invoke it in public affairs is a refusal to think, or to be governed by reason. Destiny is a name for the connection which unites the series of consequences upon an act like the war with Spain, and it is invoked to prevent us from going back to see whether the consequences do not prove that that act was wrong and foolish.

There was room to argue, in 1845, that it was the plain course of the future that the United States should occupy and develop California. It was contiguous territory. It lay between the United States and the Pacific and contained the best harbor on the coast. It was in hands which were not developing it. It was almost uninhabited, so that the subjugation of dissatisfied people, although not entirely absent, was not an important fact. The claim of a group of people to hold a part of the earth's surface is never absolute. Every group holds its territory by force, and holds it subject to the obligation to exploit it and make i

contributory to the welfare of mankind. If it does not do this it will probably lose the territory by the conquest of a more energetic people. This is manifest destiny. It is another dangerous doctrine, if it is used without a candid heed to its limitations. It has been abused twice recently :—first, an absolute right to territory has been set up on behalf of the Boers, who really challenged the English as to the manifest destiny of South Africa ; second, in our own relations with Spain we have heard arguments that, if one state thinks that another is not making good use of its territory, the former may dispossess the latter. In so far, then, as state-necessity in the weaker form of manifest destiny may be judged to apply to California that case of expansion could be justified.

If now we turn to our recent expansion and apply the doctrine of state-necessity to it, there might be some argument in favor of the acquisition of Cuba. It is contiguous to our territory and there is a slight but unimportant military advantage in owning it. No necessity for owning it was ever experienced ; that is to say, no conviction that we needed it was ever forced upon us by experience of loss, disadvantage, injury, or incapacity of any kind, from not possessing it, as in the case of the Mississippi River. The American people were indifferent to it up to 1898. We had no grievance against Spain. No folly or wrong which she had committed had reached us, as in the case of Florida. Yet it was with reference to Cuba that we went to war with her, and we have bound ourselves to make Cuba independent ; that is, to put her out of our jurisdiction, and sacrifice any interest which we have in possessing the island. It is as safe as any political prediction can be that we shall never again give up the jurisdiction over Cuba. Our national vanity is at stake in it now, and there is some rational ground for holding it.

As to Porto Rico and the Philippines the great ground for dissent from what has been done is that action did not proceed from any rational motive connected with the growth and ramifications of

the interests of the American people. The action was gratuitous and adventurous. While it was not called for by any care for our interests it involved us in risks and obligations. A new doctrine of constructive obligation has been invented which is false and dangerous. A prominent newspaper recently argued that we are bound to protect the Chinese Christian converts because we allowed missionaries to be sent to China under our protection. This is but a specimen of the way in which false dogmas grow when statesmen begin to act from motives which are entirely foreign to statecraft. The arguments in favor of expansion all have the character of after-thoughts invented to excuse or defend acts which were resolved upon for other reasons. At the present moment perhaps not a single voter wants the United States to acquire a part of China. Why not? If any one was asked, he would probably say that it is out of our way, that it would involve us in trouble, that it is not necessary for our interests, that it would be foolish, since it would show a lack of judgment as to when a thing is wise and when it is not. If any voter had been asked on January 1, 1898, whether he desired that the United States should acquire the Philippine Islands, would he not have made the same reply, with impatient scorn that any one should bother him with such a senseless proposition? How did the battle of Manila Bay alter any factor which entered into the wisdom of acquiring the Philippines as a question of rational statesmanship? If that battle had never taken place, and the Philippine islanders had continued their revolution until they drove out the Spaniards, what would Americans have cared what government they set up, or how they got along with it? Why should we care now, even if a naval battle between us and the Spaniards did take place in Manila Bay? No one is so foolish as to really believe in these constructive obligations, if there were no other elements in the case, but the national vanity is now enlisted, and vanity leads nations into folly just as it does individuals.

Upon a positive analysis, therefore, the case of recent expansion is shown to be different from all the earlier cases which are cited to justify it precisely in the most essential fact, the interest of the American people as the efficient motive.

All expansion includes the question whether we shall treat the inhabitants of new possessions as we treat each other, or on some inferior footing ; whether we shall govern them by our will or let them share in governing themselves and us. This dilemma is insoluble, under our system of government. We shall struggle with it through the next generation, and it will force a change in our system of government. This is why the present expansion, taking in elements which are foreign and uncongenial, is no parallel to cases of expansion into uninhabited territory. The inhabitants of the new possessions have interests, ideas, tastes, wills, and unless we kill them all, their human traits will enter into the problem. If we take them into full fellowship, imagine what the "Spanish Gang" will be and do in Congress within twenty years ! It would be madness to put our interests into such jeopardy, and it would be fatal to the political system under which we have lived to take that course. The other branch of the dilemma is imperialism and it is no less fatal to our political system.

Specifically, it is imperialism for the Congress of the United States to rule any people who are outside of the United States, and not under the guarantees of the Constitution of the United States. Congress owes its existence to the Constitution which defines the rights and duties of Congress. Congress has no existence or authority outside of the sway and the restrictions of the political system to which that document gives order, nor outside of the commonwealth of which that document prescribes the structure and functions. The answer which is made to this statement is that the United States is a sovereign state, like any other state, and with all the powers which any state of the first rank has. That is imperialism, for it disregards the historical

and legal facts about the Constitution of the United States, and the novel and unique political system created under it, in order to go off and find a basis of interpretation for the American Federal Commonwealth in the precedents and analogies of the Roman Empire and the modern European military monarchies. Here is an issue which is sharp enough. Here is something which may properly be called "Americanism"; namely, the novel and unique political system under which we have lived and loyalty to the same, and the issue is nothing less than whether to go on and maintain it or to discard it for the European military and monarchical tradition. It must be a complete transformation of the former to try to carry on under it two groups of political societies, one on a higher, the other on a lower plane, unequal in rights and powers; the former, in their confederated capacity, ruling the latter, perhaps by military force.

Then again, imperialism is a philosophy. It is the way of looking at things which is congenial to people who are ruling others without constitutional restraints, and it is the temper in which they act. History offers plenty of examples of it and the most striking ones are furnished by democracies and republics. The Greek cities with their colonies and dependent allies, the Roman republic, the Italian city republics, showed what tyranny one commonwealth is capable of when it rules another. We showed it ourselves in the reconstruction period. You cannot get a governing state to listen, think, repent, confess, and reform. It is more vain than a despot. Is it not a "free" government? Can "we" be tyrants or do any wrong? Already we have had ample manifestations of this temper amongst ourselves. We have juggled away so much of our sacred political dogmas as troubles us, although we cling to such as we can still make use of. We fret and chafe now at the "Constitution," of which, two years ago, we made a fetish. We fly into a rage at anybody who dissents and call him "rebel" and "traitor," as strikers shout "scab" at any one who chooses to hold an opinion of his own. It

is one of the worst symptoms of change that the American sense of humor, which has, in the past, done such good service in suppressing political asininity, now makes default. If it was still efficient we should not hear of "traitors" who choose to vote no, or of "rebels" who never owed allegiance, or of the doctrine that those who oppose a war are responsible for the lives lost in it, or that a citizen may criticise any action of his government except a war. The evil of imperialism is in its reaction on our own national character and institutions, on our political ideas and creed, on our way of managing our public affairs, on our temper in political discussion.

Imperialism is one way of dealing with the problem forced upon us by expansion to embrace uncongenial groups of people. Militarism is a method of carrying out that policy. McKinley will not wear a crown, and Congress will not introduce universal military service, next winter. Derision of such fears is cheap, since nobody entertains them. In this world it is the little beginnings which tell; it is the first steps at the parting of the ways which are decisive. Militarism is a system. It may go with a small armament, or be absent with a large one, as in England. It is militarism when a European king always wears a military uniform. It represents an idea. The predominant idea in the state is (perhaps necessarily) its military strength, and the king, as the representative of the state, keeps this ever before himself and others. This is a way of looking at state affairs, and it colors everything else. Therefore it is militarism when military officers despise civilians and call them "pekins," lawyers, grocers, philistines, etc.; when they never go about without sabres by their sides; when they push civilians off the sidewalk and cut their heads open with the sabre if they remonstrate. It is militarism when railroads are built as military strategy requires; not as trade requires. Militarism and industrialism are two standpoints which are widely separated, from which the modern state has two very different aspects, and from which almost

every question of policy will have two different presumptions to start with. Under militarism the foremost question is: Will it increase our power to fight? Under industrialism it is: Will it increase the comfort of our people? Of every new invention militarism asks: How can it be rendered useful for military purposes? Industrialism asks: How will it increase our power over nature to supply our needs? Militarism is also a philosophy and temper which is accordant with imperialism. It consists in aggression and domination instead of conciliation and concession. It is militarism to "jam things through" without consideration for the feelings and interests of other people, except so far as they can strike back, whether it is done in a legislature or on the field of battle. Militarism is pugnacity, preference for fighting methods, faith in violence, strenuosity, ruthlessness, cynical selfishness as far as one dare indulge it. It is entirely opposed to the American temper which has been developed by industrialism, and which does not believe in fighting methods, although it recognizes the fact that men must fight sometimes, and that when the occasion comes they ought to fight with all their might. Militarism means one law for ourselves and another for everybody else; the great dogmas of the Declaration of Independence were good when we wanted to be independent of somebody else; they have no validity when somebody else wants to be independent of us. Aguinaldo was a patriot when he was fighting Spain; he is a rebel when he is fighting us. Militarism is the neglect of rational motives and interests and the surrender of one's mind and will to whimsical points of vanity and anger.

We have advanced far on this road when we propose to sit in judgment on the fitness of other people for self-government. What are the criteria of this fitness? Who knows whether we possess it ourselves? Any nation possesses it only more or less. The legislature of New York apparently does not think that the city of New York possesses it. In the period 1783 to 1789 many contemporary observers saw good reason to doubt whether

the United States of North America possessed it, and even distinguished fathers of the republic have left on record their own misgivings about it. Thirty years ago we gave the suffrage to newly emancipated negro slaves, and gave them not only self-government but the political control of the states in which they lived. It was the gravest political heresy of that period to doubt if they were "fit for self-government," and no question of that sort was ever formulated in public discussion. There is something ludicrous in the attitude of one community standing over another to see whether the latter is "fit for self-government." Is lynching, or race-rioting, or negro-burning, or a row in the legislature, or a strike with paralyzed industry, or a disputed election, or a legislative deadlock, or the murder of a claimant-official, or counting-in unelected officers, or factiousness, or financial corruption and jobbery, proof of unfitness for self-government? If so, any state which was stronger than we might take away our self-government on the ground that we were unfit for it. It is, therefore, simply a question of *power*, like all the other alleged grounds of interference of one political body with another, such as humanity, sympathy, neighborhood, internal anarchy, etc., etc. We talk as if we were going to adjudicate the fitness of another body politic for self-government, as a free, open, and categorical question, when to decide it one way means that we shall surrender *power*, and when not even flagrant civil war could really be held to prove unfitness.

It does not improve the matter any to speak of a "stable government." A leading newspaper recently said that the thing to do is to establish "what may properly be regarded *by us* rather than Cuba as a stable government." This is the attitude of imperialism and militarism, and the issue involved between those of us who approve of it and those who do not is whether the American people ought, in their own interest, to engage in this kind of an enterprise with respect to anybody. All governments perish. None, therefore, are stable beyond more or less. What

degree of duration suffices? There is no issue which is capable of adjudication. There is no political issue between the parties in respect to their policy. Both use the same phrase. Mr. Bryan would be as slow to wound the national vanity as Mr. McKinley. The patronage and power in the dependencies are as dear to his followers as to Mr. McKinley's.

There is an issue, however, and the chief difficulty connected with it is that it is too deep and philosophical for easy popular discussion. It is nothing less than the standpoint, the philosophy, and the temper of our political system; that is to say, it is the integrity of our political system. Every step we take brings up new experiences which warn us that we are on a wrong path. The irritation and impatience of the expansionists testify to their own uneasiness at what we are doing. It is not to be expected that any appeal to reason can guide the course of events. Experience of trouble, war, expense, corruption, quarrels, scandals, etc., etc., may produce weariness and anger and determine action. The issue will, therefore, press upon us for years to come.

The expansionists ask what we think ought to be done. It is they who are in power, and have our fate in their hands, and it belongs to them to say what shall be done. This they have not done. They are contented with optimistic platitudes which carry no responsibility, and can be dropped to-morrow as easily as "criminal aggression" and our "plain duty." It is unquestionably true that there is no fighting against the accomplished fact, although it is rare audacity to taunt the victims of misgovernment with their own powerlessness against it, as if that was an excuse for it. We were told that we needed Hawaii in order to secure California. What shall we now take in order to secure the Philippines? No wonder that some expansionists do not want to "scuttle out of China." We shall need to take China, Japan, and the East Indies (according to the doctrine) in order to "secure" what we have. Of course, this means that, on the doctrine, we must

take the whole earth in order to be safe on any part of it, and the fallacy stands exposed. If, then, safety and prosperity do not lie in this direction, the place to look for them is in the other direction; in domestic development, peace, industry, free trade with everybody, low taxes, industrial power. We ought not only to grant independence to these communities, which are both geographically and socially outside of us, but we ought to force it upon them as soon as a reasonable time has been granted to them to organize such a political system as suits them. After that, they should go on their own way on their own responsibility, and we should turn our attention to our own interests, and the development of our own country, on those lines of political policy which our traditions set for us, and of which our experience has been so satisfactory.



RUSKIN, ART AND TRUTH¹

JOHN LA FARGE, *New York.*



IN putting together the following statements concerning the artist's relation to nature, I have merely changed somewhat some pages of things written long ago, and time, though it has diminished their interest to me, has not brought me to different conclusions. This remark I make because of the introduction of Mr. Ruskin's name,—and of a quotation from him which in reality was the cause or beginning of some of these statements of mine. The close of the career of Mr. Ruskin has naturally brought up his name and the story of his influence on English speaking people. Hence perhaps a relative timeliness in these remarks of mine. They expressed years ago not only the sentiment of the minority of the people who wrote or might write, but of the majority of the people who painted, at least of the majority of those whose works are of any probable enduring value. Over a quarter of a century ago, I had been asked to give some lectures at Harvard College, which was a place naturally given over to a respect for Mr. Ruskin. It was but natural, then, to refer to him as a person of such importance as he never can be again. Those of us of that day magnified him too much, either in praise or blame, nor did we recognize sufficiently the mere artist in words. I was also then more moved than I should be to-day,—

(1) W. C. Brownell in *Scribner's*, April, 1900. Russell Sturgis in same. De la Sizeranne, *Ruskin*. Milsand, *Ruskin l'esthetique Anglaise*, 1861.

an older and more tried man,—and I felt indignations which cannot again recur. The repairing and beautification of ancient monuments, for instance, by architects of scientific pretensions and others, banded us, many together against them;—while to-day the whitewashing of Michael Angelo's frescoes, or the repairing of Giotto's lines, (which my own eyes have seen done) would seem to me but the misfortune of natural evolution and the destiny of works of art under the hands of the teacher and the professional curator.

The young man educated and interested in the respect of his art of painting, and jealous of sincerity in its study of nature, in its use of means,—naturally feels,—and we so felt,—a belief in the artists in other modes. He takes it for granted that the workers in words which represent ideas,—and consequently visions more or less accurate of universal truth,—will have the same respect for these manners of expression that he has himself for his own tools. He also attributes to them a sincerity without which he feels that his own work would be fraudulent, and he sees very clearly that in his own art, which must have laws in common with others, that a seeking for effect by wrong use of his tools may be a success with a momentary public, but cannot go with his own self-respect and his love of truth. At some such moment, he might open a volume of Mr. Ruskin as I did—the volume of his lectures on art, delivered before the University of Oxford, in 1870—and opening on the last page, notice a condensed statement of what Mr. Ruskin's "scholarship" proposed to do to help art out. This is what the artist would read:—

"In closing this first course of lectures, I have one word more to say respecting the possible consequence of the introduction of art among the studies of the University. What art may do for scholarship, I have no right to conjecture; but what scholarship may do for art, I may in all modesty tell you. Hitherto, great artists, though always gentlemen, have yet been too exclusively craftsmen. Art has been less thoughtful than we supposed; it has taught much, but much, also, falsely. Many of the greatest pictures

are enigmas ; others, beautiful toys ; others, harmful and corrupting toys. In the loveliest there is something weak ; in the greatest there is something guilty. And this, gentlemen, if you will, is the new thing that may come to pass,—that the scholars of England may resolve to teach also with the power of the arts ; and that some among you may so learn and use them, that pictures may be painted which shall not be enigmas any more, but open teachings of what can not otherwise be so well shown ; which shall not be fevered or broken visions any more, but shall be filled with the indwelling light of self-possessed imagination ; which shall not be stained or enfeebled any more by evil passions, but glorious with the strength and chastity of noble human love ; and which shall no more degrade or disguise the work of God in heaven, but testify of Him as here dwelling with men, and walking with them, not angry, in the garden of the earth.”

Now most artists could not but feel a certain tenderness towards any man—towards the sinner even, and especially the sinner, (the man in the wrong, the man who has missed it)—when he invokes in his behalf the Greatest of all Names, as Mr. Ruskin does in this concluding paragraph. And I believe that for many of us this wearing of a symbol, the carrying of this amulet, or consecrated medal, has usually prevented our asking ourselves what he really meant. The younger artist of to-day would probably say to himself, or aloud, “Bosh !”—for he would never have had upon him the weight of Mr. Ruskin’s name. But he might also, perhaps, ask himself if such a summary of ideas belonged to the teaching of a university.

“Concerning the other forms of art,” he might think to himself “whose teaching, whose development, whose scientific analysis have been fostered by universities, how would such a programme be regarded ? Translated into the terms that belong to teaching in other modes—say in literature—these words of Mr. Ruskin would mean that in the ‘loveliest work of literature there is something weak ; in the greatest there is something guilty.’” And the artist might say again to himself, “Would he mean Shakespeare and Milton, or is he thinking of Dante and Homer ?” Then the artist would go on quoting this idea of Mr. Ruskin in the same translated terms : “And this, oh young gentlemen, will

come to pass through our superiority ; we shall so teach that works will be done through us, that neither the errors of Homer, nor the fevered and broken visions of Dante, nor the evil passions and lukewarm morality of Shakespeare shall stain or enfeeble but which shall be glorious with the strength and chastity of noble human love." The young artist, now pretty well disgusted with what must seem to him colossal impudence, would say to himself, "Pity he did not live earlier, and handle those fellows himself ! He would have had capacities that he could moralize, but first to-day he will have to make the men."

From all this effort of Mr. Ruskin, as we know, nothing has come ; his long and laborious work has no *authority* with artists. Nor, indeed, even with some of those whom he has most prominently caressed and encouraged.¹

At the bottom of what Mr. Ruskin did was the main trouble of teaching not art, but Mr. Ruskin ; a perfectly fair thing, as a practical teaching, if Mr. Ruskin had been a practical artist. For then he would have been checked continually by the natural development of his pupil in some one method, which would have had to take its place in the world, as one of many methods ; for studying carefully one method in our art, so as to prevail in it, is sure to connect with some other method.

But also there was with him, and there still is with many minds like his, a certainty that everything can be divided into

(1) Indeed Sir Edward Burne-Jones said to me in 1873 that he could no longer read Mr. Ruskin who distressed him by attacks upon his most respected idols. This I merely cite on account of the enormous preponderance given to Sir Edward's work by Mr. Ruskin. Of course we could quote similar statements easily enough from many painters, even without resorting to Mr. Whistler's ingenious arraignment of the great Slade professor. Further back, as early as 1861, Mr. Milsand had correctly stated many of the errors of Mr. Ruskin's teachings with a perhaps over-respectful appreciation of his literary merits ; and a thread of his thought runs through my own considerations.

wrong and right, and that the processes of the Last Judgment can always be applied by us finite beings.

Besides this instinct or tendency of fallen man, the mistake has perhaps an honorable origin in a confusion of ideas; as far as I can remember Mr. Ruskin's confused statements, some notion that the end of art was truth.

Through the many beautiful or absurd inquiries, statements, and declarations of Mr. Ruskin, it is possible to see a thread of influence; an impression produced upon a mind incapable of supposing itself in error,—a mind thoroughly respectable and middle-class,—the impression, perhaps, of his first teaching in art or in drawing; the teaching of the drawing-master, say of Harding of the Drawing Books, or any others. There is perpetually recurrent the notion that there is one excellent manner, in reality the very best, of drawing a tree or anything else with exterior touches, motions or twists of hand that may succeed in characterizing the said species of tree, and make it evident as that kind of a tree to the person whose mind it is intended to influence, for his good we must suppose. And anything that cannot explain what will reach the mind of that person for whom the tree is supposed to be drawn, at first for one's drawing-teacher, then for one's family, then for the public or acquaintances, is wrong and vaguely criminal. Drawing or art received as a school lesson is continued as a lesson in his mind; it is to be used as a means of obtaining something; in his own mind,—a delicate and refined mind, though middle-class,—a means of obtaining good for others by instructing them in tree-trunks or in noble views. But in lower minds trained in exactly the same way, and believing in the same way, it is merely to so draw as to affect the public desire for trees, and thus get money or influence of some kind, by never doing the unexpected, the difficult to apprehend. All through what Mr. Ruskin has written or done he has dragged this chain of early error, an error quite legitimate at one time, born in the boy, who has to be told something and to be taught somehow or

other, and with whose childish mind people often agree and reason in a childish manner, trusting that later he will see more clearly, and forget the explanation given to appease him.

This error Mr. Ruskin has ennobled as he has lived longer and seen more of greater things; he has asked of art to teach us as science does, and to uplift us as does religion or morality.

This error is, perhaps, the more general error at the foundation of Mr. Ruskin's thoughts and actions. It is what the French would call the "*thought behind the head*," "*la pensée de derrière la tête*." That is to say that there is a general turn that directs the action of men, which is too far back in their training, in their circumstances, in their heredity, to allow them to see themselves thinking; to go through that "examination of conscience" which the religious person, anxious to be pure minded, has learned to apply to himself so as to clear his intentions. That is to say to test his sincerity. Even truth, if we can risk so large a statement, that is to say a truth or some truths, can be used insincerely. It is difficult to disentangle the lines of error in Mr. Ruskin's thoughts. The anxiety to hit hard, to assert himself and his views was so great that he has never been able, as I can remember, to state anything however true or valuable or noble, without some singular disturbing error. I say singular and disturbing because contrariwise to himself, I do not believe in the doctrine just quoted from his lectures that it is possible for us, even in art, to be perfect. No popes, no councils of the Church, have ever assumed the possible perfection of man,—in fact, I am troubled with having to deal with a foundation of moving sand, the foundation of Mr. Ruskin's proposition.

Art,¹ the art of representation by images, of which he spoke and wrote, has not truth for its object any more than beauty, except in so far as truth and beauty, if we can isolate these by

(1) I am forced to limit here the word of art in the very usual way of meaning plastic art.

any chemistry of the mind, give us pleasure. What is sad, what is terrible, what is astonishing, what is commonplace, even what is ugly, are a part of the means used by art, which deals with *emotions*; and, therefore, art also uses grace, elegance, dignity for similar purposes.

And least of all can art teach, if by teaching we mean the orderly statement of facts for our improvement. If it teaches for our improvement, that is only incidental. It may teach us to see better because in art the eye is employed to discern certain things and to represent them, in so far as they belong to the unity of the work, but no further. To go beyond that and to prove or explain a matter of sight, by painting, let us say, or by sculpture, would be to destroy the artistic balance which resides in a relation of perfection, and not in the absolute perfection asked by Mr. Ruskin, which belongs, we suppose, to God alone. Incidentally, also, moral truths can be derived from plastic art as from any travel in the minds of men, and most especially in those cases when there has been no plotted attempt to teach, so that the mind and body, together affected by the work of art, are caught and addressed unawares. To give this moral impression, art has only lines and shapes and colors. In a rough way, it gives us the kind of impression that we get from the human face, which carries with it various impressions determining our judgment, our affection, our sense of physical pleasure, but about which we cannot reason absolutely unless we can suppose that, like God alone, we hold the entire soul and body of man in our hands. Hence art is a complement of science as it is also to a certain extent its opposite.

Moreover, to consider more largely the general views of Mr. Ruskin they are based on applications of ideas which he himself has, perhaps more than any one, condemned. They are in the modern shape not so far from the ideas of that *late Renaissance* which he hated. That was a moment in the history of art when as with Mr. Ruskin, teachers of art began to think that they

could obtain every virtue and every quality in their work, by certain rules which would encourage certain things and eliminate a great many things. Thereby again, they limited what they meant to be comprehensive and their rules are not so far from what the direct pupils of Mr. Ruskin obtained in direct antagonism.

Man is quite as important as mountains and clouds, in the story of humanity, and the expression of his sentiment or feeling or appreciation of any kind, through art, is as surely a function of nature as the cataract or the snowflake. That Mr. Ruskin has invariably forgotten.

The absurdity of asking the artist to represent historical truth as if he had been a bystander, to ask that his representation of Moses, Elijah, David and Deborah, Gideon and Isaiah should be so correct that we know as we stand before them that such was absolutely the way they looked, destroys itself as being beyond the power of man. Even a collection of photographs of a man and a phonographic copy of his speech may be a collection of misapprehensions of his usual look and speech, and even they are influenced by the circumstances under which they were taken, —the kind of mind that chose those circumstances.

Mr. Ruskin admired rightly, I think, many of the earlier painters in their telling of stories ; and in this we should certainly agree, even though they were extremely incorrect as to accuracies of history. Their real value is that these, more especially than later ones, were done by the entire man. They are not the results of analogies and investigations and cross-questionings, and historic doubts and higher criticisms and balance of theology and of sociology, as the later work which Mr. Ruskin's instinct disliked, but which his theory recommended. For in many ways, when he himself put aside his thinking and his investigations and whatever he was proud of, like the most of us, he was able to see straight in the work of art.

It is not through analytic intelligence that the work in sculpture or in painting of all of those Masters whom Mr. Ruskin liked,

carry a message to us to-day. It is on the contrary because they escaped from the rule of their mere intelligence, which was a rudder and not a guide.

Through intelligence we divide, we study, we extract, we contrast and make a definition composed of partial definitions,—an assemblance of forms, and numbers and colors. That is the work of the classifying intelligence.

And so our classifying intelligence enables us to distinguish, and then to put together the characteristics of some lovely plant or flower, and we see of what necessary parts it is made, in what it is not like others of a different class, and is like others of its own class, and we label it and we put this label in the pigeon-holes of our knowledge. But the painter, the artist, does not know it in this way. He is obliged to know it in its make if he wishes to reproduce it, but that is another and secondary part of his action. And, indeed, he may reproduce it as the Japanese do, so as to astonish the naturalist and yet have no classified divisions for its make. He did that kind of thing far back before we invented botany. So that, as I say, when he comes to represent his interest and his admiration of that flower, he looks at it disinterestedly in a love which has its own admiration for its object, and which, like a mirror, may receive any impression that the landscape outside can make. But he does not use this landscape to make it useful for the plough; nor does he make the flower of use by breaking it off to put in his buttonhole.

And if we could express everything, and all sorts of truth in painting,—moral, philosophical, natural, scientific, and historical,—such is the weakness of man, such the malignity of the evil imps who try to trip us, that possibly we *might* forget *something*.

There is a studio story concerning a remarkable painter, some of whose works, however inadequate in a few things, must cover a great deal of the ground mapped out for the perfect work of art of Mr. Ruskin. A very beautiful drawing it is in the engraving, but I have never seen the painting by Mr. Holman Hunt of the Child Christ with the Doctors in the Temple.

To this important work the artist gave many years of study, (not so long a time, perhaps, as Rousseau, the landscapist, the lover of ordinary nature, gave to pictures with no story, but still a long time,) perhaps five years or so : years of reading and study, antiquarian and ethnological researches, so that the many inquirers into the past of Israel might be fully satisfied. And then came a Jewish lady who said, "Fine enough, perhaps, but the painter never knew the one great physical characteristic of the tribe of Levi; he has given to his doctors that flatness of foot that belongs to the tribe of Reuben, while we know that the men of Levi have insteps highly arched."

There are few, almost no ethnological or historical reconstructions in painting that have not some very obvious defects for those who know a little upon the matter,—those who have travelled or read a little, and that means daily more and more of us. Persons who have known, as I have, artists and artistic critics of the beginning of this century, or who have read what used to be said at that moment of purification in art, are amused and chastened by the serious belief then prevalent in the accuracy of the resuscitation of classical representation,—I mean pictures of the life of the Greek and Roman world. And still more curious was their patronizing disdain of previous accuracies, such as the introduction of Oriental costumes in Oriental story, by the Venetian painters.

Still a little later, say about 1830, a similar attempt was made in protest against the failures of the beginning of the century, and the Oriental costume may be reinaugurated in a manner already somewhat silly and out of fashion to us of 1900. And even to-day the average scholar, if he looks at archæological pictures of to-day, not to find art but accuracy, will have his feelings somewhat wrenched by seeing pictured for instance, gentlemen of Lydian habitat representing the manners of life of centuries before Christ, and using the utensils of the latest Pompeii.

Not long ago, a travelled acquaintance quoted to me the disturbed feelings of an Oriental at some terrible mistake of M. Gérôme, the illustrious and accurate French painter of Oriental scenes, by which his characters, all armed and in peaceful confabulation, were wearing their weapons in the manner that indicates defiance and the readiness for "running amok."

So also another acquaintance who had travelled with the illustrious painter, and sketched the same subjects at the same time, showed me how, in one most celebrated picture, only one of the original and necessary, because obligatory attitudes, had been preserved.

These things have never worried me, though I have often noticed and pointed them out. On the contrary, I had almost said that I was pleased with them, as allowing me to enjoy the truth of art, and not to worry over the truth of accuracy.

Truth in art is the conception or memory of the feeling which replaces before me the creature that has charmed me; it is the impression I receive from this living unity before any analysis, before I can find terms of expression, as I know how I feel as to what I am about to say before I have found the words to limit and convey it.

Hence it is not for me to make others know the nature of the works of God,—neither could I represent them as they are not. I am no more called to give a catalogue of what exists than I am obliged to confine myself to what is agreeable,—to what is called beautiful. In so far as beautiful means agreeable, it is only a name for one of the emotional factors, along with the sad, the terrible, even the ugly.

Art takes in any and all species of qualities through which real or imaginable things can exercise an influence upon us.

And in our plastic arts, as in my art of painting (even though these arts do not confine their field to sensations in which no thought enters) yet we deal in and speak through those powers and faculties which are intimately connected with form and color,

those powers which are the emotions partly moral, that we feel when impressed by line and color.

Art is then the complement of science, and expresses thoughts which are true, but not all truths. All truths are not plastic, and consequently ready to be fitted into the frame of a picture.

Perhaps from what we have been thinking of we might disengage this notion, that we stumble occasionally upon the meaning of the word *truth*. The real truth, the essence of what is, must evidently not be for us to know. Truth as far as I am concerned in the present course of distinction can be defined as Bacon defines art, "*Homo additus naturae*," man added to nature, that is to say our personal equation added to the reality. Truth, therefore, can not be absolutely disentangled from ourselves. In every case any truth as far as we are concerned is some reality apprehended by the human intellect, limited more or less and using the words "appreciation," "the mechanism of our body," etc. I see what I see through my eye, a machine of flesh, from whose record I have to decide what may be, by eliminating, or condensing, or classifying the impressions which this part of the mechanism of my body gives me. When I work as an artist I begin at once by discarding the way in which things are really done, and translating them at once into another material. Therein consists the pleasure that you and I take in the work of art,—perhaps a new creation between us. The pleasure that such and such reality gives me and you has been transposed. The great depth and perspective of the world, its motion, its never resting, I have arrested and stopped upon a little piece of flat paper. That very fact implies that I consider the flatness of my paper a fair method of translating the non-existence of *any* flatness in the world that I look at. If I am a sculptor I make for you this soft, moving, fluctuating, colored flesh in an immovable, hard, rigid, fixed, colorless material, and it is this transposition which delights you; (as well as me in a lesser degree who have made it). Therefore at the very outset of my beginning to

affect you by what is called the record of a truth, I am obliged to ask you to accept a number of the greatest impossibilities, evident to the senses, and sometimes disturbing, when the convention supposed to be agreed upon between you and myself is understood only by one of the two parties in the carrying out of the matter.

Do not mistake my meaning in the return of Mr. Ruskin's name. It is only for convenience, as a type of an error or confusion in thought. There is no personality in a type. The Sicilian peasant who blindly believing in Him, invokes the Fountain of all Morality, in favor of his revenges, is also a type,—full of instruction, even to those who know better and see clearer. But Mr. Ruskin has served to start my thinking, and I cannot help returning to him for our use. Let us remember how Mr. Ruskin took one great painter and made a long examination of his works, under other names, it is true, but always really an essay on Turner. It is worth noting that the same and much else could be said of all other great artists, and that it might be most interesting to make examinations of others as exhaustive and even as little impartial as his of Turner. In such ways an artist could wish that the work of art might be studied in its relation with the mind of its author, that he could be followed step by step, or from work to work, concluding in no wise until the works or external facts have been so considered, the habit of mind of the artist has been so brought out by contradictions, by references to his time and place, to his ancestry of training, to his ordinary life as a man, that a sort of theory might disengage itself from the number of observations,—all made in sympathy, and never from outside, or with a previous code of inapplicable law,—and with a firm belief all the time that all expressions have a reason behind them, and that works of art are creatures, *no easier to divide* into good and bad than other creatures whose existence is more ancient and whose children they are.

All this is loosely stated in the way of the studio, but the

artist could imagine a similar study and consequent teaching, informed and strengthened by scientific and philosophical thought.

II.

Let us consider some view of the manner in which an artist practically looks at truth,—a given truth,—a collective series of truths; something like what would pass in the mind of a painter if he wished to analyze, if he wished to teach *himself* instead of a pupil. I say a pupil because in such case he might have to employ a narrower formula or one suited to less developed capacities.

I am very fond of quoting to my pupils and to any one who insists that this or that is the way that things look, and ought to look, a passage in a book of a French painter, Fromentin, called "The Algerian Sahel," one of the most beautiful records of travel that I know of, and the record of an artist. In this particular passage, he is trying to explain to his friend, a scientific man, what he and other painters differing from him, see in the country which he the painter and his friend the geologist are each studying from a different point of view. He is sitting with his friend in an Algerian village, and they are looking at the market-place where children are playing ball. The children are little Moors whom he describes, and they run with many gestures in the glaring sun of a deserted market-place. He describes further on the scene around them from which I quote a few words: "A square of houses, low and without roofs; one or two cypresses pointing above the terraces of the houses, the mountains beyond, whose serrated horizon divided the sky by more than half,—that sky empty; a great space of flat earth without any accidents; that was the landscape. The houses were of a dead white scarcely altered by the rubbing of the elements; the cypresses were black; the mountain was frankly green; the sky of a vivid blue, and the earth dust color, that is to say nearly lilac. A single shadow in the middle of the bright light was drawn on that

side of the place to which the sun inclined, and this shadow inundated by reflections from the sky could have been, in a way, expressed by blue."

"Do you see," said the painter to the geologist, "this place and these children? It is a very simple scene and one belonging to the country. The East can be said to be contained within this narrow frame."

Then he asks, "What do we see and how shall we look at this subject before us? Are these children who are playing in the sunlight, or is it a place in the sunlight in which children are playing?"

At once you will see if you recall to mind the scene that lay before the painter and his friend, the scientific man, that the scene could be looked at from two very different points of view. In the first case, if we suppose that we are looking at children playing in the sun, we have a figure painting, a picture of figures in which the landscape is accessory. In the second case, if this be a place in the sun in which children are playing, then we are looking at the landscape where the human figure is subordinate. "Now then, the landscapist will see there a landscape; the figure painter what he calls a 'subject.'" And in these divisions behold how many directions open! Will the landscapist see it as a scene of colors and of values;—will he look rather upon the firm lines and the solitariness of this empty place, abandoned to the noonday sun;—where will he take,—at what point of their career will he take the little figures of children who are scattered over it? Are they leaving it? Are they entering it? Do they fill the centre? Are they together in bunches, or gathered in spots of color and moving shape? Is it their mass casting shadows, or the manner in which the reflections of light breaks up all other details, which most effects the painter? Will these children repeat in some way or other the lights and shadows of the entire scene, or will the scene with its greens and blues, be modified by the little spots and accents within this frame of

landscape? Shall the painter fix his eye on that solitary cypress tree and its dark shadow lying upon the blazing earth, thereby making, as we have seen in Fortuny's sketches, of the blue sky above a dulled curtain of blue light? On the contrary shall that blue light on which the painter fixes not only the focus of his eye but the direction of his attention,—shall that blue light become the subject, and shall he follow its gradations and its variations through the landscape itself,—through the harsh brightness of the houses and their accidental shadows, and finally detect the tones of the sky, even in the many colors of the children's garments and the brightest spots of vermillion of their little moving caps? If the painter is fond of the angles and sudden contrasts of line presented by the buildings before him, will he look upon them as his theme? Or upon the mountain and the sky as something to reënforce them, and make them harsher and firmer, and find in the little figures of the children merely something to keep these lines steadier and more immovable by the suggestion of constant change? I have only mentioned a few of the many possibilities that we can derive from this first statement and division of the subject by Fromentin. Now with this same picture before us let us suppose a figure painter to whom the landscape will be subordinate in greater or less degree,—will he use that landscape as a faint tapestry behind his figures? Will he depend upon it on the contrary to accentuate by strong lights and by strong shadow, the grouping of his children? Will he care for the mass of their gestures, or for their individual succession? Will he make a point of these gestures, and their relation one to the other,—will he follow out their character,—the character of their faces,—the amusing variety of their costumes? Will he make a symphony of the arrangement of their colors? Will he make a symphony of the lights they scatter, or a pattern of the shadow they cast, which divides, or which connects them? Now from how far will he see them? "For if they are near enough to the painter so that the portrait of each has a dominant interest,

then all the landscape will disappear at once. From elimination to elimination the painter can contrive to simplify the group. The costume itself will become of no importance in a subject whose interest is centred in human form and expression. The whole sunlight will be suppressed rather than to interfere with the main interest, that of painting human beings." What then has become of the *truth*? Of the place in which these two men sat? What has become of the white place,—the green cypresses,—the white sun of noonday,—“what becomes of all these outside matters, so essential if the painter wishes to localize the scene, so useless if he wishes to generalize it? The painter can thereby abandon relative truth for an order of larger truth, less precise and, therefore, more absolute. He might decide that what is most interesting in these little foreign children is not that they are foreign, but that they are children.”

We shall then have in the treatment of this accidental and exotic subject, the permanent and home interest attached to the consideration of humanity. The field enlarges to the extent of the personal sympathy of the artist. What does he think about man? What does he think about childhood? Does he feel the mere pleasure of their joy, or does he feel something else in the relation of their present joy to their possible future? If he tends to sympathize within his own nature, such a turn of feeling will be reproduced some way or other in his art. The lines and the color will be influenced by his moral attitude even if they do not reflect it. For there have been artists with a desolate feeling of doubt and pessimism, who have specially liked to make pictures of women and children, that should tell of nothing but sweetness and confidence and optimism.¹

This contradiction is more frequent in painters than we can detect, but it is rarely expressed in painting through terms that can be disentangled. It has been usually the hidden cause of

(1) Hamon, for instance.

some subtle disturbing charm in the work of art which appeals only to the few, until at length its existence has been recognized and becomes common property; and it must be also only a matter of divination or surmise, as its absolute proof can rarely be given except from a knowledge of the man behind the work.

Not so long ago, speaking to an artist then engaged upon some of the most delightful of modern work, while we were talking of some delicate beauties in woman that he proposed to embody, I saw in his face a strange expression, which did not seem to belong to the admiration of beauty he declared, and I asked him of what he was thinking most. "Of the fact," he said, "that all this that I am doing and others are doing, is but the labor of little insects, little living points upon this small speck of dirt rolling in illimitable space, that we call the earth, destined to perish unperceived in the multitude of worlds."

Let us consider now that from all these varieties of manners of looking at the same subject there must be a corresponding system of painting. That the vibration of light, the refraction from the brilliant surfaces described in the Oriental scene just sketched will demand a placing together of high keyed colors in painting in contradiction of another manner that might accentuate by clearness and slight modulations the sharp and distinct features of the construction of the picture in nature. The sparkle attained by Fortuny through constant oppositions; the blending of color and tone by Delacroix would again belong to some variety or manner of looking at the subject—in Fortuny the search for smaller things—in Delacroix, for greater ones, and so on, for varieties as many as you can remember painters, and I abstain from even thinking of draughtsmen, and for each new method of painting some still more physical, more manual, distinctions of thickness or lightness of color, softening and blending of paint, or bringing its edges harshly together; surfaces with many underneath made of many veilings; or with coverings of color placed as nearly as possible by the first touch of the brush. And for all

these even the touch of the brush, and the brush itself would vary, and that type of our art bring the lengthy statement of differences to an end. And yet each man would have been true to that nature which we see in common, and which for us painters only assumes existence in ourselves.

We have, then, seen that this truth that we looked at was susceptible to variations, and that the truth in the artist's work depended on a combination of his desires with certain sights out of the multitude of things that he saw. Among the innumerable variations of any such scene, I have only hinted at such variations as the artists might deliberately choose. Among the innumerable variations of the scene that would appear in the work would be the factors that are unconscious, that is to say the man's greater or less susceptibility to such details as he himself does choose. They are patent to us all, for instance, in the cases of more or less sensitiveness to the physical impressions of color, or delicacy of line. They are visible to us in a way that makes even the most favorable consideration of such an attitude of mind as Mr. Ruskin's, seem childish as well as arrogant. For even the fact that a man, an artist, is an Englishman, a Frenchman, or a Spaniard, is going to influence every detail of what he does when apparently to himself he is copying a given thing in nature. We have all laughed, or many of us have laughed, when children, at the curious way in which our father, or uncle, or other relative, who had his portrait painted in China when a merchant there, assumed in this portrait, this copy of a truth, a curious Chinese appearance.

If we will take the trouble to look at the woodcuts illustrative of some given celebrities as they appear in the illustrated newspapers of various nations, we shall see that though copied very mechanically from the same photograph, Mr. Gladstone becomes a Frenchman in France, a Spaniard in Spain, and though less visible to us in the same way, the continental, the Spaniard or the Frenchman, becomes English in the engraving of an English

magazine. Even in the handling of the tool called the graver which cuts the wood, there is, then, a nationality.

When speaking of a scene, a subject represented by the painter, I have been talking as though of modern painting, a very complex result involving a great number of analytic efforts, involving the accumulation of a great many records of truth. We hardly notice that this later development of that art of record that we call painting is a greater and more continued effort to get together all the truths of sight, and we painters carry out the effort by a long series of analyses that we combine together in a manner of synthesis. We, you and I, usually think that the so-called drawing, that is to say the representation of an object by a line or several lines, is less synthetic, and we do so because both in our learning of our art and in the record of human effort we do not begin by the representation of things in a manner of analysis and detail of parts. The earliest stage that we remember personally or in the race is the representation of things by an outline, by some lines brought together, usually some dark lines on a light ground. But this earlier form of representation has never been like that part of it which we use for our complicated painting, an *analysis*. It has been a very *bold synthesis*, a *jump*, a massing of a great many things that are connected together by a single word in speech, a few lines in drawing. These lines, when they are very successful, represent a combination of what the real topographical plan, if I may so say, is, and its modification by the many facts that influence the edge of its shape. The profile drawing in a Greek vase represents not a map, that is to say a section cut right through a thing, say the human body, but the appearance of roundness that that human body has,—the manner in which the bones appear at one place, the flesh at another, the movement of the muscles, the flexibility of the entire being; consequently that outline already is a stronger attempt at bringing together a number of things than our so-called painting which details them one by one,—which recognizes for instance that

there is no such thing as an outline seen, that we do not see naturally the place of a man without seeing him in it ; while the drawing is an attempt at representing the place of a man and him filling it. If we go further back we shall see a still bolder attempt at representation in the marks that a child makes, often an unformed scrawl. These are made from the same point of view that a child scrawls something for writing, and tells you that these scrawls mean so and so,—“ Dear papa, I love you,” or “ This is sister’s dog.” It is only when he gets older and less artistic that he is troubled by what he considers to be the truth, and sometimes in drawing is forced to make the front and back of a house at once out of respect for *facts*. He is already beginning to lose that sensitiveness to real sight which the artist cultivates *carefully* ; for after all what the artist aims at is really that position of the child who believes in his expressing *anything* by the suggestion of a *few* things.

The position of the child is one to which the artist, often by hard work, by much reflection, by having met life, tends to reach again. The nearer he can get back to it, the more complete he is as an artist, big or little, a Japanese sketcher or Michael Angelo. And in this manner of considering the question we can see some of the difficulties of explanation on the part of those who themselves are artist-makers. Only quite late does the thought come to us to ask ourselves in what consists, and what are the connections of those particular emotions given to us by poetry, or that we feel at moments before the things of nature. We must already have gone through many lands of thought before we even begin to suppose that there may be there a question to ask, and very often when we ask we are no longer competent to answer. We are not the same as we were ; and in one life we have undergone metempsychosis. The poetry had been *in us* ; it had been ourselves, and on that account we did not see it outside of us,—nor the special difference in the picture presented to us by the poet. The poet represented the subjects

as they appeared to ourselves; he painted by images that which appeared to us as images. The combination of thought, consideration and emotion which constitute the essence of his conception, and of his language, did not appear to us like a separate fact. It seemed to us a natural way of seeing. That it should take in our eyes a distinct character, it must have become separated from the ordinary context of our life. When it appears to us as a curiosity, then we must have entirely changed our manner of living, and we have ceased living in the poetic temper. The prophet has first been, and then the critic, nor can the prophet become a critic without either a risk of never turning back again,—of never again feeling the spontaneous emotions which he would try to solve. And so to the questions asked of poets and of painters, the answers must usually come so as to confirm many thinking men in their error; to-day more than ever, for *if* once upon a time the artistic temperament belonged to many men, to-day it only appears occasionally in the few, and even with them is often an accidental and intermittent state of mind.

Perhaps, as I was saying, was there once a time when poetry was simply a natural manner of expressing a natural way of feeling and of thinking; as music and painting render those stories and happenings within the soul and those fairy apparitions, which the daily impressions of ordinary life determine at recurring moments in the mind of the musician and the painter. To the artist, then, it might appear that his feelings came to him almost against his will from the very fact of their spontaneity. Hence it might appear to him that they did not come to him from himself but from outside. It is most in the things which we have acquired, which we can handle as it were, that we place the idea of ourselves. The knowledge that we have acquired, and that we can *manage*, seems to us to be *us*. As to those affections beyond our control, we begin to think that they must reside outside of us, and we suppose that the thing in which we placed our love has a special fixed property of charming. This is when we

have stepped from our infancy, when no longer can we confound our own individuality with its objects; when we are beginning to be ruled by our intelligence, by the wish to judge things that are not ourselves, and to get from them ideas distinct from our impressions. It is then that we set up rules and laws outside of us and in reality *turn our back to nature*. It is only later that by an acquaintance with the outside facts as we suppose them, and our own conscience, we can return to the secret of our childhood and realize how we acted, mixed as it were with nature. If we have not recovered the full faculty of feeling, we can understand at least the value of our early impressions and of our veritable self.

When I stopped to consider the synthetic character of the simplest drawing, as for example, the drawing that a child makes, I was pushing my way toward a consideration of certain examples of synthetic art, where I might find the most clearly expressed antithesis to our own complicated art of painting, made of much analysis. When we admire a drawing of a master as compared to that of a scholar, (I mean by a master, a man in possession of himself, I do not mean a professor or teacher) that which distinguishes the higher work is the suggestion of things, their synthesis and not the careful stringing out of facts one after the other. A mere sweep of the line, which, of course, means a synthesis of a great many lines, indicates to us the man who has attained. His work in a certain way is nearest to that of the savage or the child, for the same reason that he has omitted, exaggerated, implied, and suggested rather than detailed; and at the opposite extremity of the geographical world of art, the Chinese and Japanese have been contented with the development of these possibilities. They have not apparently begun with them; on the contrary, in their earlier work, however valuable and important is the *line*, the *pattern* that it makes, and its impression on the mind, there is a tendency similar to ours towards a representation by addition of facts. Later, more and more do they care for the summing up

that is given by the touch of the brush, to indicate both the line, and the modelling, and the texture, and the aerial perspective, until at length they attain a power of suggestion which with us usually belongs only to the sketch which is accidental, which the artist himself cannot repeat, and *wonders* at, because of its saying so much to him. They go still further and find in the combination of the representation of a character, which is itself a shorthand of a natural fact, (what we call a letter,) with the movement of the hand, a sufficiency for artistic delight. This touch of the hand in drawing the letter implies a knowledge of its origin, of how it has come to be, of its historical associations, of its use in a grave or a gay subject, and gives besides that the physiology of the writer. These men reached in such views of art what they felt to be competent representation, and they may have felt that to move any further in any direction like ours, they would have to drop what they had gained, for that is the danger of any new movement. The hands are full and to grasp anything one has to drop something else.

With these Orientals, then, when all had become so simple that it was difficult to go further back on the way, and when all had been regulated, governed, and taught by precedent and example,—there all the more in contradiction do we find that the proof of mastership is the difference in the touch of the brush. They recognize therein the full meaning of the inseparableness of the representation and of the personal equation. So that we have here a case (in the extreme value given to what we should call handwriting) where there is nothing to impress our eye, and consequently our mind, nothing but the possible differences of intellectual and moral value as expressing character, that are to be found in the soft line traced by the brush full of ink moved slowly around a central pivot of the wrist. Yet this faintest and simplest of all manifestations of plastic art has for ages given the most intense pleasure to natures exquisitely sensitive to esthetic impressions.

See also how curiously another truth appears. In this case it is necessary to know beforehand just what the designer meant if we wish to appreciate one side of this work of art, the side that is affected by persons like Mr. Ruskin. This Chinese or Japanese verse, which fills with delight the cultivated reader and artist of the Far East, has only value as curves and lines and thicknesses of light and dark to us who cannot read Chinese characters. Its moral ideas may be the highest possible, but we cannot understand them any more than the Chinese sage would understand the exact religious meaning of our most religious art. Only would he understand that its subject was religious, if he were extremely sensitive to art : and that because the human mind has always chosen analogous forms, certain combinations when making a work of art under the influences that flow from the supernatural.

These few examples that I have introduced, I might almost say dragged into what I have been saying, will help to show how many anxieties, how many confused thoughts must exist in the mind of a painter apart from the endless pre-occupations of materials and of handicraft ; apart from those that belong of necessity to the world of discovered law ; the order of optics, and light, and line, and form, with which to his own mind he cannot be too well acquainted, and in which science, as we call it to-day, has only just begun to help him. Nor do these pre-occupations make him less sensitive to those that oppress or weigh fairly upon all men, the responsibility for the truths of other categories, even though he escape momentarily from them in his self-created world.

Of one thing,—whether he knows it or not in the sense of putting it into a relative certainty of words,—he is sure. He believes in the teaching of the teacher of the Art of Love, the priestess Diotima, and he knows that the object of his love is not truth or beauty, but production and generation in truth and in beauty. He has tried to make out images of the universal order about us, of which art alone gives him the full sensations. He

has watched and waited as did the shepherds who listened to the flute of the great god Pan. The poet has told us how its music awakened them as the world is aroused by the warm breath of spring. Its beginning had no commencement, its end had no conclusion. Without a break, now scattering, now prolonged, now gentle, now severe, in one unfathomable volume of sound, it filled valley and gorge, stopping the ears and dominating the senses. It rippled through the waves of the river, and lashed up against the rocks of the sea, it lived in the innumerable sound of bees, and in the fraying of summits of the forest trees. It filled the hollows of old oaks, and poured with the sunshine on the grass. "When the melody was exhausted the music stopped; if the melody did not stop the god played on, in sounds of manifold and formless joy, beginning nowhere and resting in space." To some hearers those sounds were real, to others imaginary, to some heavy, to others full of life, to some without a shape, to others brocaded like ornament, as the music scattered itself on all sides in never-to-be-anticipated chords.

The god in his sleep, some are said to have surprised, and to have compelled of him his secret. Part of this the shepherds tried to repeat on reeds broken from the river's bank; but we may feel sure that when they met together, none ever claimed to have given on his little pipe the whole of the song of the great god, whose name means All There Is.



MODERN SOCIOLOGY

FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, *New York.*



MODERN sociology begins with the earliest writings of Mr. Herbert Spencer. Back of modern sociology, a mine of invaluable thought and material for it,—is the long line of works on political philosophy, from Plato and Aristotle to Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau; and the writings of Montesquieu, Comte, and Buckle, which prepared the minds of students for a serious attempt to study society comprehensively in a scientific spirit.

The difference between Mr. Spencer's work and all sociological writing of an earlier date, lies in the circumstance that everything which Mr. Spencer has done, whether in the interpretation of society, of mind, or of the physical cosmos, is a part of the evolutionist thought which in our age has transformed science. Explanations of society which lacked the evolutionist principle can no more be called modern than can explanations of organic phenomena that antedate the observation of Charles Darwin.

M. Comte, who invented the word *sociologie*, conceived of a science of society which should be scientific in its methods, free from theological and metaphysical assumptions, and from subserviency to the revolutionary or reforming spirit. Comte had been a disciple and early friend of the socialist St. Simon, but had become as tired of attempts to make society *de novo* as he had become through years of teaching of mathematics and mechanics,

of all metaphysical vagaries. He was a man of more than ordinary scientific abilities on the mathematical side, and of respectable attainments in historical studies. So far as his personal equipment was concerned it would seem that he was the one who should have organized in fact as in attempt a comprehensive science of human society. But the master key of interpretation was not given into his hand, and lacking it he was unable to get far into the secret of the origin and development of those marvelously complicated relationships of instinct, feeling, habit, thought, ideal, and coöperation which we call society.

Mr. Spencer, on the other hand, began his intellectual career avowedly as a reformer, and to this day he has never entirely dropped the rôle. His youthful "Letters on the Proper Sphere of Government," 1842, were written to prove that the functions of government ought to be limited strictly to the three duties of repelling invasion, maintaining domestic peace, and enforcing contracts. That things go by contraries is a time worn proverb and possibly it was just this rooted aversion of Mr. Spencer's to a diversified and paternal activity of government,—an aversion which must doubtless be attributed to his excellent Quaker ancestry,—that impelled him step by step along a path of investigation which brought him ultimately to the discovery and formulation of the law of universal evolution. Convinced that governments could not rightfully limit the freedom of any individual more than might be necessary to establish an equal freedom of all individuals by restraining their aggressions upon one another, he was compelled to show to himself and to his critics, how the progress of industry, of the arts and of science, which governments have attempted in a paternal spirit to foster, not only could, but necessarily would be secured through the natural outworking of human desires coöperating with the mechanical and organic forces of man's physical environment. This task we find him attempting in his second piece of serious writing and first book, the "Social Statics," London, 1850, in the latter chapters of which, with

vigorous originality, he applied to mind and to society the generalization which Lamarck had made familiar in biology, namely the conception of a ceaseless transformation of living things through a continual adaptation of organism to environment.

Applied to mind and to society in the degree that Mr. Spence applied it, this generalization was revolutionary. The assumption of political science as of theology, had been that human nature is practically an unchanging thing. Theology, and political science as influenced and colored by theology, had pictured unchanging human nature as essentially evil, self-seeking, ruthless. Theology, and for the most part, political science also had assumed that the eradication of evil in human conduct and in social relations must come miraculously or through the outworkings of a providential plan in human affairs. Now and then a philosopher had rebelled against these assumptions, and had taught that human nature is essentially good rather than evil; such for example is the postulate of the teaching of Rousseau, and of the revolutionary writers of his school. Mr. Spence belongs to a third group, differing as widely from Rousseau as from the theologians. Imperfect human nature according to these thinkers is selfish, treacherous, untruthful, dishonest, murderous. Perfected human nature is unselfish, truthful, honest, merciful. But the conversion of the imperfect into the perfected nature is no miraculous transformation. It is a process requiring time for its accomplishment and depending upon the occurrence of certain experiences.

Mr. Spencer was of course not the first to put forth the naturalistic view of man. From the earliest days it has had its defenders and greatest among them all was Aristotle. Aristotle represents human nature as containing the possibilities of both good and evil and the making of good life at the expense of evil, is a function which he attributes to the state, that is, to organized society. It is the man who can live apart from his fellows, receiving nothing from them and contributing nothing to the common welfare, who

is essentially evil. Participation in the duties of the state is the only discipline that, in the long run, can create goodness. Not less significant although less important in its influence was the teaching of Montesquieu, Condorcet, and some lesser writers, which culminated in the historical philosophy of Buckle, that the human mind and the social institutions which it creates are directly or indirectly moulded by the topography, soil, and climate of the physical environment. These writers, however, did not go so far as to assume that the inner moral nature of man, that essential character which theology represents as by nature sinful is thus moulded. They urged only that man's temperament, his emotional or unemotional development, his ideas, his superstition or his rationalism, are thus affected by physical conditions.

Mr. Spencer's view is much more radical than that of any predecessor, and he alone shows exactly how and by means of what forces the modification of character is effected. Herein lies his originality.

Grasping the thought that habitual activity determines human character, just as habitual functioning reacts upon the bodily organ, Mr. Spencer perceived, what all interpreters of society before him had overlooked, the real significance of the great historical fact that, at the beginning of human progress, small social groups were so situated in relation to one another and to a common food supply that they were almost continually engaged in relentless warfare, but that when, through successive conquests, small groups had been united in great states and national federations, it became possible for a majority of men to give up military pursuits and devote themselves to arts of peace. Herein, as Mr. Spencer saw, lay not only the possibility but the certainty that primitive human nature, a product of the adaptation of the primitive man to the conditions of his existence, must be as brutal, as cruel, and as treacherous as theology had ever pictured the unregenerate human soul, but that developed man, under wholly different conditions, must necessarily be transformed into

the sympathetic, the kindly, helpful being who can live on good terms with his neighbors, and in coöperation with all mankind.

This great generalization is not only Mr. Spencer's chief contribution to sociology as to psychology, but it is probably destined in coming time to be regarded as the most important single contribution to the moral sciences since Aristotle. Strictly speaking, it is the only really new contribution to those sciences since the Greeks, the only modern ethical idea not found in Greek philosophical thought.

This generalization Mr. Spencer has elaborated and exploited in great detail in his "Principles of Sociology," 1876-1896, in his essays, and in his "Principles of Ethics," 1879-1893. Taking up the successive parts of the "Principles of Sociology," one after another, the student discovers that the transition from militarism to industrialism is the principle of interpretation throughout. Thus, in the discussion of Domestic Relations, Mr. Spencer explains the successive forms of family life, the status of women, and the status of children, in terms of an increasing civil and moral liberty, which is rendered possible by the relative increase of peaceful over warlike activities, consequent upon successive consolidations of small social groups into ever enlarging states. The parts on Ceremonial and Ecclesiastical Institutions apply a like interpretation to the development of social forms, ceremonies, manners, and fashions, from the display of bloody trophies, and posturings of abject obeisance among primitive men, to the refinements and amenities of modern civilizations; from the bloody sacrifices and tyrannical ecclesiastical rule of early days, to the Christian teaching of universal human brotherhood. In the part on Political Institutions the successive forms of general and of local government, and the evolution of law, are in like manner explained, and in the concluding part on Industrial Institutions the whole economic history of mankind is set forth as a result of the same causation.

If this account of Mr. Spencer's sociological system were the

end of the matter, we should have to regard his work as presenting a unity and consistency as unusual in the history of scientific thought as is the originality of his fundamental conceptions. But the greatest minds, as Mr. Emerson has told us, are seldom altogether consistent, and some of Mr. Spencer's readers have thought that the author who conceived of philosophy as the final and complete unification of knowledge has failed to give unity and consistency to his own system of sociology.

After the publication of his earlier social studies and of the first edition of his "Principles of Psychology," Mr. Spencer became interested in that analogy of society to an animal organism which is older than the philosophy of Plato, and, in a famous paper on "The Social Organism" published in the *Westminster Review* of January, 1860, he elaborated the idea in terms of the evolutionist conception. In this paper, the substance of which is reproduced in the "Principles of Sociology," society is declared to be an organism, in which the regulating system, (government), appears as the analogue of the cerebral nervous system of an animal, the sustaining system (agriculture and industry) as the analogue of the alimentary tract, and the distributing system (commerce) with its continuous circulation of goods, as the analogue of the circulatory system of the animal.

This conception of the organic nature of society introduces into sociology a principle of interpretation that is different from the principle of transformation through the substitution of industrialism for militarism, unless the latter can be shown to be derived from the former. This, however, is not the end of the apparent incertitude of Mr. Spencer's system. In the opening chapters of "The Principles of Sociology" we find an elaborate inferential account of the mental and moral nature of primitive man, in the course of which the primitive man's theory of the world and of life is set forth. The important concept in this theory is that of the ghost, the departed spirit, of which primitive man stands in continual dread. From this primitive theory of things Mr. Spen-

cer derives the conclusion that, while the fear of the living becomes the root of all political control, the fear of the dead becomes the root of all religious control. This generalization runs as a secondary principle of interpretation throughout all remaining parts of the "Principles of Sociology."

These three propositions, however, are not irreconcilable and not of equal generality. They fall naturally into a logical series, and, therefore, it is perfectly possible to find in Mr. Spencer's system a unity which he has taken no pains himself to point out to his readers. The proposition about the fear of the living and the fear of the dead is logically wider than the one about the transformation of character and institutions by the progress from militarism to industrialism and, what is more important in an evolutionist system, the fear of the living and of the dead is genetically antecedent to systematic military activities. Not only have unnumbered wars been directly caused by the fear of the living or the fear of the dead, but the wars that have had their origin in economic conditions,—in the pressure of population upon subsistence,—could never have been carried on in any systematic way through the development of that regimentation of society about which Mr. Spencer has much to say, without the fear of both the living and the dead as motive forces of government and discipline. Thus the proposition about a transition from militarism to industrialism, which is Mr. Spencer's chief principle of interpretation throughout his sociology, is clearly derivative from the wider proposition regarding the fear of the living and of the dead.

But the latter proposition, in its turn, is derivable from the yet wider truth that social groups as such, like the individuals who compose them, are forever engaged in the struggle for existence. Fear, whether of the living or of the dead, is directly or indirectly a product of this unceasing struggle. Therefore, whether society be conceived of as an organism, or as an aggregate which is better described by another phrase that Mr. Spencer has applied to it,

namely, super-organic, it is in either case a group in which, as a result of the rivalry of its component individuals, and the rivalry of the group as a whole with other similar groups to obtain shares of a limited food supply, fear in all its forms must arise, to be diminished only by the growth of knowledge and of man's power over nature, making possible an artificial production of food in relative abundance.

Consequently Mr. Spencer's propositions could be arranged in the following order: (1) society is an organism, (2) in the struggle of social organisms for existence and their consequent differentiation, fear of both the living and the dead arises, and for countless ages is a controlling emotion, (3) dominated by fear, men for ages are habitually engaged in military activities, (4) the transition from militarism to industrialism, made possible by the consolidation of small social groups into large ones, which war accomplishes, to its own ultimate decline, transforms human nature and social institutions; and this fact affords the true interpretation of all social progress.

Such, in its chief theoretical conceptions, is the great sociological system put forth by a master mind, to which all other modern systems of sociological thought, and all more special sociological studies, in one or another way are related.

Not only because it all goes back to this system of thought, but for another reason also, modern sociology must be said to begin with Mr. Spencer's work. It was the publication in 1873 of Mr. Spencer's delightfully written little book on "The Study of Sociology," which first awakened in England, America, France, Italy, and Russia a wide general interest in this subject. From that time on sociological study has been pursued with great activity, and a great sociological literature has accumulated. These later developments we must now pass in brief review.

Different minds have naturally looked at the phenomena of social evolution from different angles, and have emphasized the importance of different factors, processes or results. One group

of writers has given its attention chiefly to the analysis of social structure and function; another to investigations of social genesis, especially in studies of the early forms of marriage, the family, clan and tribal organization; while yet another group has been interested chiefly in the fundamental questions of social causation, attempting to isolate specific social forces and to formulate sociological laws.

Dr. Schaffle of Stuttgart in 1875 and 1896 put forth an elaborate work entitled "*Bau und Leben des Socialen Körpers*," which was a detailed attempt to describe society as a living organism. Few other writers on the structure and function of society have ventured to carry the biological analogy so far. Dr. DeGreef of Brussels in his "*Introduction de la Sociologie*," 1886-89, while arguing that the essential social fact which differentiates society from all other objects is that of contract, tacit or implied, between man and man or between men and men, makes some use of the biological conception in his account of the hierarchical order in which social institutions are historically evolved, and in his statement of the order in which institutions react functionally upon one another and upon social welfare. Combes de Lestrade in his "*Elements de Sociologie*," 1889, tries to differentiate sociology from political economy by assigning the study of social structure to sociology and relegating the study of social functions to political economy. Ludwig Gumplowicz of Graz, an original, incisive, and always suggestive writer, in his "*Der Rassenkampf*," 1883, and his "*Grundriss der Sociologie*," 1885, cuts loose absolutely from the biological analogy, which he ridicules, and describes human society in terms of those continual regroupings of heterogeneous ethnical elements which are brought about by a ceaseless struggle in warfare, commerce, and industry between race and race, nationality and nationality. In this struggle and regrouping of elements the strong who conquer establish lordship and develop culture, while the weak who are conquered are subjected to task work as slaves, serfs or wage

earners. The great merit of Gumpłowicz's work is that he constructs his sociology out of strictly sociological materials. This merit is shared also by Simmel of Berlin, "Über Sociale Differenzierung," 1890. Simmel, whose interests lie chiefly within the field of ethics, describes social structure in terms of a subordination of lower to higher activities, consequent upon mental and moral differences among men, a conception not essentially different from that set forth by Plato in the "Republic."

In the study of social genesis, work of the very highest value has been accomplished in recent years. Sir Henry Summer Maine had no sooner published his elaborate development of the patriarchal theory, "Ancient Law," 1861, than ethnologists in three or four different quarters of the globe began to set forth an astonishing mass of evidence drawn from contemporaneous savage and barbarian peoples, and from a reëxamination of ancient law, survivals of custom, and folk-lore, demonstrating that the patriarchal system of early Rome and of the Semitic peoples at one period in their development, and now surviving here and there, especially among the Slavs, was not the earliest organization of domestic relationships, and was never universal. The most telling work in this investigation was undoubtedly that of Lewis H. Morgan, an accomplished American scholar of unquestioned originality, who was probably the first investigator on either side of the world to discover the true nature of the totemic clan, the true relation of the clan to the tribe, and the process of transition from tribal to civil organization. Morgan's "League of the Iroquois," Rochester, 1848 and 1854, "Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity," Smithsonian Institution, 1871, and "Houses and House Life" of the American Aborigines," Washington, 1881, will stand permanently among our most valuable original sources, while his synthetic explanation of the origins and processes of social evolution, "Ancient Society," 1877, is a work of classical value.

Next to Morgan, John Ferguson McLennan, "Primitive

Marriage," 1876, "The Patriarchal Theory," 1885, "Studies in Ancient History," First Series, 1886, Second Series, 1896, accomplished most for the reconstruction of our conception of primitive humanity. McLennan's account of the origin and effects of infanticide, of exogamy, of the practice of wife capture, and of polyandry, are contributions which no serious student of anthropology or of sociology would think of overlooking. Among other writers well deserving of mention are Bachofen, "Das Mutterrecht," 1861, Frazer, "Totemism," 1877, W. Robertson Smith, "Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia," 1885, Major J. W. Powell, Director of the Bureau of Ethnology at Washington, J. Owen Dorsey, whose monograph on the sociology of the Omaha tribe, Bureau of Ethnology, 1881-82, is an excellent piece of descriptive work, and, among writers who have not chiefly collected ethnological materials by personal investigation, but have collated the observations of others, Theodor Waitz, Charles Letourneau, Adolphe Posada, Edward Westermarck, C. N. Starcke, and Karl Pearson. Of recent original researches the most important are those of Dr. Franz Boas, "The Social Organization and the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians," 1897; Dr. Livingston Farrand, "Traditions of the Chilcotin Indians, 1900, and, above all, Spencer and Gillen's great work, "The Native Tribes of Central Australia," 1899, which throws the first real light upon the origins of totemism and of totemic groups.

The study of causation, the attempt to discover the formative forces as distinct from the order or process of genesis, is the most difficult part of sociological, as it is of biological, investigation. Encouraging progress is, however, being made. A review of comparatively recent work discloses four chief theories of social causation. The physiographic theory, a mere outline of which may be discovered in the "Politics" of Aristotle, and which in modern times was developed by Montesquieu and Buckle, explains social structure and social activity as direct or indirect effects of differences of climate, topography, soil, and organic products of

the environment. This hypothesis has lately been restated and defended with great ability by John M. Robertson in "Buckle and his Critics," London, 1895, and "An Introduction to English Politics," London, 1900. Robertson in these works does for Buckle's memory a much needed service by reminding the modern reader that the author of "The History of Civilization" never attempted to prove that differences of national character and attainment could be explained in terms of the direct action of topography and climate upon the human mind. For example, the argument in criticism of Buckle, that the modern Greeks should be in every way as remarkable in literature, art, and politics, as were the ancient Greeks, because the contour and climate of Hellas have remained substantially unchanged, is entirely beside the mark. Buckle divided civilizations into primary and secondary. Primary civilizations are in a very direct way moulded by the forces of physical nature, while secondary civilizations (also directly influenced in great measure by physical conditions) are more largely affected by the contact of a people with neighboring or antecedent primary civilizations. The civilization of ancient Greece, according to Buckle was a product of the peculiarly happy coöperation of two sets of influences, namely ; one, the contact of the Greeks with the cultures of Egypt and Phœnicia, the other, physical influences arising from topography and climate. Buckle thus attached great importance to what Mr. Spencer has called the sociological environment, and his explanation of secondary civilizations is found upon examination to rest upon a psychological rather than a physiographic postulate.

Theories like Buckle's emphasize the influence of the environment. Another group of theories, developed from Mr. Spencer's essay on "The Social Organism," emphasizes the nature of the alleged social organism itself. According to these theories all real explanations of social evolution must be sought within the social system. They must be derived from the relation of part to part,

of part to the whole and of the whole to the part. These views are represented by Rene Worms, secretary of L'Institut International de la Sociologie, in "Organisme et Societé," 1896, and by Lilienfeld, in "La Pathologie Sociale," 1896.

In Germany of recent years there has been a great deal of interest in what has come to be known as the materialistic interpretation of history. This phrase would apply equally to Buckle's interpretation or to the organic concept. In fact, it is used for something quite different from either, namely, an explanation of morals, laws, and institutions in terms of the modes of economic production at any given time in vogue. The founder of this philosophy was Karl Marx, and the chief exposition of it was contained in "Das Kapital," 1867-1885. Next in importance to Marx' own statement must probably be placed Achille Loria's "Les Bases Economique de la Constitution sociale," 1898, translated with the title, "Economic Foundations of Society," 1899, by Professor L. M. Keasbey of Bryn Mawr. Professor Keasbey's article on the "Institution of Society," in *The International Monthly* of April, 1900, was written from the standpoint to the economic interpretation.

These writers may be held to have made good their main contention that economic conditions and modes of production act directly in causation of transformations of the moral code, the legal system and the political organization of society. This, however, is something very different from explaining the origin and evolution of society itself. Modes of production are themselves social inventions and modes of social coöperation. They presuppose the existence of society. Professor Keasbey has well said in the article above referred to, that "while animals usually live upon what they can find, men, for the most part, find what they can live upon;" but the statement calls for an important addition. The animal eats what it can find; primitive man tries to find what he can eat,—so far as possible he exercises choice,—but civilized man *produces* what he can eat. Now, the

production of wealth as distinguished from the finding and gathering of natural food supplies, and all political economy which assumes the production of wealth, presuppose an already existent society, which originated far back in the dim ages when men were not producing but merely trying to choose, if not indeed, and more probably, in yet remoter ages when animal bands were subsisting with little or no choice on what they could find. In short, while there can very well be an economic interpretation of *history*, if by history we mean the moral, legal, and political evolution of socially organized men, there can be no economic explanation of the origin and existence of society itself, unless by economic we mean not the production of wealth, but the mere finding of a modicum of food, a mere physiological activity. The production of wealth and the outworking of economic causes in history, presuppose socio-psychical factors of sympathy, choice, imitation, and invention.

All physiographic, organic, and economic explanations of society seem thus either to need development into psychological corollaries,—as we have shown to be the case with Buckle's philosophy and with Spencer's,—or they must be carried back to psychological postulates, as is undoubtedly true of the so-called economic interpretation of history. For this reason further serious work in the study of social causation will probably focus upon the discovery and exploitation of psychological premises. With the merest allusion to work that has thus far been done in this direction, this paper must now be concluded.

Mr. Spencer's system, as has been shown, is essentially psychological. The reader of Spencer who also reads Buckle will find himself asking whether, after all, the more important social process has been the transformation of character and institutions through the substitution of industrialism for militarism, or the transformation of culture by imitation, a process that Buckle undoubtedly assumes, though he does not attempt at length to discuss in his explanation of secondary civilizations. The first

modern sociological work which emphasized the importance of imitation as a formative force was Bagehot's little book, "Physics and Politics," 1872, a work of rare suggestiveness, which no student of these subjects should on any account fail to read. Bagehot, however, contented himself with explaining the formation of custom, caste, and status, by means of imitation, and did not undertake to work out a scientific analysis of imitation itself. This task was first undertaken by M. Gabriel Tarde, now professor in the College de France, in his very important book, "Les Lois de L'imitation," 1890 and 1895, which has exerted a profound influence upon sociological investigation, and has placed Tarde in the first rank of sociological thinkers. With Bagehot and Tarde must be named, among those who have made permanently valuable contributions to the theory of imitation, and to our knowledge of the part that imitation plays in the social process, Professor J. Mark Baldwin of Princeton, whose volume on "Social and Ethical Interpretations," 1897, constituting the second part of his treatise on "Mental Development in the Child and the Race" contains, besides his discussion of imitation, the only fairly complete study that has ever been made of the essentially social nature of the individual mind and of the interaction of the individual mind and its social milieu.

It is possible, however, to view the interaction of mind with mind from another side than that of imitation. That there may be imitation there must somewhere be an example or copy to be imitated, there must be initiative, suggestion. Many indications point to the probable conclusion that in society there is a mode of initiation, an origin of suggestion, which cannot arise in the individual isolated from his fellows, but depends for its genesis upon the massing of men in numbers or crowds. Two able and suggestive writers, M. Emile Durkheim, author of "De la Division du Travail Sociale," 1893, and editor of the valuable "L'Année Sociologique," and Gustave LeBon, author of "Psychologie des Foules," 1895, have been disposed to find in this phenomenon the fundamental and distinctive social fact.

All the theories thus far considered have one notion in common ; they all assume that social evolution is an unconscious process, practically as independent of man's volition as are the processes of physical nature. But by no means all sociologists have acquiesced in such a conception. The earlier writers on political theory, from Aristotle to Rousseau, would have repudiated it. In one form or another the doctrine of a social contract, first definitely enunciated by Epicurus, has reappeared in subsequent political writing of almost every century. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau made it the postulate of their political systems. Fouillée, "*La Science Sociale Contemporaine*," 1885, and De Greef, among modern sociologists regard it as the distinctive social phenomenon.

Mackenzie, "An Introduction to Social Philosophy," 1890 and 1895; Novicow, "Conscience et Volonté Sociales," 1897, Bosanquet, various contributions to *Mind*, Benjamin Kidd, "Social Evolution," 1894, and Edward A. Ross in articles on "Social Control," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1896, without assuming a social contract, assume that society is self-conscious and self-determining. Philosophic idealism, of course, has always made this assumption.

But how is a theory of the artificial making of society by contract or covenant or in any other way to be reconciled (if at all) with the doctrine of evolution? The evolutionist of course is barred from denial that society can be moulded by the human will because he is bound to maintain that human volition itself is a product of evolution, and that its reaction upon man's conduct and social relations is also an evolutionary fact. To an American sociologist, Dr. Lester F. Ward, whose ability, originality, and varied accomplishments place him in rank with Spencer and Tarde, we owe the one great sociological system which fairly grapples with this problem and presents a closely reasoned solution of it. Dr. Ward in his "*Dynamic Sociology*," New York, 1883 and 1897, and in his "*Psychic Factors of Civilization*," Boston,

1893, accepts the Spencerian view of an unconscious evolutionary process which brings society into existence and for many ages moulds social institutions. But he maintains that there comes a time when man, intellectually and morally developed by his social relationships, becomes self-consciously aware of himself and of his situation, and discovers that he can mould to his own satisfaction the social organization in which his life activities are cast. The means that he employs are the great truths of scientific knowledge, the power of invention which his mind has attained, and the utilization of these means by the governments as well as by the private organizations, which man establishes. It is in the volume on the "Psychic Factors of Civilization" that Dr. Ward most clearly traces in evolutionist terms the rise of the inventive faculty of man and its application to the social problem.

Thus it appears that at least five different psychological postulates of sociological philosophy have been chosen by as many different individual thinkers or groups of writers. Is it possible to decide among these, or must we carry our investigation back of them all? Some of these postulates are clearly derivative. Contract presupposes invention. Invention presupposes a long process of unconscious psychological evolution. Are the impression which the crowd makes upon the individual,—as Durkheim and LeBon describe it,—and the imitation which Tarde accepts as the primary social fact, also derivative phenomena, pointing back to something more elementary, which is the real formative principle of society? It is the belief of the present writer that we shall accept an affirmative answer to this question. In all likelihood we shall conclude that the elementary social fact is as elementary and as primitive as the elementary psychological fact. The simplest psychological fact,—bearing the same relation to all mental and moral phenomena that the cell bears to all more complex biological phenomena,—is the reaction or response of nerve substance to a stimulus. Suppose now the coëxistence of a number of nervous organisms, and suppose that they are so far

alike that they respond in the same way to the same stimulus or in like ways to like stimuli. Here, I think, we have beyond question the true, elemental, original social fact, in terms of which all social interpretations must ultimately be stated. Given like individuals, responding in like ways to the same stimulus, it will follow that sympathy, mutual understanding, common purposes, agreement or contract, and coöperation must ultimately arise among them.

Starting from this premise the main propositions of theoretical sociology would be developed as follows:—

(1) Like nervous organizations respond in like ways to the same stimulus.

(2) Habitual like response constitutes mental and moral resemblance—like-mindedness.

(3) Those who are mentally and morally alike become aware of their resemblances: This awareness, beginning in mere feeling or sympathy but becoming perceptive and rational, we may call the consciousness of kind.

(4) Those who are aware of their resemblances consciously and purposely participate in concerted volition.

(5) Concerted volition at first is sympathetic rather than rational; a phenomenon of emotion rather than of deliberation. Sympathetic like-mindedness is primarily impulsive, secondarily, formal, creating and following tradition.

(6) The immediate and chief aim of sympathetic like-mindedness is to extend and to perfect the mental and moral homogeneity of the community in the interest of social unity. It compels the individual members of society to obey a common authority, it extends systems of military discipline, it seeks to achieve religious unity, and to enforce harsh systems of sumptuary legislation and of criminal law.

(7) Presently concerted volition becomes deliberative, rational.

(8) When rational like-mindedness arises it is perceived that progress is possible only through variation, difference, disagreement.

(9) An effort is then made to establish liberty in the interest of progress.

(10) When wide liberty leads to great inequality which threatens social cohesion, an effort is made to limit liberty by equality and to reconcile them. This is the modern democratic movement.

The scope of this paper does not include a review of methodological writings, logical or statistical, or of works primarily critical. The best of the latter are probably Mackenzie's "An Introduction to Social Philosophy," 1890-1895, and Dr. Paul Barth's "Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie." Professor Karl Pearson, "The Grammar of Science," 1892 and 1900, Dr. John F. Crowell, "The Logical Process of Social Development," 1898, and Professor Albion W. Small, in a series of papers not yet completed on "The Scope of Sociology," in the *American Journal of Sociology*, 1900, have discussed the logical analysis of the social sciences. Professor Mayo Smith's "Statistics and Sociology," 1895, brings the review of statistical methods and results down to that date.



THE PACIFIC COAST:
A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF INFLUENCE

JOSIAH ROYCE, *Harvard University.*



HAVE been asked to describe some of the principal physical aspects of California, and to indicate the way in which they have been related to the life and civilization of the region. The task is at once, in its main outlines, comparatively simple, and in its most interesting details hopelessly complex. The topography of the Pacific slope, now well known to most travellers, is in certain of its principal features extremely easy to characterize. The broad landscapes, revealing very frequently at a glance the structure of wide regions, give one an impression that the meaning of the whole can easily be comprehended. Closer study shows how difficult it is to understand the relation of precisely such features to the life that has grown up in this region. The principal interest of the task lies in the fact that it is our American character and civilization which have been already moulded in new ways by these novel aspects of the far western regions. But we stand at the beginning of a process which must continue for long ages. Any one interested in the unity of our national life and in the guiding of our destinies by broad ideals, desires to conceive in some fashion how the physical features of the Pacific Coast may be expected to mould our national type. Yet thus far we have, as it were, only the most general indications of what the result must be.

In endeavoring to distinguish between what has already

resulted from physical conditions and what has been due to personal character, to deliberate choice, or to the general national temperament, or to what we may have to call pure accident, one is dealing with a task for which the data are not yet sufficient. We can but make a beginning.

I.

The journey westward to California is even now, when one goes by rail, a dramatic series of incidents. From the wide plains of the states immediately west of the Mississippi one passes at first through richly fertile regions to the more and more arid prairies of the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains. Then come either the steep ranges or the wide passes, and at last what used to be called the Great American Desert itself, that great interior basin of the rugged, saw-tooth ranges, where the weirdly dreary landscape at once terrifies the observer by its desolation, and inspires him by the grandeur of its loneliness, and by the mysterious peacefulness of the desert wherein, as one at first feels, nothing like the complex and restless life of our eastern civilization will ever be possible.

As one travels by the familiar central route still further west, one reaches the valley of the Humboldt River, that kindly stream whose general westerly trend made the early overland migration possible. At the end of this portion of the route rises the vast wall of the Sierra Range, and the traveller's heart thrills with something of the strange feeling that the early immigrants described when, after their long toil, they reached the place where, just beyond this dark and death-like wall, the land of heavenly promise was known to lie. Abrupt is the ascent of this great range; slower on the other side, the descent, amidst the magnificent canons of the western slope, to the plains of the Sacramento Valley. From the foot-hills of the Sierra one used to the journey could easily get at many points a wide outlook into the region beyond. The Coast Range in the far distance bounds

with its blue summits the western view, and seems to hide the ocean for whose shore one already looks, as in childhood I, who then lived in the Sierra foot-hills and had never seen the sea, used longingly to look. Through the valley beneath winds the Sacramento, fed by numerous tributaries from the Sierra. At length, as one continues the railway journey, one reaches the plains of the Sacramento Valley themselves, and enters that interesting region where the scattered oaks, separated from one another by wide distances, used to seem, I remember in the old days, as if set out by God's hand at the creation in a sort of natural park. One crosses the valley,—the shore of San Francisco Bay is reached. If one is travelling in summer, the intensely dry heat of the Sacramento Valley suddenly gives place to the cold winds of the coast. Mist and the salt air of the sea greet you as you approach the rugged hills about the Golden Gate, and find your way by ferry to San Francisco.

The region that to-day is so swiftly and so easily entered was of old the goal of an overland tour that might easily last six months from the Missouri River, and that was attended with many often recorded dangers. Yet the route that in this brief introductory statement we have followed, is nearly identical with the one which first guided the immigrants to the new land. And in part this route was identical, namely, as far as Fort Hall, with the once familiar Oregon Trail.

II.

Oregon and California, the Canaan which long formed the only goal of those who travelled over these intermediate regions, are determined as to their characters and climate by the presence beyond them of the great ocean, and by the trend northwards and southwards of the elevated ranges of mountains which lie west of the central basin. On all the continents of the world, in the latitudes of the temperate zones, the countries that lie on the lee side of the ocean receive the world's prevailing winds tempered

by a long course over the water. Accordingly, those countries very generally enjoy a relatively steadier climate than those which lie in the same latitudes but on the lee side of the great continental areas; that is, towards the east. But other influences join themselves, as secondary causes, in a number of cases, to this general consequence of the prevailing west winds of the temperate zones. The good fortune of Oregon and California as to their climate depends, in fact, as the meteorologists now recognize, partly upon the steadying influence of the vast masses of water that there lie to windward, partly upon the influence of the mountain masses themselves in affecting precipitation, and finally upon certain great seasonal changes in the distribution of the more permanent areas of high and low pressure,—changes which have been elaborately studied in the report of Lieutenant Glassford on the climate of California and Nevada, published as a government document in 1891.

During the summer months, the entire region west of the high Sierra Range and of its continuation, the Cascade Range, is comparatively free, and in the southern portion almost wholly free, from storm disturbances. The moisture-laden winds of the ocean are then deflected by areas of high pressure, which persist off the coast, and the moister winds are prevented from coming into close relation to the mountains and discharging their moisture. On the other hand, during the months from November to March, and in Oregon still later, storm areas are more frequent, and their behavior along the coast, by reason of certain areas of high pressure which are then established in the regions east of the Sierra, are rendered different from the behavior more characteristic of the well known storms of our eastern coast. The resulting conditions are sometimes those of long continued and decidedly steady precipitation on the Coast Range of California, and on the western slope of the Sierra, as well as throughout the Oregon region. Thus arise the longer rains of the California wet season. At other times in the rainy season the storm areas, moving back

and forth in a more variable way along the coast, but still unable to pass the area of high pressure that lies further inland, produce conditions of a more gently and variably showery sort over a wide extent of country; as the rainy season passes away in March and April, these showers grow less frequent in California, though they continue in Oregon much later. That portion of Oregon which lies east of the Cascade Range belongs, once more, to the decidedly dry regions of the western country; on the other hand, western Oregon has a much moister climate than California.

In consequence the climate, throughout this entire far western region, is characterized by a very sharp distinction between the wet and dry seasons; while otherwise, within the area of Oregon and California, there exist very wide differences as to the total amount of annual precipitation. Wide extents of country, as for instance the San Joaquin Valley in California, have needed the development of elaborate methods of irrigation. The relative variability of rainfall in the more northern regions has in some years beset the Sacramento Valley with severe floods. And still further north, at places on the Oregon and Washington coast, the annual precipitation reaches very high figures indeed. If one then returns to the other extreme, in far southeastern California, one is altogether in a desert region. Normally the wet season of central and southern California, even where the rainfall is considerable, is diversified by extended intervals of beautifully fair and mild weather. But, nowhere on the Pacific Coast has the variation of seasons the characters customary in the eastern country. A true winter exists, indeed, in the high Sierra, but even here this season has a character very different from that of the New England winter. Enormous falls of snow on the upper Sierra slopes are, indeed, frequent. But on the other hand, there are many places in the Sierra where an early spring very rapidly melts away these masses of snow from the upper foot-hills, and leads by a swift transition to the climate of the California dry season, in a dramatic fashion that happens to be prominent amongst my own childhood memories.

In general, then, in California and Oregon, with the great western ocean so near, the routine of the year's climate is much more definite and pre-determined than in our Atlantic states. In western Oregon where, as we have said, the climate is far more moist, the rains begin about the end of September and continue with more or fewer intermissions until May or June. The dry season then lasts steadily for three or four months. In California the dry season grows longer, the rainy season less persistent and wealthy in watery gifts, the further south we go, until in the far south, except on the coast, there is often a very short intermission in the year's drought.

So much for the climate of this region as a whole. Meanwhile, there are numerous local varieties, and amongst these more distinctly local influences that modify the climate both in the wet and in the dry seasons, the Coast Range of California plays a very important part. This range, separated, as we have seen, from the Sierra by the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys, joins its masses with those of the Sierra both at the northern end of the Sacramento Valley and at the southern extremity of the San Joaquin Valley. These two rivers, the Sacramento and the San Joaquin, flowing the one southwards and the other northwards, join their waters and find an exit to the sea through San Francisco Bay, which itself opens into the ocean through the Golden Gate. The Sacramento Valley is thus bounded on the east by a range that varies in height from seven thousand to fourteen thousand feet. The Coast Range on the west has an elevation varying from two thousand to four thousand, and in some cases rising to five thousand feet. The elevation of the Coast Range is thus sufficient to affect, in the rainy season, the precipitation in some localities, although the greatest rainfalls of the rainy season in California are due to the influence of the Sierra upon the moisture-laden winds of the sea during the passage of the areas of low pressure. But decidedly more marked is the influence of the Coast Range, during the summer months,

upon the determination of local climate along the northern Californian coast. Here the summer, from Monterey northwards, is along the coast decidedly cold,—sea-breezes and frequent mists marking the days of the entire dry season, while at night the winds usually fall, and the cold may not be so severely felt. But frequently only a few miles will separate these cold regions of the coast from the hot interior of the Sacramento Valley or from the smaller valleys on the eastern slope of the Coast Range.

To sum up the total result of all these conditions, one may say that the main feature of the whole climate, apart from its mildness, is the relatively predictable character of the year's weather. In the dryer regions of the south, wherever irrigation is possible and has been developed, the agriculturist often feels a superiority to weather conditions which makes him rejoice in the very drought that might otherwise be regarded as so formidable. In central California one is sure, in advance, of the weather that will steadily prevail during all the summer months. Agricultural operations are thus rendered definite by the knowledge of when the drought is coming, and by the freedom from all fear of sudden storms during the harvest season.

That this climate is delightful to those who are used to its routine will be well known to most readers. That it is not without its disagreeable features is equally manifest to every tourist. Nor can one say that this far western country is free from decided variations in the fortunes of different years. Where irrigation is not developed, great anxiety is frequently felt with regard to the sufficiency of the annual rain supply of the rainy season. Years of relative flood and of relative drought are as well known here as elsewhere. Nor is one wholly free, within any one season, from unexpected and sometimes disagreeably long-continued periods of unseasonable temperature. A high barometer over the region north and east of California occasionally brings to pass the well known California "northers." These have, in the rainy season, a character that in some respects reminds

one of the familiar cold-wave phenomena of the east, although the effect is very much more moderate. Frosts may then extend throughout northern California, may beset the central Coast Range, and may on occasion extend far into the southern part of California itself. But when the "northers" come during the dry season, they are frequently intensely hot winds, whose drought associated with hill or forest fires, may give rise to very memorable experiences. But these are the inevitable and minor vicissitudes of a climate which is, on the whole, remarkably steady and which is never as trying as the well known variations of our own northeastern climate. The generally good effect upon the health of such a climate is modified in certain cases by the possibly over-stimulating character of the coast summer, which, as for instance at San Francisco, permits one to work without thought of holidays all the year round. In my own boyhood it used often to be said that there were busy men in San Francisco who had reached that place in 1849, and who had become prominent in mercantile or other city life, and who had never taken vacations, and never left San Francisco even to cross the bay, from the hour of their coming until that moment. Of course, such men can be found in almost any busy community, but these men seem rather characteristic of the early California days and suggested the way in which a favorable climate may on occasion be misused by an ambitious man to add to the strains otherwise incident to the life of a new country.

If one now turns from the climate to the other aspects of the region, the general topography at once suggests marked features that must needs be of great importance to the entire life of a such country. California and Oregon are sharply sundered from one another by the ranges north of the Sacramento Valley. The Washington region, about Puget Sound, is destined to still a third and decidedly separate life, by reason of its relation to the magnificent inland waters, and by reason of the two high ranges which bound the shores of the American portion of Puget Sound.

And, in fact, the country of the whole Pacific Coast may be regarded as geographically divided into at least four great regions : the Washington region, in the neighborhood of Puget Sound ; the Oregon region with the valley of the Columbia ; the northern and central California region, including the coast and bay of San Francisco, together with the great interior valley ; and, finally, the southern region of California. Both the social development and the material future of these four great sections of the Pacific Coast, must always be mutually somewhat distinct and independent. The northern and central California region, the third of those just enumerated, is in possession of the largest harbor between Puget Sound and the southern boundary of the United States. It is, therefore, here that the civilization of the west was destined to find its first centre. Nor can this province ever have a social destiny independent of that of San Francisco itself. The southern California region, while not separated from central and northern California by any very high barrier, is still marked off by certain features due to the amount of precipitation, and to the smaller harbors which here lie on the Pacific Coast.

I have already mentioned more than once the breadth of landscape characteristic especially of central California, but often visible elsewhere on the Pacific Coast. Here is a feature that has to do at once with the materially important and with the topographically interesting features of this land. When you stand on Mount Diablo, a mountain about three thousand eight hundred feet high, and some fifteen miles east of San Francisco Bay, you look in one direction down upon the ocean and upon San Francisco Bay itself, while in the other direction you have in full sight the Sierra Range beyond the great valley, and vast reaches of the interior valley itself. Similarly, from the upper foot-hills of the Sierra, every chance elevation that overtops its neighbors a little, gives you far-reaching views of the interior valley. The normally clear air of a great part of the year determines the character and sharp outlines of these broad views. The

young Californian is thus early used to a country that, as it were, tells its principal secrets at a glance, and he sometimes finds his eye pained and confused either by the monotonous landscapes of the prairies of our middle west, or by the baffling topography of many parts of New England or of our middle states, where one small valley at a time invites one to guess what may be its unseen relations to its neighbors. The effect of all this breadth and clearness of natural scenery on mental life cannot be doubted.

III.

Of climate and topography this very summary view must now suffice. We turn from nature towards life, and ask ourselves what bearing these geographical features have had upon the still so incomplete social development of California.

In 1846, at the outset of our war with Mexico, the Mexican province of California extended towards the interior, at least on paper, so far as to include the present Nevada and Utah; but only the California coast itself was really known to its inhabitants. California was seized by the American fleet at the outset of the war. Its value to our country had been earlier made known partly through the New England traders who dealt on that coast, and partly through the appearance in the territory of American settlers. The famous report of the expedition of 1844, made by Lieutenant Fremont, brought to a focus the popular interest in the importance of the entire territory, and prepared the way for the excitement aroused by the discovery of gold in 1848.

The gold excitement determined the entire future history of California; and here of course the immediate influence of the physical upon the social conditions is the best known fact about the state. The golden period of California may be regarded as filling all the years between 1848 and 1860. Or perhaps a still better dividing line might be made in the year 1866, when the government first surveyed the mineral lands of California and

parted with its title to these lands, so that the conditions of mining ownership were thenceforth no longer primitive. Up to that time the miners of California had worked by government consent upon land to which they could acquire no title, so that their right to hold land was entirely due to miner's custom and to occupation, both of which were recognized by the courts of the state in dealing with conflicts amongst miners. With the close of the distinctively mining period, begins the agricultural period of California. Gold mining has of course continued until the present day, but the development of agriculture soon surpassed in importance that of all other industries in the state.

Nevertheless, the civilization of the agricultural period has been of course determined in large part, despite the change of material conditions, by the traditions of the more romantic golden period. The California pioneers are gradually passing away; but as the fathers and the early Puritans determined in many respects the future of New England, so the miners, together with their peers, the merchants of early San Francisco, lived a life whose traditions, directly due to the physical conditions under which they worked, are sure to be of long continued, perhaps of permanently obvious influence in the development of the civilization of California.

If one attempts to describe in what way the civilization either of the golden days or of the later agricultural period has been affected by the geographical conditions, a student of my own habits and prejudices feels at once disposed to pass directly to the inner life of the Californian and to ask himself what influence the nature and climate of such a region seem to have upon the life of the individual mind and body, and indirectly, upon the social order. Here of course one treads upon ground at once fascinating and enormously difficult. Generalization is limited by the fact of great varieties of personal character and type with which we are dealing. But after all, I think that in California literature, in the customary expressions of Californians in speaking to one another, and, to a very limited degree, in the inner con-

sciousness of any one who has grown up in California, we have evidence of certain ways in which the conditions of such a region must influence the life and, I suppose in the end, the character of the whole community. I feel disposed, then, to try to suggest very briefly how it feels to grow up in such a climate, to live in such a region, thus separated by wide stretches of country from other portions of our own land and from the world at large, thus led by the kindliness of nature into a somewhat intimate, even if uncomprehended relation to the physical conditions and thus limited to certain horizons in one's experience. I speak of course as a native Californian, but I also do not venture to limit even for a moment my characterization by reference to my own private experience. Californians are rather extraordinarily conscious of the relation between their home and their lives. Newcomers who have grown up elsewhere are constantly comparing their natural surroundings with those that they knew before. The natives, for reasons that I shall suggest in a moment, are put into a relation with nature which, whether they are students of nature or not, and whether they are observant or not, is in feeling a peculiarly intimate relation. The consequence may, as I have already suggested, be best understood by a reference to some of the wealthy and varied literature that California has already produced.

Every one is familiar with that reflection of the change of seasons in poetical literature which we find first in the classic English literature, which we find again gradually appearing in new forms in adaptation to the more special conditions of our American climate. New England nature has now been perhaps almost too frequently characterized in literary art. We are here to ask how the nature of California comes to be characterized. Let me appeal at once to some of the poets to tell us.

The most familiar account of the California climate in literature is Bret Harte's characterization of the seasonal changes in his poem, "Concepcion Argüello." The scene is here at the

Presidio at San Francisco, close by the Golden Gate, where the heroine waited for her lover during the long years that the poem describes.

“Day by day on wall and bastion beat the hollow empty breeze—
Day by day the sunlight glittered on the vacant, smiling seas ;
Week by week the near hills whitened in their dusty leather cloaks—
Week by week the far hills darkened from the fringing plain of oaks ;
Till the rains came, and far-breaking, on the fierce southwester tost,
Dashed the whole long coast with color, and then vanished and were lost.
So each year the seasons shifted, wet and warm and drear and dry ;
Half a year of clouds and flowers—half a year of dust and sky.”

The nature which is thus depicted has of course many other aspects besides this its fundamental rhythm; but prominent in all the literary descriptions is the stress laid upon the coming of the rains,—an event which occupies, very naturally, the same place in the California poet's mind that the spring occupies elsewhere. Only what this springtime breaks in upon in California is not in general cold but drought. It is here not the bursting away of any iron barrier of frost, but the clearing of the hazy air, the introduction of a rich and sudden new life, the removing of a dull and dry oppression from the heart,—it is such things that first come to mind when one views this change. A student of the University of California in the year 1878, a lady who has won success in more than one branch of literature, Miss Milicent Shinn, published in a college paper of that time the following sonnet, under the title of “Rain.” The poem deserves to be recalled here, just as a suggestion of the relation between nature and the individual mind under such conditions:—

“It chanced me once that many weary weeks
I walked to daily work across a plain,
Far-stretching, barren since the April rain ;
And now, in gravelly beds of vanished creeks,
November walked dry shod. On every side

Round the horizon hung a murky cloud,—
No hills, no waters ; and above that shroud
A wan sky rested shadowless and wide.
Until one night came down the earliest rain ;
And in the morning, lo, in fair array,
Blue ranges crowned with snowy summits, lay
All round about the fair transfigured plain.
Oh, would that such a rain might melt away
In tears the cloud that chokes my heart with pain."

The heavy air of the close of the dry season, the weary waiting for the autumn rains, the quick change as the new life came,—all these things bring characteristically before one the nature life of central California,—a region of the half arid type, where the conditions are far enough from true desert conditions, while at moments they simulate the latter. Yet not merely this fundamental rhythm of the climate so easily impressive to every sojourner, arouses the sensitive attention of the life-long inhabitant. The dwellers by the shores of San Francisco Bay see these seasonal changes in the midst of a highly varied landscape. From the hill slopes on the eastern shores of that great harbor one looks towards the Golden Gate. North of the Gate rise the rugged heights of Mount Tamalpais, to a point about twenty-six hundred feet above the sea-level. South of the Gate, San Francisco itself adds its smoke to the ocean mists, and its hilly summits to the generally bold landscape. The wide expanse of water, stretching north and south in the bay, changes color under the daylight in the most varied manner, according as cloud and sunshine, or as dawn, morning, afternoon, and sunset pass before you. In the summer time the afternoon ocean mists enter, along with the steadily rising daily wind which falls only with the twilight. One of California's most successful poets, Miss Coolbrith, pictures this scene in her poem entitled "Two Pictures."

MORNING.

“As in a quiet dream,
The mighty waters seem :
Scarcely a ripple shows
Upon their blue repose.

The sea-gulls smoothly ride
Upon the drowsy tide,
And a white sail doth sleep
Far out upon the deep.

A dreamy purple fills
The hollows of the hills ;
A single cloud floats through
The sky's serenest blue ;

And far beyond the Gate,
The massed vapors wait—
White as the walls that ring
The City of the King.

There is no sound, no word ;
Only a happy bird
Trills to her nestling young,
A little, sleepy song.

This is the holy calm ;
The heavens dropping balm ;
The Love made manifest,
And near ; the perfect rest.

EVENING.

The day grows wan and cold :
In through the Gate of Gold
The restless vapors glide,
Like ghosts upon the tide.

The brown bird folds her wing,
Sad, with no song to sing.
Along the streets the dust
Blows sharp, with sudden gust.

The night comes, chill and gray ;
Over the sullen bay,
What mournful echoes pass
From lonely Alcatraz !

O bell, with solemn toll,
As for a passing soul !
As for a soul that waits,
In vain, at heaven's gates.

This is the utter blight ;
The sorrow infinite
Of earth ; the closing wave ;
The parting, and the grave."

Such is the daily drama of the dry season at the bay. On the other hand, the rainy season itself contains some tragedies that in no wise belong to the eastern winter. There are the northers, with their periods of relative chill and their swift winged sternness ; and these northers have often been celebrated in California verse. But apart from such colder periods, the loud roaring storms and heavy rains are often likely to stand in a curious contrast to the abounding life of vegetation which the rains themselves have aroused. It is possible to cultivate roses in one's garden throughout the greater part of the year. These, the rainy season, will generally encourage in their blooming. On the other hand, the stormy wind will from time to time destroy them with its own floods of cruelty. Miss Coolbrith depicts such a scene in the poem entitled, "My 'Cloth of Gold.'" As in tropical countries, so here the long storms seem often much darker and drearier by reason of their warfare with the rich life amidst which they rage.

IV.

Such are a few of the many instances that might be given of the emotional reactions of sensitive minds in the presence of California nature. But now the outer aspect of nature unquestion-

ably moulds both the emotions and the customs of mankind, insensibly affects men's temperaments in ways which, as we know somehow or other tend to become hereditary, however we may view the vexed question concerning the heredity of acquired characters. Moreover, the influence of nature upon custom which every civilization depicts, is precisely the kind of influence that from moment to moment expresses itself psychologically in the more typical emotions of sensitive souls. Thus, one may observe that if we are considering the relation between civilization and climate, and are endeavoring to speculate in however vague a manner upon the future of a society in a given environment, we may well turn to the poets, not for a solution of our problem, but for getting significant hints. Or, to put the case somewhat boldly otherwise, I should say that the vast processes which in the course of centuries appear in the changes of civilization due to climate, involve, as it were, tremendously complex mathematical functions. If it were possible for us to state these stupendous functions, we should be possessed of the secret of such social changes. Of such a stupendous function, a group of poems, expressing as they do momentary human changes, might be called, if you like, a system of partial, and I admit very partial differential equations. I do not hope to integrate any such system of equations, or to gain an exact view of the types of the functions from a consideration of them, and of course I admit with readiness that I am using only a very rough mathematical metaphor. But to translate the matter once more into literal terms, the tendencies of the moment are in their way indications of what the tendencies of the ages are to be.

Now what all this poetry in general psychologically means, quite apart from special moods, is that the Californian of necessity gains a kind of sensitiveness to nature which is different in type from the sensitiveness that a severer climate would inevitably involve and different too in type from that belonging to climates mild but moist and more variable. In the first place as you see,

such a climate permits one to be a great deal out of doors in the midst of nature. To permit wide views, where the outlines are vast and in general clear. As, when you are on a steamer, it is a matter of some skill to understand what are the actual conditions of wind and sea, while, when you are on a sailing vessel, you constantly feel both the wind and the sea with a close intimacy that needs no technical knowledge to make it at least appreciated, so, in the case of such a climate as the one of California, your relations with nature are essentially intimate, whether you are a student of nature or not. Your dependence upon nature you feel in one sense more, and in another sense less,—more because you are more constantly in touch with the natural changes of the moment; less, because you know that nature is less to be feared than under severer conditions. And this intimacy with nature means a certain change in your relations to your fellow men. You get a sense of power from these wide views, a habit of personal independence from the contemplation of a world that the eye seems to own. Especially in country life the individual Californian consequently tends towards a certain kind of independence which I find in a strong and subtle contrast to the sort of independence that, for instance, the New England farmer cultivates. The New England farmer must fortify himself in his stronghold against the seasons. He must be ready to adapt himself to a year that permits him to prosper only upon decidedly hard terms. But the California country proprietor can have, during the drought, more leisure, unless, indeed, his ambition for wealth too much engrosses him. His horses are plenty and cheap. His fruit crops thrive easily. He is able to supply his table with fewer purchases, with less commercial dependence. His position is, therefore, less that of the knight in his castle and more that of the free dweller in the summer cottage, who is indeed not at leisure, but can easily determine how he shall be busy. It is of little importance to him who his next neighbor is. At pleasure he can ride or

drive a good way to find his friends ; can choose, like the southern planter of former days, his own range of hospitality ; can devote himself, if a man of cultivation, to reading during a good many hours at his own choice, or, if a man of sport, can find during a great part of the year easy opportunities for hunting or for camping both for himself and for the young people of his family. In the dry season he knows beforehand what engagements can be made, without regard to the state of the weather, since the state of the weather is predetermined.

The free life and interchange of hospitality, so often described in the accounts of early California, has left its traces in the country life of California at the present day. Very readily, if you have moderate means, you can create your own quiet estate at a convenient distance from the nearest town. You may cover your house with a bower of roses, surround yourself with an orchard, quickly grow eucalyptus as a shade-tree, and with nearly equal facility multiply other shade trees. You become, on easy terms, a proprietor, with estate and home of your own. Now all this holds in a sense of any mild climate. But in California the more regular routine of wet and dry seasons modifies and renders more stable the general psychological consequences. All this is encouraging to a kind of harmonious individuality that already tends in the best instances towards a somewhat Hellenic type.

A colleague of my own, a New Englander of the strictest persuasion, who visited California for a short time when he was himself past middle life, returned enthusiastic with the report that the California countrymen seemed to him to resemble the ancient yes, even the Homeric Greeks, of the *Odyssey*. The Californians had their independence of judgment ; their carelessness of what a barbarian might think, so long as he came from beyond the border ; their apparent freedom in choosing what manner of men they should be ; their ready and confident speech. All these things my friend at once noticed as characteristic. Thus different in type are these country proprietors from the equally indi-

vidual, the secretly independent, the silently conscientious New England villagers. They are also quite different from the typical southern proprietors. From the latter they differ in having less tendency to respect traditions, and in laying much less stress upon formal courtesies. The Californian, like the westerner in general, is likely to be somewhat abrupt in speech, and his recent coming to the land has made him on the whole quite indifferent to family tradition. I myself, for instance, reached twenty years of age without ever becoming clearly conscious of what was meant by judging a man by his antecedents, a judgment that in an older and less isolated community is natural and inevitable, and that, I think, in most of our western communities, grows up more rapidly than it has grown up in California, where the geographical isolation is added to the absence of tradition. To my own mind, in childhood, every human being was, with a few exceptions, whatever he happened to be. Hereditary distinctions I appreciated only in case of four types of humanity. There were the Chinamen, there were the Irishmen, there were the Mexicans, and there were the rest of us. Within each of these types, every man to my youthful mind was precisely what God and himself had made him, and it was distinctly a new point of view to attach a man to the antecedents that either his family or his other social relationships had determined for him. Now, I say, this type of individuality, known more or less in our western communities, but developed in peculiarly high degree in California, seems to me due not merely to the newness of the community, and not merely to that other factor of geographical isolation that I just mentioned, but to the relation with nature of which we have already spoken. It is a free and on the whole an emotionally exciting, and also as we have said, an engrossing and intimate relation.

In New England, if you are moody, you may wish to take a long walk out of doors, but that is not possible at all or even at most seasons. Nature may not be permitted to comfort you. In

California, unless you are afraid of the rain, nature welcomes you at almost any time. The union of the man and the visible universe is free, is entirely unchecked by any hostility on the part of nature, and is such as easily fills one's mind with wealth of warm experience. Our poets just quoted have laid stress in the few instances quoted upon the directly or symbolically painful aspects of the scene. But these are sorrows of a sort that mean precisely that relation with nature which I am trying to characterize, not the relation of hostility but of closeness. And this is the sort of closeness determined not merely by mild weather, but by long drought and by the relative steadiness of all the climatic conditions.

Now, I must feel that such tendencies are of vast importance, not merely to-day but for all time. They are tendencies whose moral significance in the life of California is of course both good and evil, since man's relations with nature are in general a neutral material upon which ethical relations may be based. If you are industrious, this intimacy with nature means constant coöperation, a coöperation never interrupted by frozen ground and deep snow. If you tend to idleness, nature's kindness may make you all the more indolent, and indolence is a possible enough vice with the dwellers in all mild climates. If you are morally careless, nature encourages your freedom, and tends in so far to develop a kind of morale frequently characteristic of the dwellers in gentle climates. Yet the nature of California is not enervating. The nights are cool, even in hot weather; owing to the drought the mildness of the air is not necessarily harmful. Moreover, the nature that is so uniform also suggests in a very dignified way a regularity of existence, a definite reward for a definitely planned deed. Climate and weather are at their best always capricious, and as we have seen, the variations of the California seasons have involved the farmers in much anxiety, and in many cases have given the farming business, as carried on in certain California communities, the same sort of gambling tendency that

originally vitiated the social value of the mining industry. But on the other hand, as the conditions grew more stable, as agriculture developed, vast irrigation enterprises introduced once more a conservative tendency. Here again for the definite deed nature secures a definite return. In regions subject to irrigation, man controls the weather as he cannot elsewhere. He is independent of the current season. And this tendency to organization,—a tendency similar to the one that was obviously so potent in the vast ancient civilization of Egypt, is present under Californian conditions, and will make itself felt.

Individuality then, but of a peculiar type, and a tendency despite all this individualism towards agricultural conservatism and a definite social organization—these are already the results of this climate.

V.

I have spoken already several times of the geographical isolation of this region. This has been a factor that was felt of course in the social life from the very outset, and more in the early days than at present. To be sure, it was never without its compensating features. It shows its influences in a way that varies with pretty definite periods of California history. In the earliest days, before the newcomers in California supposed that agriculture was possible on any large scale, nearly everything was imported. Butter, for instance, was sent around the Horn to San Francisco. And throughout the early years most of the population felt, so to speak, morally rooted in the eastern communities from which they had sprung. This tendency retarded for a long time the development of California society, and made the pioneers careless as to the stability of their social structure; encouraged corrupt municipal administration in San Francisco; gave excuse for the lynching habit in the hastily organized mining communities. But a reaction quickly came. After the general good order which as a fact characterized the year 1849,

had gradually given place with the increase of population to the disorders of 1851 and to the municipal errors of the years between 1850 and 1856 in the city of San Francisco, there came a period of reform and of growing conservatism which marked all the time of the later mining period and of the transition to the agricultural period. During these years many who had come to California without any permanent purpose, decided to become members of the community, and decided in consequence to create a community of which it was worth while to be a member. The consequence was the increase of the influence of the factor of geographical isolation in its social influence upon the life of California. The community became self-conscious, independent, indisposed to take advice from without, very confident of the future of the State and of the boundless prosperity soon to be expected; and within the years between 1860 and 1870 a definite local tradition of California life was developed upon the basis of the memories and characters that had been formed in the early days. The consequence was a provincial California, whose ideals at last assumed that form of indifference to the barbarians beyond the border which my friend noticed as surviving even to the time of the visit of which I have spoken.

But the completion of the trans-continental railway in 1869 introduced once more the factor of physical connection with the east, and of commercial rivalry with the investors of the Mississippi valley who now undertook along with the capitalists of California to supply the mining population of the still newer Rocky Mountain regions. On the whole, I should say that for a good while the provincial California, in the rather extremer sense of the tradition of the sixties and early seventies, held its own against the influence of the railway. But the original railway did not remain alone. Other trans-continental lines developed. The southern portion of the state, long neglected during the early days, became in the beginning of the eighties, the theatre of a new immigration and of a new and on the whole decidedly more eastern civilization. The

result has been that since that time a third stage of California life and society, a stage marked by a union of the provincial independence of the middle period with the complex social influences derived from the east and from the world at large. The California of to-day is still the theatre of the struggle of these opposing forces.

VI.

It remains necessary to characterize more fully the way in which the consequences of the early days, joined to the geographical factors upon which we have already laid stress, have influenced the problems of California life and society. From the very outset, climate and geographical position, and the sort of life in which men were engaged have encouraged types of individuality, whose subtle distinction from those elsewhere to be found we have already attempted in a very inadequate fashion to suggest. Accordingly, from the first period down to the present time, the California community has been a notable theatre for the display of political and financial, and on occasion, of intellectual individuality, of decidedly extraordinary types. The history of both earlier and later California politics has been a very distinctly personal history. The political life of the years before the war had as their most picturesque incident the long struggle for the United States Senatorship carried on between David Broderick and William Gwin. This contest involved personalities far more than principles. Gwin and Broderick were both of them extremely picturesque figures;—the one a typical Irish-American, the other a Southerner. The story of their bitter warfare is a familiar California romance. The tragic death of Broderick, in duel with the once notorious Terry, is a tale that long had a decidedly national prominence. Terry himself is an example of a type of individuality not elsewhere unknown in border life, but developed under peculiarly Californian conditions. Terry was, very frankly, a man of blood. Regarding him as a man of blood,

one finds him in many ways and within his own limits an interesting, even a conscientious and attractive personality. He was at one time upon the Supreme Bench of the State of California. He warred with the Vigilance Committee of 1856 in a manner that certainly wins one's respect for his skill in bringing that organization into a very difficult position. He carried on this warfare both as judge of the Supreme Court and as wielder of a bowie knife. When he slew Broderick, he did so in a fashion that, so far as the duelling code permitted, was perfectly fair. He lived for years with a disposition to take the unpopular side of every question, to fight bitterly for causes for which no other man cared, and it was precisely for such a cause that he finally died. His attempted assault upon Judge Field, and the controversy that led thereto, and that resulted in Terry's death, was, a few years since, in everybody's memory.

It would be wholly wrong to conceive California individuality as at all fairly represented by a border type such as Terry's. Yet when one looks about in California society and politics, one finds even at the present day picturesque personalities preserving their picturesqueness amidst various grades of nobility and baseness, in a fashion more characteristic, I think, than is customary in most of our newer communities. The nobler sort of picturesque personality may be the public benefactor, like Lick or Sutro. He may be the social reformer of vast ideals, like Henry George. Or again the baser individual may be the ignorant demagogue of the grade of Dennis Kearney. Your California hero may be the chief of the Vigilance Committee of 1856, or some other typical and admired pioneer, growing old in the glory of remembered early deeds. He may be the railway magnate, building a trans-continental line under all sorts of discouragements, winning a great fortune, and dying just as he founds a university. But in all these phases, he remains the strong individual type of man that in a great democracy is always necessary. It is just this type that, as some of us fear, the conditions of our

larger democracy in more eastern regions tend far too much to eliminate. In California, such individuality is by no means yet eliminated.

There is a symptom of this fact which I have frequently noted, both while I was a continuous resident of California and from time to time since. Individualistic communities are almost universally, and paradoxically enough, communities that are extremely cruel to individuals. It is so in a debating club, where individuality is encouraged, but where every speaker is subject to fierce criticism. Now, this is still so in California to an extent which surprises even one who is used to the public controversies of some of our eastern cities. The individual who by public action or utterance rises above the general level in California, is subject to a kind of attack which strong men frequently enjoy, but which even the stranger finds on occasion peculiarly merciless. That absence of concern for a man's antecedents of which I before spoke, contributes to this very mercilessness. A friend once remarked to me that in California, Phillips Brooks, had he appeared there before reaching the very height of his reputation, would have had small chance to win a hearing, so little reverence would have been felt for the mere form of the causes that he maintained. This remark was perhaps unfair, since a stranger preacher,—Thomas Starr King,—gained in early California days, at about the beginning of the war, a very great public reputation in a short time, received great sympathy, and had a mighty influence. But on the other hand, it is perfectly certain that the public man who intends to maintain his ideals in California will have to do so under fire, and will have to be strong enough to bear the fire. His family, or the clubs to which he belongs, the university that he represents, the church that supports him,—none of these factors will in such a community easily determine his standing. He works in a community where the pioneer tradition still remains,—the tradition of independence and of distrust towards enthusiasm. For one feels in California, very keenly, that enthusiasm may after

all mean sham, until one is quite sure that it has been severely tested. And this same community, so far as its country population is concerned, is made up of persons who, whether pioneers or newcomers, live in the aforesaid agricultural freedom, in easy touch with nature, not afraid of the sentiments of the crowd, although of course disposed, like other human beings, to be affected by a popular cry in so far as it attacks men or declares new ideals insignificant. It is much more difficult to arouse the enthusiastic sympathy of such people than it is, in case one has the advantage of the proper social backing, to affect the public opinion of a more highly organized social order, in a less isolated region.

And now we have seen the various ways in which this sort of individuality is a product of the natural features of the State as well as of those early conditions which themselves were determined by geographical factors. On the other hand, in addition to this prevalence of individuality and this concomitant severity of the judgment of prominent individuals, there are social conditions characteristic of San Francisco which can also be referred to geographical and climatic factors. Early in the development of San Francisco a difficulty in the education of the young appeared, which, as I fancy, has not yet been removed. This difficulty had to do with the easy development of vagrancy in city children. Vagrancy is a universal evil of cities, but the California vagrant can easily pass the night out-doors during the greater part of the year. A friend of mine who was connected with the management of San Francisco public schools for a number of years, laid stress upon this climatic factor and its dangers in official communications published at the time of his office. The now too well known name of "hoodlum" originated in San Francisco and is said to have been the name adopted by a particular group of young men. The social complications of the time of the sand-lot, when Dennis Kearney led laborers into a dangerous pass, were again favored by climatic conditions. Public meetings

out-of-doors and in the sand-lot could be held with a certain freedom and persistency in California that would be impossible without interruption elsewhere. While such factors have nothing to do with discontent, they greatly increase the opportunities for agitation. The new constitution of California, adopted in 1879, was carried at the polls by a combination of the working men of San Francisco with the dissatisfied farmers of the interior. This dissatisfaction of the farmers was no doubt due in the main to the inadequacy of their comprehension of the material conditing under which they were working. The position of California,—its geographical isolation again,—has been one complication factor for the California farmer, since as luxuriant nature easily furnished him, in case he should use wise methods, with a rich supply, while his geographical isolation made access to market somewhat difficult. This difficulty about the markets long affected California political life in the form of dissatisfaction felt against the railway, which was of course held responsible and which in fact for years was more or less responsible for an increase of these difficulties of reaching the market. Well, this entire series of complications, which in 1879 combined San Francisco working men with the farmers of the interior, and changed the constitution of the state, is an example of the complex way in which the geographical situation and the factors of climate have acted to affect social movements.

On the other hand, the individuality aforesaid, when brought into the presence of such social agitations, has frequently proved in California life a conservative factor of great importance. The mob may be swept away for a time by an agitating idea. But the individual Californian himself is suspicious of mobs. The agitations in question proved transient. Even the constitution, designed to give the discontented whatever they most supposed they wanted, proved to be susceptible of a very conservative construction by the courts, and public opinion in California has never been very long under the sway of any one illu-

sion. The individuality that we have described quickly revolts against its false prophets. In party politics, California proves to be an extremely doubtful state. Party ties are not close. The vote changes from election to election. The independent voter is well in place. Finally, through all these tendencies there runs a certain idealism, often more or less unconscious. This idealism is partly due to the memory of the romance due to the entire romance of the early days. It is also sustained by precisely that intimacy with nature which renders the younger Californians so sensitive. I think that perhaps Edward Rowland Sill, whose poems are nowadays so widely appreciated, has given the most representative expression to the resulting spirit of California, to that tension between individualism and loyalty, between shrewd conservatism and bold radicalism, which mark this community.



THE GREAT CHINESE VICEROY AND DIPLOMAT

JOHN WATSON FOSTER, *Washington.*



HE senior Plenipotentiary nominated by the Chinese Government to conduct negotiations with the Western or Christian powers is Li Hung Chang, the most distinguished statesman of the Celestial Empire, and is by all odds the man best fitted for the important and delicate duties entrusted to him. For many years he has held the office of First Grand Secretary of the Imperial Government and the rank of earl, for twenty-five years he was the Viceroy of Chili, the metropolitan province of the Empire, and when nominated to his present mission he was Viceroy of the two important provinces whose capital is Canton, and which embrace forty millions of people.

His career would be called remarkable in any country or in any age. A son of well-to-do, but not distinguished nor influential, parents, he devoted himself so assiduously to study in his youth that he was enabled to pass in succession the competitive examinations of his district, province, and, finally, the great imperial examination at Peking. In course of time he became a member of the Hanlin College, an institution of China somewhat similar to the French Academy. These achievements gave him a recognized position as one of the great scholars of his country, and he returned to his native district with a well-founded expectation that he might at no distant day receive from the government

some civil appointment, which would give him employment, put him in the line of promotion, and enable him to pursue his literary studies.

But one event occurred which changed the whole current of his life. The Taiping rebellion was then at the height of its success. This revolt was the most destructive war of the nineteenth century in the number of lives sacrificed and area of country laid waste, far surpassing in this respect the Napoleonic wars. The victorious rebels with an immense army passed through the native district of Li Hung Chang, in the valley of the Yang Tse Kiang, en route for the apparently certain capture of Peking and the overthrow of the ruling dynasty. Li Hung Chang, inspired with zeal for his Emperor, although without any military experience or training, raised a volunteer force, fell upon the rear of the rebel army and so harassed its progress that his movement had a great influence in causing the rebels to abandon their expedition to Peking and retire again south of the Yang Tse Kiang.

This achievement suddenly brought him into prominence, he was given an important command in the Imperial army, and he displayed such military skill and energy that, in a little while, he was placed at the head of the army, and, with the aid of the American, General Ward and afterwards of Colonel Gordon, he had the great distinction of completely suppressing the rebellion and saving the present dynasty. For some years thereafter he was engaged in the military service, putting down successive revolts and preserving the peace of the Empire. He may justly be regarded as the greatest general his country has produced in the present generation.

But again an event occurred which changed his career, and led to his future service in diplomacy. About thirty years ago, following the Anglo-French occupation of Peking in 1860, China witnessed an agitation very similar to the recent one, in its foreign-hating manifestations. Throughout the country the foreign residents suffered insult and mob violence, and as the

missionaries were most exposed they were, as now, the chief sufferers. The most terrible and bloody of these events occurred at Tientsin in 1870, when a sudden uprising of the population, overpowering and carrying along with them the soldiers, rushed upon, pillaged, and burned the French Consulate and the French Catholic cathedral, murdered the consul and priests, and thence marched to the orphanage, destroyed the building, and murdered the sisters in charge. The deed sent a thrill of horror throughout the Christian world, and led the French government to demand heavy reprisals, and to assume a menacing attitude, in which it was supported by all the representatives of the Western powers at Peking. The Chinese authorities were greatly alarmed at the situation. The Viceroy of the province of Chili, in which the riot occurred, was an old man, conservative in his tendencies, and the negotiations with him and the Tsung-li Yamen or Foreign Office at Peking by the French Minister were progressing slowly and in a very unsatisfactory manner. The Imperial Government, recognizing the gravity of the peril confronting it, removed the old Viceroy, transferred Li Hung Chang to Tientsin, and he was clothed by the Emperor with plenipotentiary powers to effect a settlement. In a short time he presented to the French Minister a proposition which was so complete an atonement for the wrongs and injuries sustained that the latter promptly accepted it, and the danger of another European war, with further humiliation for China, was averted.

In this transaction the successful Chinese general developed marked skill as a diplomatist, and he was destined henceforth for the next quarter of a century to take the control of the foreign relations of the Empire. He was made Viceroy of the province, in which Peking is situated, and the seat of his residence or Yamen was placed at Tientsin, the sea-port of Peking, instead of Pao Ting Fu, the capital of the province, located some distance in the interior. And thus for twenty-five years, up to 1895, he stood as a sentinel on the outpost of the forbidden city,

and for his secluded sovereign held intercourse with the outside world. While the routine duties connected with foreign affairs were conducted by the Tsung-li Yamen with the diplomatic representatives at Peking, this body took no important step without first consulting him and being governed by his indications; and he personally participated in every important treaty negotiation or diplomatic controversy of his government. The foreign representatives fully understood this and in their journeys to and from the capital, they never failed to call upon and confer with the Viceroy.

I first met Li Hung Chang in 1894, on a trip which I was making around the world. I saw him in his viceregal state, at a time when he possessed the unlimited confidence of his government, and when his lofty bearing and courteous manners were most distinctive. He then impressed me as no other statesman or ruler whom I met on that interesting journey. He is a pure Chinese, having no mixture of Manchu blood. He is a man of fine physique, over six feet high, of commanding presence, erect and stoutly built, with dark, piercing eyes, and a face that is strongly moulded and indicative of strength of character. Dressed in his parti-colored, silken, flowing robes, and his hat decorated with the three-eye peacock feathers, he presented a figure which would be distinguished amid the glitter and pageantry of any European court. On his recent arrival at Shanghai and Tientsin, en route to meet the foreign representatives, the press correspondents describe him as much broken in health and state that he can only walk by the aid of two assistants. Some years ago he had a severe illness, having somewhat the symptoms of paralysis, from which he never fully recovered, and I learn that of late he has grown quite stout. He is now in his seventy-ninth year, and one can well anticipate that he should begin to feel the physical effects of old age. But judging from his interviews and public utterances on the present grave questions, it would seem that his mental energies are still unimpaired, and

that he possesses the intellectual acumen which has heretofore been displayed in diplomatic affairs.

During his entire life up to the time he visited Japan, in 1895, to negotiate for peace, he had never been out of his own country, but his frequent contact with foreigners and his management of the international matters of his government have made him quite familiar with the progress and conditions of the outside world. He called about him at Tientsin a staff of able assistants, who were accomplished linguists and knew thoroughly European and American affairs, and it was their duty to keep him informed of passing events abroad. Three of his secretaries and advisers call for a passing notice in this connection.

Lo Feng-luh is a Chinese scholar who has been educated in one of the English universities. He speaks and writes English fluently and scarcely without an idiom. He accompanied the Viceroy to Japan on his peace mission, and afterward, in 1896, to Europe and America. It was Lo Feng-luh who put into classic English the various addresses and speeches which the Viceroy delivered at the receptions and entertainments with which he was honored on that memorable journey. Much of the credit which the public gave to the Viceroy for wise thought and apt expression in those addresses was due to his secretary. When Earl Li gave up his viceroyalty at Tientsin he procured the appointment of Minister to London for his secretary, and he still holds that important post.

Wu Ting-fang, for many years one of the Viceroy's secretaries, received his early education and learned to speak English in the schools of the missionaries at Canton and Hong Kong, but he completed his education by a course of law and was made a barrister at the Inner Temple, London. He was for some time a secretary of the Chinese Legation in Tokyo, Japan, and also of the peace mission to that country, and was designated by the Emperor to exchange the ratifications at Chefoo of the treaty of peace. On the breaking up of his staff at Tientsin the

Viceroy secured for Mr. Wu the post of Minister to the United States, which he still holds with so much credit for his country and acceptance by ours.

At the close of the Civil War a discharged young soldier presented himself to Secretary Seward, and said he would like to obtain a position in the diplomatic or consular service in China, as he had an ambition to go to that great country, learn its language and study its people and institutions, in the hope that he might thereby become useful to his own country. All that Secretary Seward could do for him was to give him a letter of commendation to our Minister in Peking, Anson Burlingame. This young man, William N. Pethick, went to China, failed of any employment in the service of the United States, adopted the Chinese dress and life, and in a few years became so familiar with that difficult language that he has now few equals and no superior as an interpreter and translator. He is as well an accomplished English scholar, a man of ability and a thorough American, and has been anxious to serve his own country in the consular service in China; but he had no "influence in politics," and had to seek service elsewhere. For many years he was a tutor in the family of Earl Li and secretary on his staff, and up to a late date has acted as his secretary. He has said that while he was attached to his staff he read (in translation) to the Viceroy not less than eight hundred books in English, French, and German. He has been an invaluable aid to the Viceroy in all foreign matters, and has instilled into his mind a great admiration for the United States.

It may readily be understood that with such a staff of assistants Earl Li would be well equipped for his task as a diplomatist, but a staff alone cannot make the diplomat any more than it can make the successful general. No one ever came in contact with Li without being impressed that he was a man of quick discernment and great intellectual power, and the foreign representatives who have had important questions to settle with him have gener-

ally given him credit for a good degree of frankness and fair dealing. Probably no living man has received such signal marks of respect from his diplomatic antagonists as he. In the Margary affair, a most serious controversy with Great Britain, he was so straightforward and just in meeting the demands of that government that Sir Thomas Wade, the most distinguished of British Ministers in China, was led to make an important concession, "in recognition of the frankness with which he had negotiated this very troublesome business." In the adjustment of the French conflict with China in 1884-85, the French Minister inserted in the treaty a renunciation of all claims for indemnity, in order thereby "to pay a mark of regard to the patriotic wisdom of His Excellency Li Hung Chang." When, in 1895, China in the first instance sent two of its distinguished subjects to Japan to sue for peace, the latter government declined to treat with them; but Marquis Ito, the prime minister, sent a message to Peking that if the Viceroy Li should be sent on such a mission, it would be an evidence of sincere intentions, and that he would be received with the highest consideration; and the sequel realized this estimate of his character and ability.

Although he has been the most honored of all the living subjects of the Emperor, his career has not been one of uninterrupted success and favor, for he has a multitude of enemies in the Empire. His experience in this respect illustrates a peculiar phase of Chinese government. After the suppression of the Taiping rebellion, the Emperor showered upon him high offices and emoluments, and conferred on him the "Yellow Jacket," the highest insignia of Imperial favor. But only a few years later, because of failure to put down the Nienfei revolt in the time expected, he was ordered to be degraded in rank, to be removed from his post, and deprived of the yellow jacket; but before the decree could be executed a turn of fortune gave him decisive victories, and his rank, post, and jacket were preserved. Again, the next year after his great diplomatic service at Tientsin, owing to the extensive

damage inflicted upon the grand canal by the floods, which was attributed to the neglect of the Viceroy of Chili, he was degraded in rank and stripped of his yellow jacket; but these were soon after restored to him.

During his occupancy of the viceroyalty of Chili, Earl Li was entrusted with the organization of an army on European models and the building of a strong navy, and on this work he had spent many millions of dollars. When the Japanese war was brooding, he strongly opposed it, but he was overruled by the war party at Peking. When it was entered upon, the army and navy of the Viceroy were expected to do the fighting and maintain the supremacy of China on land and sea. After the defeat of the Chinese navy at the battle of Yalu River and the overwhelming discomfiture of the army, Li, who was held responsible for the failure, was a third time degraded in rank and stripped of the yellow jacket, although he was retained in command of the province. But we have seen that when China was forced by Japan to sue for peace, it was to the disgraced Viceroy his personal enemies in control of the administration at Peking had to turn; and, as a preliminary to his commission as a peace plenipotentiary, the Emperor rehabilitated him in his rank, offices, and jacket.

Only his devotion to his country could have induced him to accept the post of negotiator, for he well knew that he must be the instrument through which deep humiliation would be inflicted by Japan upon China, that the treaty which he should make would be very unpopular throughout the Empire, and that he would be made the scape-goat for his country's sins. His fears in this respect were fully realized. He found on his return from the peace negotiations at Shimonoseki that the Viceroys and generals had united in denouncing his treaty to the Throne; with the utmost difficulty he secured its ratification by the Emperor, and after peace was declared he was removed from the viceroyalty at Tientsin, and called to Peking where he was assigned to subordinate duties. His great influence was gone and it seemed that his

enemies in the government had achieved a permanent triumph.

But another turn in public affairs soon came, and again to the great advantage of Earl Li. When the reform party, which had succeeded in getting control of the young Emperor, was overthrown and the Empress Dowager again resumed the reigns of power in 1898, Li Hung Chang was at once restored to position and influence. He had always been a strong supporter and was the special protégé of this remarkable woman. As an indicative of the relations which exist between these two high personages and of Li's estimate of the Empress Dowager, I give an extract from an interview which the well known newspaper correspondent, Mr. Frank G. Carpenter, had with the Viceroy at Canton some weeks before the recent Boxer outbreak :—

"I understand, Your Excellency, that the Empress Dowager is opposed to railroads and to all modern progress."

"That is not so," was Li Hung Chang's diplomatic reply. "She is in favor of the good things that are modern, but she wants us to be sure they are good before she accepts them. The newspapers have said many things about the government of China which are untrue."

"Yes, but, Your Excellency, it is hard to tell what is true in China. It is said that the Empress Dowager has had the Emperor penned up in the Imperial Palace for months. Is that true?"

"No," said Earl Li, "it is not. The Emperor has held audiences with the Empress Dowager and they have been doing the business together."

"But then, who is the real ruler of China? Who is governing the Empire, the Emperor or the Empress Dowager?"

The above was a leading question and Li Hung Chang could not evade it. He stopped a moment and finally replied:

"The Empress Dowager is the real ruler."

"But is not that a strange way to do, Your Excellency," said I, "to have a young Emperor and let an old woman rule?"

"I do not think so," said His Excellency. "It is not different here than it is in England. The Prince of Wales is certainly old enough, but Queen Victoria rules. The Empress Dowager is very clever."

"But, your Excellency, what can she know about the Empire? She does not travel over it and she never gets out among the people."

"Queen Victoria personally knows nothing of her Empire," said Li Hung Chang. "She goes now and then to Scotland and sometimes to the south of France. She has to take her information from the officials, and so does the Empress Dowager."

While Earl Li was restored to the Imperial favor by the *coup*

d'état of 1898, it did not suit the plans of the princes of the dynasty, who had brought about the change, to keep him near the Empress Dowager, because of his great influence with her, of his enlightened and liberal views and his knowledge of the policy and power of the Christian nations. The Empress Dowager was therefore made to see that it was important to entrust the great province of which Canton is the capital to a high official, and Li Hung Chang was thus sent to a post as remote as possible from Peking. He was the more ready to accept the post as it removed him in his old age from the wrangle of politics, made him an almost absolute ruler over forty millions of people, and gave him one of the most lucrative places in the government. It is safe to assert that if Li had been retained in Peking, where he could have had personal access to the Empress Dowager, the Boxer movement never would have been permitted to reach its alarming proportions, the scenes of violence at Peking which disgrace China and outrage international law never would have occurred, and the brutal murder of thousands of defenseless and innocent men and women which has shocked the moral sense of the civilized world never would have taken place.

From the foregoing review it may be inferred that I regard the designation of Li Hung Chang as a negotiator on the part of China for settlement of the questions growing out of the late disorders as most fitting. The only other Celestial so well equipped for the position was Chang Yen Huan, who was for a number of years the popular Chinese Minister in Washington, was the Emperor's special ambassador at the Queen's Jubilee in London in 1897, and a member of the Tsung-li Yamen. The chief advantage he would have possessed over the Viceroy was the matter of age, as he was fifteen years or more his junior. Entertaining enlightened views of the needs of his country, he had favored the reforms contemplated by the Emperor, and thus fell a victim to the displeasure of the Empress Dowager. He was condemned to be beheaded, but through the interposition of the American and

British Ministers the death penalty was commuted to banishment and life imprisonment in the far-distant territory of Ili. During the recent reign of terror at Peking an order for his execution was obtained by Prince Tuan along with that of the other enlightened, pro-foreign members of the Tsung-li Yamen, and the news now comes across the desert to Peking that the bloody order has been ruthlessly executed. No proper settlement of the Chinese problem will be reached without such a reform of the government as will prevent the repetition of such barbarities as this, and until the blood of Chang Yen Huan and other patriots is avenged by the punishment of Prince Tuan and other high criminals.

The attitude of the Viceroy in the negotiations can only be conjectured, but something may be assumed from his past conduct. In addition to his diplomatic experience, he possesses a large measure of the shrewdness, akin to cunning, which is imputed to his race, and will no doubt be prepared to take advantage of any differences of views or plans which may be developed by the Christian powers. It has been charged that he was unduly friendly to Russia and for that supposed reason his fitness for his mission has been questioned. Something on this point was said in his recent interview already cited by me, and from which I quote again:—

“It is said that you favor the Russians.”

“That is not so,” said the Viceroy, emphatically.

“But is there not a secret alliance between Russia and China? I have heard it whispered in diplomatic circles that there is.”

“No, there is not,” said Li Hung Chang. “China has the same feeling toward Russia that she has toward the other powers. You are all on a level with us.”

“How about the strained relations which have prevailed between Japan and Russia since the Chinese-Japanese war? Do you think these two countries will fight?”

“No I do not,” said Li Hung Chang. “Neither Japan nor Russia wants war. The Russians are not ready for war. It is a mistake to think they are building the trans-Siberian railroad for that purpose. They are doing that to develop the country. Siberia is enormously rich. It has but few people, and it must have a railroad if it is to be opened up to settlement.”

I have no doubt he will do all possible to secure free commercial intercourse and to afford protection to merchants and traders. China is much interested in the maintenance of the "open door" policy of commerce.

The missionary question is one in which a vast body of the best citizens of the United States are interested. The Viceroy prides himself in being a devoted disciple of Confucius, who was an avowed agnostic; but he has been brought much into relations with the missionaries, and has repeatedly recognized the useful service they have been rendering his countrymen through their schools and hospitals, and has commended this part of their work. A notable event worth relating occurred during the stay of the Viceroy in New York City in 1896, on his return to China after his visit to Europe. He was waited upon by special appointment by a body of men representing the various Protestant Mission Boards having offices in New York and embracing churches with a membership of eighty millions. This body read to him an address, a copy of which had been sent to him in advance, in which was set forth the aims and labors of their various boards in China. The Viceroy had caused his secretary, Lo Feng-luh, to prepare a reply which he read at the conference. It is too lengthy to copy, though quite interesting, in which he fully recognized the useful labors of the missionaries and the duty of his government to afford them ample protection. After his return to Peking, in an interview with a bishop of the Methodist church, he used this language: "Say to the American people for me to send over more missionaries for the schools and hospitals, and I hope to be in a position both to aid them and protect them."

Among the various interesting incidents of his stay in Japan while negotiating the treaty of peace, there occurred a correspondence, which reveals his respect for Christianity and other traits of his character. When the attack was made upon his life the Christians of Nagoya, both Japanese and foreigners, sent a message of sympathy, with a statement that they were praying

for his recovery. His son sent a reply on his behalf, the last sentence of which seems prophetic in view of his present mission. He wrote :—

“My father has directed me to write the following, dictated from his bed, in reply to your Address. He is deeply moved by the sentiments of kindly solicitude for his welfare expressed in your Address, and feels that the prayers you have offered for his recovery cannot have been unheeded by the Power who controls human destinies. He feels that his escape was little short of miraculous.

“He believes that his life has been spared to him for some wise purpose beyond the capacity of man to fathom ; but he will venture to interpret his good fortune as an indication that his life-work is not yet complete ; that he may yet do some good in the world, and perhaps render service to his country by endeavoring to restore peace and good-will, where strife now prevails.”

A well known writer on Chinese subjects, Henry Norman, has said that as for patriotism, “There is no such thing in China.” The events of the late Japanese war gave frequent occasion for the same remark on the part of foreigners. And yet there are few men living who have given greater proofs of devotion to their country’s interests, as they understand them, than Li Hung Chang. I have referred to his conduct during the Taiping rebellion. Norman, who has few good words to say for Li, states that for many years he was the virtual ruler of “three hundred and fifty millions of shaven heads and plaited tails,” as he flippantly styles the Chinese nation. It is an authentic fact that in the time of his greatest power, Colonel Gordon urged him to make himself Emperor, and offered to head his troops to Peking for that purpose. Notwithstanding he knew that since the days of his great teacher Confucius there had been no less than thirty changes of dynasty, the Viceroy put aside the temptation. No higher proofs of loyalty could be shown than in his services on the peace mission to Japan, when he subjected himself to the assassin’s bullet and his certain political overthrow at home. Whatever may be his shortcomings and defects of character, he has always proved a loyal servant of the Throne. It is to be hoped that on his present mission he will not allow his personal attachment to his sovereign to stand as an impediment to the reforms in the government necessary for its usefulness and permanence.

THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF SPAIN AT THE CLOSE OF THE XIXTH CENTURY

ARTHUR E. HOUGHTON, *Madrid.*



THE international position of Spain, and consequently her exterior policy, have both been affected by the loss of her colonies in the new world and in the Far East. As long as Spain maintained her rule in the West Indies and in the Philippine Islands and other archipelagoes of the Pacific, the Madrid foreign office could not afford to ignore the fact that she was a colonial empire whose relations with foreign and powerful neighbors had to be watched carefully. The ministers of state had to keep their relations on a cordial footing with China because there was a numerous, active, and ever increasing colony of Chinese subjects in the Philippines which not unfrequently gave trouble to the Castilian authorities. They had to endeavor to conciliate the Japanese government as the disaffected in the Spanish archipelagoes often found support and sympathy, and even material assistance in the dominions of the Mikado. About the same reasons made Spain wish to live on good terms with the rulers of Hong Kong who traded on a large scale with the natives of the Philippine and Sooloo Islands. No less anxiety in those days was felt about the doings of Germany in the Philippines and Sooloo Isles trade and in the Carolines after the bold attempt that Prince Bismarck had made in 1885 to dispute the rights of sovereignty of Spain over a group of islands, where the only long

permanent settlement had been made by the American Protestant missions, so roughly treated by the Spaniards when they at last really occupied Ponape after their quarrel with Germany. For more than sixty years before the loss of Cuba and of Puerto Rico, colonial considerations dictated the foreign policy of Spain in the new world. Her governments did their best to improve their relations generally with the Spanish-American republics, aiming especially at a revival of all the ties of a racial, historical and literary past held in common by both, and at closer commercial intercourse. It was an open secret that Spanish statesmen wished to seek in such directions and in the development of commerce between the Spanish West Indies and European nations even, a counterpoise to the visible growth of American influence in Cuba and Puerto Rico. Spanish diplomacy in the eighties and nineties, up to the eve of the last Cuban rising in February, 1895, was unceasing in its efforts to counteract on such lines the irresistible force of attraction, generated by political and agricultural causes, which was impelling the natives of the two islands towards the Anglo-Saxon republic, where their products found their principal markets and where their risings and efforts to attain independence met with growing sympathy. This action of Spanish diplomacy did not prevent Madrid governments from affecting to attach the greatest importance to the preservation of friendly relations with the United States government, which was several times approached by successive cabinets during the reign of Alphonso XII., 1875-85, and under the regency of Queen Christina, 1886-98, with a view to place the commercial relations of the United States with Spain and with her colonies on a footing of reciprocal concessions that should not be extended to other nations. Up to the very last, even such enlightened and foresighted men as Senors Sagasta and Moret appeared to fancy that the final catastrophe could be averted if Spain only offered and the Washington government could be induced to accept such treatment for American imports in the markets of Cuba and of Puerto Rico as would make Euro-

pean competition impossible, and even Spanish less felt, whilst in return such advantages should be secured for the exports of both islands in the United States as might stave off for a while the parting between the mother country and the colonies. General Woodford was well aware of this all through his laborious mission at Madrid during the winter of 1897-98, and had even come to an understanding with Senor Moret upon the main lines of a treaty of commerce two months before war was declared.

Given the foreign policy of the Madrid administrations in regard to their colonies in the West Indies, and given the fact that the majority of Spaniards and none more so than the statesmen, generals, officials, business men who were thoroughly acquainted with the state of things in Cuba and Puerto Rico, or those who had served and lived in the Antilles, had long been convinced since the great Cuban rising of 1868-78, that the colonies were inevitably drifting towards independence, and that the peace of the secession would entirely depend upon the conduct of the United States people and government, one might be at a loss to understand why the rulers of the mother country did not shape the course of their exterior policy in Europe to seek, if not avowed alliances, at least something more practical than moral and platonic sympathy. Such a course would have been a departure from the singular neutrality which Spain had adopted in European affairs and very few of her politicians seem to have thought it expedient, because somehow or other, they shared the popular belief that in the apprehended and foreseen conflict sure to arise sooner or later between Spain and the United States, European governments and nations were certain to interpose and check the development of American interference with the few remaining colonies of European powers in the new world. Alone Don Francisco Silvela, the present leader of the Conservative party and Prime Minister of the Regency since March, 1899, had dared when he was in the cold shade of opposition and chief of a group of Conservative dissentients from the bulk of the party at

the time led by Don Antonio Canovas del Castillo, to advocate a more active policy to seek friendships and alliances that might serve the interests of a power possessing vast colonial dependencies that its army and even more so its navy were insufficient to protect against foreign aggression in both hemispheres. After Spain had lost her colonies, and before he entered the councils of the Regency, Silvela significantly reminded his fellow countrymen of the note of alarm he had vainly raised when his advice was perhaps yet timely. Nor has he, as will be seen in the sequel, swerved from his idea that a policy of too complete neutrality and consequent isolation, has not only been, as events proved he said, ill-advised and short-sighted in the past, but is inexpedient still for the interests of Spain after the loss of her colonies.

It must not be supposed that the policy of neutrality and isolation imposed by the decay of her resources of every kind since the end of the eighteenth century, and by the loss of her place among the great empires of the world was popular or palatable to the majority of the Spaniards. It is as hard for nations as it is for men to have to bow to the decrees of fate, that make the loss of their positions the logical consequence of errors of judgment and short-comings like those which slowly but irreparably turned the great empire, upon which the sun never set under the first monarchs of the house of Austria in the sixteenth century, into the decaying imperialism of the last princes of that house and of the Spanish Bourbons, with the solitary exception of Charles III., in the latter half of the eighteenth century. A proud and sensitive race like the Spaniards clung to the recollections of their past, and haughtily, sullenly submitted to the successive stages of the downward course that marked their decline in prestige and power in the new world and in Europe, clinging stoutly to the remnants of their discoveries and conquests, and with a sort of fatalistic confidence in their recuperative qualities believing that there is no long lane without a turning, not even that of adversity. They consoled themselves with the illusion that a day would

come when the inhabitants of the Peninsula, so admirably situated in the southwestern extremity of Europe, at the gate of the Mediterranean, might recover sufficiently to realize Iberic unity at the expense of Portugal and of England, on the banks of the Tagus and Douro, at Lisbon and Oporto; and on the Spanish shore of the Straits of Gibraltar, to plant the colors of Spain on the Rock which is such a thorn in their side. Nothing fired the imagination of the masses as much as the idea that two such strides some day would clear the way for another, that day-dream of all Spaniards, that the greatest minister of the Restored Bourbons, Don Antonio Canovas del Castillo, expressed so clearly in an academical speech, when he declared that the natural frontier of Spain southwards ought to be the Atlas Mountains in North Africa and the Morocco hinterland beyond that chain.

The most eminent and most respectable of nineteenth century Spaniards, Emilio Castelar, again and again kept this mirage of Iberic unity and North African conquest before the eyes of Spaniards in the glowing, grandiloquent, stirring speeches that ever went to the hearts of his fellow countrymen, who, irrespective of party feelings and of castes and classes styled the republican orator, their great Castelar, *nuestro gran Castelar*. This was so much the prevalent disposition towards him that it was said of the late King Alphonso XII., in reply one day to the query of which he would have desired to be if birth had not destined him to be a king, the son of Isabella II. said, "I would have elected to be an opposition leader and an orator like Castelar."

These national and popular undercurrents of undying imperialism did not make the task of the Spanish government very easy. They of course could do nothing to keep in touch with inclinations that were sure to create the gravest difficulties with Great Britain or with Portugal. On the contrary, they were obliged to go as far as possible and as was consistent with the ministers of domestic politics in the courtesy shown to the present masters of Gibraltar, and in the deference shown to the strong representa-

tions England makes whenever Spain attempts to crown the Sierras and headlands commanding the bay of Algeciras and Gibraltar with coast defences, deemed unnecessarily close to the fortress of a power which certainly does not wish to pick a quarrel with his Catholic Majesty. In the same way the Madrid governments have had to soothe the susceptibilities of the Portugal government and people, with a view to convince them that for the present and for a long time to come they need fear nothing at the hands of Spain, and that the only aim of the sister kingdom is the improvement of commercial relations between the two countries, and the furthering of everything conducive to cordial and friendly relations generally. Spanish statesmen cannot venture to imitate their press and politicians in a perhaps too frank admission of their desire to give no pretext nowadays to the revival of British influence at the court of Lisbon, and in the little Lusitanian kingdom and its colonies which excites much jealousy in Spain.

In the affairs of Morocco, all Madrid governments have been able to keep more in touch with national aspirations. Somehow or other European governments and public opinion on the continent especially have humored Spain in regard to Morocco. A considerable amount of deference has been shown to her susceptibilities in that direction, to her representations whenever her jealousy has been aroused, frequently without much foundation, to her old standing pretension to be consulted and heard in all matters affecting the *status quo* in Morocco, which Spaniards and their governments are equally anxious to maintain as long as it does not suit their own views to alter it. This was seen in their war with Morocco in 1859-1860 and again in their conflict with the Riff tribes around their station at Melilla in 1893, when they held the Sultan so far responsible for the misdeeds of his unruly subjects as to exact from his Sheriffian Majesty an indemnity of several million dollars that was more promptly paid by Morocco than Marshal Campos, the negotiator of the treaty, and the Madrid foreign office, supposed it could be. The policy of Spain in

Morocco has been essentially a "hands off" policy, whilst keeping alive the inclination for a preponderant influence and action of Spain in that empire in order that Moors and Europeans should plainly understand that, if implications arise, if a scramble takes place for the dominions of the sick man of the northwest of Africa, Spain intends to be in the van, and will not easily allow any other neighbor to step in and seize the African shore of the Straits of Gibraltar. This explains the marked attention paid to the negotiations of European powers with the Sultan of Morocco, the anxiety and jealousy instantly revealed when English, German, Italian diplomacy or military missions are reported to be active in the Moghrel. Or when French encroachments are visible either on the river Muluya near Tetuan or in the hinterland where France is slowly pushing towards the region of the oases, Tignig, Tuat, Tapilet, encircling the empire with a network of railways and military posts over territories that Morocco still claims to be part of the dominions of the Sheriff of Fez. Spaniards resent such encroachments because they consider it unfair and unfriendly on the part of the governments which agreed to the Madrid convention of 1880, the outcome of the conference which was presided over by Canovas del Castillo, then Prime Minister to Alphonso XII., to attempt to infringe upon the *status quo* of the empire which even thus will have much trouble not to crumble to pieces, before Spain can have sufficiently recovered from her recent disasters and financial embarrassments to reorganize her army and navy on a scale to enable her to attempt to occupy and colonize Morocco.

The loss of her colonies has intensified the persistent if temporarily suppressed aspirations of Spain in Morocco, and in consequence bids fair to alter her international position in Europe, exactly as the war with the United States, which culminated in the peace treaty of December 10, 1898, has wrought a great change in that part of exterior policy of Spain that had been unavoidably based upon the requirements of her former empire.

It is singular that a nation which had clung so tenaciously

down to the end of the nineteenth century to the remnants of its colonial empire, should have so quickly reconciled itself to the inevitable. Of course if a foreigner does question Spaniards on so delicate a point, they will think necessary to affect resentment against the United States for what they still consider unjustified interference, against Great Britain for having played into the hands of the United States and paralyzed the continental powers, against the latter for not having more effectually interposed, against the Cubanos and Puerto Riquenos particularly for their alleged ingratitude towards the mother country. All this is only a surface demonstration which Castilian pride and dignity deems indispensable for appearances' sake. Where they talk among themselves about the consequences of the Colonial and American Wars, they display their characteristic vigor and frankness in confessing that the loss of the colonies is a good riddance. They bitterly charge the colonies with having been a burden on their finances, a constant drain upon their best male population through army, navy, and emigration, a drag upon their resources of every kind, a source of weakness and a clog in Europe, as they felt themselves sorely vulnerable in distant and chronically disaffected, "*provincias de ultramar*," last, but not least, a cause of corruption and demoralization as the lawless and profoundly corrupt habits of their colonial administration of every kind had aggravated if possible the very unsatisfactory state of their own administration at home. They are of the opinion that the material advantages derived from the colonies by Spanish capital, industries, agriculture, shipping interests, were but a poor set-off against the greater evils of their rule beyond the seas. Their idea is, therefore, after a more or less prolonged period to settle down within their Peninsula, become engrossed in the reorganization and development of the abundant resources of their soil and of their mines, to feed their trade in new channels, husbanding and concentrating all their energies and their spirit of enterprise, both in the Peninsula and in fields nearer at hand, so they will after all in the long run, have

improved their international position. They illustrate their modern contention by pointing out, for instance, that their diplomacy will have henceforth not only a better vantage ground from which to go on trying to induce the Spanish-American republics to consent to closer relations, commercial and political, with the old mother country now that she has severed all connection with the new world, but also a better starting point for negotiations such as the Madrid foreign office is prosecuting with Minister Storer, to put the commercial and all relations between Spain and the United States on a better footing on the principle of reciprocity of concessions. They are convinced that the government of the United States will not drive too hard a bargain in their negotiations, and will let its adversary have as favorable a treatment, if not a better one, than France, Germany, and Portugal, in American markets, and especially so in the West Indies. On these terms Spain will not object to grant, at least to the imports of the United States, concessions that would soon make it feasible for the products of American industries, agriculture, and mines, to compete with British and with Continentals in a country where they have long been denied most favored nations treatment. About the same reasons are given to show that the future of Spain will no longer have any obstacle in the way of very cordial intercourse with Germany, Japan, China, Russia, her old competitors or troublesome neighbors in the Philippines.

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century colonial considerations did not alone paralyze the foreign policy of Madrid governments in Europe, and oblige them more or less reluctantly to stick to the neutrality and isolation criticized by Senor Silvela and the present generation. The governments of Alphonso XII., during the ten first years of the restoration, 1875-1885, had to put a curb on their own inclinations and on those of the sovereign and his court, for close and friendly relations with Germany, Austria, and Italy, because the recently defeated democracy, smarting under the recollections of the mili-

tary *pronunciamientos* of Pavia and Campos, that had almost entirely wrecked the work of the Spanish revolution of 1868-74, would have too gladly seized any opportunity to show that the foreign policy of the restored Bourbons clashed with the views of many Spaniards, and with the interests of the nation. Indeed, Castelar and republicans of every shade, the radicals and democrats who had not yet adhered to the new régime, again and again advocated understandings with France and her triumphant democracy, as being more in harmony with the interests of Spain in the Mediterranean and in North Africa, more in accordance with the traditions of a Latin race, a Catholic nation, and a neighbor to whom France might be very disagreeable indeed on the Pyrenees and on the eastern frontier of Morocco, let alone in trade, in monetary and financial matters. These considerations have been for twenty years the key-note of the attitude of Spain towards France, despite some clouds that rose now and then. Its most masterly exponent was Canovas del Castillo, who held it to be part of his neutrality policy, and of his persistent assertion that Spain must live on good terms with all the great powers equally, and take special care of her relations with Portugal and Morocco, the two spheres of influence where it was her paramount interest to decide all the powers to uphold indefinitely the *status quo*. During the two years in which Canovas was out of office, a liberal minister for foreign affairs, Marquis de la Vega de Armijo, to please his sovereign, intrigued at the courts of Italy, Vienna, Berlin, with a view to pave the way for the admission of Spain in the so-called European Concert, and to induce those three governments, as well as France and England, to raise their ministers at the court of Madrid to the rank of ambassadors, Spain being willing to reciprocate, far as she was from being in a position to rank among the great powers. Some time elapsed, however, ere Vega de Armijo's design was carried out. Later an ill-advised visit of the king and his minister to Germany and the acceptance of the honorary colonelcy of a regiment of Uhlans, quartered at Stras-

burg, very nearly entangled Spain into grave difficulties with France, as both mistakes served as a pretext for a violent and disgraceful demonstration of the Parisian populace against Alphonso XII., when he was the guest of the President of the Republic, on his return journey to Spain. Nor were the king and Canovas more fortunate when the very friendly relations with Germany were sadly marred in 1885, by the unfortunate incident of the Caroline Isles with Prince Bismarck. Popular feeling ran so high against Germany and the street demonstrations were so violent, that a conflict was only averted by the poor king himself, despite his fast failing health, showing much energy in declining to rush headlong into a hopeless struggle with Germany.

After the death of Alphonso XII., the governments of the Regency, and even the Marquis de la Vega de Armijo and Senor Moret; and later on the equally germanophilist Duke de Almodovar for once agreed with Senor Canovas del Castillo and the Duke de Tetuan, in considering that the safest policy during a long minority under the regency of a foreign Queen Regent, was to steer as clear as possible from foreign conflicts and foreign alliances, keeping at equal distance from triple and dual alliances, however much wittiness or skill were sometimes displayed by the charmers, on the principle of the Latin saying, "*Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*" They elected to pay most attention to treaties of commerce that produced most excellent results from 1885 to 1890, and afterwards to treaties of commerce and conventions establishing indefinitely *modi vivandi* to minimize the disastrous results of Senor Canovas' almost prohibitive tariff of 1892. Thus for over ten years the advanced liberals and republicans could not find too much fault with the foreign policy of the Regency, and Senor Silvela was in some sort the voice of one preaching in the desert against neutrality and excessive isolation, nor did his fellow countrymen awaken to the relative soundness of his arguments until the logical march of events convinced them all that with the friendly neutrality of the British government and

consequent impotence of the famous Continental Concert, the United States was sure to have an easy walk over the course.

It is creditable for the practical sense of reality evolved out of the severe lessons of the last few years, that the majority of Spaniards have indulged in but little retrospective recriminations about the talk of European alliances, which they now perfectly perceive that none of their governments or political parties were strong enough to assume the responsibilities and consequences of, and which it is very doubtful that their present rulers will dare to risk for a long time to come. Nevertheless, the synthesis of the change that has come over the international position of Spain is graphically summed up in the following words that one hears almost daily in the whole country: "We have ceased for awhile to be a colonial and a colonizing power. We have no more concern with far-away empires in the new and old world except in the domain of purely material interests. We will confine our horizon to the shores of the Mediterranean, lying on our oars for the time being, but ever vigilant on the northwest coast of Africa, and in the western equatorial coast, to preserve the little we possess there, and to vindicate by and by what we hold to be our rights. In consequence the action of our diplomacy must now be pushed forwards both in Europe and in Morocco."

The dawn of the new exterior policy cannot be better exposed, but much is therein implied that it will take years, many efforts, and much expense to accomplish. At the present moment Spain has no navy left worth mentioning, a couple of battleships, a few cruisers, a dozen destructors and torpedo vessels, coast-guard obsolete gunboats, and despatch vessels. This fleet and her arsenals are assigned three thousand marines and five thousand five hundred sailors as annual contingent in the estimates. Her army is eighty thousand strong, with a first-class reserve on paper of about as many more. Her coast defences in the Peninsula, and in the Balearic and Canary Isles, that she believes always threatened by the ambitious designs of France

and England, are mostly ruinous, antiquated fortifications, very poorly provided with modern armament or war material of any kind. Her Pyrenean frontier alone is bristling with forts, intrenched camps, redoubts weakly garrisoned and for years past awaiting proper guns. Ceuta, her most important station on the coast of Morocco and the would-be rival of Gibraltar is better fortified still and provided with some heavy ordinance. The other Spanish stations on the Moorish coast and the island of Fernando Po in the Gulf of Guinea would be easy victims of unarmored cruisers of the third-class. This state of unpreparedness cannot be quickly remedied, as the Cortes and public opinion are not likely very soon to be in a mood to patronize extensive armaments synonymous with increase of the debt and a consequent increase in taxation.

Such considerations should be quite enough it seems to damp the ardor of the adepts of a new departure in foreign relations, but, nevertheless, in the sixteen months that have elapsed since the peace treaty with the United States, there have been some significant traits in the conduct of the Madrid foreign office, which Senor Silvela had taken charge of at the same time as he undertook to be president of the Council of Ministers, namely, Premier, early in March, 1899. Following in the wake of Sagasta, his predecessor, Silvela continued to coquet with the dual alliance, which had shown Spain so much sympathy during her struggles with her colonies and with America, especially France in connection with the peace negotiations. He came to an understanding with France for a joint action in the affairs of Morocco, on the promise that Spain would not object to a rectification of the French-Algerian frontier on the eastern border of Morocco or in the hinterland beyond, if France coöperated in maintaining as much and as long as possible the *status quo* of the Moorish Empire. He volunteered the support of Spain in Mediterranean and African questions that might arise and effect Spanish interests in both directions. He showed the same disposition towards Russia.

This did not prevent him from welcoming very courteously the friendly demonstrations of Germany and Austria that took the shape of marked attentions for the young king, gratified with the grand Cross of the Black Eagle and Saint Stephen, and he reciprocated by sending special envoys extraordinary to carry the Toison d'Or to the heir apparent of the Kaiser and to represent Spain at the coming of age of the Crown Prince. On the other hand many attentions were shown to the Austrian Archduke Charles Ferdinand, bearer of the cross for Alphonso XIII., and guest of the Queen Regent for a whole week at the Madrid palace. Nor was Italy forgotten in these recent exchanges of courtesy between royal families and governments. The impression is that the Spanish Premier at heart feels most inclination for "*rapprochements*," to use the diplomatic phraseology, with France and Russia. He perfectly understands that, apart from the great material interests that the former has in the Peninsula, political and military motives push both to aim at securing, if not an alliance with Spain, at least her neutrality in the Mediterranean and on the Pyrenees, in view of future contingencies. Like all Spanish statesmen and generals, Silvela also understands that the Triple Alliance has equal motives for using family and court influences to deter Spain from becoming a satellite of France and Russia. By playing such rivals one against another it stands to reason that Spaniards expect to attain their present main object, gain time whilst securing the prolonged respect of the *status quo* in Morocco. It is not quite so easy for Spain, in the new international position in which events have placed her at the close of the nineteenth century, to manage her relations with England with whom she cannot afford to quarrel, as her peninsular and Mediterranean situation would necessarily place her at the mercy of English fleets sweeping down upon her utterly insufficient fortifications at Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthage arsenals, her great open commercial ports Bilboa, Santander, Corunna, Vigo, Malaga, Valencia, Alicante, Barcelona, her Balearic and Canary Isles, her stations on the

Morocco coast. No dual alliance would be of much use to Spain in a conflict with Great Britain, and even less so with Great Britain flanked by continental allies, however much Spanish cabinets might be backed by the deep rancor of most Spaniards against England, on account of her attitude favorable to the United States before and during the Hispano-American struggle. Senor Silvela has therefore abstained on the one hand from interfering with the unanimous and loud expressions of pro-Boer and Anglophobe feelings during the war in South Africa, whilst on the other hand, he has allowed Great Britain to draw from the Peninsula as many mules and horses as she wanted, and has given her every facility to make the Canary Isles the coaling and victualling station for her transports and war vessels going to or coming from South Africa. Under every one of its aspects the foreign policy of the Spanish Regency and of its governments is essentially a temporizing, "bide your time" policy, to prepare more decisive steps entirely according to circumstances and on lines both of national and dynastic interests when the timely opportunity comes for further departures from the neutrality and isolation system of the past.



THE EVOLUTIONARY TREND OF GERMAN LITERARY CRITICISM

KUNO FRANCKE, *Harvard University.*



IN following out the influence exerted upon German literary criticism by the doctrine of evolution, one is confronted at the outset by the fact that the roots of the Darwinian theory are to be found on German soil. Long before the theory of a continuous and uninterrupted development of the physical world had been scientifically formulated, German poets and historians had accustomed themselves to conceive of the moral world as an organic whole living itself out according to its own immanent laws. Long before the struggle for bodily existence had been discovered as the prime cause of differentiation of racial types, the realization of the Idea through evolution from mere identity with itself to the most highly organized intellectual life had become a household word in German philosophy. It is clearly impossible, then, to trace Darwinian ideas in German literary criticism without discovering that to a large extent these ideas are at bottom pre-Darwinian.

On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the great ascendancy of the natural sciences, which set in with the middle of the nineteenth century, exerted a profound influence upon the mental sciences also. The idea of intellectual development which thus far had borne a metaphysical appearance, now assumed scientific features, and literary criticism, no less than history or philosophy, was affected by this change. Before 1850, literary criticism had

been in the main speculative; after 1850, it became either *kulturbistorisch* (there is no English equivalent for this word), or philological, or psychological,—terms which, every one of them, emphasize the scientific aspect of evolution.

Here, then, seem to be mapped out the natural divisions of my inquiry. I shall first speak of pre-Darwinian evolutionary ideas in German literary criticism from Herder to Hegel; next, I shall consider the critical views of men, like Wilhelm Riehl and Jacob Burckhardt, who looked upon literature primarily as an index of the advance or decay of civilization; thirdly, I shall examine the philological method of research, now dominating the academic study of literature, a method which is primarily directed toward the elucidation of literary origins; and finally, I shall discuss the psychological method just beginning to claim its place as an indispensable means for the proper understanding of the growth of poetic conceptions or impressions.

I.

Our review naturally opens with a man who not only gave the first strong impulse, in Germany, to the historical study of literature, but who also anticipated the scientific method of literary research by nearly one hundred years: Johann Gottfried Herder. Herder was the first German critic to conceive of literature as a natural growth. The principles which Winckelmann had derived from the study of Greek art he applied to the study of literature, and he surpassed Winckelmann in this that he did not confine himself to any one literature, be it Greek or Roman or German, but endeavored to understand *all* literature as the necessary outcome of a given national culture. Whether studying Esquimaux funeral songs or Hebrew psalms or Spanish ballads, whether comparing English and German popular poetry, whether analyzing great master-minds like Pindar or Sophocles or Shakspeare, Herder never loses sight of the fact that all poetry is the product of a particular soil,—natural surroundings, national character, and social condi-

tions,—and his critical endeavor mainly has in view the fuller understanding of the relation between the literary soil and its product. Nearly a century before Taine in his "History of English Literature" gave a specimen demonstration of the influence of the sea upon the intellectual make-up of a nation, the young Herder, in the diary of his voyage from Riga to Nantes, described how this life on shipboard made him understand the Homeric epics as the poetic outgrowth of a seafaring people. "It was seafarers who brought the Greeks their earliest religion. All Greece was a colony by the sea. Consequently, their mythology was not, like that of the Egyptians and Arabs, a religion of the desert, but a religion of the sea and the forest. Orpheus, Homer, Pindar, to be fully understood, ought to be read at sea." And it is not too much to say that Herder's ripest works, such as the "Ideas on the Philosophy of History," or the "Letters Concerning the Advancement of Humanity," are simply steeped with the conviction of the inseparableness of literature and social life. The ideal of Greek beauty is to him closely allied with the free humanity of Greek political institutions; Roman literature appears to him as a concomitant phenomenon of Roman imperialism; in mediæval epics and romances he analyzes the chivalric and the clerical element; in the Elizabethan drama he detects the spirit that moved Drake and Raleigh; and his hope of a new golden age of modern literature is founded upon his belief in the progressive humanization of modern society.

While in all this we clearly see the beginnings of an evolutionary method of studying literature, it must be admitted that Herder nowhere passes the stage of beginnings. Just how a certain national character and certain social conditions produce a certain type of literature; just how within a given national culture certain literary stages correspond to certain stages in the general intellectual and moral development; and above all how the literary conceptions of one people have affected and transformed the literary conceptions of another people,—these are

questions to which Herder offers either no answer at all or an answer couched in general and somewhat dubious terms. No one would have been better able to supplement Herder in this direction than his greatest pupil, the author of the "Metamorphosis of Plants," and Goethe has indeed given us not a few literary sketches which demonstrate that he looked upon literature as a phenomenon essentially parallel to the phenomena of nature, to be studied with all the exactness and the attention to detail required in biological research. His "Benvenuto Cellini," his "Winckelmann and his Age," and above all his own autobiography are model achievements of the evolutionary method; they describe, with truly scientific comprehensiveness and precision, the growth of a great individual, the development of a pronounced intellectual type under the modifying influences of inheritance, time, and environment. And his essay on "Mere Imitation of Nature, Manner, and Style" is, at least in outline, an inductive study of the stages through which the creative activity of a great literary or artistic individual seems necessarily to pass, from the mere reproduction of outward impressions, through the inner amalgamation of these impressions with his own individuality, to the final selection of *such* impressions as reveal the fundamental and abiding type; in other words, from naturalism through subjectivism to objective mastery.

It is to be regretted, therefore, that Goethe has not pursued this subject still further; especially, that he has not formulated more fully his views as to the relation of one literary age to another, that he has not given us a study of the development of the world's literature. If he had, his sober inductive observation would have saved us much of that subjective speculation, characteristic of the further course of evolutionary literary criticism in Germany, which, however stimulating and suggestive especially Schiller, the Schlegels, and Hegel have made this speculation, somewhat detracts from its scientific value.

Schiller, as well as the brothers Schlegel, and even more so

Hegel, derive their views of literary development from certain preconceived notions about the development of culture in general; Schiller from the contrast between what he calls the Naïve and the Sentimental, the Schlegels from the contrast between the Classic and the Romantic, Hegel from the self-realization of the Idea.

The essay on "Naïve and Sentimental Poetry," in which Schiller reviews the whole history of civilization as reflected in the history of literature, clearly demonstrates both the affinity of Schiller's æsthetic conceptions with the moral views of Rousseau and his departure from these views. It is in this departure that we see an evolutionary tendency. In entire accord with Rousseau, Schiller proceeds from the dream of a primitive state of harmony between the sensuous and the spiritual in man, a state of naïve, unconscious equipoise between the contrasting forces of our nature. In children, in animals, in plants, we have types of this inner harmony before our eyes even now: instinct and reason are here not yet at variance with each other. In the history of mankind, Greek poetry and art have been the highest expressions of this naïve, instinctive, natural oneness of man with himself. The progress of civilization has destroyed this state of natural oneness, it has brought man into conflict with himself; modern poetry, therefore, as a rule does not express harmony, but lost harmony, longing for harmony, it is not naïve but sentimental. To be sure, there have been a few great poets, even among the moderns, who seem to have preserved that childlike oneness with self which we find in the Greeks; but the great mass of modern poetry is a symbol of strife, of the strife between intellect and sentiment, duty and instinct, authority and freedom, and at the same time it is a symbol of the craving for the overcoming of this strife, of the longing for reconciliation, atonement, purification, peace. Here, then, the difference between Schiller and Rousseau clearly asserts itself. To Rousseau, the inharmoniousness, the grating discords of modern life are merely symptoms of corruption

and decay. If we are to recover our humanity, we must return to the simplicity of primitive life. To Schiller, the very discords and the very morbidness of modern life are symptoms of a higher development. The return to primitive simplicity from our complex civilization is as impossible as the return of the mature man to the days of his childhood. Not back to nature, but forward to a still more comprehensive culture is the watchword, and it is the principal office of literature and art to lead mankind in this upward movement.

This, then, is Schiller's conception of literary evolution. It is a theory clearly founded not upon the observation of facts, but upon a subjective demand of Schiller's own nature. Schiller felt in himself a most intense desire for spiritual oneness, for a welding together of the instinctive and the conscious into a higher unity, and he projected, as it were, this inner struggle of his own self into the history of the race, making it a law of all spiritual development. As a scientific contribution, therefore, this theory of a necessary progress from the naïve to the sentimental and thence to a reconciliation of both, has its obvious defects and limitations. As a suggestive speculation, as a *fermentum cognitionis*, it has been of inestimable value. The discussion so eagerly carried on in the first half of the nineteenth century, about the objective and subjective elements of poetry, about the difference between *Volks poesie* and *Kunst poesie*, about the natural sequence of the several poetic species from the naïve stage represented by the epic, through the sentimental phase characterized by lyrics, to the final combination of both as shown in the drama,—this whole discussion could hardly have taken the form which it took without the influence of Schiller's fundamental thought.

I have said that the brothers Schlegel based their theories of literary growth upon the contrast between the Classic and the Romantic. This formula by no means does full justice to the service rendered by the Schlegels to the history of literature.

Both Friedrich Schlegel and his brother August Wilhelm have done remarkable work in bringing out the intimate connection between literature and national culture in general. Such studies as Friedrich's essay, "On the Schools of Greek Poetry," with its fine characterization of the Ionic, Doric, Attic, and Alexandrian culture, or August Wilhelm's "Lectures on Dramatic Literature," with their subtle analysis of the artistic individualities and historic positions of the great dramatists from Sophocles to Calderon and Shakspeare, are masterpieces of evolutionary criticism. Yet it can hardly be said that the underlying idea of these and similar works is original with the Schlegels; it is an Herderian idea further developed and more carefully applied. The conception, however, of the contrast between Classic and Romantic is their own; this is their essentially new contribution to evolutionary thought. We are able to follow out the growth of this conception, from its first germ in Friedrich's essay, "On the Study of Greek Poetry" (1795), to its fullest form in August Wilhelm's Berlin lectures, "On Belles Lettres and Art" (1803-4).

In the essay just mentioned, Friedrich Schlegel reveals himself as a most ardent Classicist. The ancients are to him exponents of what he calls the "objective," i. e., the lawful, natural, typical, beautiful; the moderns appear to him as representatives of what is merely "interesting," i. e., the capricious, artificial, individual, accidental. Even the greatest of the moderns, even Dante and Shakspeare, offer us no true harmony, no genuine beauty. This is Friedrich Schlegel's starting point. Gradually, however, we see him drift away from this position to one exactly opposite; that is to say, while he maintains the contrast of the "objective" and the "interesting," he more and more inclines to attach different values to these terms, until at last he comes to see in the objectivity of ancient art nothing but formal correctness, "the perfect letter of poetry," while the particular interest of modern or romantic art he finds now in this that it is a revelation of the soul, that it makes us divine "the growing spirit."

This is the point where his brother takes up the discussion. Deeply imbued, as he was, with the Schellingian idea of the inner unity of all life, August Wilhelm Schlegel conceived of the contrast between Classic and Romantic as a part of the polarity of the whole universe, the polarity between form and spirit, the real and the ideal, the finite and the infinite ; he therefore refrained from extolling one of these opposing principles at the expense of the other, he merely considered them as different but typical manifestations of the same all-embracing creative force, and he endeavored to trace the consequences of this differentiation of type throughout the whole range of art and literature.

It is natural that from this point of view painting should have appeared to him as the typically romantic ; sculpture and architecture as the typically classic arts. The latter two appeal above all to the sense of form, they are dominated by line and external proportion ; ancient art, therefore, finds in them its highest expression. The fuller development of the inner life in Christian history has broken this supremacy of form ; Christian sculpture and architecture have, therefore, not reached that completeness of perfection which we admire in the Parthenon. Painting, on the other hand, has achieved its greatest triumphs in modern times, because painting is not so much concerned with harmony of outline as with the changing effects of light and shade, with the inner movement, as it were, of nature, and, therefore, has a closer affinity with the human soul. In like manner Schlegel derives the difference between classic and romantic poetry from this fundamental polarity of form and spirit. The metric system of the ancients is quantitative, that of the moderns accentuating and rhyming. The reason for this difference is to be found in this, that a line measured by quantity is an isolated fact, complete in itself, appealing to our plastic sense, while the rhyme, by depriving the single line of its independence and making it a part of a fluctuating whole, appeals to our feeling for inner movement. "Classic verse always holds us in the present and brings before

us images of equal distinctness and dignity ; romantic verse suggests both the past and the future, and gives us a foreboding sense of the infinite." And so, finally, the ultimate spiritual aims of art and literature are found to be differentiated according to these two principles of the Classic and the Romantic ; the one proceeds from the real, lifts it into the sphere of the ideal and finds its noblest form in man deified ; the other proceeds from the ideal, sinks it into the real, and finds its supreme expression in God become flesh.

Undoubtedly in these generalizations there is a good deal that is more brilliant than truthful, that is the result of hasty deduction and flighty speculation. Yet here again, as in Schiller's case, we have every reason to be grateful for a method which considers the whole development of human culture from one single point of view and thus imparts to it an organic unity and a grandeur of outline that is both illuminating and inspiring. As the first comprehensive attempt to represent the history of the world's literature in the light of a continuous succession of opposed yet related types, of a gradual approximation toward a complete harmony between form and spirit, August Wilhelm Schlegel's work will retain its place among the great achievements of evolutionary criticism.

In no æsthetic theory has the principle of evolution played a more important or more consistent part than in that of Hegel. As Hegel's whole philosophy is based upon the conception of a gradual self-unfolding of the Idea, i. e., a gradual transition from latent and unconscious to fully apparent and fully conscious spiritual freedom, so his æsthetic doctrine also is based upon the conception of a gradual self-unfolding of Beauty, from its lowest to its highest manifestations. As designations for two of the stages in this process of artistic evolution, Hegel adopts the Schlegelian terms of Classic and Romantic, but he gives these terms a new meaning, and he adds to them, or rather he prefixes to them, another,—the Symbolic. What does Hegel mean by

this necessary passage of art through the three stages of the Symbolic, the Classic, and the Romantic? Briefly stated, and robbed, as far as possible, of the technicalities of Hegel's language, it is this:—

In the lowest, or symbolic, stage "the Idea," as Hegel says,¹ "has not yet found the true form even within itself, and therefore continues to be merely the struggle and aspiration thereafter." There is no congruity, no inner bond between the thought to be expressed and its expression. Either the expression is entirely without form, shapeless, as in the case of a rude block standing for divinity; or it is of an exaggerated, huge, grotesque shape, as though the Idea in order to come to itself had to do violence to nature,—this is the impression produced, for instance, by Assyrian architecture. Although this stage is to be found in the artistic development of every race and nation,—as, indeed, in that of most individuals,—yet its typical representative is Oriental art, with its "reciprocal inadequacy of shape and idea, its aspiration, its disquiet, its mystery and sublimity."

In the second stage of art there is no such contrast between form and meaning. The Idea has found its adequate manifestation in the human body; for the human body is, among finite things, the most complete revelation of mind, it is the spiritual made sensuous. The artist, then, by representing the human body in its typical outline, i. e., freed from all the deficiencies of what is merely accidental and external, represents, indeed, the Idea in a direct and specific manner. This stage of art is again, more or less clearly, a part of the spiritual development of all nations and all individuals; it has, however, reached its perfection in Greek sculpture. But, perfect as Greek sculpture is, it proves very conclusively the limitations of this second stage of art. Mind is here "specified as a particular case of mind, as human mind, and not as simply absolute and eternal." A new struggle,

(1) I quote from Bosanquet's translation of the *Æsthetik*.

therefore, to express the Idea in all its fullness becomes necessary, and thus there arises the third stage of art, the romantic.

“The romantic form of art destroys the completed union of the Idea and its reality, and recurs, though in a higher phase, to that difference and antagonism of two aspects which was left unvanquished by symbolic art.” Indeed it revives and modifies the symbolism of that early stage. Complete harmony of form and spirit becomes once more an unattainable ideal; vague, deep, unutterable longings once more take the place of precise and definite characterization; phantastic caprice rules instead of law and measure. But while in the first symbolic stage the Idea was as yet so undeveloped that it fell short of adequate expression, it is now so fully developed that it transcends all sensuous expression and seeks to reveal itself as free and infinite. Isolated suggestions, fragmentary anticipations of this last stage of art development are again to be found throughout the whole course of human history; but only in mediæval and modern painting, music, and poetry has the romantic principle become the dominating motive of creative activity.

What a marvelous construction it is, this Hegelian evolution of Beauty, this seeking of the spirit after adequate self-revelation, from the first struggling with crude, material form to its final transcendence of all sensuous form! What light it seems to shed upon the whole course of civilization; how it seems to unlock the mysteries of all spiritual existence! No wonder that it swayed European thought with sovereign exclusiveness for a whole generation, that its indirect influence is by no means superseded yet. Without it we should not only not have had such æsthetic systems as that of Friedrich Theodor Vischer, such literary critics as David Friedrich Strauss, such literary philosophers as Kuno Fischer or Rudolf Haym; but it is doubtful whether the further course of evolutionary criticism in Germany, although to a large extent opposed to Hegel's deductive method,

would have been as vigorous and aggressive, as it has been, but for the propelling force of Hegel's thought.¹

II.

Almost simultaneously with Darwin's "Origin of Species," there appeared four books which form an epoch in German literary history: Hermann Hettner's "Litteraturgeschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts," (1855), Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl's "Kulturstudien aus drei Jahrhunderten," (1858), Gustav Freytag's "Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit," (1859), and Jacob Burckhardt's "Kultur der Renaissance in Italien," (1860). These four books may be singled out as indicating the turning of the tide in German evolutionary criticism from *a priori* reasoning to inductive methods, especially to that inductive method which studies literature and art from the point of view of national civilization. That this method was at bottom an idea of the eighteenth century, that it had been proclaimed in Germany most vigorously by Winckelmann and Herder, I have stated before. Nor had it been entirely discarded in the period of prevailingly philosophic speculation. I need only mention, as proof of this, the names of Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, Gervinus and Vilmar. But it certainly may be said that the full application of this method sets in only with the middle of the nineteenth century.

Of the four men whose works I bracketed with each other as epoch-making in German literary history, Hettner's was perhaps the least original personality. His influence was broad rather than deep; in detail his criticism is often disappointing; he lacks that delicate sense of form which enables a Sainte-Beuve or a Herman Grimm to reproduce a given work of literature or art before our very eyes. But Hettner rendered one extremely

(1) Even so intensely modern a book as Edgar Steiger's *Das Werden des neuen Dramas* (1898), a book which betrays an affinity with the spirit of Ibsen and Hauptmann as few others do, rests, in its philosophic presuppositions, largely on Hegelian views.

important service to the study of literature ; he gave us the first inductive literary history which represents on a large scale and at the same time with scientific minuteness the development of a certain intellectual type and its variation according to different national surroundings. It may truly be said that the one theme of his "History of Eighteenth Century Literature" is this, to show both the racial unity and the national differentiation of European culture in the Age of Enlightenment :—or, to use a simile which Hettner himself is particularly fond of employing, European literature of the last few centuries appears in this book as a grand fugue in which the voices of the various nations make themselves heard one after another, each taking up the leading motive in its own way, each blending with the preceding and the following voice, and thus helping to produce a progressive whole of an extremely complex and variegated character. How England takes the lead with its empirical philosophy, its constitutional freedom, its deistic religion, its emotional and satirical literature ; how France adopts the tone set by England, how Voltaire trains himself in the school of Newton and Locke, how Montesquieu studies the English constitution, how Rosseau is inspired by Richardson, how at last the English spirit, modified by French temper, leads to the downfall of the *ancien régime* ; and finally, how the whole movement reaches its artistic climax in the classic productions of the German poets and composers of the Weimar epoch,—all this is brought out with a soundness of method, a soberness of judgment and wealth of illustration far removed from the fascinatingly dangerous generalities of Hegelian reasoning. The influence of the scientific method is here unmistakable.

While Hettner's principal subject is the gradual rounding out and final consummation of that intellectual type which stands for the most essential and permanent in modern culture,—the rationalistic,—Jacob Burckhardt goes still further back to origins. His subject is the evolution of the modern individualistic type of man from the collectivism of mediæval society ; and his particular aim

is to analyze the form which this evolution took in Italy, to show in what sense "the Italian was the first-born among the sons of modern Europe." In the Middle Ages—this is the starting point of Burckhardt's investigation—the human mind was in a state of dreamy half-consciousness. It looked at the world, both the inner and the outer, "through a veil woven of faith, illusion, and childish prepossession. Man was conscious of himself only as a member of a race, people, party, family, or corporation,—only through some general category. In Italy this veil first melted into air; the objective treatment and consideration of the things of this world became possible; and at the same time the subjective side of consciousness asserted itself with corresponding emphasis, man became a spiritual individual, and recognized himself as such." In every phase of life Burckhardt traces the effects of this momentous change. In the new utilitarian views of society; in the development of state omnipotence on the one hand, of republicanism on the other; in Macchiavellian politics; in the beginnings of economical science; in the beginnings of an exact study of zoology, botany, and astronomy; in the great wave of geographical exploration setting in with the fifteenth century; in the discovery of natural beauty, signalized, for instance, by Petrarch's ascents of mountain peaks; in the striving for universality of culture, as shown in such men as Leon Battista Alberti or Lionardo da Vinci; in the revival of antiquity—everywhere we are made to see manifestations of the same fundamental fact, the emancipation of the individual from the fetters of tradition, the substitution of individual reason and feeling for collective sentiment and thought. What a distinctively evolutionary character this point of view imparts to Burckhardt's treatment of poetry and how it is just this evolutionary character which gives to his literary criticism its highest charm, may best be seen by a single quotation, a passage on Dante's Sonnets and Canzoni. "The prose of the 'Vita Nuova' in which Dante gives an account of the origin of each poem, is as wonderful as the verses themselves, and forms with them a

uniform whole, inspired with the deepest glow of passion. With unflinching frankness and sincerity he lays bare every shade of his joy and his sorrow, and moulds it resolutely into the strictest forms of art. Reading attentively these Sonnets and Canzoni, and the marvellous fragments of the diary of his youth which lie between them, we fancy that throughout the Middle Ages the poets had been purposely fleeing from themselves, and that he was the first to seek his own soul. Before his time we meet with many an artistic verse; but he is the first artist in the full sense of the word,—the first who consciously cast immortal matter into an immortal form. Subjective feeling has here a full objective truth and greatness, and most of it is so set forth that all ages and peoples can make it their own."

Both Hettner and Burckhardt, as we have seen, are primarily concerned with the development of individuality; the whole of a national organism is to them in the main only the background from which there stand out a few great personalities. Quite different is the standpoint of the two other noteworthy *littérateurs* whom I mentioned as their fellow workers in the history of civilization: Freytag and Riehl. These men also are far removed from the deductive methods of the Hegelian philosophy; they also betray clearly the influence of the exact sciences, they also study primarily the development of individual types; but in one important respect they are more closely related to Hegel than they themselves perhaps would have been willing to admit:—the individual type is to them much more strictly than to Hettner and Burckhardt, a representative of the species; the real object of their study is the evolution of the national soul as seen in the evolution of the individual. Both men have expressed in unambiguous terms their views as to the relation of the individual to this national soul. Freytag declares: "Millions of individuals make the people, in millions of souls the life of the people is pulsating, but the conscious and unconscious working together of the millions produces a spiritual content in which, at times at

least, the soul of the whole people appears as a living, self-creating unity." And similarly Riehl: "The age, i. e., the nation at a particular stage of its development, creates the man and the man helps to create his age; every epoch-making mind is at the same time child and father, disciple and master of his age, and the more fully he surrenders himself to it, the more fully will he control it." And with equal frankness and precision both men have stated which element in this incessant intermingling between the individual and the universal seemed to them the most important. Riehl, in justifying his collecting testimony from every sort of private and domestic usages, institutions, and implements, says: "These studies on isolated antiquarian matter, on customs and habits often very puerile and irrational, on house and home, on garments and utensils, are indeed, if taken by themselves, nothing but idle rubbish; they receive their scientific and poetic consecration only through their relation to the wonderful organism of a whole national personality. For of this national personality it can, indeed, be said with absolute truth, that man is man's worthiest study." And Freytag introduces his "*Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit*" with a declaration of his intention to give in them "a picture of the growth of our national soul during the last two thousand years." "What is printed here from old documents, are largely reports of men of the past about their own experiences, not infrequently insignificant incidents in the life of the common crowd. But just as every gesture of a strange man whom we meet for the first time, his address, his first words give us the image of a fixed personality, an imperfect and unfinished image, to be sure, but yet a whole; so, every document in which the life of an individual is revealed, has, if we mistake not, the curious effect of bringing before us with sudden clearness an image of the life of the people, a very incomplete and unsatisfactory image, yet likewise a whole, around which a large variety of ideas and facts, stored up in our mind, flash-like shoot together, as crystals around their centre."

It is not surprising that such views as these should have led both Freytag and Riehl to a treatment of literature and art which is more closely related to sociology than to æsthetics. To Freytag a poem, a novel, a drama is, indeed, primarily an historical document, a document in which a particular stage in the development of the national soul is recorded. And although the author of "Soll und Haben," of "Die Journalisten," and "Die Technik des Dramas" hardly needs being defended against the insinuation that he had been insensible to the specifically æsthetic charms of a work of art, it is nevertheless true that the innermost spring of his nature wells up only whenever he discovers a striking instance of the mysterious connection between individual feeling and national life. It is in this spirit that he views the martial traditions of old Germanic herodotom, the monastic culture of the tenth century, the Minnesong and the Volkslied, the spiritual struggles through which Luther became the leader of his people, the beginnings of journalism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the private correspondence and literary activity of Frederick the Great. It is in this spirit that he traces, in the introduction to the fourth volume of the "Bilder," the development of German culture from the Thirty Years' War downward. In all other countries political ascendancy and literary greatness have been simultaneous. Æschylus was a contemporary of the Persian wars; the golden age of Latin poetry was the age of imperialistic expansion of the Roman people; Shakspeare was the poetic expression of English popular energy in the days of the Armada; Corneille and Molière reflect the brilliant Parisian society under Louis XIV. "Quite otherwise in Germany. While everywhere else the state is like a body whose healthy vitality brings forth the works of the spirit, there arises in Germany since the Thirty Years' War, a new national culture out of the most decrepit and rotten political institutions; it arises from individuals entirely devoid of that discipline of mind and character which only the participation in public affairs can

give; it at first seeks support in the imitation of foreign models, gradually becomes more independent and free, and finally shines forth as an illustrious example to other nations, combining the highest beauty of poetry with the noblest freedom of science. German culture of the eighteenth century was, indeed, the wonderful creation of a soul without a body. And what is still more remarkable, this new national culture was to help in a round-about way to bring back to Germany her lost political greatness. From it there were to develop political enthusiasm and passion, party life, parliamentary institutions, national unity. Never has a literature played such a part and solved such tasks, as German literature from 1750 to the present."

Still more pronounced than in Freytag is the sociological aspect of literary and artistic study in Riehl; indeed, there is in Riehl a decided tendency toward emphasizing the influence of social and intellectual conditions at the expense of the creative individuality, so that he may justly be called the father of that historical school which at present has its chief exponent in Karl Lamprecht.¹ It can hardly be said that Riehl has advanced very far on the way toward the goal which he undoubtedly had in mind in this sociological study of intellectual life. His aim unquestionably was to represent the working of the social laws which regulate literary and artistic as well as economic and political activity. What is meant by such laws may perhaps be made clear by some words of the present writer printed elsewhere, in which he has tried to formulate the regulating influence exerted upon literature by two elemental human tendencies, the tendency toward personal freedom and the tendency toward social organization. "The

(1) An extremely interesting account of Riehl's whole activity from this point of view is given by Henry Simonfeld in his essay, *W. H. Riehl als Kulturhistoriker, Festrede gehalten in der k. b. Akademie d. Wiss. zu München*, Munich, 1898. Cf. also G. Steinhausen, *Freytag, Burckhardt, Riehl, und ihre Auffassung der Kulturgeschichte*, in *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum, Geschichte und Deutsche Litteratur*, 1898.

tendency toward personal freedom leads, in literature, to the observation and representation of whatever is striking, genuine, individual; in short, to realism. The tendency toward social organization leads, in literature, to the observation and representation of whatever is beautiful, significant, universal; in short, to idealism. The individualistic tendency, if unchecked, may lead either to a vulgar naturalism or to a fantastic mysticism. The collectivistic tendency, if unchecked, may lead to an empty conventionalism. Those ages and those men in whom the individualistic and the collectivistic tendencies are evenly balanced produce the works of literature which are truly great." It is perhaps safe to assume that Riehl when he speaks,—as he frequently does speak,—of the laws of literary and artistic taste, had some such regulative influence as that of these two fundamental tendencies in mind. But he never explicitly states, exactly what is to be understood by his "laws"; he often seems to confound law and fashion; instead of reducing the variety of social and literary or artistic phenomena to a common first principle, he confines himself for the most part to bringing out the correspondence between certain phenomena in the social or political sphere on the one hand, and certain phenomena in the literary or artistic sphere on the other.

If this is a limitation of the service rendered by Riehl to literary and artistic criticism,—as it seems to be,—it should at once be added that within these limits set by himself, Riehl has done most signal service. In the characterization of the social elements of literary or artistic phenomena, in the treatment of such themes as, for instance, the relation of music to popular life, the development of the musical ear, the evolution of the sense for landscape in their correspondence with the various stages of national culture,¹ he is unsurpassed, and in this respect even such

(1) It is interesting to note that Edgar Steiger, in his *Das Werden des neuen Dramas* is directly or indirectly influenced by Riehl's views on the development of taste, when he attempts to show that with the advance of culture the limits of what is considered ugly steadily become narrower, or, as he expresses it, that "with every new century there are fewer ugly things." (II. 28 f).

men as Georg Brandes and Julian Schmidt must recognize in him their master.

This sketch of the principal representatives, in Germany, of what may be called the method of *Kulturgeschichte* as applied to the study of literature and art, necessarily brief and incomplete as it is,¹ would be entirely insufficient were it not to include the name of a man who at the present day stands perhaps more fully than any other writer for the highest ideals of our national culture: Herman Grimm. Herman Grimm is not a literary sociologist like Wilhelm Riehl; at times it seems as though he were opposed to all scientific criticism of literature; he is an artist rather than a critic, an artist of reproductive genius. Yet even Herman Grimm's artistic temper has been drawn into the service of scientific criticism. He has never attempted to formulate a general law of literary or artistic development. But in analyzing and interpreting the great works of the world's literature and art, he always makes us feel that they are necessary manifestations of a deep, mysterious force which regulates all human life. And if there is anything that stands out as the central motive of his whole literary activity, it is the desire to reproduce before the eyes of the present the elements out of which have grown the great spiritual leaders of mankind, a Homer, a Michel Angelo, a Raphael, a Goethe. Grimm, then, is not less an evolutionist than Riehl or Taine. But whereas for Riehl and Taine the general movement is of prime importance, Grimm, like Jacob Burckhardt, lays the chief emphasis upon the individual who represents the general movement. Taine is greater in analyzing men who seem to have been nothing but tools in the intellectual or moral development of mankind, whose strength seems to have

(1) It is clear, for instance, that in a fuller treatment of the subject such men as Karl Biedermann, the author of *Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert*; Karl Hillebrand, the author of *Zeiten, Völker u. Menschen*; Karl Justi, the author of *Velasquez and Winckelmann und sein Jahrhundert* would have to be considered individually, as characteristic types of the class of writers basing their criticism upon the study of civilization.

been absorbed by living out a certain phase of the world's history ; Grimm is greater in depicting men who seem to stand by themselves, who seem to have taken rescue from the whirlpool of circumstances and fate into the serene regions of personal freedom.

III.

Some fifteen years ago there was coined, by Erich Schmidt I believe, a term which has attained considerable currency since : the term *Goethe-Philologie*. It is an ugly term, and for the sake of good taste it would be better if it never had been created. But the fact of its having been received so widely, and into such good company as German professorial circles, is significant ; it is an official recognition of a process which has been going on for generations, the process of a gradual reaching out of philology, or the evolutionary method of studying language, into the sphere of literature. Philology is essentially a science of origins. It studies the development of word-structure through the shifting of vowels and consonants, through the increase or loss of inflections ; it studies the development of word-meaning through analogy and differentiation of ideas ; it studies the development of the sentence through coördination and subordination. In other words, philology studies linguistic growth both with regard to the changes of form and the changes of content. The philological method of studying literature, also, is concerned with these two kinds of change ; it is concerned either with the variations of literary structure or with the variations of literary subject matter, or with both ; in any case it is chiefly directed toward bringing out the original type. That this method of studying literature is again, like the *kulturhistorische* method, essentially scientific and essentially evolutionary, need not be emphasized. What have been the results of this method thus far ?

There can be no question that the largely mechanical way in which the philological method has been and is being pursued by

the average scholar, especially by the authors of the stereotype *Quellenuntersuchungen*, or critical investigations of a writer's material, which form so large a part of the yearly output of the German universities in doctor-dissertations, has done much to discredit this method in the eyes of liberally trained and cultivated men. It often would seem as if the whole scientific creed of these dissectors of literary achievements consisted in the conviction that under no circumstances the writer who just happens to be the victim of their anatomical treatment must be assumed to have had an idea of his own. Whatever he has of ideas he must have borrowed from someone else, and this someone else must again have borrowed from someone else, and so on, so that it may truly be said that the primal "someone else" plays in these philological investigations the same part which, according to Spinoza, the so-called primal cause plays or used to play in theological discussions, the part namely of an *asylum ignorantiae*.

It would, however, be obviously unjust to gauge the merit of the philological method by these factory wares of the doctor-dissertation kind; its true spirit we must seek with the masters, with the men who represent not its defects but its virtues, with philologists of the type of Friedrich August Wolf, Jacob Grimm, Karl Lachmann, or Wilhelm Scherer. Let us consider one or two cases in which the philological method as applied by such men has been particularly successful in elucidating literary origins.

I suppose there is hardly a scholar living who would still cling, as Scherer did in his "History of German Literature," to Lachmann's theory of the composition of the "Nibelungenlied." The twenty so-called lays which Lachmann cut out of the thirty-nine "adventures" of the Nibelungen text and which he held to have been the original form of the Middle High German version of the subject, belonging to about as many different authors, are clearly nothing but arbitrary constructions of his own; they are no lays at all; they have a meaning only as cantos or chapters

of a larger whole. And no one who reads the "Nibelungenlied" without hypercritical bias can resist the impression that here we have, indeed, a whole which, in spite of occasional discrepancies and not infrequent irrelevancies, possesses a grand unity of conception and has a noble heroic movement going through it all. The central theme of this epic is Kriemhild's love, grief, and revenge; and everything throughout its thirty-nine "adventures" is subordinated to this one theme, from Kriemhild's foreboding dream in the first canto to the fearful massacre of friend and foe in the last. Throughout the poem we feel something of the striding of Fate, of the overwhelming inevitableness with which guilt is followed by death, and joy is turned into sorrow. But all these considerations cannot take away from the gratitude which we owe to Lachmann for having by his philological method first shed light upon the stages through which the Nibelungen legend passed before it reached the form of the Middle High German epic. That originally the Nibelungen legend was treated not as a whole, but in its various individual episodes; that its original poetic form was not that of a large connected epic, but of short, independent, ballad-like lays; and that these independent lays were still in existence at the time of the author of the Nibelungenlied and by him were welded together and made parts of a great epic organism,—this is the result of Lachmann's investigations which will stand.

Or, to take another more recent instance of the influence exerted upon literary criticism by the philological method, what a beneficial, truly enlightening effect has this method had upon the study of Goethe's "Faust." Not as though the spiritual import of this poem had not been understood, as far as such works *can* be understood, even before Heinrich Düntzer, Wilhelm Scherer, Gustav von Loeper and Erich Schmidt began their researches upon the growth of Goethe's Faust conception. No amount of philological knowledge will ever give real insight into the spirit of a work of genius, if the instinctive intuition of this

spirit is absent. But one thing the researches of these men have undoubtedly accomplished. They have freed us for the time being,—and let us hope for all time,—from the metaphysical interpretations which, until the middle of the century, so largely obstructed the clear view of Goethe's work; they have led us directly into Goethe's own presence. And if the reader who is introduced by them to Goethe misses Goethe's spirit, it is not their fault; for the principal office of these researches is to enable the reader to judge for himself, to make him see with his own eyes the original type from which the later work in all its fullness has developed. It was, indeed, a striking vindication of the value of these studies, when some thirteen years ago Erich Schmidt discovered the manuscript of Goethe's original Faust conception, and here found revealed in strongest outline exactly that type of poetical conception toward which these philological investigations had pointed as the probable germ of the whole poem,—the conception of the reckless Storm and Stress individualist whose Titanic self-assertion transgresses all law and transcends all happiness.

Or, to take still another case, what would the study of comparative literature be but an amateurish collecting of similar phenomena in the literatures of different nations,—and it must be admitted that a good many so-called students of comparative literature are nothing more than amateur collectors,—if philology had not given to the best representatives at least of this youthful science a safe direction in the search for literary origins. This is decidedly the point of view from which the relation between Provençal, Old French, and Middle High German literature has been studied by such masters as Diez, Bartsch, and Wackernagel; it is the point of view from which Benfey, Max Müller, Reinhold Köhler, and others have traced the course of literary and intellectual connections between orient and occident; and no one who has turned the pages of Max Koch's "*Zeitschrift für vergleichende Litteraturgeschichte*," can fail to see that more and

more this point of view is coming to be universally and exclusively accepted. Comparative literature, then, is converting itself into a science by adopting the evolutionary principle.¹

It would be useless to attempt here an enumeration of the works in which during the last generation the philological method has led not only to analytical investigations of literary origins but also to synthetic representations of literary development. But it should at least be said that the representative works of this kind belonging to the last few decades cover a remarkably wide area of scientific inquiry; indeed, taken together, well-nigh embrace the history of the whole world's literature. Oldenberg's and Deussen's studies in Hindu literature and Hindu philosophy; the contributions by Lepsius and Erman to Egyptology, by Schrader and Hommel to Assyriology; Nöldeke's "Studies in Ancient Arabian Poetry" and "History of the Koran"; Rohde's "History of the Greek Novel"; the histories of Greek, Roman, German, and English literatures by Bergk, Ribbeck, Scherer, and Ten Brink; Ebert's "Latin Literature of the Middle Ages" and "The Development of French Tragedy"; Mahrenholtz's "Molière"; Bettelheim's "Beaumarchais"; Körting's "Petrarch" and "Boccaccio"; Schönbach's "Walther von der Vogelweide"; Muncker's "Klopstock"; Erich Schmidt's "Lessing"; Minor's "Schiller"; R. M. Meyer's "Goethe"; Brahm's "Heinrich von Kleist"; Litzmann's "The Contemporary Drama";—are only a few examples, selected at random, which prove that the philological method has practically taken possession of the academic study of literature even in its synthetic form, and has, therefore, helped to establish the predominance of evolutionary principles, in this respect also.

IV.

It remains to cast a glance at a method of literary study

(1) Cf. W. Wetz, *Shakespeare vom Standpunkte der verg. Literaturgeschichte*, 1890, and *Ueber Literaturgeschichte*, 1891.

which, though only just beginning strongly to assert its influence, seems destined to become of great, nay of paramount importance in the further development of literary criticism,—the psychological method. Neither the metaphysical nor the historical nor the philological way of considering literature, although each of them gives us valuable insights into literary growth, go quite to the root of the matter; neither of these methods quite touches the spot from which there spring forth either the work of art itself or the sensations resulting from its being received by the public. Only by studying the genesis of the emotions which produce a work of art in the mind of the artist, and by studying the emotional processes which a work of art calls forth in the minds of its hearers or spectators, can we arrive at the foundation for a full understanding of literary or artistic evolution. This method has, of course, never been entirely neglected. We find traces of it even in such intensely speculative writers as Schelling and Hegel; it plays a not unimportant part in Friedrich Theodor Vischer's æsthetic theory; it is seen more or less distinctly in the literary investigations of the historical and philological school. But only recently, only since Fechner and Wundt established a real science of psychology, have attempts been made to apply the psychological method in a systematic manner to the study of literature.

It would be tempting to show here on a larger scale the influence exerted by the psychological method in various directions; to show, for instance, how it colored Steinthal's view of the popular epic; how it determined Friedrich Nietzsche's conception of "the birth of tragedy"; how it induced R. M. Werner to undertake a systematic description of the growth of lyric poetry from the first "inner experience" to the whole variety of artistic forms;¹ how it led Ernst Elster to the attempt of founding a "science of literature" upon a searching analysis of the normal

(1) Cf. Richard Maria Werner, *Lyrik u. Lyriker*, 1890.

processes of human imagination and emotion.¹ I shall, however, confine myself to a somewhat more detailed consideration of a work which seems to me by far the most original and suggestive contribution yet made by a German to the psychological study of literature, Johannes Volkelt's "*Æsthetik des Tragischen*," (Munich, 1897). This book is closely connected with the new life which has sprung up during the last decades in German literature, especially in the drama. For, if I mistake not, the personal motive of Volkelt's thought lies in his desire to justify before his scientific conscience the new forms of tragic art which are now coming to light in the productions of such men as Ibsen and Hauptmann. But the intellectual significance of this book is more than temporary. It is an epoch-making book. For it is the first book to show in a comprehensive manner the great variety of tragic types, the many transitions which lead from the least developed to the most complete forms of tragic emotion; it is the first successful attempt to break away entirely from æsthetic canons which since the days of the Renaissance, chiefly by means of a too rigid application of Aristotelean principles, have held the theory of tragedy within narrow and artificial limits. In short, it is nothing more nor less than a revision of the theory of tragic sensations from the evolutionary point of view.

I shall try to bring out this essentially evolutionary nature of Volkelt's investigation by considering his answers to the following questions: (1) Is sublimity of character a necessary element of the tragic hero? (2) Is guilt a necessary element of tragedy? (3) What is the essence of the tragic catastrophe? (4) What is the effect of tragedy upon the human mind?

1. It is a matter of course that, in the discussion of the elements that make the tragic hero, Volkelt should have nothing in common with the absurd and obsolete view of pre-Lessingian times

(1) Cf. Ernst Elster, *Prinzipien der Litteraturwissenschaft*, 1897.

as though an exalted station, princely or noble birth, were a necessary condition of tragic character. But Volkelt also rejects a view which in some circles is by no means considered obsolete, the view that a tragic hero cannot be thought of without grandeur of soul. Is there any grandeur in such characters as Shakspeare's Henry VI., Prince Arthur, or Hamlet; in Lessing's Emilia; in Goethe's Tasso, or Grillparzer's Rudolf II.? And do not these characters, nevertheless, impress us as truly tragic figures? No, grandeur of soul is *not* a necessary condition of the tragic type; it is only one of the elements which may or may not enter into the constitution of the tragic type. In other words, the expression "tragic character" is not a fixed term; there is a large scale of characters which may be called tragic; there is a gradation of the tragic from lower to higher forms.

There exists only one absolute prerequisite for a tragic character; he must not be hopelessly and irretrievably vulgar or commonplace. There must be something in him which appeals to our higher nature, something which calls out in us a decided human sympathy, something which gives us a strong sense of the contrast between the apparent claims of this man to happiness and his actual suffering, of the contrast between what ought to be and what is, of the contrast between human aspirations and the mysterious ways of Fate. Where this feeling of contrast is not aroused, there the suffering appears not as tragic but merely as sad or pitiful. The lowest form of the tragic, then, is that which is largely still within the sphere of the merely sad, yet at the same time in some respects is raised above it; the lowest form of the tragic is a transition-form from the pitiful to the tragic. A striking example of this tragic type is Hauptmann's "The Weavers." Every one of these disfranchised, downtrodden, physically and mentally crippled proletarians, whose suffering Hauptmann's drama brings before us, is, taken singly, too miserable to arouse anything but pity. Taken together, however, as a social group, as representatives of a class in whom the feeling

of human dignity is for the first time dimly awakening, of a class which, if once fully aroused to its great social mission, would be able to change the face of the earth, these poor weavers are tragic heroes whose suffering has something in it of the martyrdom for a noble cause, and makes us feel the contrast of what is and what ought to be.

A higher type of tragic character is that which shows us a man, not by any means extraordinary or great, yet raised in one particular respect above the common crowd and being driven into ruin by this very divergence from the ordinary. Such a tragic character is Kleist's "Michael Kohlhaas." Kohlhaas is a plain man of the people, a shrewd, practical horse-dealer, a man apparently without any claim to greatness. But there is one trait that gives to this plain, practical man the stamp of the true idealist; he has a sense of justice, absolutely incorruptible and unbending. And it is just this sense of justice that forces him to take revenge for injustice with the sword in his hand; that makes him a rebel against the law of his country; that brings the deepest misery upon himself and through him upon his people; that finally drives him into death. Here still more clearly than in "The Weavers" we have a tragic character that reveals to us (to use Kohlhaas' own words) "the defective order of this world" and makes us long for a better order.

As to the highest form of tragic character, Volkelt finds himself in accord with the accepted view in so far as he, too, considers the great personality, drawn into ruin or threatened by ruin, as the tragic character *καὶ ἐξοχόν*; for the suffering of the truly great man most emphatically forces upon us the riddle of existence. But here again Volkelt admits a larger variety of type than his predecessors. In particular, he refutes the common notion, as though tragic greatness was confined to the strong, the aggressive, the indomitable; and excluded the gentle, the contemplative, the prevailingly receptive character. The tragic feeling, the feeling of contrast between the "is" and the

“ought” is aroused, not only by witnessing the downfall of the hero of strenuous will and of action, but also by witnessing the ruin of the sensitive thinker, the passive dreamer, the reveller in sentiment. Hamlet is a tragic character of the highest type in spite of his inactivity. Werther’s fate has the quality of highest tragedy; for this passive dreamer stands for the imperishable right of feeling, for the priceless worth of personality, for a true aristocracy of the spirit, and he is crushed by the unthinking and unfeeling mediocrity that surrounds him. Even Byron’s Sardanapalus belongs to this class; for his inertia and voluptuousness have their roots in a gentle, humane heart which would do harm to none, shed no blood, wage no war, and bring happiness and enjoyment to everybody. The violent downfall of such a man impresses us as tragedy of the highest type.

2. We have seen, then, that in the consideration of tragic greatness Volkelt is led by his evolutionary principles to a freer and more comprehensive view than was attained by his predecessors. The same is true of his consideration of tragic guilt. The Aristotelean theory that the ruin of the tragic hero must be brought about by some sort of aberration or mistake or crime of which he has made himself guilty, has been considered unimpeachable throughout the centuries. It was strongly upheld by Lessing; it was philosophically reënforced and deepened by Hegel and Vischer; it practically rules to-day; the downfall of the hero, this is still the opinion of most critics, must be the consequence of his guilt and thus serve as an atonement for his guilt.

Volkelt, in truly inductive manner, discusses in the first place a number of cases in which this theory of atonement for guilt does not seem to work. Can it be said that Egmont’s death is an atonement for guilt? Or is it not simply preposterous to think that Egmont’s easy-going temper, his neglect of the warnings of his friends, his implicit trust in men and in his own good luck, were moral aberrations which could be rectified only by his death? What is it that causes Goetz von Berlichingen’s ruin?

The slight moral aberration which induces him to accept the leadership of the rebellious peasants; or is it not rather the world of meanness, treachery, trickery, and corruption which presses in upon this honest, faithful, and doughty knight, blighting his hopes and crushing his life? Does not Siegfried, in the "Nibelungenlied" as well as in Hebbel's drama, although the external cause of his death lies in his over-hasty confidingness, fall in reality as an innocent victim of evil powers? Or take "Romeo and Juliet," "Othello," "Lear"; those critics who, like Gervinus and Ulrici, find in these dramas nothing but examples of just retribution following upon the heels of reckless love and over-reaching egotism, are, indeed, to be compared to uncouth savages breaking into the flower garden of poetry in order to steal some cabbage-heads.

It is clear, then, there are not a few dramatic masterpieces in which the ruin of the hero is not caused by his guilt. In other words, the atonement for guilt is not the only legitimate form of the tragic dénouement; it is only one type of tragic structure in a whole scale of other types. But it should at once be added, that it is the highest, the most complex form of tragic structure. For guilt both intensifies and softens the tragic feeling, it both intensifies and softens the feeling of contrast between the actual and the ideal. It intensifies this feeling because guilt is the deepest of all woe. The guilt of a great man affects us still more painfully than his misfortune. The sight of greatness being drawn into guilt brings before us in particularly emphatic manner the paradoxicalness of a world in which just what is best, noblest, strongest is most easily perverted into evil, impurity, and crime. It makes us shudder at the awful possibilities of sin and agony that lurk in the recesses of the human heart. But, on the other hand, tragic guilt and suffering soften the feeling of contrast between the actual and the ideal. For the suffering of the guilty is felt as a necessity, as a moral demand; and we derive even an

æsthetic satisfaction from the sight of the moral equilibrium being restored through this suffering.

3. Closely allied with the question of tragic guilt is the question : what is the essence of the tragic catastrophe ? The answer to this question given by dogmatic æsthetics is a very simple one : the tragic catastrophe, by showing the hero, though outwardly crushed, yet inwardly victorious or purified, is necessarily elevating and inspiring. Here again we observe how, in contradistinction from the dogmatic way of looking at things, Volkelt's psychological method leads to evolutionary views. Is it really true, he asks, that the tragic catastrophe is necessarily elevating and inspiring ? Is there nothing legitimate in the tragic catastrophe of the depressing variety ?

A review of the history of literature shows that the depressing type of the tragic catastrophe is by no means uncommon. It is found not only in the most recent literature, not only in Tolstoi or Hauptmann. Some of the greatest masterpieces of the past are prevailingly depressing. The catastrophe of the "Nibelungenlied" dismisses us with a sense of nameless woe ; the whole world seems here to be out of joint ; the noblest, the best, the bravest go under in a universal wreck ; the guilty and the guiltless are crushed by the same inexorable fate. Othello, a man of colossal passion but also of purest, unadulterated feeling, a man both hero and child, is robbed by a consummate villain of happiness and peace ; is inwardly deranged ; becomes the brutal murderer of his loving wife ; and is finally driven to suicide—a career so shocking, so horrible, so bewildering to our moral sense that it seems preposterous to look here for elevating or inspiring elements. And is not "The Elective Affinities," probably Goethe's artistic masterpiece, in its moral effect essentially depressing ? Must not the same be said of Hebbel's "Judith" and "Mary Magdalen" ; the same of most of George Eliot's novels ?

Are all these works to be condemned as illegitimate productions of art ? Or are they, after all, valuable as bringing out one

side at least of human life? It seems clear that the latter is the case. It would be tantamount to depriving art of a most important part of its office, if we were to deny it the right of arousing a strong feeling of the nothingness, the confusion, the grimness, the perversity, the curse of all earthly existence. It would be a distortion of the meaning of life, it would be a mere palliation of facts, if art were to exclude from its sphere the great woe of our being, the triumph of the mean over the noble, the sinking under of great souls in shame, hopelessness, and despair. Such a sight, though deeply depressing, is not by any means degrading. On the contrary, it enriches our inner experience; it widens our sympathies; it puts the soul into a state from which there have sprung some of the finest spiritual truths, the state of a noble contempt of the world, of a lofty resignation to the eternal. And thus the depressing type of the tragic catastrophe, in a roundabout way, leads to the same goal as the inspiring type, the goal of strengthening, intensifying, and deepening the inner life. That the inspiring type is æsthetically higher, Volkelt does not deny. The highest type he sees in the combination of both, in a tragic catastrophe which both depresses and inspires, which plunges us into the deepest abyss of human woe, yet even in this woe gives us a triumphant sense of human greatness and freedom.

4. This leads us, finally, to a consideration of the effect which tragedy as a whole has upon the mind of the reader or spectator. Here the contrast between Volkelt's evolutionary method and the dogmatic method of older æsthetics is particularly marked, because here he entirely breaks away from a doctrine which for centuries has been considered as the very corner-stone of tragic theory: the Aristotelean doctrine of pity and fear. With most æsthetical writers this doctrine of pity and fear as the fundamental emotions called out by tragedy still enjoys undisputed sway. Volkelt shows that this is a formula far too narrow to do justice to the wealth and variety of tragic emotions.

Pity, in particular, is a most unfortunate term, if it is to stand

for the whole scale of sympathetic feelings aroused by tragic suffering. Let us suppose: the suffering hero is in all his agony unshaken; he does not give way to despair or lamentation; his agony serves only to set off his greatness of soul all the more strikingly. In the face of such a suffering we do not feel pity, or at least, pity is far outweighed by another kind of sympathy. Our sympathy in such a case has itself something of the courageous, the powerful; it is not so much sympathy with the sufferer, as admiration for the way in which he suffers. For the "Prometheus" of Æschylus or Byron's "Lucifer" we feel no pity. Or let us suppose: the tragic hero is drawn into vice and crime and thus becomes a caricature of his better self. For such a man we certainly feel pity, but this pity is mixed with horror and repugnance; and frequently these latter feelings gain the ascendancy over pity. When we see Macbeth hardening himself in bloody, atrocious crimes, our pity with him is overshadowed by feelings which keep us away from him. Pity tends to unite us with its object; it rests on the instinctive conception of an inner affinity. In Macbeth's case the opposite takes place; we feel an ever widening gulf stretching out between him and ourselves; and in the end pity has well-nigh disappeared.

These examples may suffice to suggest the way in which Volkelt demonstrates the inadequacy of the Aristotelean, or rather Lessingian, formula of tragic emotions. What, then, is his own formula? He has no formula, he admits the whole range of human feelings, both pleasurable and painful, depressing and inspiring, and he studies the scale of combinations into which these pleasurable and painful feelings may enter with each other. That there should be such a combination, a mixture between joy and pain, between hope and gloom, between light and dark,—this seems to him the *sine qua non* of tragic effect; and the highest tragic effect seems to him reached when this mixture is most harmonious and evenly balanced. "In that case the tragic effect is of an inexpressible charm; willingly Pain opens his being to Joy,

lets her take away his sting, and feels tremblingly her gentle touch; and Joy on her part enters into the union with Pain bashfully and hesitatingly as if fearing to disturb his sacred calm."

V.

We have followed the course of German literary criticism through a number of important stages: the metaphysical, the sociologico-historical, the philological, and psychological. We have seen that in all these stages the conception of a continuous evolution from lower forms of literature to higher ones dominated the critical analysis. We have seen that in every one of these stages the evolutionary method led to some new aspect of literature, some new insight into the relation of literature to life. It is perhaps not unfitting, and certainly harmless, to conclude this essay with a prophecy. It seems to me that the literary critic of the future, the Messiah toward whom the previous history of criticism is pointing as the coming fulfiller of its mission, will be the man who combines in himself all the preceding stages of critical thought, who is metaphysician, sociological historian, philologist, and psychologist in one. But perhaps this man partakes too much of the character of the Nietzschean *Ueberschensch* to have much of a prospect for being seen in the flesh.



THE SCHOOL AND THE HOME

PAUL H. HANUS, *Harvard University.*



WE commonly regard the school as wholly responsible for the education of our children. But that the school alone cannot be responsible for this education is obvious on a moment's reflection. The school has direct control of the children during only five hours of the day, five days in the week, for not more than forty weeks of each year. This a total less than one fifth of the waking hours. Hence, during at least four fifths of the waking hours, the children are responsible to the home, not to the school.

Nevertheless, the home's share of responsibility is not fairly expressed by this simple mathematical statement. Many of the educational influences to which the children are subject do not originate in the individual home any more than in the school, nor are they within its control. These influences emanate from the natural surroundings, and from the community life as a whole,—its industrial, commercial, and political activities, its amusements, traditions, religion, and contemporary moral and intellectual standards.

It thus appears that our children and youth are subject to an important education,—the indirect, but none the less powerful, fortuitous education of natural environment and social experience,—which neither the home nor the school is able directly to control. But both are concerned in subordinating this education to their own direct teachings; both seek to reënforce it when favor-

able to the ultimate ends they have in view, and to counteract it when unfavorable. Both home and school seek to give the coming generation such a command over themselves, and their material and social environment as will enable them to react on it to their own permanent advantage, and the advantage of the social group to which they belong, or to which they aspire.

Now, while the family has other important duties to perform, education is the whole duty of the school. This is the sole ground of its existence. Hence, whatever the duties of the home may be regarding education, the school must always bear the largest share of responsibility for the result. Still, the home's share of responsibility remains considerable; first, because of the inevitable disparity between the hours spent in and out of school; second, because the impressions of the school are easily effaced or weakened unless reënforced and supplemented by home sanctions, or stimulus, or sympathy; third, because the school, like other human institutions, is too often very imperfect, and not infrequently fails in its aims, equipment, or methods, to minister adequately to the high ends for which it is established; and finally, because the financial support of the school, on which its whole efficiency ultimately depends, must come from the homes taken collectively,—that is, from the community.

One would suppose that, under such circumstances, coöperation would be the established relation between the home and the school. One would suppose that parents and teachers, recognizing their mutual responsibilities to the same children, would find or make opportunities for personal contact with each other; that the parents would seek to learn as much as could be learned by outsiders of the teachers and the school work, and the teachers would endeavor similarly to know the parents and the home conditions of the pupils. But the fact is that such a foundation for effective coöperation is rare. Most parents know little or nothing about the school lives of their children, and the teachers are equally ignorant about the children's home lives.

Sometimes the teachers and sometimes the parents are responsible for this state of affairs. Most private schools and some public schools discourage the visits of parents to the class rooms. Hence parents are often deterred, through the fear of intrusion, from making the acquaintance of the teachers or informing themselves by personal inspection about what the schools are or are not doing for their children. On the other hand, parents are often careless or indifferent, and repeated and urgent invitations to visit the school are disregarded. Sometimes the parents,—and these are the less enlightened or the more optimistic parents,—consciously charge the teachers with full responsibility for the children's welfare, during the school hours, and, having done so, feel that they have done their full duty, both to the children and to the school, and rest content until something goes wrong.

It may be said in passing that the reluctance of some schools to invite the visits of parents is not without justification. The conception of education and of school work entertained by most parents,—just because they are *not teachers*,—is likely to be purely conventional, as regards the course of study; crude and out of date as regards books, equipment, and methods of teaching; and,—just because they are *parents*,—either too lenient or too severe, as regards methods of government and discipline. Under such circumstances helpful coöperation between the home and the school cannot be expected from the visits of parents, unless the teachers are willing to undertake the appropriate and tactful education of the parents,—a process for which there is, ordinarily, no provision, and from which, in the absence of recognized provision, most teachers naturally shrink. Besides, some parents are simply meddlesome. To invite all parents to visit the schools is to invite the meddlers among the rest.

Now, it is generally agreed by thoughtful laymen and teachers that the want of coöperation between the home and the school is an unfortunate neglect of educational opportunity. The result of this neglect is not seldom a perversion of the very education

which both the home and the school really wish to provide, and certainly the best results cannot be expected unless the home and the school reënforce each other, and unless, in case of need, the home insists on a better school, or the school does its best to improve the home.

Coöperation between the home and the school is needed, in the first place, to guard the health and promote the normal physical development of the children. Few parents are consciously indifferent to the physical welfare of their children, but many parents in all classes of society do not appreciate the serious consequences of neglect in this matter. As long as the children are not perceptibly ill, to the ordinary observer, it is assumed that they are doing well. This assumption may be quite erroneous.

Dr. Francis Warner, basing his conclusions on the examination of fifty thousand school children in England, states that 6.8 per cent. of the girls, and 8.8 per cent. of the boys showed developmental defects. When these developmental defects were taken in connection with other defects, for example, abnormal nerve signs or low nutrition, the percentage of children possessing the combined defects was 38.4 (boys), 36.2 (girls) and 16.2 (boys), 26.3 (girls), respectively.¹ Now, developmental defects are commonly the result of a disregard of the laws of health in the lives of the pupils themselves, or in their physical surroundings, or both.

The home life of the children of the poor is often a life of drudgery. Once out of school, the girls are occupied with vari-

(1) *The Study of Children*, by Francis Warner (Macmillan & Co.), page 250. See also a suggestive paper, *Habits of Work and Methods of Study of High School Pupils in Some Cities in Indiana*, by N. C. Johnson, in *The School Review*, (Chicago) for May, 1899; and Newsholme's *School Hygiene*, (D. C. Heath & Co.) Part ii., Chapters ix. to xvii. Dr. Newsholme's little book is an excellent guide for both parents and teachers. The chapters referred to give invaluable suggestions concerning the personal hygiene of children and adolescents. The treatment is clear, brief, and sufficiently non-technical to be appreciated by every intelligent reader.

ous kinds of domestic duties, and the boys, when not needed to help at home, are engaged in various kinds of work for small wages. The tension of such a life may not be excessive at any moment,—although often likely to be so,—but it is constant. Add to this that the food is likely to be poorly prepared and not infrequently deficient in quantity, or, at least in nutritive quality, and the time for sleep as much too short as the hours of work are too long. All this may take place in a crowded section of the city, or other locality, where rent is cheap, and the sanitary conditions are unsatisfactory. What wonder that the children from such homes come to school pale, thin, nervous, and irritable; unable or unwilling to subject themselves to the necessary restraints and constraints and the applications to duty required in the school? The entire school-day means for the pupil a new set of exactions.

Under such circumstances, it is clear that the home life and the school life together make demands on the pupil that easily become excessive. The result is that the normal weariness, that disappears completely under the influence of recreation and rest, becomes chronic fatigue, entailing its whole series of usual consequences,—developmental defects, together with impaired health,—and so ultimately a dismal condition of body and mind that makes all work a burden, and recreation a bore. It is true that such results may, occasionally, be inseparable from poverty; but in general, they are traceable, not to poverty, but to ignorance.

But it is not only in the homes of the poor that improper hygienic conditions constitute a menace to the physical development of the children, and interfere with their general education in school. The children of the middle and the upper classes are not called upon to do housework or to work for wages out of school, but they are permitted, or even encouraged to indulge in time consuming and physically exhausting social diversions. It matters little in the end whether a child or youth undermines his physical strength by excessive work or excessive play or by a

combination of the two. In each case he misses the physical development that he ought to get, and he therefore unfits himself for the highest efficiency in the duties and for the fullest participation in the refined pleasures of life, and this preparation for efficient and complete participation in all the worthy interests of life,—it is the fundamental purpose of all education to secure for him as fully as possible. Complete living demands vigorous bodily health, together with the power of endurance; it ought not, therefore, to be difficult to cause most parents of the ambitious classes to see the importance of hygienic conditions for their children,—the only conditions under which vigorous physical health and efficiency can be secured.

Now the price of health, as of liberty, is eternal vigilance. We have medical inspection of schools, but who will claim that it is more than a merely perfunctory performance? It does, on occasion, serve to check the spread of contagious diseases, and this is, of course, a very important service to the children and the community, so far as it goes. But so far as I know we have nowhere in the United States a thorough-going medical inspection of schools, with appropriate authority to correct abuses wherever found. Again, it is never assumed that the random, haphazard education of experience and environment is sufficient in the field of intellectual and moral education. It is well known that such an education leaves many gaps; that it fails to arouse and develop many of the child's powers, because it never reaches them; or, if it does, it does so only now and then without discriminating selection and appropriate emphasis. Moreover, the strenuousness of persistent application is wanting, and there can be no real training,—no permanent benefit,—without such strenuousness. Most of the physical training in our schools hardly deserves the name. Not much can be expected of ten minutes once or twice a day, often under unsuitable conditions, given by untrained teachers, and lacking adequate expert supervision. How much progress could be expected in Latin or algebra under

such circumstances and with such a time allotment? Dr. Warner, quoted above, lays stress on the benefits to be derived from good physical training. He says:—

“Evidence is available from comparison of reports on children seen in schools, where good physical training was provided, in contrast with a large school, where no such training was given. In the school without physical training the proportion of both boys and girls with abnormal nerve signs was higher, and a larger proportion of the boys were reported by the teachers as dull pupils. This cannot be attributed to the developmental cases or to low nutrition, as their proportion was lower than in the other schools; it must, I think, be ascribed to the absence of physical training. * * * It may be inferred that physical training tends to improve the brain condition of children, preventing or removing disorderliness in motor and in mental action, and promotes healthy activity in both directions; this applies not only to children perfectly well made in body, but also to those in some slight degree below normal.”

But developmental defects, abnormal nerve signs, and the rest, are traceable to unhygienic school buildings as well as to a disregard of personal hygiene. Improper heating, lighting, and ventilation, cramped and unhealthy positions during school hours, owing to unsuitable or ill-fitting school furniture—these also contribute their important share to undermining the health and normal physical development of the children. How far we are from having hygienic school buildings is painfully evident to any one who will read the reports of our city school superintendents, or who will take the trouble to look about him in his own community.¹ It is no exaggeration to say that unsanitary school

(1) By way of illustration I quote from the report (for the year 1898) of the superintendent of schools of an important city in a neighboring state.

“Nearly all of our rooms do not furnish sufficient floor space or cubic contents for the number of children occupying them. In many, if not most, cases this condition is caused by our being obliged to crowd into these rooms more children than they were planned for.

“In amount of light, study rooms in all our older buildings are seriously defective. * * * In several large study rooms the direction from which the light comes is wrong.

“In the matter of ventilation, we are in a very bad condition. In only six buildings have we any ventilation worthy of the name, while of these six

buildings, with respect to light, heat, and ventilation, abound. Suitable physical training, seriously pursued under wise direction, in our schools is still, as I have said, almost universally conspicuous by its absence, and medical inspection of schools is still nearly everywhere a perfunctory performance. Under such circumstances, we must not be surprised if the health and physical development of our children suffer. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that an examination of our school children would bring to light an alarming amount of school-bred ill health and developmental defects. That is to say, under such circumstances, the school, which should stand for the development of our children into health and strength, may actually promote their development into physical weaklings, —and this is indeed a perversion of education.

But if the indifference or ignorance of parents, unsanitary school buildings, and the absence of proper physical training are responsible for these things, the remedy is not far to seek.

In all cases, for rich and poor, for the ignorant and the well-informed, the duty of the school is plain. It is the institution set apart by society for the education of the children into physical as well as mental and moral health and vigor. It may, therefore, nay, it *ought* to insist that whatever the home conditions may be, it shall be allowed, yes, *required* to set the example of providing for children and youth the most salutary physical

only one gives anywhere near sufficient pure air for the number of pupils now occupying them. * * * * The trouble comes mainly from over crowding in all of the older buildings, —in the first twelve or thirteen built there is practically no ventilation except by doors and windows.

“Almost two thirds of all the desks and seats in use are unhealthful and unsuitable for school use. Only those purchased during the last three years have reasonable approach to perfection.”

See also an article, *The Big Red Schoolhouse*, by Elizabeth M. Howe in the *Educational Review* for October, 1899.

environment possible, and of devising and enforcing the wisest rules of personal hygiene.

Now it is clear that such a recognition of the function of the school can only be secured by the coöperation of the parents,—for intelligent oversight of the pupils' health from day to day requires the services of trained expects, and these, together with hygienic school buildings and furniture, and good physical training, cost money. But, if the parents were once convinced of the harm done their children by failing to provide suitable buildings, and furniture, and the best physical training they can secure for their children, these essentials to the children's welfare would be forthcoming.

That the school may present such matters as I am now discussing, and many others affecting the efficiency of the schools, to the parents, either for their instruction or to stimulate their investigation, the school and the home need recognized opportunities for conference. In some schools a somewhat elaborate plan has been worked out, during the past few years, whereby parents and teachers necessarily coöperate in caring for the interests of their common charges. By means of question blanks sent to the parents much information concerning each child is secured by the teachers, and this information is made the basis of conferences between parents and teachers. This plan has also usually included blanks for recording information about pupils by teachers, for transmission to other teachers or schools, as the pupil advances from one grade to another, or from one school to another.

The entire plan has been called "Pupil Study." It seems to be useful, and bids fair to win favor gradually wherever it is undertaken. There is no doubt, I think, that when wisely administered such a plan may provide an excellent basis for effective coöperation between teachers, and between teachers and parents in promoting not only the pupils' physical welfare, but

a wise treatment of the pupil in every detail of his school career.¹

Opportunities for conferences between parents and teachers are provided, also, in many places, by parents' meetings called periodically by the teachers,—usually by the superintendent or by some principal; and by the "Education Societies," now established in many places throughout the country. The education societies may be made, I believe, the most useful means of communication between the teachers and the parents that can be devised. They represent the organized educational interests of the community. The initiative in founding them is usually taken by the teachers, but the members are chiefly laymen. By means of regular meetings, devoted to the exposition of contemporary educational questions, they serve to inform their members of the scope and meaning of such questions, and so to cultivate public opinion in favor of important measure of progress and reform. Such societies will in time, I doubt not, do much to overthrow the prevalent apathy toward unsanitary school buildings and inadequate and unsatisfactory physical training in our schools.²

Coöperation between the home and school is no less essential in promoting the intellectual and moral development of the pupil. This commonplace is so obvious that its importance is likely to be overlooked. But it is just because such coöperation is too often lacking, that some of the most serious perversions of educational opportunity take place.

The school is rare that does not set up and consistently endeavor to maintain a high standard of intellectual achievement

(1) For details concerning "Pupil Study," see *Child Study in Secondary Schools*, by F. W. Atkinson, *The School Review*, v. 461; *A Study of High School Pupils*, by Myron T. Scudder, *The School Review*, vii. 197; *How Can the Public High School Reach Individuals?* by F. W. Atkinson, *The School Review*, viii. 377.

(2) See *Beginnings of an Education Society*, by Dr. Walter Channing, *Educational Review*, xiv. 354; also *The Report of the United States Commissioners of Education for 1898-99*, I. 538.

and of conduct. There may be a few private schools that are, primarily, commercial enterprises, and only incidentally educational institutions; but most private schools are not of this sort; and however much some of them may be justly condemned as mere cramming machines for examination purposes, very few can be justly charged with mere pretence, while consciously adhering to low standards of achievement. In the public schools mercenary motives can have no weight. Occasionally a public school pretends to standards which are not enforced, but nearly all public schools refuse to tolerate indifference, indolence, or caprice, in work, and set themselves squarely against concessions to any divergence whatever from recognized standards of conduct.

Now it is equally true that most homes cherish high standards of achievement and conduct for their children, so far as they are capable of conceiving them, whatever their social grade may be; and, in general, the standards are at least as high as those of the school. Nevertheless, it is not seldom that the school fails to attain a satisfactory approximation to its ideals, just because parents and teachers do not work together in attaining desired results. I think it is fair to say that these failures are more often chargeable to the home than parents are willing to admit; and this is particularly true of parents belonging to the middle and upper classes. While theoretically approving the standards set up by the school, these standards are, in practice, not infrequently regarded as too severe or exacting by the parents for *their* children, or, at least, the importance attached to serious and continuous endeavor to realize these standards in the daily school life of the pupils is practically regarded as excessive by the parents. Under such circumstances, the pupils, being human, correspondingly abate their devotion to school duties, and the importance of athletics, social functions, and other diversions, is correspondingly augmented, in their eyes. I have even known an ambitious but socially inclined young student, in all seriousness to deplore the fact that he had so much "to do" that he had no time to study.

Now, of course, the coarser adjustments of the home and the school in the matter of quantity and quality of work demanded of the pupils are provided for in the official relations between them, and this is also true with respect to the conduct expected and enforced by the school. When *A* is idle or troublesome and there is danger that he will fail of promotion, or that he will be suspended for misconduct, the teacher or principal fills the proper official blanks, furnished for the purpose by the superintendent, and sends them to the parents. Usually the pupil's descent to Avernus is checked by this procedure and coöperation is, temporarily at least, forcibly secured.

But sometimes the administration of this provision for official coöperation between the home and school is rendered unnecessarily difficult; indeed, the efforts of the school are sometimes thwarted by a singular and culpable dishonesty of which some parents are guilty. This dishonesty is the result of weakness. The parents charge the school, in the pupil's presence, perhaps, with full responsibility for enforcing its standards, and, in case of need, its penalties, on the pupil; and promise themselves, the pupil, and the school, that unless the school requirements are met, the pupil shall surely come to grief. But when the pupil's delinquencies have to be dealt with, some parents weakly and unwisely allow themselves to become the pupil's advocates for clemency in spite of the extended series of reminders which they have received that the pupil has been going astray. Dean Briggs¹ has shown how it is even possible for some parents, under such circumstances, to be dishonest with themselves, with their children, and with the school (college) authorities; first, by pretending to the pupil that they will advocate his cause; second, by abandoning the pupil's cause in the presence of the college officer; and third, by subsequently pretending to themselves that

(1) *Fathers, Mothers, and Freshmen*, by L. B. R. Briggs, *Atlantic Monthly*, January, 1899.

they have "done all they could" for the pupil, and telling him so. No useful active coöperation can be expected from such a parent, but the school has the right to expect, at least passive coöperation. It has the right to expect that the parent will stand aside, and permit the school to attempt the reformation of the pupil,—unaided, but also unhampered by misguided or dishonest efforts to save the pupil from the consequences of his own misdeeds.

But the greatest need of coöperation is in the finer adjustments of the school and home influences to each other in the case of the ordinary, well disposed pupils who constitute the great majority of the school.

The activities of the school may be greatly reënforced or weakened by the notice taken of them at home. Of course, it is quite possible for parents to repel rather than to invite the pupil's conversation about their school interests. If the children are daily subjected to a running fire of questions about their studies or their teachers in a mere matter of fact way; if the parents fail to respond sympathetically to a youthful enthusiasm,—temporary it may be, but none the less important to him who feels it,—in a book, or a study, or a teacher; if the children have reason to feel that every petty delinquency, or trifling difficulty will be looked upon with marked disfavor, or met with moralizing comment; or if the parents have no sense of humor and fail to appreciate the children's point of view in some mischievous but childish and really harmless prank, and treat such youthful faults with solemnity or severity, instead of good-natured raillery or friendly advice;—under such circumstances, we may be sure that children will say little at home about what goes on in school. But most children respond readily to the intelligent interest of their parents in school affairs, and are glad to talk about them to sympathetic and appreciative listeners. Instances of such a good mutual understanding between pupils and parents are, fortunately, not rare, but they are less common than they ought to be.

There is, usually, little difficulty about home sympathy in the matter of interscholastic athletic contests, and this interest, though sometimes productive of excesses on the part of the pupils, is, on the whole, rather helpful than otherwise. It is, of course, a stimulus to participation. Even that widespread vicarious participation known as "supporting the team," although not adding much to the physical development of the pupils and seeming rather trivial to us elders, is unquestionably a means of rousing and developing youthful loyalty to a common interest,—the welfare of their common institution,—and so has, on the whole, a beneficial moral effect. The parents share the enthusiasm of their youngsters before and during the games, and afterwards also partake of the bliss of triumph or the torments of defeat. The teachers, the parents, and the pupils make common cause for the time being. After a defeat, the determination to win next time is reënforced by all alike; every period of practice is discussed and its bearings on the next contest scrutinized. After a triumph, mutual congratulations equally stimulate the determination to hold the preëminence just won. There is no doubt that wisely conducted interscholastic athletics can do much to help the school and the home to set up and maintain a high standard of physical development and vigor.

But it is not only in the field of athletic sports that good results are thus secured. There is, fortunately, at this moment a growing interest in interscholastic (especially intercollegiate) debates. What has been said of the reënforcement of the school by the sympathy of the parents in respect to athletics cannot be asserted with equal truth about debating. Nevertheless, the interest of the non-participating pupils and of the parents in an interscholastic debate often falls but little short of the interest in an approaching athletic contest, with corresponding beneficial results.

But my object in calling attention to these interscholastic contests is not to emphasize their value, as such. My special purpose is to point out how great is the stimulus of a common end con-

ceived and striven for by all alike,—parents, teachers, pupils ; and hence, to indicate, to some extent at least, what we might expect if we could secure a similar coöperation in the less dramatic, ordinary activities of the school, day by day. Each pupil is daily making conquests or suffering defeat in his individual work. The extent to which the significance of these daily successes and defeats could be increased through home sympathy varies, of course, with the varying conditions of the home, but there is no doubt that in many of our best homes many valuable opportunities for encouraging the pupils with timely aid, for augmenting the pupils' interest in their work, and for stimulating them to achieve something more than routine results, are lost because parents do not know and often do not seem to care what the pupils' work or other school interests may be.

A powerful educational influence in every school which the parents may do much to help or hinder is its *tone*. No influence of the school is more powerful. It springs from the community life of the pupils, and of the pupils and teachers. It is, for the most part, developed unconsciously, so far as the pupils are concerned, but a high tone cannot be developed without the wise coöperation of good teachers,—men and women who are themselves representative of a high tone. What is this tone, and how may it be maintained ? The answer is not difficult.

The tone of a school consists of the standards of work, thought, and conduct which it maintains, and the extent to which these standards dominate the varied activities of the school. Where high standards of work in quantity and quality,—that is where strenuous application to duty and insistence on the best achievement commensurate with health, ability, and maturity, are upheld, and where high ideals of thought and conduct are striven for and approximately realized in the daily intercourse of the teachers and pupils, there the tone of the school is high, and its influence is elevating and refining. "We live by admiration, hope, and love," and it happens that these qualities are easily

aroused and can be wisely controlled and directed in children and youth of school age. Under precisely the same course of study, the pupils in two different schools may "live" very different lives. A mechanical routine which consists in assigning and "hearing" lessons is deadening to this life of "admiration, hope, and love"; an inspiring interest in the subject matter of instruction, felt by the teacher and sympathetically imparted to the pupils by him is most conducive to that life. An austere or sour demeanor, an unsympathetic censorship over the pupil's interests and conduct by the teacher, or a moral pedantry that looks with suspicion on every move that the pupil makes, and treats with equal severity the breaking of an arbitrary though perhaps desirable rule of the school and a moral offence, a martinet system of government and discipline,—these are characteristics of the teachers that detract from the tone of the school, and lower the plane of that living which we would maintain. It is an old story that character, scholarship, interest, in the teacher are essential to the development of these characteristics in the pupil; that only life begets life.

In marked contrast to what I am pleading for, let me cite two brief illustrations of "how not to do it." Not long ago, I heard of a teacher who said to her class in history, which had not been doing very well for some days, "All the monuments of ignorance may rise." As no one rose, she continued, "Miss A, why don't you rise?" Miss A replied, "Because I am not a monument of ignorance." This reply should have brought the teacher to her senses, but instead she sent the pupil to the principal for impertinence!

Another teacher, who had taught Cicero for twenty years, said to me after a somewhat trying effort with a class of boys, struggling with the "Manilian Law." "If there is one thing in this world I have no patience with it is *stupidity!*" I could not help telling him that I had seen no evidence of stupidity *in his class*; and, if I had, there was nothing that seemed to me more entitled

to patience than stupidity, inasmuch as the victim of stupidity is not to blame for his meagre intellectual endowment. Comment on the effect of such teachers on the tone of the school is unnecessary.

Thus far, I have been dealing with general considerations. I wish to devote the remaining space at my disposal to a brief discussion of two specific problems of great importance in our contemporary education, and both requiring for their wise solution the effective coöperation of the individual home and of the community, at large. These two problems are no longer new, but their solution,—if we had it,—would be new. I refer to the improvement of the grammar school course of study, and the elective system in secondary education.

Everybody admits that a reform was necessary in the grammar school course of study as it was, and much has been expected and claimed for the improvements made in it. But, at this moment, a widespread discontent with the results, thus far, is alleged. It is urged that frills and fads have displaced or overwhelmed the solid studies—reading, writing, arithmetic; and that whereas, formerly, these latter were actually well taught, or at any rate, well learned, now nothing is well done; the solid studies are sacrificed and very little, if anything, new or better is gained.

Now, granting, for the sake of argument, that the school arts are not learned as well to-day as they were formerly (which, however, I do not believe), it is still true that the so-called frills and fads are a necessity to the progressive adjustment of our education to contemporary needs. A recent report of the Boston Board of Supervisors puts the case admirably. I quote from it as follows :—

“The extension of the primitive curriculum has been going on steadily for more than a hundred years. Each addition after being tested and having commended itself to public opinion has received the sanction of legislative enactment and has become a compulsory study. The causes and the forces behind all this enlargement have been sociological and not pedagogical.

“To the reading and writing of the colonial school, subjects have been added in the following order: English grammar, spelling and arithmetic in

1789; geography in 1826; history of the United States in 1857; music (optional) in 1860; drawing in 1870; sewing (optional) in 1876; physiology in 1885; manual training in 1898. Several of these subjects were at first allowed, and later required. Thus physiology was allowed in 1850, required in 1885. Drawing was allowed in 1860, required in 1870. Manual training was allowed in 1884, required in 1898.

“The introduction of each of these new subjects has a historical and social setting. Geography was made a compulsory study in 1826. Between 1789 and 1826 there had been great territorial changes in the United States. Florida and Louisiana had been purchased, and the expedition of Lewis and Clark had revealed the magnitude and importance of this great territory reaching to the Rocky Mountains and beyond. Settlement had pushed itself far beyond the Alleghanies, and there was scarcely a town in Massachusetts which had not sent some of its people into the Great Northwest. Eleven new States had been added to the Union. Commerce had been developed and ships of the country were sailing all seas. The navy had distinguished itself in the War of 1812, and Decatur had introduced the United States to the piratical powers of Barbary. Out of all this had grown wide international relations. It is not surprising that in an era of such expansion the thoughtful people of Massachusetts began to think of geography as an ‘essential’ factor in the education of their children.

“The history of the United States was added in 1857. During the preceding thirty years great social changes had taken place. The establishment of the new manufacturing industries had attracted to the State a large foreign population, and the unsuccessful revolutions throughout Europe in 1848 had swelled the number to 200,000 in 1850. These people were ignorant of the history and traditions of their new home, and they needed and desired to be enlightened. At the same time the country was in the throes of the anti-slavery struggle, and great constitutional questions were at issue. The appeal on both sides was to the opinions and acts of the fathers—to history. The public discovered that a knowledge of the history of the country had become an ‘essential’ of popular education, and they declared their opinion by a statute.

“Drawing was added in 1870. This followed close upon the great Paris Exposition of 1867, where the superiority of continental nations to England and America in all the artistic features of manufactured products was startling and humiliating. It is most significant that the original petition to the Legislature in 1869 for compulsory instruction in industrial drawing was signed exclusively by business men, leaders in the great industries of the Commonwealth. They declared that for the United States to maintain its

standing as a manufacturing nation drawing was an 'essential' in elementary education. For similar reason manual training was introduced.

"Of the authorized subjects several have been forced into the front rank of 'essentials' by modern social conditions. This is true of sewing, cooking, physical training and elementary science. The latter under the modern title 'nature study' has peculiar claims.

"Reading has always been deemed of fundamental importance, and in early times children passed easily through the narrow gateway of the alphabet into the broad fields of literature. The passage was easy because the children and the writers of literature had had the same experiences; both had lived in the country and had been familiar with nature in all its phases. The writers had reflected all these phases in their books. They were observers and lovers of nature and they wrote for such. Much of the vocabulary they used, and all their imagery, expressed ideas and scenes of nature. When country life was universal, the children had only to learn the word symbol, and they had the master-key to open all doors. The transition from the primitive country life to the modern city life threw a barrier across the way, and for thousands of children easy progress became impossible. They could learn the symbols as before, and could read words, but the words conveyed no meaning. The language was essentially a foreign language. Now in city schools the road to intelligent reading is through nature study. The same line of work is essential as a preparation for the study of geography. Indeed it might all be included under the name geography, in any formal statement of a course of study.

"The same change in social conditions is responsible for the introduction of physical exercises into the schools. The limited opportunities which the city affords for free play and the small demands of modern home life upon the bodily activities of children have seemed to call for some counteracting efforts, and tentative beginnings have been made in various forms of school exercises.

"This sketch, necessarily brief, shows that the present elementary school course is not a miscellaneous collection of subjects brought together by the chance efforts of enthusiasts, but a conscious and intelligent effort of the people to frame a course of elementary instruction and training adapted to the changed conditions of social life."

Accordingly the newer subjects must remain; the improvement of the grammar school course of study must go on. The community itself demands it. The problem of just how this is to be done must be solved in the schools. It is a professional

problem that must be worked out by the teachers. The solution of this problem will take time, patience, and some experimenting. In the meantime, there is no doubt that mistakes are made. A period of transition is an unsatisfactory time to all concerned ; all progress involves some risk, some disappointment, and some excesses. But we cannot halt ; we must either go forward or backward. I ask the parents and the community, which shall it be ?

The other problem,—the problem of the wisest possible administration of the elective system in secondary education is equally difficult and pressing. The elective system is now happily becoming general in our secondary education, but it suggests the most imperative necessity for coöperation between the home and the school. The elective system wisely administered in secondary education is a great boon ; unwisely or loosely administered, it may become pernicious. If the elective system is allowed to entail diminished strenuousness in work, it becomes a perversion of educational opportunity ; but if wisely administered, a youth may find it, during the period of secondary and college education, his greatest opportunity to make the most of himself for his own good and for the good of society ; for his own good, because voluntary effort usually accompanies the privilege of choice ; and in case of need, the duty of strenuous and persistent endeavor can be justly insisted on ; and for the good of society, because strenuous endeavor in harmony with dominant capacities and tastes leads to the habit of adequate achievement,—that is, the fullest and most varied usefulness of which men are capable in vocational and extra-vocational activities. Moreover, it leads simultaneously to the habit of independent initiative, to joy in work, and to real satisfaction in the refined pleasures of life.

These results are worth striving for. But they cannot be procured by a careless or a loose administration of the elective system during that most important period of later childhood and youth,—the period of adolescence. This is the period when the serious purposes and activities of life begin to have an interest

which previously they did not and could not possess. The fleeting and random interests of early and middle childhood are passing away. Aims and habits rapidly acquire permanence. Under wise guidance, they may, therefore, be permanently influenced. If now we seize the fleeting moment, and make sure the youth gets from it what he needs for guidance, for solace, and for inspiration ; that is, if we adapt the opportunities of his education to him as an individual, we may expect to find him in his maturity shaping his career, enjoying his leisure, and behaving toward his fellow-men in accordance with the ideals of work, of pleasure, and of conduct that allured him in his youth. I said, a moment ago, that such a result could not be secured by a careless or a loose administration of the elective system. I mean that it cannot be secured if we do not guard the youth against the blindness of his own ignorance, and if we do not insist upon the persistent and strenuous pursuit of work once undertaken. We must protect the youth against his own ignorance by suitable restrictions on his choice, at first ; we must cultivate self-direction by gradually withdrawing restrictions as he grows older ; and we cannot expect habits of adequate achievement, unless we insist on a sufficiently long and sufficiently continuous pursuit of work once undertaken.

Now it is just here that the coöperation of the home and the school is so essential. Both the kind of work needed by the pupil, and his rigorous pursuit of it for a period sufficiently long to determine his capacity, or want of capacity, in a given subject of study, can only be secured by a good mutual understanding between the teachers and the parents. Of course, I am supposing that both educated parents and teachers are seeking without conscious bias the best good of the pupil ; that they are not unduly influenced in the restrictions or the advice they impose on the pupil by personal predilections, or by a too keen sense of the conventionally correct thing. That they, especially the parents, will be influenced more or less by the prevailing fashion in

education goes without saying ; and, of course, in education, as in other forms of human activity, one must give sufficient heed to fashion not to be conspicuous for lack of conformity to it, or for ultra devotion to it. But it is not too much to expect that, on the whole, each parent and every teacher will seriously study the young life entrusted to him, and so deal with it educationally as to bring it to the fullest perfection which native endowment makes possible, and to make it count as much as possible in the sum total of social service. As I have already said, this can be done consistently and economically by a wise use of the elective system, and this requires the completest possible coöperation of the home and school. What the pupil chooses to do both the home and the school must insist that he shall perform. To do otherwise would be to use the elective system as a means of escaping education, and not as the most valuable means of real education, that we have thus far developed.

It must be evident, also, that much of the work of the school, however well and clearly conceived, will fail of reaching fruition, both during the pupil's school life and thereafter, unless the school can count on the effective coöperation of the homes, taken collectively, of the community. If the school lays stress on a life of service, and consistently aims to fix this idea as a life ideal in the pupil's mind, while most of the influential members of the community persist in acting as if they regarded work in every form as a hardship which they intend to save their children from ; if the school uses the lessons of history and of contemporary social interests to inculcate worthy ideals of private citizenship and of public office as a public trust, while the community shows its indifference to these ideals by toleration of, or practical devotion to, their opposites ; if the school rouses an interest in culture for its own sake, and beckons the pupil onward to a career of spiritual growth, whatever his vocation may be, while the community is apathetic toward the pursuit of science, literature, and art for their own sake, and niggardly in promoting such

pursuit ;—in short, if the school aims to prepare its pupils for a life of usefulness, of worthy citizenship, and of refinement, and the pupils are conscious that this threefold preparation is not valued in the life outside and after the school as it is in the school, how can we expect that the lessons of the school, however well planned, will be a lasting influence in the pupils' lives? It is clear, then, that the community cannot safely evade its share of the responsibility for the right training of our children and youth. That responsibility is summed up in our word, reënforcement. The education which the community is constantly giving our children and youth,—the instruction which the community's life entails, and the habits which this instruction constantly tends to promote, will either strengthen or weaken the influence of the school. I ask the parents, which shall it be?

This paper lays stress on the necessity of coöperation by the home and the school. But let us not deceive either ourselves, as teachers, or the non-professional public. Professional problems must be worked out, if at all, by professional workers,—by the teachers,—not by laymen. Laymen,—the community,—may and should tell us, as nearly as they can, what they desire to have the schools accomplish, but they can give us very little assistance in carrying out those wishes in the class room. Beyond providing suitable buildings and equipment, for the nature and scope of which they must depend on the teachers, their most effective coöperation is to make sure, from time to time, that they are employing the right persons to carry on the work they want done. In plain terms, lay interference in professional matters is not helpful coöperation, but obstruction.

One of the most conspicuous examples of lay interference in professional affairs, is the present organization of our city school boards,—an organization which permits, and usually requires, them to exercise executive as well as legislative functions. Subcommittees (of school boards) on courses of study, or on the appointment of teachers, or on the selection of text-books, are as

competent to attend to the important professional duties with which they are charged as sub-committees of a hospital board consisting of laymen,—supposing such sub-committees to exist, would be competent to decide about the nourishment and care of the patients, and the efficacy of the remedies or exercises prescribed for them, and on the qualifications of the nurses employed. Nobody supposes, nowadays, that any hospital board is competent to discharge such functions. They employ an expert, or experts, whom they can entrust with these professional duties. But, in the analogous case of the school board committees, it is still supposed that professional duties can be wisely performed by non-professional persons.

To sum up:—

1. The school cannot be wholly responsible for the education of our children. The individual home and the community are jointly responsible with the school for the education of every child.

2. Nevertheless, the school must carry the largest share of this responsibility, because it is the institution which society charges with the sole function of education, while the home and other institutions of society have many other functions. It is, therefore, the business of the school to cast the more or less vague desires of the community respecting education into definite aims, and to find, to organize, and to administer the means through which these aims are to be achieved.

3. But, in order that the school may really fulfil the function for which it is established, it must have the active coöperation of the individual home and of the community, for:—

- a. Unless the work of the school is reënforced by home support, the efforts of the teachers will not meet with an appropriate response from the pupils;—the teacher may work as hard as he please, he cannot rely on corresponding effort on the part of the pupil if the pupil's parents are indifferent or even averse to the aims and work of the school.

b. Unless the school has the adequate financial support of the community, it can do nothing well; it cannot provide suitable buildings and equipment; it cannot secure and retain teachers who possess scholarship, cultivation, and teaching power commensurate with the work they have to do; it cannot provide the skilled supervision needed to maintain the school buildings and their equipment in a satisfactory condition, and the teaching force at a high level of efficiency.

4. Now, the individual home and the community will not give moral or financial support to the school—will not coöperate with the school unless they *believe* in it; unless they believe that the school is doing what they wish it to do, and doing it satisfactorily. Hence the necessity for conferences between the homes and the school, in order that the school may know and clearly understand the desires of the home in other than merely formal ways, and that the home may similarly understand and appreciate the difficulties and the efficacy of the school, as well as its shortcomings; and in order that each may recognize its own share of responsibility for the results actually achieved.

Three devices for promoting a good mutual understanding between the home and the school have been referred to, namely: "Pupil Study," Parents' Meetings, and Education Societies. All these devices are as yet more or less imperfect, but they are decidedly promising. Through these or similar devices, the individual home and the community will gradually learn that every educational demand puts corresponding educational problems to the school; that these problems can be solved successfully and wisely only by professional teachers working in the school, and not by laymen; and that, patience and a willingness to experiment intelligently are indispensable in the wise solution of educational problems; and the school will learn that adjustment to the gradually changing and ever expanding educational needs of individuals and of society is the fundamental condition on which the effective coöperation of the community depends.

THE AMERICAN NEGRO AND HIS ECONOMIC VALUE

BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, *Tuskegee Institute.*



WITHIN the last two months I have had letters from the Sandwich Islands, Cuba, and South America, all asking that the American Negro be induced to go to these places as laborers. In each case there would seem to be abundant labor already in the places named. It is there, but it seems not to be of the quality and value of that of the Negro in the United States.

These letters have led me to think a good deal about the Negro as an industrial factor in our country.

To begin with, we must bear in mind that when the first twenty slaves were landed at Jamestown, Virginia, in 1619, it was this economic value which caused them to be brought to this country. At the same time that these slaves were being brought to the shores of Virginia from their native land, Africa, the woods of Virginia were swarming with thousands of another dark-skinned race. The question naturally arises: Why did the importers of Negro slaves go to the trouble and expense to go thousands of miles for a dark-skinned people to hew wood and draw water for the whites, when they had right about them a people of another race who could have answered this purpose? The answer is, that the Indian was tried and found wanting in the commercial qualities which the Negro seemed to possess. The Indian would not submit to slavery as a race, and in those

instances where he was tried as a slave his labor was not profitable and he was found unable to stand the physical strain of slavery. As a slave the Indian died in large numbers. This was true in San Domingo and in other parts of the American continent.

The two races, the Indian and the Negro, have been often compared to the disadvantage of the Negro. It has been more than once stated that the Indian proved himself the superior race in not submitting to slavery. We shall see about this. In this respect it may be that the Indian secured a temporary advantage in so far as race feeling or prejudice is concerned; I mean by this that he escaped the badge of servitude which has fastened itself upon the Negro, and not only upon the Negro in America, for the known commercial value of the Negro has made him a subject of traffic in other portions of the globe during many centuries. Even to this day, portions of Africa continue to be the stamping-ground of the slave-trader.

The Indian refused to submit to bondage and to learn the white man's ways. The result is that the greater portion of American Indians have disappeared, and the greater portion of those who remain are not civilized.

The Negro, wiser and more enduring than the Indian, patiently endured slavery; and the contact with the white man has given the Negro in America a civilization vastly superior to that of the Indian.

The Indian and the Negro met on the American continent for the first time at Jamestown, in 1619. Both were in the darkest barbarism. There were twenty Negroes and thousands of Indians. At the present time, there are between nine and ten millions of Negroes and fifty-eight thousand eight hundred and six Indians. Not only has the Indian decreased in numbers, but he is an annual tax upon the government for food and clothing to the extent of \$12,784,676 (1899), to say nothing of the large amount that is annually spent in policing him. The one in this case not

only decreased in numbers and failed to add anything to the economic value of his country, but has actually proven a charge upon the state.

Let us see how it is with the other. For a long time our national laws bearing upon immigration have been framed so as to prevent the influx into this country of any classes or races that might prove a burden upon the taxpayers, because of their poverty and inability to sustain themselves, as well as their low standard of life which would enable them to underbid the American laborer. The effect has been, then, to keep out certain races and classes. For two centuries and more, it was the policy of the United States to bring in the Negro at great cost. All others who have come to this country have paid their own passage. The Negro was of such tremendous economic value that his passage was paid for him. Not only was his passage paid, but agents were sent to force him to come. This country had two hundred and fifty years in which to judge of the economic value of the black man, and the verdict at the end was that he was constantly increasing in value, especially in the southern part of the United States.

Would any individuals, or a country, have gone to the expense during so many years to import a race of people that had no economic value?

The Negro seems to be about the only race that has been able to look the white man in the face during the long period of years and live, not only live, but multiply. The Negro has not only done this, but he has had the good sense to get something from the white man at every point he has touched him; something that has made him a stronger and a better race.

As compared with the Malay race, the Negro has proven his superiority as an economic factor in civilization. Take for example the Malays in the Sandwich Islands. Before the Sandwich Islanders came into contact with the white race, they had a civilization that was about equal to that of the twenty Negroes

who came to Jamestown in 1619. Since their contact with the white man they have constantly decreased in numbers, and have so utterly failed to prove of economic value that practically the industries of the Islands are now kept in motion by other races, and a strong effort has recently been made to induce a large number of black Americans to go to these Islands as laborers.

The industries that gave the South its power, prominence, and wealth prior to the Civil War, were mainly cotton, sugar-cane, rice, and tobacco. Before the way could be prepared for the proper growing and marketing of these crops, forests had to be cleared, houses to be built, public roads and railroads to be constructed. In all of this, no one will deny that the Negro was the chief dependence.

The Negro was not only valuable as a common workman, but reached a degree of skill and intelligence in mechanics that added a large per cent to his money value. Indeed many of the most complicated structures at the South to-day stand as monuments to the skill and ability of the Negro mechanic of ante-bellum days.

In the planting, cultivation, and marketing of the cotton, rice, sugar-cane, and tobacco, the black man was about the sole dependence, especially in the lower tier of the southern states. In the manufacture of tobacco, he became a skilled and proficient workman and at the present time, in the South, holds the lead in this respect in the large tobacco manufactories.

Not only did the black American prove his worth in the way of skilled and common labor, but there were thousands of Negroes who demonstrated that they possessed executive ability of a high order. Many of the large plantations had a Negro overseer to whom the whole financial interests of the masters were very largely intrusted. To be able to plan months ahead for planting and harvesting of the crop, to reckon upon the influence of weather conditions, and to map out profitable work for scores of men, women, and children required an executive ability of no

mean order. In very few instances did the black manager prove false to his trust.

Without the part which the Negro played in the physical development of the South, it is safe to say that it would be as undeveloped as much of the territory in the Far West.

The most valuable testimony that I have seen upon the subject that this article covers is from the pen of Prof. N. S. Shaler, Dean of the Scientific School of Harvard University, which appeared recently in *Appleton's Popular Science Monthly*. My readers, I am sure, will forgive me for using a rather long quotation from Professor Shaler's article. I do it for the reason that Professor Shaler is not only a recognized scientist, but for the further reason that he is a southern man and has had abundant opportunity to secure valuable testimony. Professor Shaler says :—

“The Negroes who came to North America had to undergo as complete a transition as ever fell to the lot of man, without the least chance to undergo an acclimatizing process. They were brought from the hottest part of the earth to the region where the winter's cold is of almost arctic severity; from an exceedingly humid to a very dry air. They came to service under alien taskmasters, strange to them in speech and in purpose. They had to betake themselves to unaccustomed food and to clothing such as they had never worn before. Rarely could one of the creatures find about him a familiar face of friend, parent, or child, or an object that recalled his past life to him. It was an appalling change. Only those who know how the Negro cleaves to all the dear, familiar things of life, how fond he is of warmth and friendliness can conceive the physical and mental shock that this introduction to new conditions meant to them. To people of our own race, it could have meant death. But these wonderful folk appear to have withstood the trials of their deportation in a marvelous way. They showed no peculiar liability to disease. Their longevity or period of usefulness was not diminished, or their fecundity obviously impaired. So far as I have been able to learn, nostalgia was not a source of mortality, as it would have been with any Aryan population. The price they brought in the market and the satisfaction of their purchasers with their qualities show that they were from the first almost ideal laborers.

“If we compare the Algonquin Indian, in appearance a sturdy fellow, with these Negroes, we see of what stuff the blacks are made. A touch of housework and of honest toil took the breath of the aborigines away, but

these tropical exotics fell to their tasks and trials far better than the men of our own kind could have done. * * * * Moreover, the production of good tobacco requires much care, which extends over about a year from the time the seed is planted. Some parts of the work demand a measure of judgment such as intelligent Negroes readily acquire. They are, indeed, better fitted for the task than white men, for they are commonly more interested in their task than whites of the laboring class. The result was that before the period of the Revolution slavery was firmly established in the tobacco planting colonies of Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina; it was already the foundation of their only considerable industry. * * * * This industry (cotton), even more than that of raising tobacco, called for abundant labor which could be absolutely commanded and severely tasked in the season of extreme heats. For this work the Negro proved to be the only fit man, for while the whites can do this work, they prefer other employment. Thus it came about that the power of slavery in this country became rooted in its soil. The facts show that, based on an ample foundation of experience, the judgment of the southern people was to the effect that this creature of the tropics was a better laborer in their fields than the men of their own race.

“Much has been said about the dislike of the white man for work in association with Negroes. The failure of the whites to have a larger share in the agriculture of the South has been attributed to this cause. This seems to be clearly an error. The dislike to the association of races in labor, is, in the slaveholding states, less than in the North. There can be no question that if the southern folk could have made white laborers profitable they would have preferred to employ them, for the reason that the plantations would have required less fixed capital for their operation. The fact was and is, that the Negro is there a better laboring man in the field than the white. Under the conditions, he is more enduring, more contented, and more trustworthy than the men of our own race.”

So much for the Negro as a financial factor in American life before the Civil War. What about his value as a free man?

There were not a few who predicted that as soon as the Negro became a free man he would not only cease to support himself and others, but he would become a tax upon the community.

Few people in any part of our country have ever seen a black hand reached out from a street corner asking for charity. In our northern communities a large amount of money is spent by

individuals and municipalities in caring for the sick, the poor, and other classes of unfortunates. In the South, with very few exceptions, the Negro takes care of himself and of the unfortunate members of his race. This is usually done by a combination of individual members of the race, or through the churches or fraternal organizations. Not only is this true, but I want to make a story illustrate the condition that prevails in some parts of the South. The white people in a certain Black Belt county in the South had been holding a convention, the object of which was to encourage white people to emigrate into the county. After the adjournment of the convention, an old colored man met the president of the meeting on the street and asked the object of the convention. When told, the old colored man replied: "Fore God, boss, don't you know that we Niggers got just as many white people now in this county as we can support."

The fact is often referred to that the Negro pays a very small proportion of the taxes that support his own schools. As to whether or not this is true depends a good deal on the theory of political economy that we follow. Some of the highest authorities on political economy contend that it is the man who rents the house that pays the taxes on it, rather than the man who simply holds the title to it. Certain it is that without the Negro to produce the raw material in the South from which a large proportion of the taxes are paid, then there would not be a very large tax paid by any one.

Reliable statistics concerning the economic progress of the Negro are difficult to be obtained, owing to the fact that few of the states keep a record separating the property owned by Negroes from that owned by white people. The state of Virginia and one or two southern states do keep such a record. Taking the matter of taxes as a basis for indicating the Negro's value Prof. J. W. Cromwell, of Washington, D. C., gave the following statistics bearing upon the colored people of the state of Virginia, at a recent conference at the Hampton Institute:—

“The colored people contributed in 1898 directly to the expenses of the state government, the sum of \$9,576.76, and for schools \$3,239.41, from their personal property, a total of \$12,816.17; while from their real estate for the purposes of the commonwealth there was paid by them \$34,303.53, and for schools \$11,357.22, or a total of \$45,760.75; a grand total of \$58,576.92.

“The report for the same year shows them to own 978,118 acres of land valued at \$3,800,459, improved by buildings valued at \$2,056,490, a total of \$5,856,949. In the towns and cities they own lots assessed at \$2,154,331, improved by buildings valued at \$3,400,636, a total of \$5,554,967 for town property and a grand total of \$11,411,916 of their property of all kinds in the commonwealth. A comparative statement for different years would doubtless show a general upward tendency.

“The counties of Accomac, Essex, King and Queen, Middlesex, Mathews, Northampton, Northumberland, Richmond, Westmorland, Gloucester, Princess Anne, and Lancaster, all agricultural, show an aggregate of 114,197 acres held by Negroes in 1897, the last year accounted for in official reports, against 108,824 held the previous year, an increase of 5,379, or nearly five per cent. The total valuation of lands owned by Negroes in the same counties for 1897 is \$547,800 against \$496,385 for the year next preceding, a gain of \$51,150 or more than ten per cent. Their personal property as assessed in 1897 was \$517,560, in 1896, \$527,688, a loss of \$10,128. Combining the real and personal property for 1897, we have \$1,409,059 against \$1,320,504 for 1896, a net gain of \$88,555, an increase of six and a half per cent.”

The greatest excitement and anxiety has been recently created among the white people in two counties in Georgia because of the fact that a large proportion of the colored people decided to leave. No stone has been left unturned to induce the colored people to remain in the county and prevent financial ruin to many white farmers.

Any one who has followed the testimony given recently before the United States Industrial Commission will see that several white men from the South have stated in the most emphatic language, that the Negro is the best laborer that the South has ever had and is the best that the South is likely to get in the future. Not the least part of the Negro's worth at the present

time (and this is going to be more apparent in the future than now) is that he presents a conservative, reliable factor in relation to "strikes" and "lockouts." The Negro is not given to "strikes." His policy is to leave each individual free to work when, where, and for whom he pleases.

The cotton crop of the South has increased many fold since the beginning of freedom. Of course the Negro is not the only labor element to be considered in the production of cotton, but all will agree that the black man is the chief dependence in this country for that purpose. In order to be more specific I give some figures that will indicate the difference between the number of bales of cotton produced by slave and free labor:—

SLAVE LABOR.		FREE LABOR.	
YEAR.	BALES.	YEAR.	BALES.
1845	2,394,503	1890	8,652,597
1850	2,233,781	1899	8,900,000

While there are several factors, among them increase in population, entering into these figures, still I think they show clearly that freedom has not destroyed the economic value of the Negro.

What I have thus far stated, relates mainly to the common Negro laborer before and since the war. But what about the educated Negro?

Reference is often made to the large proportion of criminal and idle colored men in the large cities. I admit that this class is much larger than it should be, and in some cities it is beginning to present a rather serious problem. Two things, however, should be kept in mind when considering the younger generation of colored people: First, that the transition from slavery to freedom was a tremendous one; that the Negro's idea of freedom for generations had been that it meant freedom from restraint and work; that the Negro mother and father had little opportunity during slavery to learn how to train children; and that family life was practically unknown to the Negro until about

thirty years ago. Secondly, the figures relating to criminality among all races in all countries show that it is the younger people, those between the ages of sixteen and thirty-five, that are given to crime and idleness.

Notwithstanding these facts, I want to present some testimony showing that the young, educated Negro is not failing to prove his worth.

Some time ago, I sent letters to about four hundred white men scattered throughout the southern states in which these three questions were asked :—

1. Has education made the Negro a more useful citizen ?
2. Has it made him more economical and more inclined to acquire wealth ?
3. Has it made him a more valuable workman, especially where thought and skill are required ?

Answers came from three hundred of my correspondents, and nine tenths of them answered the three questions emphatically in the affirmative. A few expressed doubts, but only one answered the questions with an unmodified "No."

In each case, I was careful to ask my correspondents to base their correspondence upon the conditions existing in their own neighborhood.

The Negro is gradually branching out into nearly all lines of business. To illustrate this remark, I give a few statistics representing typical cases in different portions of the South. These statistics were gathered by Dr. DuBoise of the University.

NEGRO BUSINESS MEN.

BIRMINGHAM, ALA.

Grocers	8
Barbers	6
Banks and Brokers	5
Druggists	4
Tailors	4
Miscellaneous	5

MONTGOMERY, ALA.

Grocers	6
Undertakers	2
Drug-stores	2
Butcher	1

VICKSBURG, MISS.

Saloons	2
Jewelers	2
Clothiers and Tailors	2
Drug-stores	2
Newspapers	2
Dry-goods	2
Undertaker	1
Confectioners	2
Upholsterer	1
Butcher	1
Fish and Oysters	1
Miscellaneous	3

NASHVILLE, TENN.

Contractors	9
Grocers	6
Undertakers	2
Saloons	2
Drug-stores	2
Second-hand Stores	2
Livery-stables	2
Publishers	2
Tailors	2
Coal and Ice	1
Produce Merchant	1
Furniture	1
Transfer Wagon	1
Restaurant and Grocer	1
Grocer and Saloon	1
Second-hand Furniture	1
Miscellaneous	9

HOUSTON, TEX.

KINDS OF BUSINESS.	YEARS IN BUSINESS.	CAPITAL INVESTED.
Grocery	4	\$1,500
Grocery	3	1,000
Grocery	5	2,000
Grocery		1,000
Real Estate Dealer	15	10,000
Real Estate Dealer	18	50,000
Contractor	12	10,000
Contractor	12	8,000
Barber	20	1,000
Barber	19	1,200
Barber	16	1,000
Saloon	14	4,000
Hair Dressing	20	1,000
Real Estate Broker	3	6,000
Real Estate Broker	20	40,000
Real Estate Broker	30	75,000
Grocer	5	350
Grocer	15	1,200
Contractor, Builder	6	7,000
Grocer	3	200
Contractor, Builder	30	5,000
Grocer	10	3,000
Grocer and Real Estate Broker	10	15,000
Grocer	4	500
Grocer	3	500
Barber	10	2,000
Barber	15	3,000
Real Estate Broker	10	14,000
Dairyman	14	2,000
Real Estate	6	7,000
Real Estate	8	4,000
Tailor	6	5,000
Huckster	12	2,000
Barber	9	2,500
Contractor and Real Estate	15	12,000
Wood Dealer	10	900
Saloon Business	3	6,000
Caterer	15	1,000
Blacksmith and Wheelwright	12	1,800
Pawn Broker	8	3,500
Saloon	17	5,000

316,950

RICHMOND, VA.

Insurance and Banking	\$75,000
Insurance and Banking	135,000
Fish Dealer	3,000
Fish Dealer	2,000
Dry-goods Store	2,000
Insurance Society	1,000
Undertaker	2,000
Undertaker	10,000
Photographer	1,500

2,515.50

MOUND BAYOU, MISS.

KINDS OF BUSINESS.	YEARS IN BUSINESS.	CAPITAL INVESTED.	ASSESSED REAL ESTATE.
General Merchandise	10	\$5,000	\$3,000
Merchandise and Ginning	8	1,000	2,000
General Merchandise	2	300	500
General Merchandise	8	150	800
General Merchandise	3	750	
Merchandise and Blacksmith	7	150	800
Merchandise and Sawmill	10	1,000	10,000

AMERICUS, GA.

KINDS OF BUSINESS.	YEARS IN BUSINESS.	CAPITAL INVESTED.
Grocery and Farming	14	\$1,500
Grocery and Restaurant	10	1,200
Grocery	9	1,500
Druggist	5	1,000
Grocery	2	225
Grocery	6	300
Furniture	7	3,000
Grocery	4	300
Grocery	10	270
Grocery	8	300

AMERICUS, GA. (Continued).

KINDS OF BUSINESS.	YEARS IN BUSINESS.	CAPITAL INVESTED
Grocery	8	375
Grocery	5	300
Grocery	12	1,000
Restaurant and Barber Shop	9	500
Market	7	1,000
Wood Yard	22	1,000
Grocery	9	500
Cigars and Tobacco	4	500

TALLAHASSEE, FLA.

KINDS OF BUSINESS.	YEARS IN BUSINESS.	CAPITAL INVESTED.	SALES PER YEAR.
Groceries and Dry-goods	—	\$1,500	\$6,000
Meat Market	—	1,000	4,680
Meat Market	—	250	832
Groceries	—	400	\$1,500
General Merchandise	—	150	

SEATTLE, WASH.

KINDS OF BUSINESS.	YEARS IN BUSINESS.	CAPITAL INVESTED.
Real Estate	5	\$10,000
Stock Broker	3	2,500
Hotel	2	1,500
Club House	2	700
Barber	6	3,000
Saloon	2	1,000
Barber	3	500
Restaurant	4	900
Restaurant	9	1,000
Newspaper	6	2,000

From all the foregoing facts, I think we may safely find ground for the greatest hopefulness, not only for the Negro himself, but

for the white man in his treatment of the Negro. In the South, especially, the prosperity of the one race enriches the other, the poverty of one race retards the progress of the other.

The greatest thing that can be done for the Negro at the present time is to make him the most useful and indispensable man in his community. This can be done by thorough education of the hand, head, and heart, and especially, by the constant instilling into every fibre of his being the thought that labor is ennobling and that idleness is a disgrace.



ARCHÆOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND THE SCHOOLS AT ROME AND ATHENS

ARTHUR L. FROTHINGHAM, JR., *Princeton University.*



IF any student of antiquity were asked to name the one agent that had done the most to open up during this century the hidden storehouses of ancient life, he would surely answer: "The Schools." In our study of human development, which we have made so much more personal, searching, scientific, and detailed than it had ever been, it is the science of archæology that has led the way, prescribing new methods, furnishing new material, making new history. It has revealed a new Orient, with several thousand unsuspected years of civilized activity. The vague forms of the empires of Babylonia, Elam, Assyria, and the Hittites, have assumed distinct outline and gigantic proportions. Egypt has been brought almost as close to us as Greece, so intimately do we know through the monuments, its public and private life. The prehistoric age of Greece, dear to us in the Homeric poems, but otherwise quite mythical, has, every day since Schliemann's first work at Troy, been emerging from the shadows and we can see that its roots extend back of Homer for some fifteen hundred years and cover an ever widening territory. Even in times whose literature has always been carefully studied—the historic centuries of Greece and Rome—we have been penetrating through archæology far more deeply into the essence and life of things.

The best elements in this field are its breadth and its human interest. It does not concern itself merely with works of art but touches upon every side of life and holds out the largest promise for the future. For the ancient Orient it is from the excavations that we have learned practically everything about its religion, philosophy, state, language, literature, public and private life, history, topography. Of course in other periods, better known through literature, the results have been less startling, but in the study of no period can archæological results be disregarded, especially by the philologist and the historian. If what I call "The Schools" have been the main factor in achieving this result, a study of their history will substantially explain the whole movement.

Our own participation in it has been recent. Only since 1882 have we had an American School at Athens, and since 1895 an American School in Rome, following in the wake of Germany and France. We could hardly have done this earlier because archæology has been practically the latest branch of learning to be cultivated among us. Our Archæological Institute was established in 1879, but there was not at that time in America a single scholar who could be termed an archæologist—if we except, of course, American archæology. The art critics, philologists, and lovers of art and antiquity who were most active in founding the Institute, wished to pass at once beyond the field of dilettante interest into that of original research and proved this in the very successful Clarke excavations at Assos in Asia Minor. But it was evident that we could not adequately continue to make such contributions without giving our young would-be specialists a training unobtainable in this country and possible only in the main centres of the civilizations that were to be studied, through continual contact with the actual remains, in place of mere book-learning or undirected desultory travel. This led to the School at Athens in 1882. A large share in its foundation was taken by the classical philologists of our colleges and universities,

because they realized that unless our scholars became permeated with the new life that was revivifying the dry bones of ancient literature and philology, they could neither compete with their European colleagues in original work nor maintain for the humanities that preëminent place in education from which science, so novel and fascinating, is now continually threatening to expel it.

Since then our progress has been rapid. It is true that when in 1884 I broached at a meeting of the Institute the idea of establishing the *American Journal of Archæology* it was objected to me that there were still no writers in our country to whom the old-world *savants* would apply the term archæologists. However, the School at Athens had already begun to effect a change, in turning some of our younger philologists toward the study of the monuments; and the new *Journal of Archæology* diffused among us the knowledge of current discoveries and investigations throughout the world, encouraged the men returning from Athens to continue in archæological work and became the main organ for our original contributions. It is only surprising that we waited until 1895 to add the companion School at Rome, for when I proposed its organization, at a meeting of our learned societies in Philadelphia in 1894, the response was immediate and it seemed as if it might have been made much sooner. When our third school for Oriental archæology, now in process of organization, shall have been opened the obvious cycle will be complete; each year sees an added impetus, an accumulated knowledge and experience. In Greece and Western Asia the American excavations of the last few years have been acknowledged to be among the most important.

But the experience of Germany and France has shown one thing conclusively, that without strong schools one cannot have the best work of exploration and publication. Our schools are not yet on a satisfactory financial basis. If they had an endowment

corresponding to the government support given to the German and French schools, they would do far more effective work. Let us see how this work has been and should be done.

In this field we are heirs to a century of workers in the old world, and it is a debt of honor we owe to those who have made our path easy to sing the song of their work. When did archæological study begin? To some extent it is no novelty. What is tradition but archæology, and in this sense many generations in Egypt and Byzantium were archæologists: Nebuchadnezzar, when he rebuilt the temples of Babylonia in the style of three thousand years before; Augustus when he encouraged the reproduction of Greek sculpture of all styles. The Renaissance was as a whole almost slavishly archæological in its imitations of antiquity, but how little it really loved it, is shown by its ruthless destruction of ancient monuments. The literary antiquarianism that followed was pedantically curious of the details of ancient life and things, but like all the rest, was devoid of knowledge of their realities. The study was subjective; no one projected himself into the past; no one got beyond the crust.

A change came toward 1750. We are all familiar with the classic revival that found expression in literature, art, and industry,—even in dress,—during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Age. It was but the outward reflex of a movement that led to the establishment of archæology as a science. We reckon the historic treatment of art to begin with Winckelmann; its æsthetic appreciation with Lessing's "Laokoon"; its collections of published monuments with Caylus, Winckelmann, Millin, and others, and its first combination of the two methods with Agincourt. But these men of the eighteenth century were usually unable to distinguish a Greek from a Roman work, and doubly unable to distinguish the historic phases of each. They based their theories principally on Greco-Roman art, because Greece, still under Turkish yoke was almost a closed book. To Englishmen

is due our first knowledge of Greek art, ever since Stuart, Revett, and Chandler illustrated the monuments of Athens and of Ionia, and the British Museum published its incomparable series of sculptures including the Parthenon and Phigaleian marbles. Still Italy continued the centre of interest, through the dramatic discoveries at Herculaneum and Pompeii, which gave for the first time great series of antique decorative paintings, and even through its superbly preserved Greek temples at Pæstum and in Sicily which were now becoming known.

It is curious that the great stimulus to archæological study now came from the field of politics. The French Revolution worshipped Rome and all its works; orators, writers, fighters, all set up as their ideals the old Romans,—Brutus, Cato, Seneca. Even the Greeks, though revered, could not rival them; they were not sufficiently uncompromising. The flood of enthusiasm and reminiscence required feeding. The habit of research became habitual. Patriotism and archæology were brothers. The known things were insufficient. In the spread of this movement it was natural that the Germans, with their philosophic, analytic, and inquisitive minds, should be first in the field and should lay down the laws of the new science.

Toward 1820 a number of German scholars gathered in Rome. One of them, Niebuhr, was writing his Roman history, but most of them were engaged on a great description of the ancient city “Beschreibung d. Stadt Rom.” Their leader, Gerhard, was inspired by the frequent meetings which they held and by their interesting and fruitful discussions, to perpetuate them in the form of a permanent international archæological society, centred in Rome, which should be the one great focus of archæological work. Assisted by Bunsen and that liberal Frenchman the Duc de Luynes; encouraged by Prince Frederick William of Prussia, who promised to be its patron, Gerhard and his friends founded, in 1829, the first and greatest of the schools, the *Instituto di Cor-*

rispondenza Archeologica, now developed into the German Institute. With an Italian name it had then three separate sections,—German, French, and English,—but while it long retained its international character it became gradually Germanized, though remaining a strictly private enterprise. Its object was to keep in touch by continuous correspondence with all workers in the field, to receive and publish their discoveries, to make known inedited monuments of importance and to put forth valuable historic or other conclusions. Among its publications, the *Monumenti Antichi* were for inedited works; the *Annali* for essays and articles; the *Bullettino* for ephemeral notes and news. The main trouble was lack of funds for adequate publication and independent effort. Depending on private liberality, its very existence was often menaced through poverty during the first thirty years. Still it had the good fortune to be founded at the very high tide of the richest era of discovery in Etruria. It is in its publications that we can note the results of the epoch-making finds, which first lifted the veil from the life of the nations of Italy before the Roman domination, beside furnishing a series of imported Oriental and Greek works of art not second to those discovered in Oriental and Greek lands themselves. To the leaders of the Institute the chronicling and even the success of many of these excavations was due.

The Institute reacted also upon Germany and France. Gerhard, after his return to Germany in 1837, became an ardent propagator of the new science in lectures, meetings, and publications; and in 1841 he organized the Archæological Society of Berlin as an offshoot of the Institute. Historical and critical works multiplied in Germany. Boeckh and his great pupil, K. O. Müller,—the latter a leader in the Institute,—were writing great works of synthesis, establishing the forms of the new science more clearly every day, and defining the differences between Greece and Rome. France, full of zeal but with less

exact training, and feeling that the Institute did not in reality represent her, founded her own *Revue Archéologique* in 1844, the year after the *Jahrbuch* of the Institute began to appear in Berlin. She also sent out expeditions, like that of Texier in Asia Minor, to explore the little known parts of the ancient world.

Meanwhile the second phase of the general classic movement had been entered upon in the general theatre of European politics. After the apotheosis of Rome came that of Greece, with Byron and the Philhellenes, with Chateaubriand and the Romanticists. The great struggle for liberty among the Greeks; the expulsion of the Turks; the opening up of the new kingdom to the world; all this brought ancient heroic Greece closer to the modern heart. It seems strange, now, that Greece and the Greek world should have been, as late as seventy years ago, comparatively unexplored lands. Their wealth of buried antiquities was hardly suspected; a great deal of what still stood above ground was inedited; and the historic sequence of Greek art was practically unknown even in its broadest lines. The best work had been done by Englishmen in every branch of study, especially in architecture and topography, for the Germans seemed satisfied with Italy and the French did little beyond their *Expédition de Morée*.

Still, it was France that first stepped into the promised land, by establishing a school at Athens in 1846. It must not be forgotten that France had an *Académie de France* at Rome as early as Louis XIV., and that its architects had made the finest restorations of antique monuments. They formed the fine art section of the new school and did yeomen's service in connection with the various excavations of the School at Athens, which thus enjoyed an advantage which the German Institute never had. The French idea was at first to found at Athens an international institute of archæological correspondence like that at Rome, admitting all nationalities, but this Utopian scheme failed to be realized even more completely than in Rome. Among the

School's patrons were a number of Greeks who aimed at a Frenchifying of their new kingdom and thought that the school, filling the purpose of a college and university, would be the best agent. Its tendencies were at first literary instead of archæological and its attempts at propaganda excited Greek jealousy. It was given supervision over the French schools and missions throughout the East. In 1850 the atmosphere cleared, however. The School was reorganized as a government institution for the study of archæology, history, and philology; was placed under the patronage of the *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres*, connected with the Paris University system, and inscribed on the public budget for a considerable sum. This was one of the many acts by which the French government has shown its practical interest in the development of the highest forms of intellectual effort and advance. No government in the world has done this so consistently and liberally. A glance at the volumes of the *Archives des Missions Scientifiques et Littéraires* will sufficiently prove this preëminence.

Eight years later the Prussian government followed the French example; making the Roman School a Prussian Institute, connecting it with the Berlin Academy of Sciences and inscribing it on the budget for a considerable amount. Already, two years before it had established for it two travelling fellowships. These fellowships, since then increased in number, did more than anything at both schools to ensure a high level of work. They were not limited to one year but continued at the discretion of the administration, so that a valuable career should not be interrupted. One notable difference was that the Germans believed in tenure for life among the officers of their school, while the French preferred infusing new life every six years.

Two great national schools now divided the ancient world between them in its two main centres. The German Institute in Rome studied Greek monuments as well as Etruscan and

Roman, but labored under the disadvantage of great distance from most Greek centres. The French school at Athens had a narrower field of subjects, confining itself to Greek lands, but from its point of vantage it could extend its grasp upon the Greek Islands, Asia Minor, and the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, and it included also early Christian and Byzantine antiquities. The Germans had the advantage of historic precedence, universal prestige, and numerous standard publications. Their school was also fed by the incomparable work in the archæological seminars that were being multiplied at German universities, mainly by the very founders of the Institute and their pupils. It had also been first in the field with such monumental publications as the "Corpus of Latin Inscriptions," the "Ancient Sarcophagi," the "Etruscan Mirrors," the "Ancient Terra-cottas." It had maintained its hold on all Italian archæologists, who owed to it training and stimulus, and, though often unacknowledged its influence over French and English scholars had been hardly less. Circumstances alone had kept the Institute out of one, perhaps the greatest sphere of usefulness, the sphere of excavations. Its library was an ideal workshop, with an incomparable collection of books and reviews and a superb apparatus of photographs and drawings.

We have now reached the time of the Franco-Prussian struggle of 1870, and in reviewing the progress made it is evident that the schools have done more to classify, become acquainted with and publish available material, to develop systematic and scientific treatment of the themes, than themselves to supply new material by excavations. It was first necessary to explore the ancient world, identify sites, tabulate and study extant ruins, establish the history of art in its schools and periods, and found chairs of the new science in the principal universities. This was being done by the schools as rapidly as possible. Hence numerous expeditions, some under school direction, some private, some

under direct government control. The most important of these were French. The time to excavate had finally come. It cannot be said that during the first half of this century the possibilities of excavation had been at all clearly realized. The only work on a large scale had been in Italy. The opening up of Herculaneum and Pompeii from their volcanic covering was too unique a circumstance to lead one to hope for similar results on other sites not so volcanically favored. The only other notable excavations,—those of Etruria,—had yielded little beyond contents of tombs; few works of architecture or monumental sculpture. It seems to me, therefore, as if the great stimulus to excavation came from quite another direction, from Western Asia.

For some twenty years before the middle of the century scholars had been struggling to decipher the cuneiform hieroglyphs in which the languages of Western Asia were written, when, between 1844 and 1874 the world was electrified by the successive discoveries of the cities of Assyria by English and French enterprise, especially by Layard, Botta, and Place. The city of Sargon, the royal palaces of Nineveh, Nimrud, and Calah, emerged from their dirt heaps with such a wealth of artistic and literary documents as to prove beyond a doubt that the ancient world could be resurrected. The same story came from Egypt where France had retained preëminence ever since the learned *Commission d'Egypt* went with Napoleon. Museums were being filled with the results of these excavations. Evidently classic lands could hardly fail to yield similar results. The French government made an attempt in Rome, with success, and the Italian government did the same in Campania and Sicily. But Greece and Asia Minor remained still practically the object of such explorations as those of Le Bas and Waddington and of Perrot and Guillaume, except for some English excavations like those of Newton and Pullan at Halicarnassus, Cnidus and Branchidae, resulting in the recovery of the famous Mausoleum. The reports brought back by the expeditions

sent everywhere between 1850 and 1870 made the necessity for excavations in Greek lands imperious and it was to the schools that the governments and scholars both turned as the best agents for undertaking them. They alone could furnish trained men familiar with the most promising sites and equipped with the preliminary knowledge and methods. Just now political events again interposed their influence, proving a blessing in disguise. In consequence of the war of 1870, French archæologists withdrew definitely from the Roman Institute and in 1872 founded their own School at Rome under Dumont with a similar organization to their School at Athens. Consequences followed thick and fast. The way was thus cleared for an even closer connection between the new Imperial German government and the German Institute in Rome. In 1874 a new organization was effected. The seat of administration was transferred to Berlin and a second German School was established at Athens. The fellowships were increased and the connection with German universities and *gymnasias* made closer. Soon the Athenian School had its special organ for publication. The yearly meeting of the Archæological Society in Berlin became the one great event, when all the results of endeavors of all kinds were rehearsed.

The French schools established three important publications: *Bibliothèque* common to both schools, as series of monographs, each in a separate volume embodying the more extensive, especially the literary researches of its members. Then, the quarterlies of each: the *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique* for Athens and the *Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'histoire* for Rome, in which the results of explorations, excavations, and literary work were published. The tendency of the Roman section has been toward Christian antiquities and literature, and two of its Directors, Le Blant and Duchesne, have been the most noted men in France in this study; their works have been epoch-making. The study of original documents in Italian archives and libraries, even for as

late a period as the Renaissance, forms a substantial part of the work. At the same time Etruscan and classical antiquities have not been omitted. The work is, therefore, broader in its scope than that of the German School which limits itself to the classic field. The most important recent undertaking of the Germans in Rome has been making moulds of the reliefs on the Memorial Column of Marcus Aurelius, which relates his northern campaigns against the Quadi and Marcomanni, interesting for primitive Germanic history. One of its secretaries, Hülsen, has been making himself the most reliable authority on the topography of ancient Rome, and one of its permanent members, Mau, is recognized as the greatest authority on Pompeii. Lepsius, Braun, Brunn, Michaelis, Henzen, Conze, Helbig, Petersen, are a few of the eminent men intimately connected with its history.

The only part of the life of these two Roman institutions that has been disappointing is their apparent apathy in the field of excavations. Perhaps it is not generally understood that it is not their fault, but owing to the illiberal policy followed by the Italian government, whose officials have finally frankly stated that they will not allow any foreign organizations to carry on original research. Through the government's apathy or financial stringency this has degenerated into a "dog-in-the-manger" policy; it does but little itself and allows nothing to be done. Its cry is: "Italy for the Italians." "We will not share with foreigners the discovery of our historic past, even if it takes us a couple of centuries to recover it." Some years ago, with difficulty, the French School was allowed to excavate under Italian supervision in the great Etruscan necropolis at Vulci, and the German School at the temples of Alatri and Locri, but now this would be impossible. Even those Italian scholars whose views are more liberal have been hounded out of their positions for this reason. It has reached such a pass that private owners have been systematically refused the right to excavate their own land, apparently for fear

lest foreign scholars might profit by the discoveries. The government also, though not supported by the courts, applies to the whole Peninsula the obsolete "Pacca" law of the Papal States, because it is the strictest against excavations. Evidently the interests of science are not consulted, because the ancient sites are being gutted every year by speculators, peasants, and thieves, who destroy whatever they cannot conveniently carry off and usually dare not confess the place of discovery. The wholesale destruction, the irretrievable loss to science are lamentable, and the finger of scorn should be pointed at those who are responsible for it. Meanwhile, the impression grows on the public that ancient Italy is worked out. Far from that, scientific work has hardly begun in any but a few places beside Rome and some Etruscan and Sicilian sites. If the liberal policy which is so dear to the hearts of most Italians should prevail, and the coöperation of the foreign schools should be welcomed, it would be possible even now to excavate in certain regions, as along the coast line from Rome to the end of the bay of Naples, with the expectation of finding there an even greater wealth of art than now fills all the museums of Italy.

The Greek government has shown far greater liberality. Even after it quite naturally decided to disappoint other nations by not allowing the exportation of works of art found in the excavations, it extended its hearty coöperation to the Schools at Athens in all their undertakings. The era of excavations really opened in 1875, with a complete change of policy in the French School and with the activity of the Germans in connection with their newly established school. After Schliemann's success at Troy, and before his discoveries at Mykenae and Tiryns, came the uncovering of Olympia by the Germans under Curtius, assisted by Adler, Hirschfeld, Treu, and Dörpfeld. The "Hermes" of Praxiteles, the "Victory" of Alcámenes, the gable and metope sculptures of the Temple of Zeus,—the finest of all Greek

sculptures before the Parthenon,—the temples, treasure-houses, halls, and colonnades which were found there, aroused the greatest enthusiasm. Hardly had the novelty of these great finds died away when there followed the hardly less superb discoveries at Pergamon in Asia Minor under the leadership of Conze, assisted by Humann, Bohn, and others. Olympia had given us Greek art of the heroic age of the fifth century B. C. Pergamon showed what the Greeks could do in their last bloom after Alexander's time, when art was so dramatic and colossal. The great Altar is one of those masterpieces of sculptural composition on a large scale that affect art and imagination for centuries. Meanwhile Schliemann had been recovering the pre-Homeric age and setting the fashion for continuous effort in that direction, and the German School besides its main enterprises was doing yeoman's work through the Greek mainland, the islands, and Asia Minor.

First under Dumont and then under Foucart the French School had been carrying on many enterprises at the same time, excavating at Thespiæ, Elatea, Mantinea, Tigeia, Træzene, Nemea, Samos. But its four greatest sites have been Myrina in Asia Minor, Acræphiæ, Delos, and Delphi. As one of their directors expresses it: "A necropolis almost as rich as that of Tanagra and much more instructive because so scientifically explored; an entire city which was one of the great markets of antiquity, with its docks, its theatre, its streets and houses; three of the most ancient and sacred sanctuaries of Greece; the religious metropolis of the Ionians and that of the Dorians, this has been our share in the exploration of the Greek world." Of these four the excavations at Delphi alone stand in the same class as those of Olympia and Pergamon. The sculptures discovered there that belong to the crucial period of the hundred years before Phidias, form a series richer and more varied than any yet found and the famous colossal bronze "Charioteer" is one of the *chef d'œuvres* of early Greek art. Only in architecture has the result

been disappointing. We Americans have taken an especial interest in the work at Delphi, as it was a plum taken out of our mouth. While we were wrestling with the problem of raising the money France stepped in. It merely shows the advantage of enlightened government assistance in scientific research.

For so young an institution, with untrained men as its members, our own School at Athens has been very successful. After Sterrett's fruitful exploration in Asia Minor, almost each year has seen some excavations on the Greek mainland. Two of these stand out preëminently, the Argive Heræum and Corinth. The Heræum was the pre-Homeric sanctuary *par excellence*, whether Tiryns, Mykenae, or Argos were politically supreme, and the hopes of finding there works of art of many periods but illustrating particularly the beginnings of Greek civilization have been fully justified. Our campaign at Corinth has lasted three years, and has certainly disproved one current notion,—that the Greek city was destroyed when the Roman city was erected. But above all this work of research is the great fact that our school is giving to our choicest young classical scholars the highest and most inspiring atmosphere. They bring back to their work at home a new spirit as well as a great increase of knowledge. They will eventually occupy a large part of the chairs of Greek in our higher institutions, as the graduates of our Roman School will probably eventually occupy most of our chairs of Latin. Their increased realization of ancient life will react upon all the men who go through our institutions. At least, this has been the experience of Germany and France, and it cannot fail eventually to be ours, if we give our schools adequate support.

One other Greek school remains, the English. It was long a puzzle among students that England should have taken no steps toward establishing any schools. No nation had shown as early or as strong a zeal in studying and obtaining works of classic art and in making known Greek architecture and sculpture. Perhaps

the very strength of this artistic appreciation on the one hand and the very solidity of their classical literary tradition on the other, gave Englishmen a sense of self-sufficiency that made them blind to their deficiencies in pure archæological science. Schools seemed unnecessary to their training. The consequence has been in many cases an astonishing insularity, a lack of acquaintance with current scientific facts. This has shown plainly in every variety of published matter until within the last ten years. It has been a good object lesson of what France and Germany might have been without their schools. But now the gap is being closed, not only by the English School at Athens but by the exploration funds, often connected with their school, which are so splendid an example of organized liberality. There have been the "Palestine Exploration Fund," the "Cyprus Exploration Fund," and, above all, the "Egypt Exploration Fund." These correspond to the French government's "*Caisse des Musées*," to their credits for "Missions," to the "Piot" Fund of the Academy,—all governmental and official grants, which illustrate the different methods in vogue in the different countries. The Latin idea is to have the government do everything; our own is to leave everything to private initiative. Between these two extremes are the Germans who stand closest to France and Italy and give but little scope to individual effort; and the English who do not entirely exclude the assistance of the government support or museums and other institutions but rely principally on their wealthy men and educational organizations.

But, to return to the English School. It is still in its probationary stage and has wisely refrained from any very extensive enterprise. However, the increasing quality of its work is shown by the *Journal of Hellenic Studies* and if English services in classical archæology still fall short of its grand achievements in Oriental spheres, it is probable that this remark will soon call for revision.

This leads us back to Oriental discovery. After the heroic

age of Assyrian digging had closed it became evident that the origins of this culture must be studied further south, in Babylonia which had a history of as many thousands as Assyria had hundreds of years. The Assyrian copies of the Babylonian libraries only whetted curiosity. To our Philadelphia Expedition belongs the honor of unearthing for the first time, at Nippur, the library of a great Babylonian city, as it was left after being burned by the Elamite invaders in c. 2200 B. C. The brick books from its shelves will probably afford material sufficient to occupy most Assyriologists desirous of laying before us the primitive epics, legends, myths, scientific and historic records of the Orient. With due regard for what the site still promises to yield this discovery appears one of the most important,—perhaps the most important,—for early human history. Already it has enabled Dr. Hilprecht to lay the foundations of a scientific history of Babylonian cuneiform palæography based on the earliest written documents yet known, and Babylonian architecture is being enriched by a series of buildings covering a period of four or five thousand years. This American success has undoubtedly spurred the French to resume their very fruitful work at Telloh, where they found the most extensive series of early Babylonian sculptures and the completest royal palace. The Germans, after several tentative efforts have begun an undertaking at Babylon itself which promises to be gigantic either as a failure or a success. The inaccessibility of the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates will always prevent the establishment on the spot of any Schools by Europeans or Americans. The nearest available centre of operations would be Beirout or some other point along the Syrian seaboard and here we Americans are taking the lead in establishing a School that is to be affiliated with the Archæological Institute in the same way as the Schools at Athens and Rome. The Germans, who have so large a body of University men finely trained in Oriental languages and antiquities, have decided to direct

operations from Berlin, through an Oriental committee, which achieved its first success in opening up at Sindjirli in Syria the first known ruins of the great Hittite civilization. France has grandly upheld her traditions in Western Asia, with governmental expeditions that have done the most to make known monuments of pure art and archæology as distinguished from literary remains. Such were the Persian excavations under Dieulafoy at Susa, which are being resumed in order to reach the earlier, or Susian stage; those of M. de Sarzec; the missions of M. de Morgan in the Caucasus, Armenia, and Elam, and of M. Chantre in Asia Minor.

Still, the greatest of all French fields has been Northern Africa. There France has no rivals in her own domains of Algeria and Tunisia, which are so profusely dotted with the ruins of Roman cities. It is curious that the intelligent officers of the French army should have had so large a share in making known the cities built by the engineers and architects attached to the Roman army of occupation. In Egypt, France and England have always been rivals, but while England has obtained political supremacy France has retained archæological management of museums and monuments. Perhaps the most fruitful work has been done for the Egypt Exploration Fund and by independent English workers like Flinders-Petrie at Bubastis, Naukratis, Deir-el-Bahari, etc. But to the French is due the discovery of the royal tombs, with their superb contents, and of late the monuments of the earliest dynasties and even of the age preceeding the welding of Egypt into a single Kingdom. A large share of the credit belongs to the only School in Cairo, the French *Mission*, with its superb publications. Fitly enough the mass of results of all Egyptian discoveries has been embodied in a monumental historic work by that leader of French Egyptologists, Maspero. Until recently most of the mummy wrappings and other papyri found in Egyptian diggings were thrown aside but now these are not only carefully preserved but scholars like Grenfell, Hunt, and Mahaffy

make special expeditions every year for their discovery. The reason is that they contain such rich and varied literary material. More than one famous Greek author lost to us because neglected by mediæval monastic copyists, is being resurrected through these papyri, which promise us in future the greatest novelties in Greek and early Christian literature.

Crete and Asia Minor are now the centres of interest in the classic field. We Americans recognized several years ago how important for Greek origins were the ancient sites of the island of Crete, with the hundred walled cities sung by Homer. In those days,—only six or seven years ago,—Crete still groaned under Turkish rule, and the best efforts of its best explorer, Halbherr, made on behalf of our Archæological Institute, did not compass even one thorough excavation, owing to the refusal of the Turkish governor. Still his discoveries, now being published in the *Journal of Archæology*, were far-reaching and important. But now that the island is free archæologists are flocking there. During the past season, Evans, discoverer of the now famous early Cretan systems of writing, Halbherr and other Italians, as well as the French, have been proving what was already foreshadowed, that in Crete we find in its purest form and in all its historic and racial phases that Mediteranean civilization,—Pelasgic and Achæan,—that culminated in Tiryns and Mykenae. We now see that Homer sings of the closing years of a culture that dates back of the “Trojan War” at least for fifteen hundred years. Crete is found to be covered with ruined Pelasgic cities, surrounded by gigantic polygonal walls, crowned by acropoli, adorned with royal palaces, defended by forts, connected by artificial highways, and with necropoli of vaulted tombs like those discovered by Schliemann at Mykenae. Already the royal palaces and libraries are being unearthed at Cnossos and “Goulâs” with sculptures and decoration of the most novel description and early date. A literature in an unknown tongue and in undeciphered

scripts is being found, to puzzle scholars as much perhaps as the Hittite and Etruscan languages. Some day these "Pelagic" documents will disclose the secrets of a neglected civilization and fill up the gap between early Eastern and Hellenic cultures.

Alexandria and Antioch being extinct, even as to ruins, we had long looked to Asia Minor for details of the life and art of that interesting Greco-Roman period after Alexander when the centres of Greek activity were outside of Greece itself. Only during the last three or four years has the success attained at Pergamon been followed up and the era of exploration been definitively succeeded by that of excavation—not of single monuments such as the Mausoleum at Halicarnassus, or the Temple of Diana at Ephesus, but of entire cities. Priene, Ephesus, Magnesia, and others are emerging with their walls, streets, wharves, and warehouses, private houses, religious and political meeting-places, theatres, market-places and colonnades, sacred enclosures, fountains, memorial monuments, and inscriptions. Not only is it possible to reconstruct, as at Priene, the entire detailed plan of the city, but to reconstitute its political life, internal organization and diplomatic relations, through the discovery of its inscribed records. Germany has been doing the lion's share of the work, but Austria and France are both taking part.

While we are awaiting the heralded resumption of excavation in the Roman Catacombs, there have been two regions where discoveries in monuments of Early Christian art have been recently made,—Northern Africa and Syria. In both cases the Arab invasion of the seventh century is responsible for their ancient destruction and present preservation. Rich series of early churches and of works of Byzantine military architecture have been recovered and studied. They were unknown less because buried than because in regions untrodden by former explorers. It is to Frenchmen, again, that we owe this work, which has furnished so many new types to the historian of archi-

itecture and decoration. We Americans have added our mite very recently in a very thorough survey of the ruined Christian cities and monasteries of Northern and Central Syria, with the first full series of photographs yet taken.

In fine, although no part of the broad field is being neglected the themes in which most progress is now being made are: the origins of civilization in Babylonia, Egypt, and Hellenic lands and the primitive connections between them; the archaic art of Greece; the civic, diplomatic, and social antiquities of the Greco-Roman world, especially in Asia Minor; the recovery of Greek literature and documents relating to Roman civic life and Christian antiquities. In these fields work will probably be concentrated for a number of years, though should the Italian government adopt a more liberal policy there would almost certainly be an enthusiastic attempt to open up the now little known history of Italy before the Roman supremacy, hidden in several hundred well-marked sites of ancient cities, most of them "Pelagic," in as good or better preservation than Tiryns and Mykenae. Our Roman School, still in its tentative stage and trammelled by present restrictions, would then find its true vocation.

It is both easier and harder to describe the share taken by the Schools in the present archæological work; for it is no longer by the actual record of things technically performed by the Schools as organizations that their influence should be computed. Ever since the Schools first organized archæology as a science they have been determining its principles, both theoretical and practical, in text-books and histories on the one side and in methods of field-work on the other. They have published corpuses of monuments; organized and filled museums; established courses of instruction; spurred on governmental and private generosity; created an interested public. It would be difficult to say what discoveries made by private or government initiative were not at bottom due to the influence and action of the Schools.

In all this present work national pride and feeling are becoming more and more prominent factors ; stimulating as it is to effort and multiplying agencies this feeling becomes obnoxious only when, as in the case of French and German scholars, it makes friendly coöperation impossible. Americans labor under three great disadvantages in the race : distance from all fields of study ; almost complete absence of archæological instruction in our institutions ; and lack of organized and centralized direction of work, which is left too much to chance and individual caprice. It is, therefore, in the development of our three Schools that our hopes for the future must lie, for they alone can overcome these disadvantages.



AP
2
I75
v.2

The International quarterly

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY
